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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this research study is to examine the impact of Saudi Arabian culture on corporate 
governance (CG) and its regulatory compliance with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ 
interests. The protection of minority shareholders is a primary concern in the area of CG and 
particularly as defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
principles. In Saudi Arabia, CG is a newly introduced regime. Its set of CG principles was initially 
issued after the first market crash in 2006, which signified the need for appropriate CG standards in 
Saudi Arabia because minority shareholders suffered catastrophic losses. Moreover, CG legislation in 
Saudi Arabia is still slowly moving from voluntary to obligatory because family-owned firms, which is 
the dominant form of incorporation, are stifling corporate growth by their reluctance to open their 
equity to outside shareholders,as argued by the OECD report of Koldertsova (2011). Hence, the 
conceptual framework for understanding how Saudi Culture affects minorities is based upon 
Hofstede’s (1980-2010) Cultural Value Dimension (CVD) model linking societal constructs with the 
legal and political milieu. Thus, this research sets out to examine this link in relevance to Saudi 
Culture. In addition, this undertaking will extend, via the second research question, to uncover other 
factors, such as the legal and political, influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations 
with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholder rights. 
The findings of this study provides significant correlations between each of Hofstede’s CVDs: 
Individualism, PowerDistance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Femininity, and Long Term Orientation and 
the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights as defined by the OECD’s principles of CG 
in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the distribution of each CV dimension was found not to be the same when 
comparing groups of Majority and Minority shareholders. Hence, the significant correlations expose 
two different subcultures: an active culture pertaining to Majority shareholders and a passive culture 
pertaining to Minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the current legal environment guiding 
the CG procedures in Saudi Arabia was found to attach a low level of significance to minority 
shareholders in terms of: ease of litigation, establishment of specialised courts, appointment of 
competent qualified judges in CG commercial cases, and creation of awareness programmes for 
minority shareholders’ rights. In addition, the lack of a solid constitution was found to weaken popular 
pressure to safeguard shareholders' rights and promote a block-holding model of corporate control. 
Hence, due to governmental institutions falling short on their responsibilities, Saudi controlling 
families can practically be considered as an institution, as indicated by Institutional Theory, and this 
familial institution is likely to continue to manifest itself in the governance of emerging economic 
systems such as Saudi Arabia's as its survival is dependent on the institutional context. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Overview of the Study    
 
Chapter One: Introduction and Overview of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
The dominant western perspective, as articulated by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(2000), is that the legal system is crucial in understanding the role of corporate governance (CG) in 
protecting minority shareholders’ rights.  In addition, the role of CG in protecting minority 
shareholders’ rights is often viewed in light of Agency Theory, the dominant theory used in accounting 
literature where relationships are defined as a nexus of interpersonal contracts, which in the area of CG 
is assumed to exist between investors and managers (La Porta et al., 2000). Where minority rights are 
strongly protected in law, this theory illuminates many of the problems confronted by firms and their 
investors (La Porta et al., 2000).  
However, Agency Theory breaks down where there is a lack of homogeneity in organisational 
structures and the interests of individual stakeholder groups, as found worldwide (Crossland & 
Hambrick, 2007). For example, the dominance of family controlled corporations around the world, 
especially in emerging markets such as Asia, calls for a new theory to investigate the concerns of 
minority shareholders in those markets. Hence, exploring the agency theory conflict of relationships 
from a cultural perspective might suggest to be more universally applicable (Crossland & Hambrick, 
2007). "Efforts to change corporate governance practices around the world are best informed by an 
appreciation of cultural as well as institutional factors" (Daniel, Cieslewicz & Pourjalali, 2012). 
Even though law practitioners and scholars seem to overlook the importance of culture on laws and 
enforcement, there is a growing awareness among them regarding the relevance of national cultures to 
CG practices around the world. This can be clearly seen in the recent, but still little, amount of work 
that has been done in CG in relation to cross cultural psychology by law practitioners. "As cultural 
values shape and inform  people's internal utility functions, the theory of cultural value dimensions 
takes social norms analysis one step ahead…by providing an empirically validated framework with 
which to account for social phenomena that are otherwise difficult to reconcile with standard micro-
economic predictions" (Licht, 2001). 
Hence, Cultural Theory of CG, based on the CVD framework, has addressed fundamental issues like 
shareholding structures, the regulations of self dealing, insider trading and disclosure in previous 
research, such as La Porta et al., (1999; 2000; 2002). Moreover, the findings of Licht et al. (2005) 
present a strong association between statutory law and culture, specifically in the context of CG in the 
area of investor protection. 
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1.2 Research Problem 
In Saudi Arabia, Corporate governance is a newly introduced regime. Its set of CG principles was 
initially issued in 2006, after the first market crash in 2006, as this crash signified the need for 
appropriate CG standards in Saudi Arabia (Al-Zahrani, 2013). After the first and second market 
crashes in 2006 and 2008 (Al-Twaijry, 2012), adherence to CG principles was made obligatory in 2010 
(Al-Zahrani, 2013). Nevertheless, CG legislation in Saudi Arabia is still slowly moving from voluntary 
to obligatory because family-owned firms, as argued by Koldertsova (2011), are stifling corporate 
growth by their reluctance to open their equity to outside shareholders.  
The dominant form of incorporation, in Saudi Arabia, is a family-controlled block holding and such 
corporations are slowing the growth of the CG’s regulatory compliance framework (Koldertsova, 
2011). Minority shareholders have suffered catastrophic losses from initial Public Offers,in 2006 and 
2008, and Saudi CG regulations are still adhered to on a 'comply or explain basis' (Al-Zahrani, 2013). 
As a result, protections for Saudi shareholders, "even in accordance with SCL [Saudi Company Law of 
1965] are weak; this law does not provide shareholders with all the rights that they should enjoy. Thus, 
minority shareholders are often subject to the control of majority shareholders, who are generally in 
charge of the company’s management"(Al-Zahrani, 2013). Hence, the protection of minority 
shareholders (being those who do not have a controlling influence in the firm) is a primary concern in 
the area of CG and particularly as defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) principles. 
Limited literature is available in regard to the link between available cultural models (for example, 
Hofstede, 1980) and the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG. Thus, this research sets out to examine this link in relevance to Saudi Culture. 
In addition, this undertaking will extend, via the second research question, to unveil other factors, such 
as the legal and political, influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations with the 
OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholder rights. Potential findings will 
contribute to understanding of the influence of cultural values on CG practices across countries of 
similar culture, with particular reference to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. 
In addition, it should be noted that the complexity of the Saudi political, legal and religious 
environments need to be navigated with great care and in the discussion of this thesis – the researcher 
is endeavoring to be a fair writer to the truth while recognising differences in views. 
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1.3 Motivation for the Topic 
“We needed people with vision prepared to make investment in governance because the long term 
returns are worth it” (Deane, 2006). Research into the field of Corporate Governance (CG) has gained 
prominence not only for the sake of producing accurate financial data, but also in promoting 
responsible work ethics for healthier work and social environments. CG is no longer a voluntary 
process handled solely by participating companies, but rather has transcended into a compulsory 
compliance regime driven by national governmental agencies and sophisticated global stakeholders 
(Talamo, 2011). Previously, CG was considered an externally imposed obligation for listing and 
continuation. However, care shall be exercised by the researcher when compliance for the sake of 
‘legitimacy’ in the form of ‘de-coupling’ is witnessed due to prevailing cultural aspects affecting the 
process of compliance with OECD principles pertaining to minority shareholders. De-coupling is “a 
separation between external image [pretentious compliance] and actual structures and procedures 
[benefiting major shareholders] (Weick, 1976; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1992)” 
(Hoque, 2006, p.187).  
In addition, Rossouw and Sison (2006) state, “corporate governance regimes around the world shaped 
by different sets of cultural values, are also divided with regard to the question: for whose benefit 
should corporations be governed?”  Therefore, legal and political factors should be considered when 
undertaking such research to unveil other factors influencing the level of compliance of listed 
corporations with CG principles pertaining to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. 
Nevertheless, it should be clear that corporate governance is “to a large extent, a set of mechanisms 
through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders: managers and 
controlling shareholders” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2001). Therefore, principles 
of CG raised in the Cadbury report and legislated in the OECD prinicples of 2004 have been put in 
place by the international accounting profession to ensure that a high level of compliance with CG 
standards is capable of protecting all types of shareholders.  
However, such protection have not been intangibly noticed nor tangibly witnessed by the researcher in 
Saudi Arabia before and after the market crashes of 2006 and 2008. Moreover, the impact of Saudi 
culture on CG has not been thoroughly researched in terms of protecting minority shareholders’ 
interests in a highly-networked market of a developing country such as Saudi Arabia. 
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1.4 Theoretical Framework: 
The association between economic development and national cultures is becoming increasingly 
important. It has been investigated whether or not national cultures’ distinctive traits can explain the 
variations in the "resource allocation efficiency" and "wealth distribution" in worldwide societies 
(Dodor & Rana, 2007). In fact, Dodor and Rana (2007) found that their statistical results confirmed the 
argument that culture traits do matter in economic development when national cultural dimensions 
such as Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity, and Long Term 
Orientation are used.  
Hence, Cultural Value Dimension (CVD) models such as Hofstede (1980) promise to advance our 
understanding of the relations between social norms, culture, and law (Licht, 2000). Moreover, value 
dimension frameworks such as Hofstede’s (1980) are capable of providing a rigorously suitable means 
to explore the causality between national cultures and the quality of the application of CG principles. 
Not only that, but it also “provides a theory-driven, universally validated operationalisation of 
fundamental societal orientations and enables us to derive and empirically test hypothesis about 
relations between national culture and corporate governance” (Breuer & Salzmann, 2012). In fact, the 
findings of Licht et al. (2005) present a strong association between statutory law and culture, 
specifically in the context of CG in the area of investor protection. 
In addition, the effect of a national culture on the application of CG principles is in part due to cultural 
values motivating policy makers and special interest groups to preferably undertake specific corporate 
governance arrangements (Breuer & Salzmann, 2012). These arrangements are more likely to be 
correspondents to dominant cultural values. For instance, feminine orientated cultures are more 
inclined to improve their CG than highly masculine ones on the basis of their care for others. 
Therefore, it is expected that “high masculinity societies are less likely to protect minority 
shareholders” (Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li & Shao, 2014). 
Hence, Hofstede’s (1980) CVD model has the explanatory power to unveil differences in CG 
worldwide, reflecting prevailing cultural values (Chan & Cheung, 2012). Specifically, it is common to 
realise weak minority shareholders protection and a low level of CG compliance in emerging markets 
characterised as high on Power Distance, Collectivism, Uncertainty Avoidance and Masculinity (Rafiee 
& Sarabdeen, 2012). In fact, the nature of causality is found to be long term driven and responsible for 
shaping institutions and CG practises (Williamson, 2000; Licht, 2000). Therefore, there is no doubt 
that “national culture is an essential determinant for the design of corporate governance systems" 
(Breuer & Salzmann, 2012).For example, as noted by the OECD report of 2011 by Koldertsova, "the 
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disclosure-averse culture in the [Middle East and North Africa] region, where controlling shareholders 
have often been reluctant to divulge operational or financial details of their business, has contributed to 
the general lack of transparency in the corporate sector”.   
Moreover, the institutional environment is found to mediate the relationship between national cultures 
and CG (Daniel, Cieslewicz & Pourjalali, 2012). Specifically, the four Hofstede dimensions: 
Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, Future Orientation and Performance Orientation, are found 
positively related to the institutional environment in any given society (Daniel et al. 2012).  The 
empirical findings of Daniel et al. (2012) show how certain cultural components impact CG indirectly 
through their influence on the elements composing the institutional environment.  Daniel et al.’s study 
also implies that CG regimes around the world should reflect the cultural values of a given society in 
order to operate efficiently. Otherwise, policy makers will misleadingly keep on implementing CG 
codes of best practice superficially without adjusting the institutional environment to support further 
improvements in accordance with prevailing cultural values (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008; Denis & 
McConnell, 2003; Mintz, 2005; Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997; Young, Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2004). 
The legal environment can be seen as a potential agency cost as it serves the purpose of powerful 
parties at the expense of others. In fact, in a mathematically-theoretical study set to uncover the 
relationship between this type of agency cost and how it operates in relation to concentration of 
ownership and control, it was found that this cost was as real as any other costs (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). "The level of agency costs depends, among other things, on statutory and common law and 
human ingenuity in devising contracts"(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In fact, this agency cost is very 
recognisable in listed Saudi corporations as their issues with CG compliance and disclosure procedures 
partially stem from the highly concentrated ownership structures found within these corporations 
(Koldertsova, 2011; Al-Zuhair, 2008). Moreover, the determinants promoting or influencing these 
concentrated ownership structures in Saudi Arabia are not clear: families own 75% of listed 
companies, while government and individual founders own just 25% of listed companies (Al-Zuhair, 
2008). In addition, CG legislation in Saudi Arabia is still slowly moving from voluntary to obligatory 
as family-owned firms, as argued by Koldertsova (2011), are stifling corporate growth by their 
reluctance to open their equity to outside shareholders. 
In addition to that, the political literature on CG is seen as the bridge between the legal rules and 
economic developments. Hence, some political theories have been proposed to explain CG. For 
instance, Pagano and Volpin (2005) analyse the political determinants of investor protection and 
propose a model of the political determinants of the degree of shareholders’ protection using a sample 
of 45 countries plus the 21 OCED countries of 2005. Their findings revealed the following: 
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1. Under Proportional Voting Systems, winning majority votes means winning the election, the 
political consequence is a low degree of shareholder protection. Nevertheless, this proportional 
voting system provides, “a high degree of employment protection-benefiting entrepreneurs and 
workers and damaging outside shareholders" (Pagano & Volpin, 2005). 
 
2. Under Majoritarian Voting Systems, winning more districts means winning the election; the 
political outcome is a high degree of shareholder protection and low employment protection. 
Hence, legislation features strong investor protection which leads to an outcome preferred by 
outside shareholders. 
 
Pagano and Volpin explain the rationale of their proposed model as, "company law can be changed by 
politicians easily any time: having a political economy model can formalize the behaviour of voters 
and politicians in response to the economic interest as well as their ideologies" (2005). Moreover, once 
the concentrated ownership structure transforms into Crony capitalism, uniting both the political and 
the economic powers, the effect of the law becomes minimal (Coffee, 2001). On the other hand, once 
the private sector adopts good governance, it will consequently “generate credible signals that 
investors’ rights will be protected, then an equity market can arise, and in time protective legislation 
will predictably follow" (Coffee, 2001). 
Thus, given that the linkage between CG and performance is dependent on the cultural, legal, political 
and institutional environment of the country concerned, and given the secrecy that surrounds the 
dissemination of corporate power in Saudi Arabia, quantitative data on compliance is of a very low 
level and of dubious quality.  For example, the empirical relationships between the mechanics of 
internal CG (board of directors and audit committee characteristics) and performance noted in 
international studies are not found in listed Saudi corporations (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, Fadzil & Al-
Matari, 2012). In addition, the internal audit function, as a CG mechanism, is found to be concentrated 
on compliance rather than on performance auditing in Saudi listed corporations, which is designed to 
enhance organisational legitimacy at the cost of market development (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & 
Gwilliam, 2003). 
 Interestingly, the most important piece of information disclosed by most Saudi corporations is the 
names of powerful individuals in management or in ownership. This is due to the characteristics of the 
Saudi society in significantly valuing taking prestige from the power of particular individuals, whilst 
the role of the family is characterised by a high level of secrecy that dominates the regulatory system 
and the flow of financial information (Al-Nodel & Hussainey, 2010). Moreover, cosmetic accounting 
practices are common among Saudi listed corporations and unfortunately audit firms comply with their 
corporate clients’ wishes to appear professional and stay in business (Al-Moataz, 2012). 
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Therefore, it is safer to pursue potential research qualitatively, bearing in mind the assumption that 
“corporate governance regimes around the world shaped by different sets of cultural values, are also 
divided with regard to the question: for whose benefit should corporations be governed” (Rossouw, 
2009). Hence, factors other than culture, such as the legal and political factors, are crucial to consider 
as they are found significantly reflective of cultural hierarchies in worldwide comparative studies of 
minority rights (La Porta et al., 2008; Gourevitch, Pinto & Weymouth, 2010; and Bebchuk, Cohen & 
Wang, 2013). 
1.5 Research Aims 
The aim of this research is to examine the impact of Saudi Arabian culture on CG and regulatory 
compliance with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ interests. The conceptual 
framework for understanding how Saudi Culture affects minorities is based upon Hofstede’s cultural 
model, linking societal constructs with the legal and political milieu. 
1.6 Research Questions 
Note: As noted by the OECD report of 2011 by Koldertsova,"the disclosure-averse culture in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where controlling shareholders have often been 
reluctant to divulge operational or financial details of their business, has contributed to the general lack 
of transparency in the corporate sector". Hence, my research questions are: 
 
1- To what extent do available cultural models (for example, Hofstede, 2010) explain the quality 
of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia? 
 
2- What other factors influence the level of compliance of listed Saudi Corporations with the 
OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights? 
 
1.7 Scope of the Study 
The scope of this research study is limited to the conceptual frameworks stemming from the literature 
review conducted. A review of the literature has provided that cultural, legal and political factors are to 
be considered when assessing the strength or weaknesses of any minority shareholders' protection 
regime worldwide. Hence, rather than seeking an understanding of the factors influencing the level of 
compliance of listed Saudi Corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of 
minority shareholder rights from scratch, critical variable-constructs were chosen from the literature 
review phase.  
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Nevertheless, even though some of the conceptual framework adopted for this study is based on prior 
studies in different contexts, this present research utilises prior studies' concepts in a multi-dimensional 
framework tailored for the Saudi cultural, legal and political enivroments. Hence, only applicable 
variable-constructs from the literature review were chosen to provide a means of comparison between 
countries of similar culture to Saudi Arabia, in terms of the legal and political factors to be considered 
when assessing the strength or weaknesses of a minority shareholder protection regime. 
The key stakeholders identified for this study's quantitative phase are Majority, Sophisticated, Minority 
and Non-shareholders of the 161 listed Saudi corporations identified via trading room managers of 
designated banks were the survey took place. In addition, further internal testing by the researcher was 
carried on the level of information possessed by participants to justify the classifications, previously 
aided by the trading room managers (as it became apparent to the researcher that listed corporations 
tend to inform major investors of their rights more than less-financially significant investors such as 
minorities). Moreover, the questionnaire was used to validate the literal conceptual framework aimed 
at measuring the CVD of Saudi shareholders and explore the perceptions of Saudi shareholders 
regarding the factors influencing their investments. 
In addition, the key stakeholders for this study's qualitative phase are commercial lawyers and ex-
legislators, which are in line with prior studies' type of targeted stakeholders. The purpose of the 
qualitative phase was to explore the attitudes, beliefs, and experiences of those stakeholders in regard 
to the legal and political factors influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations’ with 
the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholder rights. 
1.8 Research Justification 
A primary motive for conducting this research study is the lack of a comprehensive multi-dimensional 
model showing how culture affects the rights of minorityshareholders based upon available cultural 
models such as Hofstede’s, linking societal constructs with the legal and political milieu. There have 
been a number of studies designed to consider the factors affecting minority shareholders’ rights. 
Nevetheless, these same studies have only limited their focuses to either a cultural theoretical 
framework without conducting a quantitative analysis, or focused solely on legal or political reasons. 
Moreover, none of these prior studies have examined the impact of Saudi Arabian culture on corporate 
governance and regulatory compliance with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ 
interests. Neither has any prior study contributed to understanding of the influence of cultural values 
on corporate governance practices across countries of similar culture with particular reference to the 
protection of minority shareholder rights. 
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Therefore, this study comprehensively addresses this knowledge gap by devising a conceptual 
framework, incorporating cultural, legal, and political factors, contributing to either the strengths or 
weaknesses of a minority shareholders' protection regime as a case study.  Hence, this framework will 
contribute to a greater understanding of the influence of cultural values on CG practices across 
countries of similar culture with particular reference to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. 
Therefore, this is the first study to be conducted in such a context. 
1.9 Research Methodology 
There is no single research methodology that is better than any other (Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead, 
1987). Hence, after developing the conceptual framework via a traditional literature review, a research 
design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative approaches was chosen to achieve the overall 
aim of this research. Both methodological approaches were employed in succession. Hence, results of 
the quantitative phase partially informed the qualitative phase; however, its variable constructs were 
mainly derived from the relevant literature. The logic behind the employment of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods was due to initially avoiding a common method bias, and eventually ensuring 
potentially emergent insights from the quantitative phase to be included into the variables of the 
qualitative phase. In addition, the qualitative phase is meant to corroborate the quantative phase of this 
study. 
The quantitative data analysis phase aimed to achieve the first objective of the study, which is to 
explore the extent that available cultural models (for example Hofstede, 1980) can explain the quality 
of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights as defined by the OECD principles in Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, the quantitative data were analysed using both descriptive analysis followed by inferential 
analysis via the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. 
In succession to the quantitative phase, a qualitative approach was employed to achieve the second 
objective of this research, which is to investigate other factors, legal and political, influencing the level 
of compliance of listed Saudi Corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights. Therefore, the ethnographic approach pertaining to the concept of thick 
description was employed to help explain both the behavior and its context (Greetz, 1973).  
Moreover, the qualitative data analysis was then performed, initially using a functional analysis 
process followed by an interpretive analysis process designed to analyzethe data produced by the semi-
structured interviews (Schulz, 2012). Coding and themes were pre-constructed via the literature 
review. Hence, there was no need to use a qualitative software or a manual technique to establish them. 
Nevertheless, a few emergent themes were captured through the relational analysis regarding new 
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concepts. Relational analysis is a part of the interpretive analysis involved in identifying concepts and 
exploring relationships between concepts. 
1.10 Contribution of Research 
This research contributes to understanding of the influence of cultural values on CG practices across 
countries of similar culture with particular reference to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights.   
The protection of minority shareholders (being those who do not have a controlling influence in the 
firm) is a primary concern in the area of CG, particularly as defined by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles. 
Hence, this is the first study that investigates the OECD principles of CG pertaining to the rights of 
minority shareholders from a cultural perspective using Hofstede’s (2010) CVD model. Moreover, this 
study unveils significant correlations between each of Hofstede’s CVDs and the quality of the exercise 
of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD principles, in Saudi Arabia. In addition, this 
study explores in depth the legal and political factors influencing the level of compliance of listed 
Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ 
rights. In fact, this study is the first attempt to look into the issue of minority shareholders’ rights 
stemming from the legal and political factors in Saudi Arabia from a CG perspective.  
Overall, this study provides a multi-dimensional framework for assessing CG regimes in developing 
countries such as Saudi Arabia in light of minority shareholders’ rights by integrating cultural, legal, 
and political factors.  
 
Figure: 1.1 
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Such integration is motivated by the gaps found between those disciplines in the relevant CG literature. 
For example, cultural theory of CG based on the CVD framework has addressed fundamental issues 
pertaining to minority shareholders such as shareholding structures, the regulations of self dealing, 
insider trading and disclosure in previous research. Hence, Hofstede's (2010) CVD model will account 
for social norms and their relations with the law in terms of CG as it has been suggested to be 
beneficial (Licht, 2001). Thus, value dimension models such as Hofstede’s (1984) offer the promise of 
advancing understanding of the relations between social norms, culture, and law (Licht, 2000). 
Moreover, the legal scholars are focused on the dichotomy between dispersed and concentrated 
ownership structure. Hence, they view the legal protection for minority shareholders as the significant 
variable underlying the growth of 'viable' securities markets (Coffee, 1999). Hence, facilitating a 
dispersed ownership structure is more likely to produce desirable social and political consequences in 
the long run (Coffee, 1999). In addition, politics shape the laws and conditions under which companies 
operate (Gourevitch, 2003). Moreover, managers and owners around the world behave differently, 
assuming identical bodies of law, depending on various claims derived from politics (Gourevitch, 
2003).  Hence, politics should be integrated into the way such disciplines as law, economics, sociology 
and culture can explain governance on a country case basis (Gourevitch, 2003). 
“The various authors in this debate know too much to deny altogether the relevance of each others’ variables: 
Politics, law, judges, the role of the state, norms, private mechanisms, and path dependence appear in all of their 
writings. They differ in how these variables act in a causal sequence and how they are privileged relatively in a 
model" (Gourevitch, 2003). 
 
 Therefore, future researchers can take advantage of a multi-dimensional approach for further CG 
studies in developing countries.   
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1.11 Thesis Chapters: 
Figure 1.2 
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1.12 Thesis structure 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters, which have been structured as follows:  
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
This chapter presents the research background, motivation for the topic, the research problem, and a 
justification for the research. The two research questions mapping the research objectives are 
established along with a clarification of the scope of the study. Brief explanations of the research 
theoretical framework, research methodology, and significance of the research are outlined. 
 
CHAPTER TWO: SAUDI ARABIA CG FRAMWORK 
This chapter introduces the CG legal and regulatory framework in Saudi Arabia. It outlines the historic 
and current efforts to reform the CG regime in Saudi Arabia. This chapter identifies the key players in 
the development of the CG regime in Saudi Arabia. The chapter begins with an overview of the CG 
legal system.  
 
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter outlinesthree sections of results of the traditional literature review process, namely: the 
culture, legal, and political sections. Comprehensive reviews of relevant studies, stemming mostly 
from formal literature and partially from grey literature, are discussed. This chapter draws attention to 
the main debates concerning the rights of minority shareholders among cultural, legal, and political 
scholars and identifies gaps in the relevant literature in this regard.  
 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This chapter presents the main theories employed by this research and the methodologies employed to 
investigate the theoretical framework. Justification for the use of an interpretive case study approach as 
well as the two-data collections approaches, quantitative and qualitative, are illustrated. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: QUANTITATIVE PHASE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the quantitative phase and illustrates the adopted 
statistical analysis techniques. Also, this chapter details preliminary analysis carried out initially, 
descriptive analysis, and the inferential statistical analysis of each hypothesis testing regarding the 
cultural factors along with their appropriate techniques. Then, this chapter ends by discussing the 
findings of the quantitative phase with reference to relevant studies identified in the literature. 
 
CHAPTER SIX:  QUALITATIVE PHASE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents the results of the qualitative phase and details the analysis of the interviews along 
with techniques used in the process. Also, the chapter highlights insights relating to legal and political 
factors. Finally, this chapter concludes by discussing the findings of the qualitative phase with 
reference to relevant studies identified in the literature. 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION  
This chapter presents the overall conclusion of the thesis with a particular reference to both research 
questions. Also, this chapter illuminates the contributions of this research. Moreover, the chapter ends 
by highlighting the limitations of this research study along with its implications for policy makers, and 
future research.  
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2. Chapter Two: Saudi Arabian CG Framework 
Introduction: 
In order to answer the second research question of this thesis regarding the other factors such as the 
legal that influence the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations, a walk through the CG legal 
and regulatory framework in Saudi Arabia is considered appropriate at this stage of this thesis’s 
development. Hence, the aim of this chapter is to outline the historic and current efforts to reform the 
CG regime in Saudi Arabia, and identify the key players in the development of the CG regime in Saudi 
Arabia. Hence, such proceeding will contribute largely to the following chapter, chapter 3: literature 
review, regarding the legal literature in terms of what the Saudi legal environment is lacking to 
improve its CG legal framework. 
The Saudi accounting profession is relatively young compared to western accounting professions. The 
time of its birth dates the period of 1950 to 1965 and foreign licensed firms began work in the country 
after 1955 (Al-Zaid, 2012). However, due to the lack of an existing accounting body in Saudi Arabia to 
monitor these foreign audit firms’ performance, the audit profession was left with no clear identity (Al-
Angari, 2004). This was until 1965 when the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry (SMCI) issued 
the Saudi Company Act of 1965, which required all companies to prepare their financial statements 
and submit them to chartered public accounting firms (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003). Hence, the Saudi 
Company Act of 1965 was the first obligatory legislation to require the auditing of Saudi companies’ 
financial statements and to monitor the audit practice. Subsequently, in 1968, the SMCI established a 
set of requirements for audit firms, such as qualifications and years of experience (Al-Angari, 2004). 
During this period, King Saud University established a department of Accountancy which played a 
crucial role in establishing and improving the level of accounting education in Saudi Arabia and 
initiated the foundation of the Saudi Accounting Association (SAA) (Al-Angari, 1999). Consequently, 
in 1999, the Saudi Organisation of Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) was established by a royal 
decree, No m/12, and authorised new regulations for Saudi chartered public accountants. The decree 
also prescribed that SOCPA should operate under the supervision of SMCI (SOCPA, 2015). 
Nevertheless, this historical development of CG in Saudi Arabia was put under scrutiny in 2006 when 
the Saudi capital market experienced its first financial crisis. As a result, the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority (SCMA) was established in 2004 by royal decree accompanied by a high level of 
recommendation by the Saudi Consultative Council (SCC) with the specific intention of regulating and 
developing the Saudi capital market (SCMA, 2015). Hence, the power to legislate CG regulations 
switched from the hands of SMCI to the hands of SCMA.  
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Moreover, ever since the SCMA has been considered the main legislative body of CG regulations and 
has, accordingly, adopted some international accounting standards such as the OECD principles of CG 
(Al-Zaid, 2012). Therefore, when the financial crisis of 2006 crashed the Saudi capital market, SCMA 
insisted on issuing a new set of CG rules to prevent further crises. "It announced a first draft code of 
the SCGRs [Saudi Corporate Governance Requlations] with many applications, all of which were 
optional until the beginning of 2009, becoming compulsory in 2010 for listed companies in terms of 
implementation. However, the listed companies are now only required to demonstrate adherence to the 
SCGRs on a ‘comply or explain’ basis" (Al-Zahrani, 2013b). 
2.1 Corporate Governance (CG) in Saudi Arabia 
This section describes the regulatory framework of CG in Saudi Arabia, such as the regulation, 
supervision and monitoring bodies. It also highlights the accounting and auditing profession 
governmental agencies along with CG codes of best practice in Saudi Arabia.  
2.1.1 CG Regulatory, Supervisory and Monitoring Bodies in Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, there are four governmental agencies in charge of regulating, supervising, and 
monitoring listed Saudi corporations. These governmental agencies are: the Saudi Consultative 
Council (SCC), the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry (SMCI), the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority (SCMA), and the Saudi Organization for Chartered Public Accountants (SOCPA). 
2.1.1.1 The Saudi Consultative Council (SCC): “House of Shuora” 
The Saudi Consultative Council has the legislative power to guide the local and international standards 
of CG in Saudi Arabia. The SCC was established in 1992 by a Royal Decree, titled A/91, and its 150 
members are directly elected by the Saudi King. The elective appointment by the king takes into 
consideration various aspects of nominated members’ quaifications such as experts' knowledge, 
experience, and level of education. In addition, members of the SCC vary in their fields of expertise 
ranging from economics, politics, health care, the military etc. As prescribed by article No.15 of the 
SCC legislative law, the function of the SCC is to initially address its opinions on general policies 
referred to it by the Prime Minister. Hence, the SCC’s duties include but are not limited to the 
following: 
a) Reviewing and debating general plans currently considered for economic development and 
social welfare improvements. 
b) Revising and analysing current or proposed laws, regulations, concessions, and international 
treaties to draw appropriate suggestions. 
c) Reviewing annual reports of governmental agencies and proposing new governance measures 
(SCC, 1992). 
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Moreover, the SCC’s views, opinions, and proposals on current delegated affairs by the prime minister 
are eventually submitted to the King for vetoing as required by Article 17 of the SCC (SHURA) 
Council's Law of 1992. This article clearly states:   
"the Council's resolutions shall be submitted to the King, who decides what resolutions are to be referred to 
Cabinet. If the views of both the Shura Council and the Cabinet agree, the resolutions are issued after the King's 
approval. If the views of both councils vary, the issue shall be returned to the Shura Council (Consultative 
Council) to decide whatever it deems appropriate, and send the new resolution to the King, who takes the final 
decisions " (SCC, 1992). 
2.1.1.2 The Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry (SMCI) 
The Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry is one of the governmental bodies that are legislatively 
responsible for regulating, supervising and monitoring listed Saudi corporations. By law, the SMCI is 
required to ensure listed Saudi corporations’ compliance with the Saudi Company Act of 1965 and 
other relevent regulations. Moreover, one of the major roles played by the Department of listed Saudi 
Corporations’ Affairs at SMCI is analysing, reviewing and authorising potential applications of 
establishing new joint stock companies by listed corporations and reviewing the relevant articles of 
incorporation. In addition, SMCI is also responsible for registering new companies, monitoring their 
businesses, checking their balance sheets and supervising the overall implementation of the Saudi 
Company Act (SMCI, 2015). 
2.1.1.3 The Saudi Capital Market Authority (SCMA): 
The SCMA was established in 2004 by a royal decree. SCMA is considered autonomous and an 
independent governmental organisation that has the legal, financial, and administrative independence 
to report directly to the King in his capacity as the head of the Council of Ministers (Al-Habshan, 
2015). In addition, SCMA was established with the specific intention of regulating and developing the 
Saudi capital market. Hence, SCMA is supremely, by the King, granted the authority to have the 
necessary legislative and executive powers to create, pass, and adopt local and international CG 
standards, such as the OECD principles of CG (Al-Habshan, 2015). Therefore, SCMA is currently 
considered the main legislative and executive body of CG in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, SCMA has the 
legislative power to issue rules and regulations for the implementation of provisions of the Saudi 
Capital Market Laws (SCMA, 2015). Therefore, SCMA's role as prescribed by the Saudi Capital 
Market law is to:  
a) Regulate and improve the Saudi capital market 
b) Protect inside and outside investors and all stakeholders from unfair and unjust practices 
involving fraud, manipulation insider trading…etc 
c) Ensure fairness, and transparency in transactions involving securities and their financial 
disclosure. 
d) Set risk reduction measures pertaining to securities' transactions. 
e) Authorise, regulate and monitor the issuance and trading of securities. 
f) Regulate and monitor the disclosure of information related to new and trading securities and 
their issuers; 
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g) Regulate proxy and purchase requests and public share offerings 
(SCMA, 2015). 
 
Moreover, SCMA has a Department of Corporate Governance which is responsible for improving and 
implementing CG standards through the following duties: 
a) "Developing communication with specialized institutions, both local and international, which 
are involved in the corporate governance of publicly traded companies;  
b) Encouraging perceptions of transparency, disclosure, liability and equality;  
c) Increasing investors’ knowledge of listed companies through the appropriate CGR provisions;  
d) Promoting and overseeing implementation of corporations’ self-regulation of their corporate 
governance policies;  
e) Training representatives of listed companies in the proper implementation of corporate 
governance practices" (Al-Habshan, 2015).  
 
In addition, SCMA’s CG department has a direct resposibilty to monitor and requlate listed Saudi 
corporations' compliance with Corporate Covernance regulations (CGRs). Moreover, it is gifted the 
power to bring legal action against corporations violating CGRs. Moreover, this CG department 
analyses "listed [Saudi] corporations’ articles of associations, online and print announcements, 
pronouncements through the stock exchange, and annual board financial reports. The department 
passes its decisions about violations onto the [S]CMA Board, which reviews the decision, the 
recommended penalties and the legal basis for them [as entitled by Saudi Capital Market law Article 
7(d)] " (Al-Habshan, 2015).  
2.1.1.4 The Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
SOCPA was established in 1991 by a royal decree, No M/12, and was given its authorised new 
regulations for Saudi chartered public accountants. The decree also prescribes that SOCPA shall 
operate under the supervision of SMCI. Therefore, SOCPA's objective is to promote, develop, and 
enhance the accounting and auditing profession in Saudi Arabia. As prescribed by law, SOCPA's main 
roles are to: 
a) Review, develop and approve accounting standards. 
b) Review, develop and approve auditing standards. 
c) Set the necessary rules for the accounting fellowship certificate examination (CPA exam). 
d) Provide continuous educational programmes in accounting. 
e) Set and monitor quality review programmes ensuring that Saudi CPAs are implementing 
professional standards and complying with the provisions of CPA regulations. 
f) Conduct research in accounting, and auditing. 
g) Publish periodicals, books and bulletins about accountancy and auditing 
h) Participate in international accounting committees and symposiums set by the international 
accounting standards' bodies. 
(SOCPA, 2015). 
 
 
Chapter Two: Saudi Arabian CG Framework   P a g e  | 18 
 
 
 
2.1.2 Aspects of CG in Saudi Arabia 
Corporate governance as a concept is relatively new in Saudi Arabia. Hence, CG is a newly introduced 
regime which has been historically voluntary since their signified initial issuance in 2006 following the 
first market crash (Al-Zahrani, 2013). Moreover, adherence to CG principles was made obligatory in 
2010 (Al Alzahrani, 2013). Nevertheless, CG legislation in Saudi Arabia is still slowly moving from 
voluntary to obligatory as family-owned firms, it has been argued by Koldertsova (2011), are stifling 
corporate growth by their reluctance to open their equity to outside shareholders. In fact, although 
Saudi minority shareholders suffered catastrophic losses from Initial Public Offers in 2006 and 2008, 
the Saudi CG regulations are still adhered to on a 'comply or explain basis' (Al-Zahrani, 2013). 
 As a result, academics and economists who are concerned with the development of the Saudi Capital 
Market are expressing in the press the need to apply appropriate CG standards. Nevertheless, Saudi 
listed corporations perceive their "obligations as restricted to what appears in regulations that cover the 
business of companies and which may have some relation with corporate governance, such as the 
Companies Act (1965), the Capital Market Law (2004) and the corporate governance code [of] 2006 
issued by the [S]CMA" (Falgi, 2009). 
Therefore, the following section will highlight some of the aspects of CG in the light of the historcilly 
applicable regulations available. 
2.1.2.1 The Saudi Company Law of 1965: (SCL 1965) 
The Saudi Company Law was issued in 1965 by a Royal Decree and is considered to be the first 
legislative attempt to regulate Saudi companies' operations. Further modifications have been required 
and made by royal decree to update Saudi Company Law (SMCI, 2015). The CG concepts appearing 
in Saudi Company Law are as follow: 
A. Company Structure 
Article 66 of SCL (1965) prescribes that any Saudi company must be managed by a board of directors, 
comprising at least three members, appointed at the annual general meeting (AGM) for a period of no 
more than three years. In addition, it requires the formation of unitary boards as characterised by one 
single board comprising both executive and non-executive directors (Mallin, 2004). Moreover, the 
SCL of 1965 requires members of the board of directors to hold at least 10,000 Saudi Riyal (equivalent 
to 1,600 Pounds Sterling) of the market value of a company's shares. In addition, it allows Saudi 
companies to choose appropriate methods for board members’ remuneration, salaries, and 
compensation, which all have to be disclosed at the AGM (SCL, 1965) 
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B. Shareholders' Rights 
The SCL (1965) gives shareholders owning 20 shares or more the right to attend the AGM, which is 
required to be held once a year to discuss issues related to the company. In adiditon, the SCL (1965) 
preserves those shareholders with the rights attached to their shares such as share in profits, 
participating at the AGM and a vote on decisions. Moreover, Article 109 of SCL (1965) provides 
shareholders holding at least 5% of a company's capital to ask the "Companies Settlement Authority to 
inspect the company if they have any doubt about the behavior of the board of directors or the external 
auditors" (Falgi, 2009). 
2.1.2.2 The Saudi Higher Economics Council (SHEC) 
The Saudi Higher Economics Council (SHEC) approved the proposals made by the Saudi ministerial 
committee set by Royal Decree, No. 3151 in 2001, to investigate the status of listed Saudi 
corporations. The Saudi ministerial committee recommended initial steps towards applying appropriate 
CG measures (SMCI, 2015). These recommendations include: 
a) Signifying the role of listed corporation's internal control measures. 
b) Enlightening shareholders of their roles in monitoring listed corporations. 
c) Ensuring the credibility and fair representation of listed corporations' financial statements. 
(SMCI, 2015). 
 
2.1.2.3 The Saudi Capital Market Law of 2004 
The Saudi Capital Market law was established and articulated by SCMA in 2004. The sole purpose of 
the Saudi Capital Market Law of 2004 is to develop an organised, transparent financial market. For 
example, Article 45 of the Saudi Capital Market Lawof 2004 issued by the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority states the following: 
a) "Every issuer offering securities to the public or whose securities are traded on theExchange 
must submit to the authority quarterly and annual reports. Annual reports must be audited as 
required by the rules of the authority.  
b) In addition to the information required in paragraph (a) of this article, the annual report must 
also contain an adequate description of the issuing company, the nature of its business, 
information regarding the members of its board of directors, and any other information as may 
be required by the rules of the Authority as it deems necessary to assist investors and their 
advisers in making a decision to invest in the issuer's securities" (SCMA, 2015). 
 
2.1.2.4 The Saudi CG Code 
The Saudi CG code of best practice was issued in 2006 by the SCMA.  The code aimed to ensure that 
Saudi listed corporations comply with the best CG standards capable of protecting all type of 
stakeholders (SCMA, 2015). Even though the Saudi CG code was initially intended to be a guideline, 
listed Saudi corporations are required, by the CG code, to disclose in their board's reports which 
provisions of the CG codes were implemented and those not implemented (SCMA, 2015). In addition, 
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those listed corporations, in case of no implementation, are required to provide an explanation for the 
non-compliance (Al-Zahrani, 2013b). The code covers three major topics such as the rights of 
shareholders, disclosure and transparency, and the board of directors. 
2.2 Discussion 
CG regulations in Saudi Arabia have been relatively premature due to the late significance attached to 
adopting a sound CG system after the first market crash of 2006. A few governmental agencies have 
played key roles in setting the stage for implementing appropriate CG standards in Saudi Arabia such 
as SCC, SMCI, SOCPA, and SHEC. Nevertheless, it can still be said that the main legislative sources 
of CG in Saudi Arabia stem from: 
1. The Companies Act of 1965: initially considered the first legislative attempt at establishing 
general CG guidelines. 
2. The Saudi Capital Market Law of 2004: practically, the first legislative attempt to organise the 
Saudi Capital Market's operations of listed corporations. 
 
Nevertheless, the Saudi Company Law of 1965 does not effectively protect minority shareholder's 
rights. In fact, the SCL of 1965 is rather found to empower majority shareholders with unrestricted 
control over their companies to the point where majority shareholders are capable of causing abuses 
and injustice (Al-Madani, 2011). For instance, in accordance with SCL 1965,  
"the company is entitled to maintain its interests and the interests of shareholders against any detrimental act… 
[Hence,] if the company does not file a liability suit against the aggressor through the GM, the shareholders have 
no right to file a liability claim on behalf of the company and for the company itself... [In addition] GM will 
object to a shareholder filing a suit if it is deemed to threaten the influence of the controlling shareholders who, 
de facto, manage the company. The current law does not provide any guarantees for minority shareholders 
against any excessive behavior on the part of the major shareholders in the company"(Al-Zahrani, 2013). 
 
Hence, the current state of the Saudi CL of 1965 is considered outdated and this outdated version fails 
to protect Saudi minority shareholders (Al-Madani, 2011, Al-Zahrani, 2013). Despite the Saudi 
government’s intention to reform CG, the Saudi CL of 1965 “has not been modified to any significant 
degree; it is still not sufficiently effective, and does not address many important points relating to 
shareholders’ rights in listed companies"(Al-Zahrani, 2013). 
Moreover, the board of SCMA, which was created via the Saudi Capital Market law of 2004, has 
utilised its powers, granted by the King, to legislate the issuance of CG regulations in 2006 after the 
first market crash (Al-Zaid, 2012). Nevertheless, adherence to Saudi CGRs was made obligatory in 
2010 and listed Saudi corporations still adhere to CG regulations on a 'comply or explain basis' (Al-
Zahrani, 2013). 
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The objective of the SCGRs issued by SCMA is to provide Saudi listed corporations and their 
shareholders with a general guideline for best practice. In addition, these guidelines are meant to 
enhance the level of protection provided to all shareholders, including minorities. However, "most of 
SCGRs are just recommendations, except for those stated as being mandatory, i.e. they are optional in 
application and there is no penalty for non-compliance" (Al-Zahrani, 2013b).  Hence, the current state 
of compliance with SCGRs, being mostly recommendations, opens the doors wide open for listed 
corporations to legally avoid following obligatory provisions even with requlations requiring “a 
comply or explain basis” (Al-Zahrani, 2013b). 
In addition, "the SCGRs are completely free of any definition of what is meant by the term CG, 
although it is the term that needs the most clarification, due to its novelty on the one hand, and the need 
for each person to be aware of its gravity and to know what it entails on the other; many shareholders 
do not know the full meaning of the concept of CG"(Al-Zahrani, 2013b). 
In addition, there is an apparent contradiction between SCMA’s, guidance, Saudi Corporate 
Governance Requlations (SCGRs) and the obligatory requlations of Saudi Company Law of 1965. 
Hence,  
"corporations tend only to apply those SCGRs that are included in SCL 1965 under threat of penalty, being 
unable to argue that they are not mandatory, even though those same regulations are stated as being for guidance 
only in the SCGRs. Owing to these problems, the SCGRs must be modified to comply with SCL 1965, and all 
conflicts should be resolved by MOCI [Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry] and the SCMA in the public 
interest" (Al-Zahrani, 2013b). 
 
Overall, protecting minority shareholders is a fundamental objective of the OECD principles of CG 
issued in 2004. And, member countries such as Saudi Arabia should take this fundamental objective 
seriously into consideration when implementing a set of CG regulations. Those OECD principles of 
CG capable of protecting minority shareholders include: 1) Rights of Shareholders; 2) Equitable 
Treatment of Shareholders; 3) Role of Shareholders; 4) Disclosure and Transparency; 5) Responsibility 
of the Board.  
Nevertheless, the Saudi version of those CG regulations (SCGRs) issued by SCMA in 2006 only 
include: 1) an introduction and definition of CG; 2) the rights of shareholders and the GM; 3) 
disclosure and transparency; 4) the board of directors; 5) the closing provisions (Al-Zahrani, 2013b). 
Hence, SCMA needs to improve it SCGRs to cover all areas as emphasised by the OECD principles of 
2004. In addition, SCMA needs to provide the necessary legal awareness programmes for minority 
shareholders to implement the appropriate devices to aid minority shareholders in exercising their 
rights and encounter any oppression imposed on them by majority shareholders (Al-Zahrani, 2013b). 
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In addition, Saudi minority shareholders should not need to rely on Listed Saudi corporations’ policies 
and procedures put in place to preserve and exercise their rights. As emphasised by the OECD “[to] 
ensure an effective corporate governance framework, it is necessary that an appropriate and effective 
legal, regulatory and institutional foundation is established upon which all market participants can rely 
in establishing their private contractual relations” (OECD, 2004). 
In addition to that, it is worthwhile to mention that the Saudi legal system is principally governed by 
Shariah law, the principle of Islamic Law; hence, potential adaptation of CG international standards 
such as the OECD principles of CG need to be considered by SCMA board on a Shariah basis (Al-
Kahtani, 2013). Otherwise, compliance with standards will not assist when a dispute between involved 
parties is settled by a Saudi court of law by a judge whose orientation with the law is mainly based on 
Islamic principles. As a consequence, adopted CG international standards should be scrutinised under 
the Shariah microscope, before implementation, by key players such as the SCC, SOCPA, and SHEC. 
"Familiarity with the Saudi legal system is essential to understanding corporate governance and how disputes 
related to corporations are resolved. Depending on the nature of a dispute, a judge in Saudi Arabia in resolving 
cases concerning corporations will look first to the contract among the parties (the Articles of Incorporation) and 
will enforce that provided that it does not contradict Shariah, a statute or a regulation. For matters not covered in 
the corporation Articles of Incorporation or bylaws, a judge would look at the law governing the issue, which in 
the case of corporations will most likely be in the Companies Act. If no answer is found in the Articles of 
Incorporation, bylaws or the Companies Act, the judge must apply Customs.The general principles of Shariah 
come into play after the judge has looked into the sources noted above" (Al-Zaid, 2012). 
 
For example, in practise, when an international CG standard is considered for adoptation in Saudi 
Arabia, at the first instance, the SCMA board would not consider those proposed regulations on the 
basis of whether or not they might contradict basic Islamic principles (Al-Kahtani, 2013). 
Consequentally, in dispute cases, Saudi judges look first at the contract between involved parties and 
will make sure such a contract does not contradict the basic law of governance, which are Islamic 
legislation stemming from the Quran (Book of God) and supplications of Sunna (traditions) (Basic 
Law of Governance, 1992, Art. 1 as cited in Al-Khatani, 2013). This is an example on the conceptual 
framework of governance and how it affects judicial decicions in Saudi Arabia. In addition, a proper 
example of how SCMA and the other key player such as SCC, SOCPA, and SHEC can harmonise 
potential intenational CG standards with Islamic principles would be:  
"The Anglo-American model of CG indicates that a member of the board of directors can represent all 
shareholders. This declaration confines accountability to shareholders only. As a result, it can be said that the 
accountability of the board of directors, as mentioned under the CG can  work in line with the meaning of 
accountability from an Islamic perspective, which inspires board members to be accountable to God in all 
worldly actions as well in those related to other aspects of the corporation"(Al-Kahtani, 2013). 
Hence, it is very important for the SCMA board to consider the Islamic implications of internationally 
proposed CG standards (Al-Kahtani, 2013). Otherwise, compliance with proposed standards will not 
aid minority shareholders when a dispute is settled by a Saudi court of law by a judge whose 
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orientation with the law is mainly based on Islamic principles. 
2.3 Chapter Summary 
In summary, despite of the recent practical attempts undertaken by SCMA, the current status of the 
Saudi CG framework does not constitute effective legal, regulatory and institutional foundations 
capable of protecting minority shareholders. Therefore, reviewing the relevant international legal 
literature, in the following chapter, will contribute largely in terms of shedding lights on legal 
constructs that the Saudi legal environment is lacking to improve its CG legal framework. 
Moreover, the current status of CG in the whole Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 
consisting of countries sharing the same culture, oil based economies, and religion as Saudi Arabia, is 
very similar to Saudi Arabia. As indicated by the OECD report of 2011, the "disclosure-averse culture" 
in the MENA region has contributed to the general lack of transparency in the corporate sector 
(Koldertsova, 2011). 
Therefore, researching the effect of culture on CG is both timely and critical as such contributions can 
be of a major significance to the MENA reigion as a whole. Hence, this case study will focus on Saudi 
Arabia as it represents an important economic, political, religious and cultural significance in the 
MENA region due to the size of its economy and the leadership role it plays. Furthermore, this case 
study will review the relevant international literature to assess the impact of the Saudi Arabian culture 
on CG and its regulatory framework with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ interests. 
The conceptual framework for understanding how the Saudi Culture affects the rights of minority 
shareholders will take into account cultural models linking societal constructs with the legal and 
political milieu. 
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3. Chapter Three: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
In this review of the literature, the model of network theory developed by Hesse (1966-1980) is used as 
a literature review technique. The technique is based on the assumption that well-established literature 
in any subject area "represents a series of nodes in an interlinked network of theoretical and empirical 
developments" (Ryan, Scapens & Theobald, 2002). Hence, articles containing significant theoretical 
developments and at the core of the literature are defined and referred to as the 'grandmothers': "other 
articles, which are still important in developing significant strands within the literature, we describe as 
'mothers’ and the reminder as 'daughters'” (Ryan et al., 2002). In fact, this model is heavily relied upon 
when conducting the literature review of the principles and theories of CG stemming from cultural, 
legal, and political factors as the graph below illustrates: 
 
Figure: 3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
 
In addition, the most cited articles in a subject area were selected for initial readings. 
Moreover, ‘the key articles' cited by the authors as principally generative were identified and 
read. Such process as advised by (Ryan et al, 2002) was repeated back through time to map 
out all nodes constructing the elements of such grounded assumption pertaining to the subject 
and adjacent areas of this research. In addition, an exhaustive literature search process of 
published and unpublished studies was transparently carried out and aimed to provide an audit 
trail of the researcher's procedures and conclusion (Tranfield, Denyer & Smart, 2003)(see 
Appendix A.2). Other literature review techniques used include: 
Cultural 
Factors 
 Legal 
Factors 
 
Political 
Factors 
Application of OCED Principles of Minority 
Shareholders’ Rights  
 
 
 
Minority 
shareholders’ 
protection 
 New Institutional 
Sociology Theory 
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A. Searching  
The first stage of the process was aimed at identifying the cultural impact on the rights of 
minority shareholders. The second stage was aimed at unveiling the legal factors affecting the 
strength of minority shareholders rights. The third stage was aimed at exploring the political 
factors affecting the strength of minority shareholders rights. No studies were found in the 
Saudi context. Hence, the searching process was set to focus on findings of international 
studies. Moreover, the literature review was conducted over the period between October 2012 
and March 2015. A review strategy was developed to include resources to be looked at and 
search terms to be used for each resource. 
B. Use of Search Terms  
 In this research study, keywords were systematically generated based on their relevance to the 
predefined research questions' words as keyword-search is a common method of identifying 
relevant literature (Ely and Scott, 2007). Hence, the strategy used to construct the keywords is 
as follows: 
1. Identify major conceptual framework derived from the research questions. 
2. Identify synonyms for key terms; Allowing databases' Boolean and Boolean AND to incorporate 
alternative synonyms. 
3. The total number of selected papers was reduced by investigating the titles and the abstracts in order to 
exclude articles not addressing the research topic and adjacent areas.  
 
C. Screening  
The screening process was performed to select publications, stemming from search terms, 
meeting the pre-specified inclusion and exclusion criteria. As the pre-determined inclusion 
criteria recognize a set of characteristics classifying such publication as suitable for analysis. 
Moreover, the exclusion criteria identify a set of characteristics making such publication 
inappropriate. The tables below show both sets:
1. Inclusion Criteria: 
Rational for inclusion  CRTITERIA 
To gain a wide picture of cultural factors impacting CG In all countries: barriers to CG compliance 
To identify the legal factors affecting the strength of minority 
shareholder's protection  
In all countries: barriers to strength  
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To identify the political factors affecting the strength of 
minority shareholder's protection  
In all countries: barriers to strength 
To capture all sort of evidence Quantitative & qualitative methods used 
 
2. Exclusion Criteria: 
Rational for exclusion CRITERIA 
The researcher can only review studies written in English and 
Arabic 
Studies in other languages than Arabic, and 
English 
Beyond the scope of the current study Studies not relevant to the scope of this study 
 
D. Data Extraction  
The data extraction form included five sections: bibliographic information; focus of the study; 
methodology; findings; and analysis (see Appendix A.1). 
E. Reporting & Dissemination  
Reporting and dissemination of knowledge is the final stage of the systematic literature review 
process. It requires writing up the findings of the review process and circulating them to 
potential interested parties. In fact, the results of this review process were reported in at the 
2015 BAM conference at the University of Portsmouth on the 8
th
 of September 2015. 
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3.2 Culture and Corporate Governance (CG) 
In order to answer the first research question of this thesis, regarding the cultural factors that might 
explain the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights as defined by the OECD principles 
of CG, a review of the relevant international cultural literature on CG will contribute largely in terms 
of identifying critical cultural constructs to implement via a research method to investigate such 
relationship.   
Figure 3.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
 
3.2.1 Background 
The significance of reliable research in CG has increasingly been acknowledged in the business world. 
Deane (2006) described CG as an ownership responsibility rather than a legal obligation. Previously, in 
the usual notion, CG was considered an externally imposed obligation as a matter of criteria settings 
necessary for corporate listings and continuations. He goes on to say that, “we needed people with 
vision prepared to make investment in governance because the long term returns are worth it.” 
 However, such a vision cannot be utilised without recognising the fact that, "corporate governance 
regimes around the world shaped by different sets of cultural values, are also divided with regard to the 
question: for whose benefit should corporations be governed?” (Rossouw & Sison, 2006). 
The association between culture and CG has not been long researched in accounting due to the multi-
dimensionality of opposing factors such as the legal and political ones and their uncertain effects on 
CG. Moreover, consideration of economical developments in relation to distinctive cultural traits is 
beneficial. In addition, it might provide this research with the opportunity to identify the appropriate 
Cultural Value Dimension (CVD) model to adopt for the purpose of answering the first research 
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question of this study: To what extent do available cultural models (for example Hofstede, 2010) 
explain the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi 
Arabia? 
Therefore, a thorough review of the literature on Cultural Values Dimentional (CVD) models found in 
cross-cultural psychological studies and commonly used in the area of business studies and accounting, 
will be undertaken by the researcher to explore significant cultural variables to be considered when 
assessing the association between Saudi culture and CG in light of the rights of minority shareholders.  
3.2.2 Evolution of CG 
Eighty-five years ago, Berle and Means (1932) assumed that all large public corporations would 
mature to a capital structure that is highly characterised by the separation of ownership and control. 
They were systematically too enthused with their assumption to the point that they overlooked cultural 
obstacles awaiting this hypothesis in different corners of the world's continents. It has become clear in 
the twentieth century that not all cultures are capable of convergence toward a specific capital-
structure.  In fact, the twentieth century witnessed the polarisation of corporate structures between two 
dominant-rivaling systems of CG stemming from different cultural orientations. These systems, as 
explained by Coffee (2001), are: 
A. Dispersed Ownership System, characterised by strong- 'bidding oriented' securities markets, 
high level of 'well lobbied' accounting disclosure standards, and market transparency. This 
system is consistent with the prediction of Berle and Means and as expected is highly 
responsible for setting corporate control mechanisms to facilitate negotiating the conflicts 
between share owners and managers. 
B. Concentrated Ownership System, characterised by controlling shareholders, fragile security 
market, and a low level of disclosure and market transparency. This system falls outside of 
Berle’s and Means’ assumption because its market plays a moderately weak role in setting 
control mechanisms. Instead, large banks centered around listed corporations are responsible 
for setting and monitoring corporate control procedures. 
Nevertheless, both systems seem to operate with ease on a geographical basis.  The significance of 
each system is recognised by different parts of the world (Daniel, Cieslewicz & Pourjalali, 2012). 
3.2.3 National Cultures and Economic Development 
The association between economic development and national cultures are becoming increasingly 
important. Studies have investigated whether or not national cultures’ distinctive traits can explain the 
variations in the resource allocation efficiency and wealth distribution in societies worldwide. In fact, 
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Dodor and Rana (2007) found their statistical results confirmatory to the argument that culture traits do 
matter in economic development, when national cultural dimensions such as Individualism, Power 
Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity, and Long Term Orientation are used. In addition, their 
recommendations to investigate the influence of further variables such as geography, history, religion, 
institutions, and governments on economic development were highly emphasised given their large 
sample of 53 countries. 
Nevertheless, further investigations into the association between national cultures and economic 
developments cannot be fruitfully productive without taking the two dominant schools of thoughts in 
socioeconomic development into account. Modernisation theorists such as Karl Marx (1973) 
emphasise the convergence of values with economic development, and assume the death of religious 
beliefs in the long run.  On the other hand, the opposing school of Max Weber (1904) puts the 
emphasis on the persistence of traditional values despite economic and political changes. Max Weber’s 
view conforms with the notion that values are relatively independent of economic conditions 
(DiMaggio, 1994).   
Empirical evidence rooted in a large sample of 65 societies undertaken by Inglehart and Baker (2000) 
subscribed to both opposing schools’ points of views. Inglehart and Baker stated, 
 “economic development is associated with pervasive, and to some extent predictable, cultural changes. 
Industrialization promotes a shift from traditional to secular-rational values, while the rise of postindustrial 
society brings a shift toward more trust, tolerance, well-being, and post-materialist values.  If economic 
development continues, we expect a continued decline of institutionalized religion. The influence of traditional 
value systems is unlikely to disappear, however, as belief systems exhibit remarkable durability and resilience. 
Empirical evidence… indicates that values can and do change, but also that they continue to reflect a society's 
cultural heritage" (2000).  
 
Therefore, it is safer to consider the implications of both opposing schools with a level of caution for 
the purpose of this study when assessing the association, if any, between Saudi culture, in light of 
economical developments, and its CG frmawork.  
3.2.4 National Cultures, Institutional Environments and CG 
The institutional environment is found to mediate the relationship between national cultures and CG. In 
a sample of 62 societies, the four Hofstede dimensions, namely; Uncertainty Avoidance, Power 
Distance, Future Orientation and Performance Orientation, are found positively related to the 
institutional environment in any given society (Daniel, Cieslewicz & Pourjalali, 2012). This empirical 
study shows how certain cultural components, such as Hofstede’s (1980) Cultural Value Dimentions 
CVD, impact CG indirectly through their influences on the elements composing the institutional 
environment in any given society. 
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 This study also implys that CG regimes around the world should reflect the cultural values of a given 
society in order to operate efficiently. Otherwise, policy makers will misleadingly keep on 
implementing CG codes of best practices superficially without adjusting the institutional environment 
to support further improvements in accordance with prevailing cultural values (Davies & Schlitzer, 
2008; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Mintz, 2005; Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997; Young et al., 2004). 
In addition, the recent global financial crisis has shed some lights on the weaknesses found in 
regulatory and CG practices worldwide. This is might be due to, “a lack of congruence between the 
cultural expectations and the regulatory infrastructures” (Daniel, Cieslewicz & Pourjalali, 2012).  
3.2.5 Theoretical Implications 
3.2.5.1 Agency Theory 
The use of Agency Theory to explain the different CG systems around the world  has failed in both 
developed and emerging markets because, " it is not clear whether the board of directors is 
management or agent or owner" (Oxelheim, 2007). Hence, the dominance of family controlled 
corporations around the world, especially in emerging markets such as Asia, calls for a new theory to 
investigate the concerns of minority shareholders in those markets. In fact, exploring the agency theory 
conflict of relationships from a cultural perspective might suggest to be more universally applicable. 
For example, research into Japanese CG suggests that the agency relationships must be modified in 
cultures high on collectivism (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007). "Efforts to change corporate governance 
practices around the world are best informed by an appreciation of cultural as well as institutional 
factors" (Daniel, Cieslewicz & Pourjalali, 2012). 
3.2.5.2 Institutional Theory 
The Institutional Theory perspective is suggestive of corporations seeking legitimacy within any given 
society by adhering to societal norms and values. Empirically, the findings of Li and Harrison (2008) 
are confirmatory with the fact that CG practices around the word, as found in multi-national 
corporations they had tested, reflect prevailing societal cultural norms in order to seek societal 
legitimacy.  
3.2.5.3 Ontological Conflict in CG 
As explained by Blaikie (1993), 
 "Ontology is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of what exists. It is the study of theories of 
being, theories about what makes up reality. In the context of social science: All theories and methodological 
positions make assumptions (either implicit or explicit) about what kinds of things do or can exist, the conditions 
of their existence, and the way they are related" (cited in Lewis-Beck, Bryman & Liao, 2004). 
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Morland (2013) views CG as relying on certain identity constructs needing to be questioned. Morland 
argues that “the way in which corporate governance initiatives address the various crises of capitalism, 
allows us to gloss over some crucial ontological questions that could precipitate a more rigorous 
questioning of capitalist practices” (2013). Consequently, Morland presents these following problems: 
Problem 1: The nature of capitalism and the crisis of control 
Under this problem, Morland extensively reviews the CG literature and concludes that the literature is 
heavily concentrated on the fiduciary duty of directors and managers to guarantee the growth of 
shareholders’ values. Hence, the focus of such literature arguably is on ‘money’, rather than on the 
welfare of the society, which is affected as a ‘side-product’ of this pursuit (Morland, 2013). 
Problem 2:  Moral agency and identity crises. 
Morland (2013) arguably views capitalism as striving on flows; hence, in the process, most of the 
humanitarian values escape as the focus is on production and efficiency rather than on the sovereignty 
of the workforce. Contestably, Morland views the outcome of that to be the enlargement of social 
classes leading to a confrontation with the problems of inequality, disenfranchisement, and poverty 
(Morland, 2013). Consequentaly, Morland sees the agency conflict is rather a side-product of the 
obsessively desired level of productivity and efficiency.    
“Corporate governance aims to contain identities, instead of engaging with the flows through which these 
identities spontaneously emerge. Corporate governance seems to try and engineer, direct and program these 
‘‘identities,’’ instead of fostering the couplings that in and of themselves involve relational constraint, albeit not 
complete control…We therefore have to address the ‘‘identity crisis’’ that is inherent to capitalism. Governance 
initiatives relying in controls institutionalized and managed by singular individuals with integrity are bound to 
miss the ever shifting target of flows” (Morland, 2013). 
 
Problem 3:  Hierarchical governance and the crisis of structure 
‘‘In biological terms,  a ‘rhizome’ refers to a form of plant that extends itself through horizontal tube-
like root system and can in this way create endless new plants” (Morland, 2013). Hence, exploring CG 
in a rhizomatic way might arguably lead to a mind-shift. Such shift might be capable of directing 
attention away from delineating units that operate in accordance with certain foundational principles to 
be open to ‘‘dimensions or rather directions in motion’’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p.21) 
“This requires a different kind of methodology as well. Where Boards are typically concerned with how they can 
direct their corporations from where it is now, to where it wants to end up, understanding the rhizomatic requires 
starting in the middle, rather than from a beginning or end. This may entail looking at how projects are affecting 
people and environments, rather than whether targets are met or compliance boxes are checked” (Morland, 2013). 
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3.2.5.4 The Epistemological Stand of Value Sytems:  
Epistemology is defined by Sumner (2006) as: 
 "a field of philosophy concerned with the possibility, nature, sources and limits of human knowledge. As distinct 
from ontology (the study of the essential nature of reality), epistemology is concerned with whether or how we 
can have knowledge of reality: questions that have concerned philosophers since, at least, the Ancient Greeks. 
Criteria for what counts as knowledge (rather than mere belief) normally include reference to truth and to the 
justification for it" (as quoted in Jupp, 2006, p. 92). 
 
Value systems tend to differ among nations worldwide. The reason for this is that systems of thoughts 
are not only rooted in local beliefs but extend to metaphysical systems at a deeper level (Nisbett, Peng, 
Choi & Norenzayan, 2001). For example, Asian systems of thought have a holistic orientation "making 
relatively little use of categories and formal logic, and relaying on 'dialectical' reasoning" (Nisbett et 
al., 2001). On the other hand, Western systems of thought have more of an analytical orientation that 
rely more on “paying attention primarily to the object and categories to which it belongs and using 
rules, including formal logic, to understand its behaviour" (Nisbett et al., 2001). 
In addition, these ‘systems of thoughts’, according to psychological findings of Nisbett et al., (2001) 
are consistant with findings of other studies such as Vygotsky (1978), Cole (1995), Cole and Scribner, 
(1974), Hutchins (1995), Lave (1988), Luria (1932) and Rogoff (1990). Collectivelly, all of these 
previous studies emphasise the fact that "tools of thought…embody a culture’s intellectual history… 
tools have theories built into them, and users accept these theories-albeit unknowingly-when they use 
these tools” (Resnick, 1994, pp. 476-477). 
Over the last three decades, psychologists have striven to qualify, interpret and expand the work of 
Nisbett (1993) and Hutchines (1995) in regard to the deeper level of values and their rooted stances in 
epistemologies. For example, the study of Peng, Ames and Knowles (2001) reveals how the 
holistically dialectal epistemology of the Asian culture makes their self-concepts to be "socially 
diffused and context, and relationship bound while [W]esterners self concepts are more concrete and 
abstract".  As a result, Peng et al. (2001) categorise Asians' system of inferences to be inductive in 
reasoning as compared to the deductive Westerners’ reasoning trait.  
Morover, Peng et al. (2001) theoretically find cultural studies to highlight diverse epistemological 
stances of what counts as evidence and truth. Hence, Peng et al. (2001) perceive differences in 
epistemologies to give rise to different models of reasoning through inductions and deductions. Most 
importantly, they conclude that the Asian dialectical epistemological model of reasoning emphasises 
the changing nature of reality along with the enduring presence of contradictions. On the other hand, 
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they conclude that the Westerners' analytical epistemological stance rather places the emphasis on the 
notions of truth, identity, and the absence of contradictions in their deductive reasoning. 
In addition, Peng et al. (2001) perceive cultural values to be a major source for theories as they guide 
focus to what is essential. As a result, values, along with self-concepts, play a major role in shaping 
theories, which in turn shape the contexts in which the resulting inferences are turned into actions.  
Therefore, the epistemological stand of such culture has to be taken into account when assessing its 
impact on CG, as this epistemological stand is capable of shaping the inferences upon which actions 
take form (Peng et al., 2001).  Moreover, Hutchins (1980) explains reasoning as inseparably 
intertwined with cultural models. Therefore, what is widely believed to be true is a measure of people’s 
capacity to infer and judge in the light of cultural models (D'Andrade, 1995). 
3.2.5.5 Cultural Value Dimension (CVD) Models 
Table 3.1: The Schwartz Cultural Value Dimensions 
Embeddedness/Autonomy 
Concerns the desirable relationship between the individual and the group. Embeddedness represents a cultural 
emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt 
group solidarity or the traditional order. Autonomy describes cultures in which the person is viewed as an 
autonomous, bounded entity who ﬁnds meaning in his or her own uniqueness. Intellectual Autonomy refers to a 
cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual 
directions; Affective Autonomy to a cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing 
affectively positive experience. 
Hierarchy/Egalitarianism 
Concerns guaranteeing responsible behavior that will preserve the social fabric. Hierarchy refers to a cultural 
emphasis on obeying role obligations within a legitimately unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources 
Egalitarianism refers to an emphasis on transcendence of selﬁsh interests in favor of voluntary commitment to 
promoting the welfare of others. 
Mastery/Harmony 
Concerns the relation of humankind to the natural and social world. Mastery refers to a cultural emphasis on 
getting ahead through active self-assertion. Harmony refers to an emphasis on ﬁtting harmoniously into the social 
and natural environment. 
Source: Licht et al. (2005, pp. 229–255). 
Table 3.2: The Hofstede Cultural Value Dimensions 
Individualism/Collectivism 
Valuing loosely knit social relations in which individuals are expected to care only for themselves and their 
immediate families versus tightly knit relations in which they can expect their wider in-group (e.g. extended 
family, clan) to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 
Power Distance 
Accepting an unequal distribution of power in institutions as legitimate or illegitimate 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Feeling uncomfortable or comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, and therefore, valuing or devaluing beliefs 
and institutions that provide certainty and conformity. 
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Masculinity/Femininity 
Valuing achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success versus relationships, modesty, caring for the 
weak, and interpersonal harmony. 
Long Term Orientation/ Short Term Oreintation 
Long-Term Orientation (LTO) is defined as the fostering of virtues toward future rewards–in particular, 
perseverance and thrift. In contrast, short-term orientation stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past 
and present–in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of face, and fulfilling social obligations.  
Source: Licht et al. (2005, pp. 229–255) and Hofstede (2010) for the 5th dimension. 
 
Empirically validated value-oriented studies in recent years have strived to map out specific insights 
into cultural differences. The distinctive approach of laying down the foundation on prior theorising to 
derive cultural dimensions has been a major goal for scholars in cross-cultural psychological studies. 
The reason being to specify how a set of Cultural Value Dimensions (CVDs) is capable of forming a 
coherent and integrated system of socialisation of a culture (Schwartz, 1994, 1999, 2004).  For 
example, the analysis of empirical and conceptual relations regarding value dimensions taken on a 
large sample representing 75% of the world’s populations suggests the following, according to 
(Schwartz (2004): 
1-" A dimension dealing with the desirable degree of independence of the person from in-groups vs. 
embeddedness in these groups: This includes [ his] autonomy/embeddedness, Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) 
individualism without the component of whose goals—own or group—should take precedence, and elements of 
both the Inglehart (2000) dimensions [ materialism and post-materialism]" 
 
2-"A dimension dealing with the desirability of equal vs. hierarchical allocation of resources, roles, rights, and 
obligations among persons and groups: This includes [ his ] egalitarianism/hierarchy, elements of Hofstede’s 
power distance, and the materialism aspect of Inglehart’s survival pole". 
 
3-"A dimension concerned with the relative desirability of assertively using or changing the social and natural 
environment in the active pursuit of goals vs. maintaining harmony in relations to this environment: This includes 
my mastery/harmony, Hofstede’s masculinity, and elements captured by Inglehart’s secular-rational pole." 
 
The most interesting highlight of the above mentioned dimensions made by their founders is the fact 
that these dimensions are capable of producing robust empirical evidence as they all measure cross- 
cultural items equivalent of meanings. Moreover, “these three combined dimensions were evident in a 
multidimensional scaling analysis of the seven Schwartz cultural orientations, four Hofstede 
dimensions, and two Inglehart dimensions. The first two dimensions correlate substantially with 
economic development, while the third does not—making it especially interesting to pursue further" 
(Schwartz, 2004). In addition, the validity of such an approach is assessed through the choice of the 
unit of analysis. In fact, most cross-cultural studies chose social groups as their units of analysis, not 
the individuals (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). 
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The theory of CVD and its implications for work demonstrated to be empirically sound in a large 
sample of 49 nations tested by Schwartz (1999). Schwartz describes these CVDs as capable of 
generating hypotheses about work-related variables and he adds, "[these CVD models] point the way 
towards utilising what is known about national differences in cultural values for the study of national 
differences in work related–variables" (Schwartz, 1999). 
Moreover, Schwartz’s (1992) study uses a sample of 20 countries to determine the universality of the 
content and structure of values. The result of this study is moderately specific in determining 10 
motivational values found worldwide. "Power, achievement, and tradition types were universal, as they 
emerged in all countries. The hedonism, self-direction, universalism, and security types were found in 
95% of countries, and the stimulation, benevolence, and conformity types were found in 90% of 
countries" (Schwartz, 1992). Hence, it can be said that the identification of universal aspects of value 
content and structure set the foundations for investigating cultural-specific aspects in the future. For 
example, in 2001 Schwartz and Bardi undertook the challenge of taking a similarity perspective 
regarding the hierarchy of value priorities on a sample of 56 nations. They concluded,  
 “Benevolence, self-direction, and universalism values are consistently most important, power, tradition, and 
stimulation values least important, and security, conformity, achievement and hedonism in between. Value 
hierarchies of 83% of samples correlate at least .80 with this pan-cultural hierarchy [comparing the ratings and 
order in each national sample with the overall average ratings and order of all nations]" (Schwartz & Bardi, 
2001). 
 
The work of Schwartz, (1992, 1994, 1999, and 2004) and Bardi (2001) is representative of the 
importance of investigations into cultural value specifics on both opposing perspectives of differences 
and similarities. In addition, the application of either perspective in work-related activity investigation 
is capable of yielding valuable evidence. However, Schwartz’s work has not been as extensively used 
by business researchers as Hofstede's (1984) CVD model. This might be due to the relative simplicity 
of Hofstede's approach. 
Hofstede (2005) defines culture as, “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from another" (p. 23).  Hofstede (2005) explains how the 
word ' culture' is perceived differently by world populations. For instance, culture for Western people 
is commonly associated with civilization and refinement. Hence, the end results of such refinement are 
expressed through education, art, and literature. Hofstede, titles this perception as 'culture one'. 
However, culture as mental software of the mind is much broader in essence and includes patterns of 
thinking, feeling, and acting, as explained by Hofstede (2005). Respectively, Hofstede titles this well-
established perception among social anthropologists as 'culture two'. 
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 In addition to that, Hofstede’s model (1984) captures most elements found in both previous 
definitions. In fact, Hofstede’s proposal of the four value dimensions of (1984), namely Power 
Distance, Collectivism versus Individualism, Femininity versus Masculinity, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance, is representative of the basic problematic areas found in all cultures. Moreover, the 
terminologies for these four value dimensions already exist in the social science field, and their 
empirical application resonates well with the basic problem area each dimension stands for (Hofstede, 
2005). 
3.2.5.6 Critique of CVD Models: Schwartz vs Hofstede 
In an attempt to evaluate the explanatory potential of Hofstede and Schwartz’s models with respect to 
the macro-social and macro-economic variables on the same sample of 20 countries used by Schwartz's 
and Hofstede’s studies, Gouveia and Ros (2000) conclude some intriguing results. They find that the 
“Hofstede model is better explained by macro-economic variables while the Schwartz model is better 
accounted for by the macro-social variables" (Gouveia & Ros, 2000). For instance, the dimensions of 
Individualism versus Power Distance in Hofstede's model are essentially defined by a country's wealth 
and level of education. On the other hand, the dimention of Autonomy versus Conservation in the 
Schwartz model are closely defined by the distribution of wealth in social welfare, and human 
developments (Gouveia & Ros, 2000). In fact, Schwartz (1994) admits that the scant association of his 
model regarding economical indicators is representative of his distinct conceptual stances and 
measurements with respect to Hofstede's.  
Moreover, an ethnographic analysis of Hofstede's (2001) model done by Fougere and Moultett (2007) 
arguably reveals that Hofstede discursively constructs a world characterised by a division between 
developed (Anglo-Germanic countries) and traditionally less developed world.  Hence, Hofstede's 
CVD model is insufficiently capable of presenting deep values as explanatory indicators for cultural 
influences because his division "is a discursive construction based on a colonial thinking" (Fougere & 
Moultett, 2007). Therefore, Hofstede's work is arguably seen as a promotion of Western culture as the 
benchmark for economic development, democracy, and advanced technologies. Not only that, but 
Hofstede’s work is even viewed by Fougere and Moulettes (2007) as encouraging Western companies 
operating overseas to confirm their beliefs that they are quite right in appointing Western educated 
managers. Unless, as Hofstede states, "effort in theory-building, especially in those countries in which 
theories of modern man, management, organisation, and society must be imported wholesale from 
abroad" (Hofstede, 2001, p. 462). 
In addition, McSweeny (2009, 2002) theoretically speculate how national cultures models used by 
anthropologists are misleading as these models are not capable of capturing other-sub-cultures within a 
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country but rather draw on the homogeneity of cultural factors within a country. It is true that 
anthropologists are more concerned with the homogeneity of a culture within a country as opposed to 
addressing the issues of variations within sub-cultures existent in a country. The reason is because 
they, anthropologists, assume that values are stable and are not changed by political and economical 
factors as predicted long ago by the work of Max-Weber (1904).  
However, what McSweeny (2009) wishes to have, in his theoretical attempt, are anthropologists who 
are willing to peruse cultures from the perspective of modernization theorists such as Karl Marx (1973) 
emphasizing the decline of tradition values due to economical and political factors. Hence, in such 
view values are dynamic and are not limited to history but to also the future development of countries 
as also predicted by Licht (2001). Therefore, such view is factored in this research paper to find out 
whether or not values are dynamic.  
In addition, McSweeny (2009, 2013) criticizes culturist at the analysis level saying that they relay 
heavily on averages to draw correlation and causations and their samples are not representative. Hence, 
McSweeny (2009, 2013) sees no generalizations should be made. McSweeny states, “our ability to 
make generalizations on the basis of the current body of empirical research is limited by significant 
within group heterogeneity in regional, country and ethnic group comparison” (2009). However, the 
point of most reviewed anthropological studies such as Hofstede’s (1982-2010) and Schwartz’s (1992-
2007) is to draw broad guidelines, as their unit of analysis is the culture whereas sociologists use the 
individual as a unit of analysis. Hence, they can have multiple level of group analysis. McSweeny also 
states, 
“’Hofstede apparent sophistication analysis of extensive data necessary relies on a number of profoundly flawed 
assumptions to measure the software … his claims are excessive and unbalanced: excessive because he claims far 
more in terms of identifiable characteristics and consequences than is justified; unbalanced because there is too 
great a desire to prove his a priori convictions rather than evaluate the adequacy of his findings”. 
 
Hence, for the purpose of this thesis in answering the first research question, the researcher intends to 
avoid such generalization as he plans to use culture as a unit of analysis to capture the general and 
break down the dimensions on a micro-sociological level using the individual to draw comparison 
between groups of Saudi shareholders. Hence, the macro analysis will not create the micro as 
McSweeny (2013) warns against. McSweeny (2002) states, “Hofseted’s model is profoundly 
problematic. His conflation and uni-level analysis pre-cludes considerations of interplay between 
macroscopic and microscopic cultural levels and between the cultural and the non-cultural”.   
Moreover, McSweeny (2002, 2013) criticizes how national cultural models such as Hofstede’s (2010) 
“disregards independent non-cultural and non-national cultural influence as cultures…are made and 
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remade through exchange, imitation, intersection, incorporation, reshuffling, through travel, trade, 
subordination” (McSweeny, 2013). In fact, McSweeny is right with this assumption especially when 
analysing such profession as CG and the effects of culture on compliance. Hence, other factors such as 
the economical, legal and political have to be taken into account as to be seen and discussed in depth in 
the subsequent sections of this literature review chapter. Otherwise, such analyses will be incomplete, 
which will be avoided by this research as the second research question is intended to capture the effects 
of non-national culture factors on the level of CG compliance of listed Saudi corporations. 
Nevertheless, the claims of McSweeny that the methodology of Hofstede’s model is fundamentally 
flawed and so are the questionnaire- method adopted in a functionalist paradigm have been critiqued 
by Williamson (2002). Williamson (2002) maintains that researchers into national cultures have 
carefully collected their data from large stratified samples, which they analyse with statistical 
techniques designed to “suppress subjective interpretations”. Therefore, Williamson sees that 
McSweeny’s rejection of Hofstede’s paradigm was done on “unclear premises, [hence,] his 
conclusions are difficult to assess”(2002). Therefore, Williamson (2002) sees McSweeny, 
“argues mainly from the functionalist paradigm, but fails to falsify Hofstede model. For example, his arguments 
about reliability and validity do no quit stick or are insufficient to refute empirical studies that corroborate the 
model. His view that Hofstede model might assume uniform national culture is inconsistent with Hofstede 
research…McSweeny confusion can arise from a lack of clarity about the paradigm from which cultural research 
is debated…Unless, the flaws of McSweeny ‘s argument are recognized, there is a danger that readers may reject 
all functionalist models of national cultures, including those of Schwartz and of Tompenaars. They may reject the 
phenomena of national culture”. 
 
Therefore, Williamson (2002) views favourably the significance of national cultural models and 
considers rejection of Hofestede’s or similar functionalist models of national culture, “before more 
satisfactory models have been developed, would be to throw away valuable insights. For social 
scientists working within the functionalist paradigm, quantification of national culture opens up what is 
otherwise a black box of cultural factors”(Williamson, 2002). Therefore, the researcher intends to 
quantify Hofstede (2010) CVD model to draw further insights upon which an answer to the first 
research questions can be accumulated. Most importantly, the paradigm upon which this research study 
will be based on is interpretive but it will border on functionalism as questionnaires’ constructs stem 
from the codes and principles of CG as a function. Further discussion of this research paradigm will 
follow suit accordingly in the following chapter, chapter 4. In fact, Williamson encourages adoption of 
different paradigm with such proceedings as he puts it,  
“Moving research of national culture outside the functionalist paradigm would enrich its findings by facilitating 
inquiry into complex dynamic interrelationships among cultures, institutions, histories and social adaptations 
(bhimani, 1999; Harrison & Mckinnon, 1999; Redding, 1994)”(Williamson, 2002). 
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Moreover, important-warning signs of McSweeny’s work as signified by Williamson (2002) such as  
“The danger of assuming all members of a culture homogeneity carry the same cultural 
attributes…[and] confusing scores for cultural dimensions with cultural constructs for which they are 
but approximate measures” will be taken into account for the purpose of this research study. Therefore, 
the questionnaires of this study will use the descriptive statistics to measure generally the CVD of 
Saudi shareholders via the CG constructs derived from the relevant CG literature. However, such 
measurements will be analysed further on groups via inferential statistical analysis to depict any 
anomalies between groups to address the existent of sub-cultural groups of Saudi shareholders. 
In addition, other criticisms aimed at Hofstede's model are summarized in the table below: 
Table 3.3: Arguements For and Against Hofstede 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST HOFSTEDE 
 
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HOFSTEDE 
 
Relevancy 
Surveys are not appropriate instruments to measure cultural 
disparities as such variable being measured is a value which 
culturally sensitive and subjective (Schwartz, 1999). 
Hofstede response to this criticism is that surveys are one 
method, but not the only method that was used (Hofstede, 
1998, p. 481). 
Cultural Homogeneity 
Hofstede’s study assumes domestic populations are 
homogenous whereas nations are composed of groups of 
ethnicities (Nasif et al., 1991, p. 82; Redpath, 1997, p. 336). 
Plus, Hofstede tends to ignore the importance of community, 
and the variations of the community influences (Dorfman and 
Howell, 1988, p. 129; Lindell and Arvonen, 1996; Smith, 
1998, p. 62). 
National Divisions 
Nations are not the proper units of analysis as cultures are not 
necessarily bounded by borders 
McSweeney (2000) - recent research has found that culture is 
in fact fragmented across group and national lines 
(DiMaggio, 1997). Hofstede points out however that national 
identities are the only means we have of identifying and 
measuring cultural differences (Hofstede, 1998, p. 481). 
Political Influences 
The outcomes, particularly those pertaining to Masculinity 
(Søndergaard, 1994, pp. 451-452) andUncertainty Avoidance 
(Newman, 1996, p. 775), may have been sensitive to the 
timing of the survey. Europe was in the midst of the cold war 
and was still haunted by vivid memories of World War Two, 
similarly there was the communist insurgence in Asia, Africa 
and Europe. As a result of the political instabilities of the 
time, the sample lacks data from socialist countries, as well 
as from the less affluent Third World Countries. 
Relevance 
During the time of its delivery there was very little work 
on culture, and at this time many businesses were just 
entering the international arena and were experiencing 
difficulties; they were crying out for credible advice. 
Hofstede’s work met and exceeded this demand for 
guidance. Scholarly attention was also turning toward 
culture during this period, and Hofstede was considered a 
pioneer and pathfinder (Søndergaard, 1994, pp. 448-449). 
Rigour 
The research framework used by Hofstede was based on 
rigorous design with systematic datacollection and 
coherent theory. This is just what scholars and the 
marketplace had been asking for 
(Søndergaard, 1994, pp. 448-449). However, many critics 
claim the sampling was flawed, being sparse and 
unevenly distributed (McSweeney, 2000). 
Relative Accuracy 
In Søndergaard’s bibliographical analysis (1994) he 
compared the replications (research similar toHofstede's 
IBM study, originated to compare his findings of 
Hofstede’s research. 61 replications were analysed. The 
majority of the replications confirmed Hofstede’s 
predictions. Four of the replications concurred in their 
entirety, and 15 showed partial confirmation. The only 
dimension of Hofstede’s that could not be validly 
confirmed was ‘Individualism’, however, Hofstede 
addressed this issue by predicting that cultures will shift 
over time (Søndergaard, 1994, pp. 450-453). 
Several studies were developed not as replications, but 
along similar lines, to test the relevancy of Hofstede’s 
questions. These have also confirmed the accuracy of 
Hofstede’s four dimensions (Søndergaard, 1994, p. 453). 
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One Company Approach 
A study fixated on only one company cannot possibly 
provide information on the entire cultural system of a country 
(Graves, 1986, pp. 14-15; Olie, 1995, p. 135; Søndergaard, 
1994, p. 449).  
Out-dated 
Some researchers have claimed that the study is too old to be 
of any modern value, particularly with today’s rapidly 
changing global environments, internationalisation and 
convergence 
Too Few Dimensions 
Hofstede agrees, he believes additional dimensions should 
continue to be added to his original work (Hofstede, 1998, p. 
481). 
  
One Company Approach 
Hofstede said he was not making an absolute measure, he 
was   gauging differences between cultures and this style 
of cross-sectional analysis was appropriate (Hofstede 
1998, p. 481). In addition, Hofstede points out that the 
use of a single multinational employer eliminates the 
effect of the corporate policy and management practices 
from different companies influencing behaviour 
differently, leaving only national culture to explain 
cultural difference (Hofstede, 1980). 
Out-dated 
Hofstede countered saying that the cross-cultural 
outcomes were based on centuries of indoctrination, 
recent replications have supported the contention that 
culture will not change overnight (Hofstede, 1998, p. 
481). 
Source: Table adapted from Jones (2007). 
 
Other criticism, apart from the early discussion, as depicted by table (3.3) such as in regard to 
relevance of Hofstede’s dimensions being out-dated and having a political influence, a conclusive 
response might be that Hofstede’s CVD model is widely used by scholars and practitioners as it has 
many appealing attributes (Furrer, 2000; Ross, 1999; Søndergaard, 1994, as cited in Jones, 2007). For 
instance, "Søndergaard (1994) found that Hofstede’s 1980 study received 1,036 citations, while 
another highly regarded study on strategy by Miles and Snow received only 200 citations" (Jones, 
2007). Moreover, it has been recommended that societal dimensions such as Hofstede's "should be 
considered in all cross-national studies of corporate governance" (Salter, Kang & Duong, 2015). In 
addition, “the cross-cultural outcomes were based on centuries of indoctrination; recent replications 
have supported the contention that culture will not change overnight’’(Hofstede, 1998, p. 481). 
Moreover, regarding cultural homogeneity criticism as depicted by table (3.3) and as discussed earlier, 
most reviewed anthropological studies such as Hofstede’s (1982-2010) and Schwartz’s (1992-2007) 
draw broad guidelines as their unit of analysis are the cultures whereas sociologists use the individual 
as a unit of analysis. Hence, sociologists can have multiple level of group analysis. Therefore, the 
researcher intends to avoid such generalization as he plans to use culture as a unit of analysis to capture 
the general and break down the dimensions on a micro-sociological level using the individual to draw 
comparison between groups of Saudi shareholders. 
In addition, other criticism aimed at the methodology used by Hofestede (1982-2010) is that “surveys 
are not appropriate instruments to measure cultural disparities as such variable being measured is a 
value which culturally sensitive and subjective” (Schwartz, 1999). However, survey research is 
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appropriate for such a paradigm bordering on functionalism as discussed earlier. In addition, as 
Hofstede claims surveys are one method but not the only method used when he accumulated his results 
(jones, 2007). In addition, another criticism is regarding the unit of analysis and that nations are not the 
proper units of analysis, Hofstede response to this critique is that “national identities are the only 
means we have of identifying and measuring cultural differences” (Hofstede, 1998, p. 481). 
Moreover, regarding the rigorous of Hofstede’s tests and its statistical integrity, apart from the early 
discussion, many critics claim that Hofstede’s sampling was flawed and unevenly distributed 
(McSweeney, 2002, 2009, 2013). Nevertheless, other contributors to this debate view that Hofstede 
used “rigorous design with systematic data collection and coherent theory. This is just what scholars 
and the marketplace had been asking for (Søndergaard, 1994, pp. 448-449, as cited in Jones, 2007)”. In 
addition,  
“the majority of the replications confirmed Hofstede’s predictions. Four of the replications concurred in their 
entirety, and 15 showed partial confirmation…[and] Several studies were developed not as replications, but along 
similar lines, to test the relevancy of Hofstede’s questions. These have also confirmed the accuracy of Hofstede’s 
four dimensions (Søndergaard, 1994, p. 450-453, as cited in jones 2007). 
 
Lastly, regarding the critique aimed at Hofstede using a one company approach and too few 
dimensions, critics claim that studies fixated on one company may not possibly provide information on 
the entire culture of a country (Graves, 1986, pp. 14-15; Olie, 1995, p. 135; Søndergaard, 1994, p. 449, 
as cited in Jones, 2007). However, Hofstede responded that he was not “making an absolute measure, 
he was gauging differences between cultures and this style of cross-sectional analysis was appropriate” 
(Hofstede 1998, p. 481). In addition, Hofstede points out that “the use of a single multinational 
employer eliminates the effect of the corporate policy and management practices from different 
companies influencing behaviour differently, leaving only national culture to explain cultural 
difference” (Hofstede, 1980). Moreover, Hofstede agrees that further dimensions shall continue to be 
added to his CVD model (Hofstede, 1998, p. 481). Hence, for purpose of this research the dimension 
of Long Term Orientation (LTO) found in the recent development of Hofstede (2010) model will be 
added to the investigation to address Saudi shareholders’ pragmatic approach towards their 
investments, orientation towards future dividends, and willingness to wait longer for dividends.  
3.2.5.7 Significance of CVD Models 
Understanding the impact of cultural values of societies on organisations has been suggested to be 
theoretically essential. Societal values highly influence organisations directly and indirectly (Schwartz 
& Sagiv, 2007). Specifically, personal factors such as individual's status, experience, and seniority are 
capable of providing individuals with the tools and abilities to influence organisational values (Gordon, 
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1991; Schein, 2010). Moreover, a high managerial position enables individuals to impose their views 
of what they think organisational values should be, such as dress codes, reward systems etc. Therefore, 
societal-culture values are capable of shaping organisational tasks even through governmental policies, 
media, and market systems (Schwartz & Sagiv, 2007).  
Empirical evidence of this effect has been documented through the work of Smith, Peterson and 
Schwartz (2002). They use data representative of 47 countries to test the ability of CVDs derived from 
Hofstede (1984), and Schwartz (1994) to predict the specific source of guidance on which managers' 
rely. They found values to be highly successful in predicating reliance on tacit sources of guidance, and 
sources of guidance are highly relevant to vertical relationships within organisations. Hence, they 
conclude that values are predictable of the substantial variances in the use of most widespread sources 
of guidance provided by organisations. As a result, management programs employ the CVD of 
Hofstede to raise cultural awareness and form the basis of training institutes. 
Moreover, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's values orientation theory (1961) suggests that attitudes are 
based on stable values. Therefore, human societies can answer a limited number of universal problems, 
and their cultures can represent different preferences among them. This way, values are capable of 
providing a method of measurement of cultural traits. As a result,  
"the psychological study of values [is] worthwhile for several reasons. Using the values concept, the researcher 
can aim to cover the whole of life-space, not just the positive and the negative, as with attitudes. Values are 
central to human thought, emotions and behavior. They are cross-culturally relevant and valid, and finally, values 
allow both between-group and within-group comparisons" (Hills, 2002). 
 
Hence, for the purpose of this research, Hofstede's model is more suitable as this research study is 
meant to assess the impact of Saudi culture on CG in light of minority shareholders’ rights, to answer 
the first research question: To what extent do available cultural models (for example, Hofstede, 2010) 
explain the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi 
Arabia? 
In addition, the application of culture as a unit of analysis as prescribed by Hofstede is not likely tobe 
an issue as Saudi society does not possess a high degree of ethnic variety. In fact, it is found that the 
use of Hofstede CVD model has "greater validity at the ethnical level of analysis... in countries without 
high Ethnic variety" (Khastar et al., 2011). Nevetheless, statistical results aimed at measuring the CVD 
of Saudi culture on CG constructs, drawn from the rights of minority shareholders found in the OECD 
principles, will be broken down onto groups to address any variation that might be found between 
groups of Saudi shareholders. Hence, any existence of sub-cultures will be considered in the statistical 
analysis.    
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3.2.6 Pyramid of Social Norms and CG: Shareholders' Perspective 
The study of social norms and their relations with the law is beneficial. Notionally, norms form a 
pyramid that is based on CVD theories found in cross-cultural psychology (Licht, 2001). Thus, various 
CVD models have the promise to advance our understanding of the relations between social norms, 
culture, and law. Nevetheless, by thoroughly reviewing the literature, the researcher finds it true as 
Licht (2001) confirms that the legal literature does not seem to recognise or be aware of this body of 
knowledge. However, in management and international accounting literature, Hofstede's (1984) CVD 
model dominates the analysis. 
In addition, Licht (2001) explains theoretically how CVD models integrate both views of social norms. 
He explains,  
"social norms scholars tend to define the term by specifying the mechanism that they believe engenders norms 
and maintains them. One can distinguish between two main lines of thought in this regard: the internal versus the 
external view of social norms. The key difference between these views is the identity, or location, of the factor 
that induces compliance with a norm. Under the internal view, this factor lies within the individual person. 
Depending on the situation, one feels compelled to obey the norm due to guilt or pride, namely, a “warm glow” 
for doing the right thing. Under the external view, people comply with social norms due to non-governmental 
enforcement and in light of a cost/benefit calculation of sorts." 
 
Therefore, "as cultural values shape and inform people’s internal utility functions, the theory of 
cultural value dimensions takes social norms analysis one step ahead…by providing an empirically 
validated framework with which to account for social phenomena that are otherwise difficult to 
reconcile with standard micro-economic predictions" (Licht, 2001). For instance, the norm of 
shareholder wealth maximisation stems from the CVD of Individualism found in Hofstede (1984 as 
cited in Licht, 2001). Conversely, the norm of stakeholders' rights is more consistent with Hofestede's 
collectivism dimension (Licht, 2001). As a consequence, it can be said that: 
“a cultural profile functions as an external mechanism for enforcement of societal norm in concurrence with 
internal mechanism. As societal values are so deeply rooted in such a society, they shape social institutions and 
environment. "This environment [in turn] gives meaning to action, defines what is socially acceptable and 
[ultimately] exercise social control through sanctioning" (Licht, 2001). 
Moreover, Licht recommends the use of the CVD frame work as it addresses the need expressed by 
researchers in CG studies to "operationlize social norms and integrate them into their analysis" (2001). 
In addition, even Hofstede, himself, witnesses the need for implementing the use of social norms 
through the CVD framework to address the issue of corporate legislation. He states,"Uncertainty 
avoiding countries will have a greater need for legislation than less-Uncertainty Avoiding countries" 
(Hofstede, 2005, p. 325).  Moreover, theories embedded in the CVD framework are capable of 
unveiling the intriguing relation between the content of the law (Law on Books) and the corresponding 
social norms of compliance with the law (Law in Action) (Licht, 2001). As claimed by Licht (2001) 
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such dilemma is likely to exist in societies that emphasise Autonomy and Egalitarianism (in 
Schwartz’s system) and Individualism (in Hofstede’s model). 
Nevertheless, “the pyramidal model of social norms enables one to specify conditions for effective use 
of the law in its expressive mode as a norm inducing means" (Licht, 2001).Even though law 
practitioners and scholars seem to overlook the importance of culture on laws and enforcements, there 
is a growing awareness among them regarding the relevance of national cultures to corporate 
governance practices around the world (Licht, 2001). This can be clearly seen in the recent, but still 
little, amount of work has been done in CG in relation to cross cultural psychology by law 
practitioners.  
Contrary to tradition, Licht, (2000) theoretically sketches a cultural theory of CG based on the CVD 
framework by "implementing it to fundamental issues like shareholding structures, the regulations of 
self dealing, insider trading and disclosure" (Licht, 2000). The major theoretically conclusive findings 
of Licht (2000) are: 
“National cultures can be seen, metaphorically, as the mother of path dependence dynamics in the sense that they 
play a role in both the origin and in future development of corporate governance systems. 
In their very essence, values are social norms, as social norms affect individual behavior and social institutions. 
The social norms addressed in most of the current law and economics literature tend to be particular and context 
specific and may also change rather quickly. In contrast, values are more general and stable. [As it has been 
previously explained by the work of Max Weber in the National Culture and Economic development section] 
One may thus imagine a pyramid of social norms in which cultural values constitute the foundations. Corporate 
governance systems build on these foundations to develop both formal and non-formal rules as well as structures. 
A very promising avenue for further research lies in the thriving field of law and social norms. This line of 
research recently reached corporate law too. Legal scholars generally perceive social norms as rules "governing 
an individual's behavior that third parties other than state agents diffusely enforce by means of social 
sanctions."Norms [however] guide people's behavior after having been internalized as a result of a socialization 
process. 
The CVD framework can lend itself to developing rigorous comparative approaches to social norms and their 
interrelations with the law in different cultures. 
Moreover, the use of the CVD frame work in corporate governance research should provide researcher with the 
shield of avoiding risks of relying on social myths and stereotypes"( Licht, 2000). 
 
In addition, empirical evidence about the relations between national cultures and social institutions is 
well documented in the literature. For example, in a study of 52 nations, three social norms of CG such 
as the rule of the law, corruption, and accountability have been operationalised in accordance with the 
CVD framework (Licht, Goldschmidt & Schwartz, 2002). The findings reveal that there are strong 
associations between these three norms with the prevailing cultures in those 52 nations. Most 
importantly, the associations of culture with governance norms are found substantial even when critical 
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economic and historical factors were considered. These findings are very helpful in assessing legal 
systems and economic mechanisms. Moreover, it has been recommended by Licht et al., (2002) that 
research into the relations between culture, governance and economics is both timely and warranted. 
Additionally, in an attempt to answer the intriguing question in what ways ' law on the books' reflect 
cultural values, an analysis between indices of investors’ legal rights (as coded by La Porta et al., 
1997), in relation to national cultural profiles (Hoftsede and Schwartz), was conducted by Licht, 
Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2005). Their findings present a strong association between statutory law 
and culture, specifically in the context of CG using CVD models. Therefore, they coclude that national 
scores on CVD models from the two leading theories in cross-cultural psychology, Hofstede and 
Schwartz, illustrate the fact that CG laws systematically relate to prevailing cultures.  
Moreover, societal norms play major roles depending on the legal system under which firms are 
incorporated (Coffee, 2001). In his thorough review of the literature, Coffee states,  
“One tentative generalization may, however, be advanced: Norms may matter most when law is the weakest. 
When formal law does not adequately protect shareholders, the strength of social norms becomes more important, 
because they could provide a functional substitute for law. Conversely, when legal rights and remedies 
adequately protect investors, there is less need for corporations to signal their intentions to observe standards that 
are already legally mandated or to develop creative means by which to bond those promises through self-help 
corporate governance measures" (2001). 
 
Evidently, in a sample of 90,000 stakeholders drawn from 29 countries, evidence suggests that 
differences in stakeholders' reactions towards bad corporate acts appear to be consistent with 
differences in the cultures of those countries, using Hofstede’s (1984) dimensions, (Williams & 
Zinkinn, 2008). Specifically, stakeholders in countries where Individualism is strong are more likely to 
punish firms for bad behavior than those in countries where collectivism is high (Williams & Zinkinn, 
2008). In addition, stakeholders in countries where time is considered to be a scarce resource, Short 
Term- Orientation, are more likely to punish firms than those in countries where a Long Term 
Orientation prevails (Williams & Zinkinn, 2008). 
In addition to that, Globalisation as a process has aided in the integration of worldwide competitive 
markets. It has also compelled firms worldwide to improve their CG regimes (Chan & Cheung, 2012). 
In fact, due to globalisation, good CG is expected by international investors to be a common strategy 
for corporations worldwide to satisfy the increasing demands of competitive markets. In a sample of 
271 firms in 12 countries, it was found that Hofstede’s CVD model has the explanatory power to 
reveal differences in CG worldwide (Chan & Cheung, 2012). The findings suggest that the dimensions 
Chapter Three: Literature Review   P a g e  | 46 
 
 
 
of Individualism, Masculinity, and Uncertainty Avoidance posses the explanatory power to predict CG 
scores for firms worldwide (Chan & Cheung, 2012). 
“People from different cultures will have different levels of ethical sensitivity and their levels of ethical 
sensitivity are influenced by the values and beliefs that are socialized by people in their cultures. In fact, we 
should try to understand others who have different levels of ethical sensitivity than us because they have been 
brought up in such a way. When discussing CG, continuous patience, education and negotiation are needed to 
show people who hold low ethical sensitivity to CG that inappropriate ethical sensitivity and perception in doing 
businesses is harmful to society. At the same time, in cultures where people have lower ethical sensitivity to CG, 
closer observation may be needed to ensure that they are following the appropriate ethical guidelines"(Chan & 
Cheung, 2012). 
 
These findings of Chan and Cheung (2012) are also supported by Armstrong (1996) and Chan and 
Cheung (2008). They all found that Individualism and Ethical Sensitivity are positively correlated. In 
addition, the fact that individuals in high individualistic countries strive for fair treatment from 
corporations is also supported by Hofstede (2005).  Hofstede (2005) describes the highly 
individualistic societies to prefer reward allocations based on equity and the same rights for all. In turn, 
such view influences the CG practice to reflect individualistic beliefs. 
Moreover, people in highly Masculine societies are found to have less ethical sensitivity (Blodgett, Lu, 
Rose & Vitell, 2001). In fact, those same people are also found to be less likely to be affected by codes 
of ethics (Lu, Rose & Blodgett, 1999). Hence, people in highly Masculine cultures are more concerned 
about their personal achievements and material wealth. By contrast, in a culture that possesses a high 
level of Femininity, people are found more compassionate and to have a strong ethical sensitivity 
(Hofstede, 2001; Nadler, 2002). Thus, Feminine orientated cultures are more inclined to improve their 
CG than highly Masculine ones. 
Furthermore, people in high Uncertainty Avoidance cultures are found to be highly compliant with 
formal rules (Husted 2000; Vitell, Nwachukwu & Barnes, 1993; Weaver 2001). However, those same 
people do not recognise the ethical dilemma in business decisions when no formal rules exist 
(Schepers, 2006). In addition, those same people are found to value ethical values set by themselves 
within a group membership (Schepers, 2006). Consequently, they find it hard to respect or comply 
with ethical guidelines set by outside members (Schepers, 2006). As a consequence, CG rules that are 
set to serve all stakeholders are found to score low in countries with a high level of Uncertainty 
Avoidance (Chan & Cheung, 2012). Therefore, "people from high Uncertainty Avoidance cultures may 
feel uncomfortable adopting any new management practices when their ‘own’ ethical codes, which are 
beneficial to in-group members, have been applied for so long" (Chan & Cheung, 2012).  
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Moreover, some studies such as Rawwas’s (2001) take the challenge of pairing Hofstede’s dimensions 
to utilise societal groupings. As a result, Rawwas (2001) describes small Power Distance and weak 
Uncertainty Avoidance people to be ‘functionalists’. High Power Distance and strong Uncertainty 
Avoidance people are described as ‘deferents’. Weak Power Distance and strong Uncertainty 
Avoidance people are given the description of ‘survivors’. Strong Power Distance and weak 
Uncertainty Avoidance people are viewed as ‘enthusiasts’. Interestingly, Rawwas finds these four 
types of societies to hold opposing perceptions regarding the appropriateness of behavior in the market 
place. For example, ‘deferents’ were found so obedient to their bosses' rules, but were also found to 
have stringent ethical beliefs. 
Rossouw (2005) states ‘‘the way in which a company treats its stakeholders reflects its ethical 
standards. It is therefore to be expected that companies for whom ethics is a priority will be sensitive to 
its stakeholders. This moral sensitivity will be reflected in the identification of stakeholders as well as 
in the manner in which they are being engaged by the Company’’ (p. 99). Hence, national culture CVD 
models are also capable of explaining existing corporate policies and procedures put in place.  
In addition to that, the association of Hofstede’s CVD model in the determination of the different 
dividend policies found worldwide has been recently under scrutiny by researchers. In a sample of 
112,295 firms from 33 countries, it has been found that the cultural dimensions of Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Masculinity, and Long-term Orientation affect both the potential to pay dividends and the 
amount of dividends paid (Bae, Chang & Kang, 2012).  In addition, this association has varied with the 
strength of CG regimes found worldwide, measured by the degree of investors' protection. The 
findings of this study also suggest that firms are more likely to pay lower dividends in high 
Uncertainty Avoidance, high Masculinity and high Long Term Orientation cultures (Bae, Chang & 
Kang, 2012). Hence, the relation between cultural dimensions and dividend level varies in accordance 
with the level of strength of investor protections.  
“Collectively, cultural dimensions are negatively related to dividend levels and investor protection is positively 
related to dividend payouts. The cultural factors and investor protection, however, interact with each other, such 
that strong investor protection is positively associated with firms’ dividend levels even in highly uncertainty-
avoiding and/or highly masculine cultures.[ Therefore,] national culture and investor protection independently 
affect firms’ dividend payouts but also interact with each other, such that strong investor protection induces 
higher dividend payouts in high uncertainty avoiding and/or highly masculine cultures” ( Bae, Chang & Kang, 
2012). 
 
In addition, level of dividend are found to be positively affected by the CG measures of firm size, 
dividend tax incentives, and negatively affected by financial leverage, growth rate and a country's 
stock market development (Bae, Chang & Kang, 2012).   
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Moreover, the predicative nature of Hofstede’s CVD model has provided a strong support for the 
argument that norms rooted in such culture affect the CG practice, at least at the board level. 33,999 
multinational firms in 15 industrial countries were empirically investigated by Li and Harrison (2008) 
to find out to what extent national cultures influence the composition and leadership structure of the 
boards of directors. Their findings supported the predictive nature of Hofstede’s CVD model. Their 
results suggest that national cultures have a major effect on CG. For instance, 
"Firms based in uncertainty avoiding cultures tend to have more outside directors on their boards and tend to 
consolidate the CEO and chair positions. Firms based in societies that value higher levels of individual freedom 
tend to have a higher percentage of outside directors on their boards, and also consolidate the leadership 
positions. Firms based in societies that value personal dominance (masculinity) tend to have fewer outside 
directors, and also to consolidate the leadership positions. Firms based in societies that prefer high power 
distances are more likely to have a single leader as both board chair and CEO and fewer insiders on the board"  
(Li & Harrison, 2008). 
 
In addition, such relationship between Hofstede’s CVD model and CG measures of board 
compositions and structures have been substantiated by other previous research, such as (Ghoshal & 
Bartlett, 1990; Doz & Prahalad, 1991; Nelson, 1993). 
3.2.7 Market Maturity and CG: Shareholders’ Perspective 
The cultural influence on the level of CG is empirically investigated by Chan and Cheung (2008). 
Their findings are suggestive of the dimensions of Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance to be 
the most valuable indicators of the degree of CG, regardless of the maturity of a country’s stock 
market. Also, their results suggest that Low Power Distance and Low Uncertainty Avoidance in a 
culture are associated with strong CG regimes worldwide. The logic behind such an association is the 
fact that shareholders in Low Power Distance countries are culturally equipped with applying more 
pressure on corporations to improve accountability, openness, and ultimately governance (Sweeney, 
2008). In addition, people in low Uncertainty Avoidance cultures are  more encouraged to speak about 
poor governance practices and , in turn,  corporations are "more accustomed to handling such diversity, 
conflict, and feedback from shareholders" (Sweeney, 2008). 
Therefore, despite of the historical significance of a nation’s market or how long it has been in 
operation or whether or not it has reached maturity, cultural dimensions such as Hofstede’s are more 
prevailingly predictive of better governance. "Age alone isn’t enough to make people smarter or to 
provide more governance protections. A ‘governance friendly’ culture can help a newly developing 
country short-circuit problems that might be faced by other countries” (Sweeney, 2008). 
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3.2.8 Adopted CG Definition and its Implications: 
There is a lot of logic in Sweeney's interpretations of the work of Chan and Cheung (2008) as such 
logic has been confirmed by other empirical studies such as Williams and Zinkin (2008). Hence, the 
adoption of Sweeney's definition of CG is worthwhile for the purpose of this study. Sweeney states, 
"corporate governance refers to forces that encourage management to be accountable and to act in the 
interests of stakeholders. These forces are varied and complex. They include the nature of the firm’s 
organizational structure, type of legal system, accounting protections, and even the political" (2008). 
Further evidence of the implications of Sweeney's definition is found in an empirical study of 41 
countries regarding the issues of private benefits of control and earnings management (Zhang, Liang & 
Sun, 2013). Their findings suggest strong evidence of culture, legal rules, and law enforcement playing 
critical roles in shaping corporate behaviours. Their statistical results reveal the fact that both private 
benefits of control and earnings management are positively associated with the level of collectivism in 
any given society. In turn, both private benefits of control and earnings management are found 
negatively associated with the level of investors' protection in any given country (Zhang et al., 2013). 
Unlike in individualistic cultures, agency issues found between stakeholders are severe in collective 
cultures (Zhang et al., 2013).  In addition, their results are robust as they included “controls for investor 
protection, country wealth, and economic heterogeneity across countries as well as international 
differences in Owner [ship concentration]” (Zhang et al., 2013). 
Moreover, in a an attempt to capture all determinants of investor protection around the world, Matoussi 
and Jardak (2012) embraced the dimensional diversity of cultural, legal, and political factors affecting 
the level of investors’ protection in 81 countries, which in turn impacted on financial market 
development worldwide. Their findings suggest that high Individualism, low Uncertainty Avoidance, 
and low Power Distance are capable of providing stronger protections for investors worldwide. 
Moreover, the legal origin factor is found to have both direct and indirect impact on stock markets’ 
capitalisations through the mediation of investors’ protection legislation (Matoussi & Jardak, 2012). In 
addition, the political factor is found to have a direct effect on market capitalisations (Matoussi & 
Jardak). Lastly, religion and Masculinity are found not to be significant in causing variations among 
investors’ protections and market developments around the world (Matoussi & Jardak). 
3.2.9 Effects of Religions and Languages on CG: Shareholders’ Perspective 
In an attempt to determine the effect of religion and language as the core cultural proxies when 
examining the variations of investors’ protections across countries, certain elements of cultural proxies 
have been found to be significant when accounting for legal origins (Stulz & Williamson, 2003). In a 
sample of 49 countries, the cultural proxies, language and religion, were found to play significant roles 
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in the variations of shareholders' rights worldwide (Stulz & Williamson, 2003). Also, these cultural 
proxies were found to have more explanatory power of how a country enforces investors' rights (Stulz 
& Williamson, 2003). Therefore, in Muslim countries close attention should be paid to institutional 
forces when investigating variations of shareholders' rights (Stulz & Williamson, 2003). In addition, 
the cultures of countries which were colonies not long ago tend to matter less. Hence, the cultures that 
matter more for institutions in those past colonised countries are rather the cultures of the colonising 
countries (Pistor, Keinan, Kleinheisterkamp & West, 2001).  Moreover, the degree of openness to 
international trade of such cultures is found to mitigate the influences of religion and language (Stulz 
& Williamson, 2003). 
A similar but rather more specific attempt to uncover whether or not cultures in general and religions 
in particular are capable of mitigating earnings management has been documented. A sample of 31 
countries reveals that earnings management is unrelated to religions "despite the social stigma 
engendered by major religions against manipulative activities" (Callen, Morel & Richardson, 2010). 
Such result can be rationalised in many ways.  “Unlike tax evasion for example, earnings management 
is not necessarily viewed by religious adherents as being solely manipulative. Earnings management 
may be more nuanced and may be ascribed, at least some of the time, to a positive economic activity, 
namely, management’s attempt to signal firm productivity" (Callen, Morel & Richardson, 2010).  
Such findings possibly convey the fact that religion might matter but rather implicitly, as it influences 
other cultural variables. Nevertheless, limitations of such findings have been attributed to possible 
aggregation of data, and small sample size restricting their ability to reveal concrete evidence (Callen, 
Morel & Richardson, 2010). However, the most intriguing finding of this study is that earning 
management is found negatively related to Hofstede (1980) cultural dimension of Individualism and 
positively related to the dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance (Callen, Morel & Richardson, 2010). 
Therefore, the impact of culture on earning management in terms of religion is equivalent of the impact 
of culture on corruption. An analysis of the impact of culture on corruption using religion as a proxy, 
in a sample of 11 religious variables from 100 countries, for such culture was undertaken by Paldam 
(2001).  The findings reveal that reformed Christian sectarians such as Protestants and Anglicans 
decreased corruption whereas the pre-reform Christian sectarians of Catholics and Orthodoxies did not 
(Paldam, 2001). Islam can be added to the pre-reform group as indicated by Paldam (2001). This 
nature of cultural effect in terms of religions on economic development is philosophically attributed to 
Max Weber’s (1904) work, who predicted such a link a century ago, observing "clear signs of this 
mechanism were found but it is difficult to estimate from static-cross data as it has developed via 
historical processes" (Paldam, 2001). However, Adam Smith’s (1776) assumption of religious 
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diversity's capabilities of reducing corruption is a suitable counterpart for further investigations of such 
an effect.   
3.2.10 Summery 
Cultural theory of CG based on the CVD framework has addressed fundamental issues pertaining to 
minority shareholders such as shareholding structures, the regulations of self dealing, insider trading 
and disclosure in previous research. Moreover, Hofstede's (2010) CVD model is more suitable  to 
assess the impact of Saudi Culture on CG in light of minority shareholder’s rights to answer the first 
research questions: To what extent do available cultural models (for example, Hofstede, 2010) explain 
the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia? 
Implications of such association are going to aid in assessing the rights of minority shareholders in 
Saudi Arabia as they are culturally and economically driven. Specifically, Hofstede’s CVD will 
account for social norms and their relations with the law in terms of CG as it has been suggested to be 
beneficial (Licht, 2001). Notionally, norms form a pyramid that is based on cultural value dimension 
theories found in cross-cultural psychology (Licht, 2001). Thus, value dimension models such as 
Hofstede’s (1984) offer the promise of advancing understanding of the relations between social norms, 
culture, and law (Licht, 2000). 
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3.3 Legal Literature 
In order to answer the second research question of this thesis, regarding the legal factors that might 
influence the level of CG compliance of listed Saudi corporations with minority shareholders’rights, a 
review of the relevant international legal literature on CG will contribute largely in terms of 
identifying critical legal constructs to implement via a research method to investigate the Saudi legal 
environment.   
Figure 3.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
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identifying the ultimate shareholders of large corporations in 27 countries, findings suggest a 
completely different picture than the once predicted by Berle and Means (La Porta et al., 1999). Firstly, 
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legislated investor protection have a dilemma of separation of ownership and control; however, it is far 
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these controlling families have the power and interest to expropriate minority shareholders. Fourthly, 
controlling families are found to neithersupport nor encourage legal reforms enhancing minority 
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shareholders’ rights. Instead, these families are found to lobby against such reforms. Fifthly, La Porta 
et al. state that "ownership concentration is a consequence of poor legal protection of minority 
shareholders casts doubt on the theory of Mark Roe (1994): policy discouraging ownership 
concentration" (1999). 
Moreover, in their work, La Porta et al. (1999) recommend ways of solving the agency conflict 
between controlling families and minority shareholders through improving the legal environment. 
Their recommendations focused on implementing the tools of extensive disclosure and one-share one 
vote mechanism. Nevertheless, they admit such strategies will not succeed as long as those controlling 
families are hiding behind their pyramidal structures. Perhaps, making the legal reform more radical in 
giving minority shareholders explicit rights to protect them from expropriation and enabling these 
explicit rights to be remedied might prove to be a progressive step, as suggested by Berglof (1997).  In 
summary, “existing ownership structures are primarily an equilibrium response to the domestic legal 
environments that companies operate in" (La Porta et al., 1999). Hence, it is quite hard for potential 
entrepreneurs seeking external capital to succeed in an environment where they have no such 
persuasive political voice as those controlling families (La Porta et al., 1999). 
In addition to that, the legal environment is arguably seen as a potential agency cost as it serves the 
purpose of powerful parties at the expense of others. For example, in a mathematically-theoretical 
study designed to uncover the relationship between this type of an agency cost and how it operates in 
relation to concentration of ownership and control, it was found that this cost was as real as any other 
costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, "the level of agency costs depends, among other things, 
on statutory and common law and human ingenuity in devising contracts" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Hence, the law relevant to modern corporations worldwide should be viewed as the product of a 
historical process shaped by interested parties. 
3.3.2 The Link between Poor Investor Protection and Undeveloped Markets 
In a sample of 49 countries, the findings of La Porta et al. (1999) reveal a strong relationship between 
weak investor protection regimes and the sizes of their capital markets. Also, their findings confirm the 
notion that enforcement regimes of legal environments, as characterised by legal rules, have a major 
impact in determining the size of any given country's capital market.  The logic behind such 
associations is that , "a good legal environment protects the potential financier against expropriation by 
entrepreneurs-it raises their willingness to surrender funds in exchange for securities, and hence 
expands the scope of capital markets" (La Porta et al., 1997).  In addition to that, this study is 
considered one of the first to reveal how civil law countries, such as France, arguably have poor 
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investor protection, which led them to have less developed markets as compared to common law 
countries such as England. Such evidence is rationalised as having 'unfriendly' investor law which: 
 Kept investors relatively weak 
 Assured controlling families and states larger roles to play in economic development (La Porta 
et al., 1997). 
In addition, La Porta et al. (2000b) argue that the legal approach is a more suitable way in aiding our 
understanding of CG and its reforms worldwide than the traditional distinction between bank-centred 
and market centred financial systems. As a result, La Porta et al. (2000b) sought to support such a 
notion by collecting data from 49 countries classified by their legal origins. Hence, their findings 
reveal that a strong investor protection is highly associated with effective CG in countries characterised 
by “broad financial markets, dispersed ownership of shares, and efficient allocation of capital across 
firms" (La Porta et al., 2000b). Moreover, their findings also reveal how natures of different CG 
regimes around the world are rooted in the legal origins of their laws. In addition, the findings of La 
Porta et al. (2000b) enforce their previous findings of (1997) that existing CG regimes around the 
world are designed to benefit key politicians and controlling families. 
Moreover, in an attempt to unveil the effects of degrees of legal protections on valuations of listed 
corporations worldwide, the findings of La Porta et al. (2002) offer strong evidence of high valuation 
of firms in countries with strong protection for minority shareholders, from a sample of 539 large firms 
located in 27 wealthy economies. Hence, their findings indicate how weak protection of minorities in 
such countries is causing lower valuations for their large corporations. Nevertheless, this finding is 
offset by the high level of cash flow ownership which improves valuations of firms in those countries 
(La Porta et al., 2002). Overall, La Porta et al. (2002) assist in explaining the link between various 
investor protection regimes around the world, and the level of market development. In addition, they 
help in explaining , "the role of investor protection in shaping corporate finance, by clarifying the roles 
which both the incentives and the law play in delivering value to outside shareholders" (La Porta et al., 
(2002) 
After building a model empirically capable of predicting the link between the degrees of investor 
protection in a given country in relation to its corporate valuations, La Porta et al. (2002) gathered data 
from 4,000 companies from 33 countries to investigate the effect of dividends. They created two 
agency models of dividends. “The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should 
be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite" (La Porta et al., 
2002). Their findings reveal that corporations located in countries with strong investor protection pay 
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higher dividends. Furthermore, fast growth firms in these countries pay lower dividends than slow 
growth corporations. 
 Hence, such evidence reveals how well-protected shareholders are willing to wait for their dividends, 
unlike in countries with weak investor protections (La Porta et al., 2002). Therefore, this evidence 
indicates how well-protected shareholders entrust corporations to seize opportunities as opposed to 
weakly protected investors, who seem to be willing to take whatever dividends they can get their hands 
on. As La Porta et al. (2002) state "firms appear to pay out cash to investors because the opportunities 
to steal or miss-invest it are in part limited by law, and because minority shareholders have enough 
power to extract it. In this respect, the quality of legal protection of investors is as important for 
dividend policies as it is for other key corporate decisions". 
Moreover, vote value studies reveal some insights into minority shareholder protection issues in cross 
country analysis. The findings of Nenova (2003) highlight the significance of the legal framework in 
'curbing private benefits' using a sample of 661 dual class firms in 18 countries. Nenova undertook a :   
"study of vote value by transferring the focus away from the value of a single vote towards the control block as a 
measure of the value of voting power. The legal framework that governs the link between those two magnitudes 
is made explicit … [Hence] Law enforcement, investor protection, takeover regulations, and corporate charter 
provisions together explain 68% of the systematic differences in the value of control-block votes"(Nenova, 
2003). 
 
Theoretical supporting evidence of the above findings of Nenova (2003) is found in Grossman and 
Hart's work (1987). The findings of Grossman and Hart (1987) conclude that a one share-one vote 
mechanism is capable of reducing the effect of block holding and the size of private benefits.  Also, 
their theoretical findings show how the dispersed assignment of income claims to voting rights 
"determines the extent to which an acquirer must face competition from parties who value the firm for 
its security benefits rather than its private benefits" (Grossman & Hart, 1987). Hence, it is in the 
shareholders' best interests to accumulatively aid in setting the cost of acquiring control as high as 
possible (Grossman & Hart, 1987). 
3.3.3 Critique of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny’s (LLSV) work 
In recent years, many studies have used the variables in La Porta et al. (1997-1998) on shareholders' 
protections in CG. Due to the ground breaking effect of the La Porta et al’s studies regarding 
shareholders' protection worldwide, studies such as Dyck and Zingales (2004), Licht et al. (2005) and 
Paganos and Volpin (2005) rely on its findings in terms of the variables used to determine the degree 
of shareholder's protections in cross-country studies. In addition to that, the European Commission's 
‘draft directive’ regarding shareholders' rights explicitly refers to La Porta et al. (Siems, 2006). 
Chapter Three: Literature Review   P a g e  | 56 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, other researchers cast some doubts on La Porta et al.’s significant variables (e.g. 
Braendle, 2006; Cools, 2005; Spamann, 2006). Conclusively, these opposing studies identify some 
coding errors in the construction of the Anti-Director Index used by La Porta et al. Specifically, these 
researchers perceive the limited number of significant variables suggested by La Porta et al. to be 
hardly sufficient to provide any meaningful picture of the legal protection of shareholders worldwide 
(Siems, 2006). 
Conversely to La Porta et al’s index of 1997, Lele and Siems’s (2007) study builds a new protection 
index for five countries (UK, US, Germany, France, and India) and traces the developments of the law 
over the past 30 years. Lele and Siems (2007) call the methodological quantification of the legal rules 
across time series and legal system they use their ' Leximetrics'. In addition, their findings imply 
improvements in shareholder's protections over the past 35 years. Contrary to La Porta et al., Lele and 
Seims’ (2007) study suggests that the legal protection of shareholders in the US is weaker compared to 
' block-holders' countries such as France, Germany and India due to the care exercised by legislators in 
those countries in framing laws responsible for the protection of minority shareholders. In addition, 
Lele and Siems state, “[their examination] does not confirm the distinction between common-law and 
civil law countries" (2007).  Nevertheless, one of the limitations of their studies is that the 'score' of 
their shareholder protection index is not tested in terms of whether or not it could provide better CG 
and ultimately boosts the economical development of any given country (Lele & Siems, 2007). 
In their article on the ‘leximetric analysis’ (Lele & Siems, 2007), both authors provide some analytical 
insights of Siems' (2006) findings that La Porta et al.’s choice of variables suffer tremendously from a 
US bias. Hence, La Porta et al.’s Anti-Director Index is a poor proxy for shareholders' protections in 
general. In addition, La Porta et al.’s Anti-Director Index variables do not capture the most significant 
elements of the law pertaining to shareholders' protections (Lele & Siems, 2007; Coffess, 2001). 
Hence, La porta et al.’s assumption of good shareholder protections regimes worldwide being capable 
of producing more dispersed ownership structure in developed capital markets is found unproven.  
Moreover, the division between common law and civil law countries emphasised by La Porta et al. is 
also found misleading. "Although there is more dispersed shareholder ownership in the US and the 
UK, this commonality is not reflected in the law on shareholder protection. With respect to the law, 
generalisations about (Anglo-Saxon) common-law countries and (Continental) civil-law countries are 
therefore doubtful” (Siems, 2006). For instance, “if one speaks of colonies (and not members of the 
same legal family) it becomes clear that the reasons for differences among countries may be a 
consequence not only of different legal origins but also, for instance, of the ongoing political and 
economic effects of colonization" (Siems, 2007). Notably, Siems (2006) points out that as "the social, 
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political and economic conditions that form the background to shareholder law come closer together 
internationally, the law itself will also grow more similar (“convergence through congruence”). 
Secondly, individual interest groups will press for a greater approximation of laws (“convergence 
through pressure”)". 
Further doubts of the applicability of La Porta et al.’s index of 1997 is cast by Cools (2005). "A broad 
array of legal sources, however, reveals many mechanisms that interfere with, or substitute for, the 
mechanisms for shareholder protection used to construct the [La Porta et al] index. Hence, recoding of 
the index to include these sources yields no significant differences between common law and civil law 
jurisdictions (Cools, 2005). Therefore, this finding analytically sabotages the countless studies 
assuming different degrees of investor protection between common and civil law countries. 
Nevertheless, a major area of difference between the US and Continental Europe is found in the 
distribution of power within corporations (Cools, 2005). For instance, management in any US 
corporation has the legal power to run a corporation without the effect of other constituencies to 
intervene (Cools, 2005). On the other hand, the law, in Continental Europe, puts the power in the hands 
of stockholders. Thus, the board of any given corporation cannot ignore nor overlook stockholders' 
views (Cools, 2005).  
Moreover, the prevailing concentrated ownership structure in Continental Europe is arguably 
understood in terms of the distribution of power as it is granted in the hands of large shareholders. For 
example, in Continental Europe, the law empowers majority shareholders to appoint the board and 
hold its members accountable to their wishes (Cools, 2005). Unlike in Continental Europe, the United 
States’ laws empower management, along with boards, to run listed corporations (Cools, 2005). Hence, 
allowing more dispersed structure of ownership. “This difference in the way corporate law distributes 
the powers within a corporation has too often been neglected in legal and economic 
scholarship…Revising received theories from this new angle therefore promises to yield many new 
insights" (Cools, 2005). 
In addition, the different legal systems available worldwide have produced different laws regulating 
shareholders' protection. Nevetheles, the criteria set by La Porta et al.’s index of 1997 is contestably 
viewed as hardly recognisable of this simple fact (Braendle, 2006). In a thorough review of company 
law in the US and Germany, Braendle (2006) states, “Proxy votes of banks, the deposit of shares and 
cumulative voting in Germany illustrate where LLSV sticks to US-oriented criteria without giving 
Civil Law countries the opportunity to meet the goal of the criterion with other means" (Braendle, 
2006). In addition, after re-coding the criteria, Germany is, to a large extent, found to perform much 
better than in the original study produced by LLSV (Braendle, 2006). Therefore, it is clear to Braendle 
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(2006) that LLSV’s index does not consider the different ownership structures neither does it recognise 
the different allocation of power within corporations worldwide. 
Another attempt of re-coding LLSV (1998) Anti Director rights’ Index pertaining to shareholder's 
protection using the same 46 countries in 1997 and 2005, the findings of Spamann (2006) suggest that 
LLSV index’s values “are neither distributed with significant differences between Common and Civil 
Law countries, nor predictive of stock market outcomes” (Spamann, 2006).  Hence, Spamann claims 
that the countless empirical studies, over the past 10 years, using LLSV non-recoded index as a 
measure of investor protections have obtained erroneous results.  Thus, Spamann views the link 
between the strength of shareholder's protection and the dispersion of ownership in LLSV’s (1999) 
work as fragile and ultimately their stock market predictions as suspicious. 
3.3.4 LLSV Response to Criticism 
 Djankov, La Porta, Lopez and Shleifer (2008) re-constructed a new index of shareholder's 
protection for 72 countries. Their new index is aimed at addressing the protection of minority 
shareholders against self-dealing transactions benefiting controlling stakeholders (Djankov et al., 
2008).  They claim this new self-dealing index is better grounded in theory as opposed to the Anti-
director index constructed by LLSV (1997-1998). The reason for this was that the new index is derived 
from the historical legal principle of fiduciary duties (Djankov et al., 2008). In addition to that, this 
new index, according to Djankov et al. (2008), is composed of the same variables found in the Anti-
Director Index as well as the indices of shareholders' protection found in securities laws previously 
constructed by La Porta, Lopez and Shleifer (2006). They also claim that this new index is higher in 
common law countries than in civil law countries. Moreover, they claim this new Anti-Self-Dealing 
Index is statistically significant and is economically a strong predictor of stock market developments 
(Djankov et al., 2008). They explain,  
"self-dealing is the central problem of corporate governance in most countries, the law’s effectiveness in 
regulating this problem is the fundamental element of shareholder protection. This suggests to us that, in general, 
the anti-self-dealing index is preferable to the anti-director-rights index in cross country empirical work" 
(Djankov et al., 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, they admit, "this does not mean that politics, media, or cultures do not affect legal rules – 
they surely do. But the evidence shows quite clearly that legal origins are not merely proxies for 
politics or media; they exert large and powerful influences on legal rules"(Djankov et al., 2008). 
In addition, they explain the rationale behind the differences found between the common law countries 
as opposed to the civil law ones as due to the treatment of each in regard to related party transactions in 
terms of closer regulatory and legal scrutiny (Djankov et al., 2008). Also, they reaffirm their result of 
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common law countries subjecting related party transactions to greater disclosure and arm's length 
approval to early findings by La Porta et al., (2000).  
Djankov et al. (2008) summarise their results as follow: 
1. "Our results suggest that effective regulation of large self-dealing transactions combines full public 
disclosure of such transactions (including potential conflicts) with the requirement of approval by 
disinterested shareholders. 
2. To avoid shareholder involvement in the daily activities of such groups, the law needs to set lower 
bounds on which intra-group transactions must be disclosed and brought to shareholders for approval. 
3. We stress that this approach to regulating self-dealing is compatible with any legal system, and is 
appropriate for both rich and developing countries. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) also 
report significant benefits of full disclosure for stock market development with regard to firms issuing 
securities to the public. 
4. The evidence suggests that ongoing disclosure of self-dealing transactions, combined with a relative 
ease of litigation by aggrieved shareholders, also benefits stock market development. 
5. Our results suggest that giving aggrieved shareholders the standing to sue, access to information to 
examine self-dealing, and a low burden of proof would deter investor expropriation and promote stock 
market development 
6. The evidence suggests that the government’s power to impose fines and prison terms for self-dealing 
transactions does not benefit stock market development. We stress that this is a narrow conclusion, since 
we lack data on the actual enforcement of criminal sanctions and cannot rule out that public enforcement 
matters under alternative scenarios. 
7. To avoid self-dealing, however, it appears best to rely on extensive disclosure, approval by disinterested 
shareholders, and private enforcement." 
 
Shortly after their collaboration with Djankov in their (2008) study, La Porta and his collegues,  
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,followed up the previous study with further analysis using the 
same data. In their analysis of La Porta et al. (2008), they justify their initial stand of La porta et al’s., 
(1997) assumptious findings in regard to the prevalence of common law over civil law in providing a 
better investor protection legal framework.  Also, they cement their previous claim that differences in 
legal regulations are attributed to the legal origin (La Porta et al., 2008).  They explain, “the policy 
implementing focus of civil law versus the market supporting focus of common law—explains well 
why legal rules differ"(La Porta et al., 2008). In addition, they add that their theory of the legal origin 
will hold as long as the world economy guided by capitalism remains stable (La Porta et al., 2008). 
Hence, more countries will converge with the common law legal environment to better improve and 
develop their capital markets (La Porta et al., 2008). Otherwise, a shift towards embracing the Civil 
Law is more likely as historically documented (La Porta et al., 2008).  
Moreover, La Porta et al. (2008) claim that legal origin is closely tied to the type of capitalism. 
Therefore, the appropriate question to ask accordinaglly is which type of capitalism is likely to prevail 
in the long run; the market focus or state centered capitalism (La Porta et al., 2008).  Nevertheless, 
Globalisation will have a major effect on both systems as exchange of ideas about laws and regulations 
is more likely to increase the transfer of legal knowledge (La Porta et al., 2008).  Hence, convergence 
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will work both ways. For instance, a common law country such as the US has adopted a policy–state 
legislation to address a social problem through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (La Porta et al., 2008). On the 
other hand, in Continental Europe, there has been a reduction in labour regulations and increase in 
shareholder's rights (La Porta et al., 2008).   
3.3.5 The Impact of Shareholders' Rights on Firms' Earnings, Valuations and Law 
Convergence 
In an attempt to investigate the relationship between the strength of investor protection, firm 
performance and valuations, a sample of 1500 large firms during 1990-1999 was empirically 
investigated by Gompers, Ishii and Metick (2003). Using the 24 governance rules ascribed in the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Gompers et al. (2003) constructed a Governance 
Index, entitled the G Index, to measure the strength of shareholders' rights in relation to firm 
performance and valuation. Their results indicate a strong correlation between CG and stock returns. 
For instance, "an investment strategy that purchased shares in the lowest-G firms (‘Democracy’ firms 
with strong shareholder rights), and sold shares in the highest-G firms (‘Dictatorship’ firms with weak 
shareholder rights), earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year" (Gompers et al., 2003). In 
addition, corporations in democratic countries, where shareholders rights are strong, were found to be 
valued higher and have high returns correlating with higher performances. Nevertheless, the only 
limitation of this study is accredited to the data not allowing strong conclusion about causality 
(Gompers et al., 2003). 
The relative importance of the 24 provisions found in the Gompers et al. (2003) G-Index was 
investigated by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) using a sample of 3,200 firms from 1990-2003. 
Their findings reveal that increases in the index components are found ‘monotonically’ correlated with 
economical reductions in corporate valuations and negative returns (Bebchuk et al., 2009). In addition, 
18 of the IRRC provisions were found uncorrelated with reduction in firms' valuations and negative 
returns (Bebchuk et al., 2009). Arguably, this study identifys the six 'entrenching' provisions 
responsible for the causality, and they are titled in the E-Index this: staggered boards; limits to 
shareholder by law amendments; poison pills; golden parachutes; supermajority requirements for 
mergers; and charter amendments (Bebchuk et al., 2009). Bebchuk et al. state, 
" our analysis cautions against the “kitchen sink” approach of building ever-larger indexes of governance 
measures… any large set of governance provisions, many are likely not to matter or to be an endogenous product 
of others…[ hence]adding more provisions to an index is hardly bound to be beneficial; in this area, less can be 
more. Shareholders and their advisers might do well to focus on those corporate governance provisions that really 
matter for firm value"(Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009).   
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 Moreover, the documented association between governance indices and abnormal returns from 1990-
1999 has diminished as indicated by a sample of 3,400 firms from 1990-2008 (Bebchuk, Cohen & 
Wang, 2013). The findings of their study reveal that one of the reasons behind the diminishing returns 
is due to the fact that market participants have learnt to appreciate the difference between good 
governance and poor governance corporations (Bebchuk et al., 2013). Furthermore: 
"the correlation’s disappearance was associated with increases in market participants’ attention to governance; 
market participants and security analysts were, until the beginning of the 2000s but not subsequently, more 
positively surprised by the earning announcements of good-governance firms; and, although governance indices 
no longer generated abnormal returns during the 2000s, their negative association with firm value and operating 
performance persisted"(Bebchuk et al., 2013). 
 
Another attempt examining whether or not strong shareholders' rights induced higher earnings quality 
is carried by Jiang and Rajan (2009), using a sample of 5,658 firms. Their findings reveal that greater 
shareholder empowerment, as measured by the Gomper's Index, is found to correlatewith higher 
earnings (Jiang & Rajan, 2009).  Nevertheless, this positive effect is weakened when controlling for 
institutional investors concentrating on short-investment horizons (Jiang &Rajan, 2009). Evidently, 
institutional investors appear to have used their increased empowerment to influence management so 
that they could increase the value of their shares in the short run (Jiang & Rajan, 2009).  Hence, this 
study sheds lights on the type of institutional ownership and its effect on the quality of corporate 
earnings. However, the main limitation of this attempt is the sample size, which was restricted to 
available date on both shareholders' index and institutional ownership (Jiang & Rajan, 2009). 
In addition to that, in examining the effect of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
mandatory adoption and investor protection on the quality of accounting earnings, a sample of 46 
countries from the period of 1998-2007 reveal a strong association (Houqe, Van Zijl, Dunstan & 
Karim, 2012). The findings indicate that adoption of IFRS standerds ‘per se’ does not lead to increase 
in earnings quality. Rather, earning quality is increased when mandatory IFRS standards are adopted in 
a country where the investor protection regime is found to be already strong (Houqe et al., 2012). 
Regardless of this study's limitation illustrated by the short time period of observation after the 
introduction of mandatory IFRS adoption, this study reinforces previous studies in that "earnings have 
relatively higher quality in countries with strong investor protection regimes" (Houqe et al., 2012). 
3.3.6 Law Enforcement and Remedies 
As recent CG researchers have found systematic differences in ownership concentration, stock market 
development, and voting rights, these differences seem to associate closely with the strength of legal 
protection given to minority investors (Coffee, 1999).  In addition, enhancing capital market growth, 
ownership dispersion, and liquidity of securities markets have been found to be directly associated with 
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the quality of legal protections given to minority shareholders (Coffee, 1999).  However, the quality of 
CG laws is found to matter less as compared to the strength of the CG enforcement practices 
worldwide (Coffee, 1999). Perhaps, "enforcement may depend more upon the strength of the 
incentives to assert legal remedies than upon the availability of legal remedies, themselves" (Coffee, 
1999). 
3.3.7 Summary 
Due to the increasing evidence that newly privatised markets have failed to set up viable securities, 
legal scholars are focused on the dichotomy between dispersed and concentrated ownership structure. 
Hence, they view the legal protection for minority shareholders as the significant variable underlying 
the growth of 'viable' securities markets (Coffee, 1999). Moreover, expedited privatisation not 
accompanied by minority protection and adequate disclosure is more likely to lead to expropriation of 
minority shareholders (Coffee, 1999b). This observation of Coffee (1999b) is apparent in most 
developing markets, such as Saudi Arabia’s. In addition, facilitating a dispersed ownership structure is 
more likely to produce desirable social and political consequences in the long run (Coffee, 1999). 
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3.4 Political 
In order to answer the second research question of this thesis, regarding the political factors that might 
influence the level of CG compliance of listed Saudi corporations with minority shareholders’rights, a 
review of the relevant international political literature on CG will contribute largely in terms of 
identifying critical political constructs to implement via a research method to investigate the Saudi 
political environment.   
Figure 3.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
 
3.4.1 Politics as the Link between Legal Rules and Economic Outcomes 
The political literature on CG is seen as the bridge between the legal rules and economic development. 
Hence, some political theories have been proposed to explain CG. For instance, Pagano and Volpin 
(2005) analyse the political determinants of investor protection and propose a model of the political 
determinants of the degree of protection for shareholders using a sample of 45 countries plus the 21 
OCED countries of 2005. Their findings unveil the following: 
1. Under Proportional Voting Systems, wining majority votes means winning the election, the 
political consequence is a low degree of shareholder protection. Nevertheless, this proportional 
voting system provides “a high degree of employment protection-benefiting entrepreneurs and 
workers and damaging outside shareholders" (Pagano & Volpin, 2005). 
2. Under Majoritarian Voting Systems, winning more districts means winning the election, the 
political outcome is a high degree of shareholder protection and low employment protection. 
Hence, legislation features strong investor protection which leads to an outcome preferred by 
outside shareholders. 
 
Pagano and Volpin (2005) explain the rational of their proposed model as, "company law can be 
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voters and politicians in response to the economic interest as well as their ideologies" (Pagano & 
Volpin, 2005). 
Therefore, Pagano and Volpin (2005) conclude that the correlation between the legal origin theory of 
LLSV and shareholders’ protection does not, "provide a theory of the determinant of investor 
protection…no clear reason why common law countries provide non-controlling investors with better 
protection… [Hence,] LLSV theory lacks predictive power: in civil law countries non-controlling 
shareholders are doomed to weak protection no matter what they do" (Pagano &Volpin, 2005). 
3.4.2 Ownership Structure as a Political Consequence: Crony Capitalism 
The continuous debate over the Common Law vs. the Civil Law in light of investors’ protection has 
obscured a significant effect of a hidden variable contributing to the growth of securities markets and 
this variable is the level of government involvement in economic decision making (Coffee, 2001).  In 
reviewing Company laws and cases in the U.S, UK, Germany, and France, the findings of Coffee 
(2001) suggest that generalisations are emerging from a historic examination of the rise of dispersed 
ownership. Firstly, the growth of security markets and increase in dispersed ownership correlate, 
“closely not with specific legal rules or protections, but with the appearance of a private sector that is 
relatively free from direct governmental interference” (Coffee, 2001). Secondly, the political 
economies characterised as decentralised nurture the growth of security markets by allowing 
entrepreneurs to invent their own techniques to make their investments credible for stakeholders to 
invest in (Coffee, 2001). Thirdly, in centralised economies, fedral governments find it convenient to 
use large banks to achieve their purposes (Coffee, 2001). Hence, government economical interventions 
in world markets are likely found to “outweigh the impact of legal variables, including the choice 
between common-law and civil-law rules" (Coffee, 2001). 
In addition, the division between the two dominant market structures, the bank-centered and market-
centered, is rather a matter of in whose hand control should be placed in order to favourably serve the 
political agenda (Coffee, 2001). For example, bank-centered economies are politically designed to 
facilitate governmental control over the flow of investments whereas market-centered economies are 
politically designed to allow entrepreneurs to devise their own control (Coffee, 2001).  Therefore, 
"much contemporary evidence demonstrates that concentrated ownership systems can serve as a means 
by which powerful families and governments reinforce each other and control economies in some areas 
of the Third World" (Coffee, 2001). Hence, crony capitalism is the political outcome of such mutual 
reinforcing technique and is the dark side of concentrated ownership (Coffee, 2001).  
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Moreover, once the concentrated ownership structure transforms into crony capitalism, uniting both the 
political and the economical powers, the effect of the law becomes minimal (Coffee, 2001). On the 
other hand, once the private sector adopts good governance, it will consequently "generate credible 
signals that investors rights will be protected, then an equity market can arise, and in time protective 
legislation will predictably follow" (Coffee, 2001). 
 In addition, Coffee (2001) views remedial legislation as very desirable in establishing strong minority 
protections. As a consequence, Coffee (2001) proposes a theory of 'Path Dependency'- postulating: 
"Instead that institutions evolve along path-dependent trajectories, which are heavily shaped by initial starting 
points and pre-existing conditions… [Hence,] LLS&V thesis may in effect read history backwards. They argue 
that strong markets require strong mandatory rules as a precondition. Although there is little evidence that strong 
legal rules encouraged the development of either the New York or London Stock Exchanges (and there is at least 
some evidence that strong legal rules hindered the growth of the Paris Bourse), the reverse does seem to be true: 
Strong markets do create a demand for stronger legal rules. Both in the United States and the United Kingdom, as 
liquid securities markets developed and dispersed ownership became prevalent, a new political constituency 
developed that desired legal rules capable of filling in the inevitable enforcement gaps that self-regulation left”. 
 
Moreover, Gourevitch (2008) reviews the political literature of CG in light of investor protection in 
five countries, namely: China, Singapore, Malaysia, Russia and Chile. As aresult, Gourevitch (2008) 
concludes that CG and politics in much of the world involve 'Oligarchs'. Gourevitch (2008) states,  
“Governments are controlled by small numbers of officials who restrict access to authority, police, courts, and the 
media. The two oligarchies interact. The corporate insiders use their special path to political power to get money 
and contracts, and to prevent entry or competition into their business. The state authorities rely on the corporate 
types for financial and economic resources useful to keeping power and restricting access of outsiders to political 
influence. The relationship has acquired the label “crony capitalism”. 
 
Therefore, Gourvevitch (2008) proposes the notion that an understanding of the change in CG requires 
an understanding of the "broader changes in the polity that make[s] and enforce[s] those rules which 
shape corporate governance practices". 
In addition, Gourevitch's (2008) findings reveal firstly that the absence of constitutional processes 
creates the potential for market interventions by centralised authority. Hence, such absence is found 
responsible for weakening popular pressure to safeguard assets and shareholders' rights. As a result, 
“the overall effect is to favor block holding models of corporate control" (Gourevitch, 2008). Secondly, 
democratic countries are found to vary in the degree of shareholders’ diffusion, whereas the non-
democratic countries all have block holding. Thirdly, “regimes with fewer policy swings, may seem 
too capable of predation, thus the stability is not reassuring. If that is in question, block holding 
remains an attractive option. Thus centralised institutions can be too powerful, leading to anxiety, 
which then produces the defensive reflex of block holding" (Gourevitch, 2008). On the other hand, 
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“majoritarian systems allow decisive action, higher policy swings, and thus break solidarities that 
sustain block holding; the result is more ... minority shareholders’ protection, and diffuse shareholding" 
(Gourevitch, 2008).  
3.4.3 Political Parties and Stock Market Developments: CG Reforms. 
Using a panel of 83 countries over the period 1975-2004, Gourevitch, Pinto and Weymouth (2010) 
empirically studied the political determinants of increased investor protection in relation to stock 
market developments. Their findings suggest that left-leaning governments are associated with higher 
stock market capitalisations than right and center-leaning governments and the association was found 
quite robust. Hence left-leaning governments are more attractive to investors; moreover, left-leaning 
parties’ involvement in any government is found to be reassuring to investors (Gourevitch et al., 2010). 
This finding is also confirmed by Rajan and Zingales (2003). In addition, the findings of Gourevitch et 
al. (2010) also found, “English legal origin, veto players and majoritarian electoral rules, and informal 
political rights—all having a positive effect on market capitalisation". Therefore, the effect of politics 
on investments is surely not news (Fisman, 2001). 
In reviewing the literature on the left-leaning parties in Italy, France, Germany, and the US, Cioffi and 
Hopner (2006) make valuable observations. Firstly, left-leaning political parties are found to have 
always voiced their preferences for pro-shareholder CG reforms, while the right-leaning parties, pro-
business, are found to have always resisted the leftists’ attempts (Cioffi & Hopner, 2006). The 
resistance of the right parties is best explained by Cioffi and Hopner as their attempts to “protect 
established reforms of organized capitalism, [and] concentrated stock ownership" (2006). Secondly, 
left-leaning parties are found to have always used the logic of CG reforms to “[1] attack the legitimacy 
of existing political economic elites, present[ing] themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, [2] 
strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and [3] appeal to middle-class 
voters"(Cioffi & Hopner, 2006).Thirdly, left-leaning parties are also found to have pioneered 
advancing CG reforms, inducing pro-shareholder, and pro-reform policy agendas (Cioffi & Hopner, 
2006). Lastly, it is also suggested by Cioffi and Hopner (2006) that left parties are the best means 
through which CG reforms could be accomplished because shareholders are too poorly organised to 
'constitute an effective coalition' on the political conundrum. Hence, “state actors on the center-left 
initiated corporate governance reform in each country case and have been instrumental in fashioning 
new interest group alliances” (Cioffi & Hopner, 2006). 
3.4.4 The Effect of Interest Groups on the Choice of Ownership Structures 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) propose an interest group theory of financial development where controlling 
parties oppose financial development because it breeds competition. Using a sample of 24 countries 
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using data available from 1913-1999, Rajan and Zingales (2003) found that interest groups’ politics is 
an important factor in financial developments across countries. In addition, they found that trade 
openness was associated with financial market developments. Most importantly, they concluded that “a 
country's institutions might slow or speed-up interest group activities. This might indicate that 
institutions matter, though the way they matter might primarily be in tempering interest group 
activities" (Rajan & Zingales, 2003). For example, "policies that tend to promote efficient, competitive 
industries rather than inefficient, rent-seeking ones will also tend to pave the way for institutional 
development, as will public awareness of the hidden costs of policies that ostensibly promote economic 
stability"(Rajan & Zingales, 2003). 
In addition, Gourevitch’s (2008) findings also reveal that the type of interest group alignments capable 
of producing pro-diffusion policies in authoritarian regimes requires “a strong interest by that regime 
in foreign investment and in private initiatives". Nevertheless, Gorvevitch (2008) explains the 
exception to the rule in certain countries such as Russia and China by stating,  
"Russia has the disadvantage of size and natural resources, China of size. Russia especially has such wealth in 
oil; it could operate even without being very attractive to foreigners. China needs investors, but its huge domestic 
market gives it substantial bargaining leverage toward external investors: it bargains them to play by China’s 
rules concerning technology. In neither country is there enough democratic politics at work to explore coalitions 
operating through parliamentary means. Korea is a good foil, and with Chile, make good comparison cases: both 
shifted from authoritarian regimes, Korea for the first time, Chile in restoration. This has in both cases given 
more influence to groups that oppose the closed world of blockholding...Overtime, we will be able to watch the 
interplay of institutional change with shifts of preferences: change in the power system altering the influence of 
different groups; and changes in the real world, opening the way to different patterns of preference". 
 
3.4.5 Controlling Families as a Political-Institution Affecting the Choice of Ownership 
Structures 
Steier (2008) theoretically sketches how families matter in economic activities worldwide; therefore, 
he emphasises that their effect is dependent on the institutional context under which they operate. 
Hence, Steier (2008) offers five central-theoratical conclusions in this regard: 
1. “Family is itself a primary institution that will continue to be manifest in the governance of economic 
systems throughout the world 
2. Depending on the institutional context, familial capitalism is potentially favorable or unfavorable for 
economic development. 
3. Transition and emerging economies such as East Asia, with less developed institutions (e.g., legal, 
financial) will be characterized by even higher levels of family involvement in economic activity than 
regions with well developed institutions. As this region forges new models of governance, 
entrepreneurial family firms represent alternative templates to the often-prescribed Anglo- American 
model. 
4. Entrepreneurship has a powerful family dimension, even in those contexts with well-developed 
institutions wherein individual action is celebrated. 
5. As global institutional contexts continue to vary greatly, so will notions of what constitutes the optimal 
familial role in effective firm governance” (Steier, 2008). 
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In addition, what makes this rich flavor of familial capitalism more interesting is how this form of 
capitalism co-evolves with the institutional context, shaping economies, firms, enretpreurial actions, 
and ultimately the new form of governance (Steier, 2008). Hence, there is a need for developing a 
better theory that is capable of addressing the existence of such co-evolutions of external and internal 
factors as this familial capitalism is little understood by the existing literature in Asian countries 
(Steier, 2008). 
Moreover, in an attempt to explain the effect of familial control in East Asian countries, Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000) used a sample of 2,980 corporations from 1996-1998. Their findings reveal 
that the separation of ownership and control was found mostly recognised in family controlled firms 
regardless of the firm's size (Claessens et al., 2000). In addition, the separation of management from 
ownership control was found minimal; hence, 60 % of the managerial personnel of these firms were 
found to be related to controlling families (Claessens et al., 2000). Moreover, “older firms are more 
likely family controlled, which dispels the claim that dispersion of ownership is just a matter of time" 
(Claessens et al., 2000). As a result, 
“Through lobbying, Wealth concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and other 
institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It 
could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform… Concentration of control might also have been a 
detriment to the evolution of the countries' legal systems. A concentrated control structure of the whole corporate 
sector could lead to the suppression of minority rights and hold back the institutional development of legal and 
regulatory channels to enforce these rights"(Claessens et al., 2000). 
 
3.4.6 Ownership Structure as a Profit Maximising Choice Shaped by Institutional 
Factors 
In a theoretical attempt, Bebchuk (1999) developed a rent protection theory of corporate ownership 
structure. His theory is aimed at explaining the choice between concentrated and dispersed ownership 
structure from the perspective of a company’s initial owner. The implications of his theory revolve 
around identifying the benefits of control shaping the choice of ownership structure (Bebchuk, 1999). 
Hence, the decision driving such choice is influenced by the size of the private benefits of control to be 
gained. For example, “when private benefits are large, initial owners, maintain a lock on control to 
increase fraction of surplus they would be able to capture in a surplus transfer of control" (Bebchuk, 
1999). Therefore, initial owners strive to maintain their private benefits of control, especially when 
control is valuable, to keep rivals away from capturing these private benefits (Bebchuk, 1999). Hence, 
when private benefits of control is found to be high in any given country, its publically traded 
companies would chose to have a controlling shareholder, or rather choose not to go public at all to 
reap the rewards of the private benefits of control (Bebchuk, 1999).  
Chapter Three: Literature Review   P a g e  | 69 
 
 
 
This theoretical implication of Bebchuk (1999) are consistent with the finding of La Porta et al. (1997) 
that companies would choose to go public and security markets would be more developed in countries 
with a high degree of shareholders' protections (Bebchuk, 1999). The rationale behind such implication 
is that a "corporate law system that effectively limits private benefits of control can produce more 
efficient choices of ownership structure" and eventually well lead to a dispersed ownership structure 
that is accompanied by a strong shareholder's protection regime (Bebchuk, 1999). Another important 
implication of Bechuk's theory is also that, “separation of cash flow rights and voting rights will tend 
to be used in conjunction with a controlling shareholder structure but not with a dispersed ownership 
structure" (Bebchuk, 1999). 
Another theoretical attempt examining the choice of ownership structure was developed by Bebchuk 
and Zingales (2000). They theoretically present how the ownership structure choice by an initial owner 
at the IPO stage might differ from the more socially optimal choice. They explain the logic of their 
rational as, 
"when the corporate law system is lax and the private benefits of control are consequently large, a PU [publically 
owned] structure will enable the initial shareholders to extract more surplus from control transfers than will a DI 
[dispersed] structure. Meaning offering less share[s] will produce higher surplus on transfer. Otherwise, share 
prices will drop in sales between  potential shareholders…[hence] they might choose a PU structure even if a DI 
structure is superior from a social point of view" (Bebchuk & Zingales, 2000). 
 
Therefore, institutional factors, such as weak shareholder protection in many countries, are more likely 
to lead entrepreneurs to select the choice through which they can extract the highest level of surplus 
when offering minimal shares (Bebchuk & Zingales, 2000). In addition, such weak legal protection 
might also lead to limiting the development of any security market and in turn might compel initial 
owners to opt for the choice of offering too little public ownership (Bebchuk & Zingales, 2000) On the 
other hand, in countries where institutional factors provide strong investor protection and ultimately a 
developed capital market, entrepreneurs are more likely to be compelled to choose the socially optimal 
ownership structure (Bebchuk & Zingales, 2000). Nevertheless, even the socially optimal choice might 
produce negative results when excessively exercised. For example, a highly developed capital market 
might produce too much public ownership,  
"Since the prospect of this externality increases share price at the time of the entrepreneur’s initial public offering 
(IPO), the entrepreneur can capture a larger piece of the surplus generated by such a transfer by selling a larger 
portion of the firm at the time of the IPO…[hence] legal rules can affect this bias toward too much public 
ownership "(Bebchuk & Zingales, 2000).The bottom line is this: in either case, “weak protections for minority 
shareholders will have a negative effect on public ownership because fear that the entrepreneur will engage in 
such overreaching reduces the price at which shares can be sold. As a result, a lower level of public ownership 
will allow the entrepreneur to capture a larger share of the surplus created by the transfer and thus affect the 
division of rents between her and the transferee" (Bebchuk & Zingales, 2000). 
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3.4.7 The Effect of Institutional Factors: Ownership Structures on Market Valuations 
Using a sample of all publically traded corporations in nine East Asian countries, an examination of the 
evidence of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders and its effect on market 
valuation was carried out by Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999). Their findings reveal that 
higher cash flow rights were found correlating with higher market valuations. However, higher voting 
rights were found to correlate with lower market valuations (Claessens et al., 1999). In addition, the 
separation of control from ownership was found to correlate with lower market value; hence, this could 
be interpreted as evidence of expropriation of minorities by controllers (Claessens et al., 1999).  
"It is likely that the degree to which certain ownership structures are associated with expropriation depends on 
country-specific circumstances including: 
1. The quality of banking systems 
2. The legal and judicial protection of individual shareholders  
3. The degree of financial disclosure required. 
The exact magnitude to which these institutional variables affect the degree of expropriation is an issue of 
important policy relevance and of potential future research" (Claessens et al., 1999). 
 
Moreover, it should be noted that Claessens et al.’s (1999) findings in regard to the separation of 
control from ownership in relation to the market valuation are consistent with Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) economical model as explicitelly noted by Claessens et al. (1999). 
In addition, Claessens et al. (1999) investigated the effect of the ownership structure in terms of control 
and ownership percentage on market valuation, taking the external environment factors such as weak 
propriety, shareholders' rights, inefficient judicial systems, and corruption into account.  Their findings 
reveal that higher cash flow rights were found to correlate with higher market values. In addition, their 
findings also reveal that higher control rights were associated with lower market valuations. Hence, 
these findings are significant because they hold ground when cash-flow rights are low and controls 
rights are high, suggesting an expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 1999). They 
conclude that using regression on individual classes of shares reveal that family control was found to 
be a significant cause of the negative relation between control rights and market valuations (Claessens 
et al., 1999). Therefore, "the risk of expropriation is indeed the major principal-agent problem for large 
publicly-traded corporations, as suggested by La Porta et al. (1997)" (Claessens et al., 1999). 
3.4.8 Curbing Private Benefits of Control 
Private benefits of contol were estimated in 39 countries by a sample of 393 controlling-blocks 
between the years of 1990-2000 (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). The findings of this study reveal that in 
countries where private benefits of control are large, concentrated ownership structure is found to be 
dominant. Hence, privatisation in these countries is less likely to happen as public offerings; hence, 
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capital markets in those countries are found less developed (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). Moreover, the 
most intriguing finding emerging from this study is the role of tax enforcement in reducing the size of 
private benefits. Therefore, improving corporate tax system as suggested by Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
would produce a feasible mechanism in curbing private benefits and enhancing CG reforms within any 
given country. For instance, previous findings such as Shleifer’s and Vishny’s (1986) reveal how small 
shareholders prefer their returns as capital gains whereas large shareholders, due to their tax attributes, 
prefer their returns in the form of dividends. Hence, such preference by controlling shareholders should 
be placed under scrutiny to devise a tax-system mechanism capable of curbing private benefits enjoyed 
by controllers.  
In addition, "many institutional variables, taken in isolation, seem to be associated with a lower level of private 
benefits of control: better accounting standards, better legal protection of minority shareholders, better law 
enforcement, more intense product market competition, a high level of diffusion of the press, and a high rate of 
tax compliance"(Dyck & Zingales, 2004). 
 
Moreover, the media effect on public pressure is highly recommended by Dyck and Zingales (2004) as 
a mechanism of curbing private benefits of control. Also, it has been suggested by Dyck and Zingales's 
previous research that the media is capable of exposing bad corporate practices and inducing corporate 
managers to bow to social and environmental pressures (Dyck & Zingales, 2002 & 2003). Therefore, it 
is worthwhile investigating how this media pressure intermingles with social norms in shaping 
potential CG reform policies. 
3.4.9 Moral Hazard between Minorities and Controllers in Takeovers: Policy 
Implications 
Moral hazard arising between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders in takeover 
transactions is another area of significance. Mathematically, bidders are not compensated ‘ex ante' for 
reducing the moral hazards 'ex post' in any takeover (Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi, 1998). For example, 
“post takeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free-riding by the target shareholders lead the former 
to acquire as few shares as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such low 
ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers" (Burkart et al., 1998). Hence, 
corporate legislation and charts are great resource for further examinations for this type of hazard. 
”By increasing the fraction of shares required to gain control, the one share–one vote rule reduces ex post 
inefficiencies. However, it also reduces bidders’ surplus and thus their incentives to launch takeovers. The 
presence of takeover costs creates a trade-off between a higher likelihood of tender offers and more efficient 
tender offers. It is interesting that by inducing higher ‘Premia’ and maximizing ex post efficiency, the option to 
freeze out minority shareholders constitutes a ‘Pareto’ improvement. Competition (even by an inferior rival) also 
improves social welfare since it leads to a higher bid price and, thus, more shares tendered and less moral hazard. 
This effect can be further exploited by the security voting structure: fewer voting shares make competition fiercer 
and hence lead to an even higher price and a larger supply of shares. The mandatory bid rule has no effect under 
conditional offers but is socially beneficial under unconditional offers” (Burkart et al., 1998). 
Chapter Three: Literature Review   P a g e  | 72 
 
 
 
Another attempt to theoretically explain the trade off conflict of takeovers between minorities and 
controlling shareholders was attempted by Bebchuk and Kahan (1999). They recognised the difficulty 
faced by new controllers when required by law to compensate minority shareholders for the 'no freeze 
out' value of their shares when taken. For instance, when‘per share’ value of a minority shareholder is 
below the ‘per share’ value of a controller, the free-out option is valuable for minorities. Hence, such 
conflict has significant policy implications in determining the 'no freeze out value' (Bebchuk & Kahan, 
1999). This is especially true when controllers use their private information to decide on whether or not 
they should affect a freeze out at terms favourable to them. Therefore, the ' freeze out' as a concept 
becomes a crucial source for private benefits (Bebchuk & Kahan, 1999).  Hence, “any source of private 
control benefits is of concern if a goal of the legal system is to ensure that all shareholders participate 
proportionally in the value of the company"(Bebchuk & Kahan, 1999). 
3.4.10 Economic Growth and Development of Financial System Policies 
In reviewing the literature regarding the link between economical growth and financial systems, Levine 
(1997) places the emphasis on the inputs of nonfinancial developments in the structuring of financial 
systems worldwide. For example, as financial systems are molded by non-financial developments, in 
the fields of telecommunication, computers etc., those non-financial developments ultimately affect the 
economic growth of any given country (Levine, 1997).  Another example is the evidence of the effect 
of monetary policy on taxation of financial services as it has been documented by previous research 
(Bencivenga & Smith 1992; Roubini & Martin 1995 as cited in Levine, 1997). Hence, it is safe to 
assume a multi-dimensional framework when investigating factors influencing the development of 
such economy and its capital market. Moreover, there are no doubts that any legal system has a major 
effect on the development of its financial system, the size of its security market and ultimately its 
economy as a whole (La Porta et al., 1997. 1999, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008). In addition, political 
changes and power drive critically influence financial developments worldwide, as shown by Haber 
(1991, 1997). 
3.4.11 Summary 
No better summary can be written on the effect of politics on CG than the one provided by Gourevitch 
(2003) when reviewing a book by Mark Roe (2003) entitled Political Determinant of Corporate 
Governance. Unlike Roe, LLSV's examination of the effects of legislative policies, rules of law, and 
judicial efficiency in explaining the various CG regimes around the world implys a major role of 
politics that has not been specified in their arguments (Gourevitch, 2003). In addition, LLSV have not 
privileged the effects of politics in the design of their data nor in their level of theorising (Gourevitch, 
2003).  
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Moreover, Gourevitch views Roe's second debate concerning the attributes of politics that produce out-
puts as the most significant of his contribution (2003). Gourevitch explains, 
“Leftist political power does matter; he [Roe] has shown this convincingly. But its effects can be better 
understood when placed in the framework of coalitions and institutions… Roe’s emphasis on the importance of 
politics, coalitions and institutions provide alternative political channels to the forces that constrain or expand the 
primacy of shareholder rights and the degree of shareholding diffusion…[Hence] Roe solves the puzzle of weak 
leftist presence in low-diffusion countries with “path dependence” (2003). 
 
In addition, Gourveitch (2003) views Roe's position as positively challenging the finance theory 
driving the law and economics literature on CG. For instance, Roe's position in this regard can be seen 
firstly as being that politics shape the laws and conditions under which companies operate (Gourevitch, 
2003). Secondly, managers and owners around the world behave differently, assuming identical bodies 
of law, depending on various claims derived from politics (Gourevitch, 2003).  Hence, politics should 
be integrated into the way such disciplines as law, economics, sociology and culture can explain 
governance on a country case basis (Gourevitch, 2003).  
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
3.5.1 CVD Framework and its Implications 
Cultural theory of CG based on the CVD framework of Hofstede (1984) addresses fundamental issues 
like shareholding structures, regulations of self dealing, insider trading and disclosure in previous 
research. Hence, utilisation of Hofstede’s (2010) CVD framework, for the purpose of this study is, in 
accordance with the literature, capable of providing an answer to the first research question, which is: 
To what extent do available cultural models (for example, Hofstede, 2010) explain the quality of the 
exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia? 
In addition, below are some of the issues that have emerged and informed the first research question as 
they present a strong association between statutory law and culture, specifically in the context of CG in 
the area of investor rights as signified by the relevant literature. (A detailed description of the cultural 
factors extracted for the data collection phase is included in Appendix B1)  
A. Rights of Shareholders and Shareholder Structures 
As the researcher intends to address the issue of shareholding structures, Licht (2001) points out that  
“countries that score high on Uncertainty Avoidance, where living in an environment of unknown future 
contingencies is considered particularly undesirable,…one should expect to find a lower share of business firms 
with dispersed ownership…[and] a higher incidence of hierarchical structures like stock pyramids. The cultural 
dimension framework suggests that, in such countries, the entire populace, rich and poor, of higher and lower 
classes alike are likely to perceive such shareholding structures as just another facet of a proper social order. If 
this were true it would help solve the question of why small investors in some countries put their savings in 
suspicious stock pyramid schemes or subject them to the whims of controlling families ". 
 
Therefore, elements of shareholders’ rights and structures will be taken from the OECD principles of 
CG and assigned to the appropriate Hofstede (2010) CV dimensions for the questionnaire to generate 
both descriptive and inferential statistics via the SPSS program to answer the first research question. 
B. Self Dealing 
The issue of Self-dealing “is the central problem of CG in most countries, the law’s effectiveness in 
regulating this problem is the fundamental element of shareholder protection” (Djankov et al., 2008). 
Therefore, special attention will be directed to this problem. Regardless of all criticism aimed at the 
work of La Porta et al’s (1997, 1998 and 2006) studies pertaining to the construction of the Anti-
director rights Index, certain elements of this index have been demonstrated to be significant for the 
purpose of this research. For example, the Anti-director rights Index is composed of (1) vote by mail; 
(2) shares not deposited; 3) and cumulative voting. Certain components of this index pertaining to self 
dealing transaction such as voting by mail, oppressed minority, pre-emptive rights, and capacity to call 
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a GM meeting are crucial to consider. In fact, most, if not all, of those components pertaining to the 
rights of minority shareholders are drawn from the OECD principles of CG of 2004 (OECD, 2004).  
In addition, the follow up Index of Self Dealing by Djankov et al. (2008) has certain elements which 
are significant for the purpose of this research. These elements are: 1) approval by disinterested 
shareholders, 2) standing to sue, and 3) extensive disclosure of related party transactions.  
Moreover, Licht (2001) views Anti-self-dealing rules as working, “to give effect to economic 
judgments of parties who would have otherwise been outnumbered or simply ignored by those that are 
to benefit from the transaction”.  
Therefore, such explanation will be of significance to this research as it aids in qualifying elements of 
CG principles addressing the issue of self dealing from the OECD principles to be assigned to the 
appropriate Hofstede (2010) CV dimensions for the questionnaire to generate both descriptive and 
inferential statistics via the SPSS program to answer the first research question. 
C. Insider Trading 
Insider trading regimes around the world are highly attributed to cultural diversity. In fact, insider 
trading is always classified as a form of self-dealing. Hence, “one could reasonably assume that nations 
still differ considerably in the degree their cultural values are compatible with a strict ban on insider 
trading. Such divergence, however, would be difficult to reveal simply by comparing legal texts” 
(Licht, 2001). 
Therefore, as with the previous merging issues, the researcher intends to employ elements of CG 
principles addressing the issue of insider trading from the OECD principles of CG and assign them to 
the appropriate Hofstede (2010) CV dimensions for the questionnaire to generate both descriptive and 
inferential statistics via the SPSS program to answer the first research question. 
D. Executive Compensation 
“From a legal perspective, executive compensation is a distinctive paradigm of conflict of interests, 
like self-dealing. The setting of executive compensation lies at the heart of the agency problem and is 
thus a major feature of corporate governance systems” (Licht, 2001). The notion behind such argument 
is that certain societies are more tolerant of income inequality stemming from efforts, talents, or 
entrepreneurial spirit (Licht, 2001).  
Hence, it is possible to infer that the CV dimensions applicable to the issue of executive compensation 
are Individualism, Power Distance, and Femininity (Licht, 2001). For example, the Individualism 
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dimension could be seen as rewarding entrepreneurship, while the Power Distance dimension 
legitimises the extraordinary pay structures for executives (Licht, 2001). 
Therefore, as with the previous merging issues, the researcher intends to incorporate elements of CG 
principles addressing the issue of executive compensation from the OECD principles of CG and to 
assign them to the appropriate Hofstede (2010) CV dimensions for the questionnaire to generate both 
descriptive and inferential statistics via the SPSS program to answer the first research question.  
E. Disclosure 
Disclosure is a powerful means for curbing the agency problem for CG especially in the area of 
minority rights. The findings of LLSV (1999) reveal that one of the most feasible ways of solving the 
agency conflict between controlling families and minority shareholders is through extensive disclosure. 
In corroboration with LLSV’s (1999) findings, Licht (2001) states,  
“Prominent disclosure items in this category include contentious issues like forward-looking ("soft") information, 
immediate disclosure of material events, detailed personal breakdown of top management remuneration, and the 
identity and intentions of shareholders who cross certain holding thresholds…[Moreover,] Uncertainty 
Avoidance dimension seems like a good starting point, especially in light of the empirical support …Countries 
that score high on this dimension may prefer to suppress transparency so as to avoid conflict and competition and 
to preserve security. They would thus be likely to impose lower disclosure requirements” (Licht, 2001). 
 
Therefore, as with the previous merging issues, the researcher intends to employ elements of CG 
principles addressing the issue of disclosure from the OECD principles of CG and to assign them to the 
appropriate Hofstede (2010) CV dimensions for the questionnaire to generate both descriptive and 
inferential statistics via the SPSS program to answer the first research question.  
3.5.2 Legal Factors 
The legal scholars' focus is on the dichotomy between dispersed and concentrated ownership structure. 
Hence, they view the legal protections provided to minority shareholders as a significant variable 
underlying the growth of 'viable' security markets (Coffee, 1999). 
In addition, recent CG researchers have found systematic differences in ownership concentration, stock 
market developments, and voting rights in world wide comparative studies. These differences are 
found to associate closely with the strength of legal protection given to minority investors (Coffee, 
1999).  Hence, these issues along with other issues and their implications as detailed in the Legal 
section of the literature review have emerged and informed the second research question of the legal 
factors influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi Corporations with OECD principles in 
respect of the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. (A detailed description of the legal factors 
extracted for the data collection phase is included in Appendix B2) 
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Moreover, enhancing capital markets growth, ownership dispersions, and liquidity of security markets 
have been found to be directly associated with the quality of legal protection given to minority 
shareholders (Coffee, 1999).  Hence, the quality of CG laws matters less as compared to the strength of 
CG enforcement practices worldwide (Coffee, 1999). Perhaps, "enforcement may depend more upon 
the strength of the incentives to assert legal remedies than upon the availability of legal remedies, 
themselves" (Coffee, 1999). 
3.5.3 Political Factors 
The political literature on CG is seen as the bridge between the legal rules and economic 
developments. Hence, some political theories have been proposed to explain different CG practices 
found worldwide. For instance, left-leaning political parties are found to have always voiced their 
preferences for pro-shareholder CG reforms, while the right-leaning parties, being more pro-business, 
are found to have always resisted the leftists’ attempts (Cioffi & Hopner, 2006).  
As a result, weak legal protections are found in countries with strong right-leaning parties (Bebchuk & 
Zingales, 2000). Right-leaning parties are found to limit the development of any security market and in 
turn compel initial owners to opt for the choice of offering too little public ownership (Bebchuk & 
Zingales, 2000). 
“Leftist political power does matter…But its effects can be better understood when placed in the framework of 
coalitions and institutions… emphasis on the importance of politics, coalitions and institutions provide alternative 
political channels to the forces that constrain or expand the primacy of shareholder rights and the degree of 
shareholding diffusion” (Gourevitch, 2003). 
 
Hence, these above issues along with other issues and their implications as detailed in the political 
section of the literature review have emerged and informed the second research question of the 
political factors influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi Corporations’ with the OECD 
principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’rights. (A detailed description of the 
political factors extracted for the data collection phase is included in Appendix B3) 
In summary, a review of the relevant CG literature pertaining to both research questions has provided 
that cultural, legal and political factors are to be considered to answer both research questions. As a 
result, the literature review chapter as a whole provides a multi-dimensional framework for assessing 
CG regimes in developing countries such as Saudi Arabia in light of minority shareholders’ rights by 
integrating cultural, legal, and political factors. Such integration is motivated by the gaps found 
between those disciplines in the relevant CG literature.  
“The various authors in this debate know too much to deny altogether the relevance of each others’ 
variables: Politics, law, judges, the role of the state, norms, private mechanisms, and path dependence 
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appear in all of their writings. They differ in how these variables act in a causal sequence and how they 
are privileged relatively in a model" (Gourevitch, 2003). 
Therefore, extracted critical variables found from the relevant literature will be employed in the 
construction of this research's data collection methods (see Appendix B1, B2, B3). The following 
diagram demonstrate the conceptual issues considered and signpost some of the critical variables 
driven from the literature review phase:  
(Figure 3.5), Source: The Author 
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Overall, most of the variables signified by the relevant literature have been mostly driven by 
quantitative analysis of the results of structure and semi-structured questionnaires and variety of 
statistical methods were employed including, factorial analysis, PCA and other data reduction 
techniques. These methods have allowed the concentration of questionnaires responses into meaningful 
classifications supporting in varying degrees the Hofstede’s (2010) classifications. 
However, the problem with this methodological approach is in the variety of assumptions required to 
drive the quantitative analysis. Hence, the approach discussed in the next chapter on research 
methodologies is also based upon question design, but with corroboration through an extended 
qualitative phase based upon semi-structured interviews (see figure 4.4 Research Design Flow Chart, 
page 117). This process of corroboration deepens the quality of the conclusion and, to allow to an 
extent the reduction of elements of bias in the variables’ selection.  
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4. Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
A review of the literature has suggested that cultural, legal and political factors are to be considered 
when assessing the strength or weaknesses of any minority shareholder protection regime. Hence, the 
scope of this research study is limited to the conceptual frameworks containing cultural, legal and 
political factorssignified by the literature review phase. Therefore, signified variables via the literature 
review phase have been extracted by the researcher to build up the data collection methods for this 
study.  
As has been argued by Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987) there is no one singular research 
methodology that is better than any other. Hence, after developing the conceptual framework via a 
traditional review of the literature, a research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches has been chosen to achieve the overall aim of this research. Both method-approaches are to 
be employed in succession, bearing in mind the results of the quantitative phase will partially inform 
the qualitative phases, whose variable constructs are mainly derived from the literature review. The 
logic behind the employment of both methods is due to initially avoiding a ‘common method’ bias, and 
eventually ensuring potential insights arising from the quantitative phase are included into the variables 
of the qualitative phase. 
The quantitative method will be employed via questionnaires and is aimed to achieve the first objective 
of the study, which is to explore the extent that available cultural models (for example, Hofstede, 2010) 
can explain the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia. In 
succession to the quantitative phase, and with the intention to corroborate the quantitative phase, a 
qualitative approach via semi-structured interviews will be employed to achieve the second objective 
of this research, which is to investigate the other factors, legal and political, influencing the level of 
compliance of listed Saudi Companies’ with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of 
minority shareholder rights. 
In addition, this study will apply institutional theory as the main body of theory addressing both 
research questions, to investigate how Saudi culture influences its CG regulatory compliance in light of 
minority shareholders’ rights. This approach seems to be suitable in terms of usage in the accounting 
literature (Scott, 1987). Particularly, the third version of institutional theory, New Institutional 
Sociology has been highly recommended (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Hence, application of the New 
Institutional Sociology theory will refine the methodology and paradigm this research follows to 
achieve both objectives. 
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4.2 Research Methodology: 
4.2.1 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science: 
Institutional theory, especially the New Institutional Sociology version, offers “a wide range of 
applicability for understanding the practise of accounting in organizations…[and] draw[s] on a broad 
varity of insight from cognitive science, cultural studies, psychology and anthropology, and…draw[s] 
attention to multiple levels of analysis ranging from the individual organisation to society” (Scott, 2001 
as quoted in Hoque, 2006, p.188). 
Therefore, it can be said that the New Institutional Sociology theory’s rooted assumptions in Berger 
and Luckmann’s (1966) work makes it of such subjectivity as Scott explains, “the argument is that 
social order is based fundamentally on a shared social reality which, in turn, is a human construction, 
being created in social interaction” (1987). Moreover, the level of subjectivity of the New Institutional 
Sociology theory can be measured through Morgan and Smircich’s (1980) six ontological assumptions: 
Table 4.1: Six Ontological Assumptions 
1. Reality as a concrete structure ( Naïve Realism) 
2. Reality as a concrete process (Transcendental realism) 
3. Reality as a contextual field of information(Contextual relativism) 
4. Reality as a symbolic discourse (Transcendental  idealism [Kant]) 
5. Reality as a social construction(Social Constructionism [Socially Mediated Idealism]) 
6. Reality as a projection of human imagination (Idealism [Berkeley]) 
Source: Ryan, Scapens & Theobald (2002, p.36): adapted from Morgan and Smircich (1980) 
 
Looking at the table above, the closest category for the New Institutional Sociology theory as 
described previously by Scott (1987) fits within reality as a symbolic discourse:  
“we now see the world as comprising human actors who make sense of their reality through a process of social 
interaction and negotiation, which is made possible through the shared meanings and norms they attach to people, 
things and situations. As such, reality is not a set of rules per se, but it is embedded in the meaning and norms 
which are created through individual experiences of events and situations, and then shared through social 
interaction” (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 37).  
 
Moreover, it is worthwhile to mention that even though these meanings and norms can change at any 
time, they are stable over a long period, which in turn structures social activities (Ryan et al., 2002). As 
Ryan et al. state, “these meanings and norms are, therefore, the reality of the social research and such 
an approach can be used to study the role of accounting in giving meanings to organizational activity, 
providing norms of behaviour and structuring day-to-day social practices in organizations and society” 
(2002, p.37). However, it should be noted that reality as a symbolic discourse (Transcendental 
Idealism) falls fourth within the above table, and as explained by Ryan et al., “the other intermediate 
assumptions [including symbolic discourse] can then be regarded as points on an objective-subjective 
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continuum” (Ryan et al., 2002, p.36). 
4.2.2 Objectivist Approach Vs Subjectivist Approach 
Based on the reviewed literature, the origin of the institutional theory in the work of Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) in relation to Morgan and Smirich’s (1980) six ontological assumptions 
speculatively provoked the researcher into viewing reality as a symbolic discourse. Consequently, the 
ontological stance of this research is set on the subjective continuum as portrayed by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979). Burrell and Morgan use this framework of assumptions pertaining to ontology, 
epistemology, human nature, and methodology to explain the subjective-objective dimension: 
Table 4.2: Subjective-Objective Dimension 
 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3) 
 
Therefore, the ontology of this research will be one of Nominalism as prescribed in the table above 
which is the equivalent of Idealism. Specifically, through this type of ontology, reality as a symbolic 
discourse is embedded in the form of ‘Transcendental Idealism’, which is of such a moderate 
subjective stand as it falls just out of the range of the objective continuum prescribed by Ryan et al., 
(2002). Moreover, as the table depicts, the epistemology of such research will be within the anti-
positivism regime in which constructionism is embedded. Crotty (1998) states, 
“there is no meaning without a mind. Meaning is not discovered, but constructed. In this understanding of 
knowledge, it is clear that different people may construct meaning in different ways, even in relation to the same 
phenomenon…In this view of things, subject and object emerge as partners in the generation of meaning”. 
 
In other words, as Ryan et al. explain, “the term ‘social constructionism of reality is sometimes used 
for all subjectivist approaches, to distinguish them from the assumption of an independent reality 
which is assumed by the more objectivist approaches” (2002, p.38). However, the only difference 
between constructinisem and subjectivism, apart from in the degree of subjectivity, is that meaning in 
subjectivism comes from anything but an interaction between the subject and the object (Crotty, 1998). 
Therefore, the epistemology of the proposed research will be of a moderate subjectivity as it assumes 
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that subject and object emerge as partners in the generation of meaning, as explained previously by 
Crotty (1998). Moreover, such research will be described as interpretive, as it captures all elements of 
its framework: 
Table 4.3: Interpretive Accounting Research 
A. Beliefs about knowledge 
Theory is used to provide explanations of human intentions. Its adequacy is assessed via logical consistency, 
subjective interpretation, and agreement with actors’ common–sense interpretations. 
B. Beliefs about physical and social reality 
Reality is socially created and objectified through human interaction. Human action is intentional and has 
meaning grounded in the social and historical context. Social order is assumed and conflict mediated through 
shared meanings. 
C. Relationship between accounting theory and practice                                                                         
Accounting theory seeks to explain action and to understand how social order is produced and reproduced. 
Source: Adapted from Chua (1986 as cited in Ryan et al., 2002, p. 42)  
 
4.2.3 Assumptions about the Nature of Society 
Assumptions about the nature of society can be explained through the work of Burrell and Morgan 
(1979). They criticise the work of the original contributors of the two different approaches of sociology 
in regard to the nature of society as identified by Dahrendorf (1959), who sees focus on the social 
order, and Lockwood (1956), who is concerned with issues of conflict (Wanyama, 2006). 
Consequently, Burrell and Morgan (1979) developed a more comprehensive model of Dahrendorf’s 
Order vs Conflict theory along with incorporating the aspect of Lockwood’s conflict issues. Burrell and 
Morgan, instead, place the emphasis on regulation and radical change. They explain, 
“Traditionally, the prominent sociologists of Durkheim, Weber, and Pareto were concerned with social order, 
while Marx was concerned with social change. Dahrendorf sees the order-conflict debate centred around two 
camps, one emphasizing stability, integration, functional co-ordination, and consensus, and the other emphasizing 
change, conflict, disintegration, and coercion. In reality this dichotomy is more a continuum. Each of these 
opposite word-pairs is open to much interpretation, and each is not completely accurate in describing the debate 
and can cause misinterpretation” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 37). 
 
As a consequence, Burrell and Morgan (1979) propose the notion of ‘regulation’ as a means to enrich 
the explanations of such society in terms of unity, cohesiveness, and the need for regulation to social 
affairs so that society is maintained as a unity (Wanyama, 2006). Therefore, all characteristics such as 
the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration, solidarity and actuality can be explained 
under the notion of ‘regulation’, as Table (4.4) below depicts. On the other hand, Burrel and Morgan 
(1979) propose the notion of ‘Radical Change’ as a means to provide explanations regarding deeply 
rooted structural conflict, modes of domination, structural contradiction, and societal emancipation 
from structures limiting their potential (Wanyama, 2006). 
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Table 4.4: Order Vs Conflict Theory 
 
Source: Burrell & Morgan (1979, p.18) 
 
Most importantly, the sociology of regulation is closely related to the nature of institutionalisation’s 
assumption, as explained by Scott (1987) through the work of Berger and Luckmann (1967). Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) explicitly state, 
“social order comes into being as individuals take action, interpret that action, and share with others their 
interpretations. These interpretations or ‘typifications’ are attempts to classify the behaviour into categories that 
will enable the actors to respond to it in a similar fashion. The process by which actions become repeated over 
time and are assigned similar meanings by self and others is defined as institutionalization (as quoted in Scott, 
1987, p. 54)”. 
 
4.3 Research Paradigm 
The use of the institutional theory has been of a great assistance in determining the paradigm upon 
which the research question of how Saudi Culture affects minority shareholder rights based upon 
Hofstede’s cultural model linking societal constructs with the legal and political milieu can be 
answered. Hoque (2006, p. 197) states, “from a methodological point of view, many of the studies 
reviewed in this [institutional theory] chapter involved qualitative methods. Since the institutional 
theory focuses on understanding context specific accounting practises, this methodology is apt”.  
In addition, tracing back the origin of institutional theory and its evolution since the late 20
th
 century 
(as to be seen in the theory section, p. 75) has been of a great assisstence to this research in terms of 
choosing the appropriate paradigm to use. Moreover, Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) four depicted 
paradigms have been beneficial in summing up all elements of such choice, as their pioneering model 
was developed to guide researchers in building up their work analytically. 
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Table 4.5: Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Theory 
 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 22) 
Table 4.6: Four Paradigms in Organisation Theory 
 
Source: Wanyama, (2006, p.135). Note: This Table summarises the different strands within each paradigm as 
proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979); Dahrendorf (1959) and Cohen (1968). 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) engineered their table by having the ‘Subjective’ and ‘Objective’ axis 
running horizontally, with the ‘Sociology of Radical Change’ and ‘Sociology of Regulation’ running 
vertically. The interpretive paradigm falls in the bottom left corner of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 
four paradigms model (Table 4.5). It embeds subjectivism as a construction of reality, its entailed 
ontological strand of reality as a symbolic discourse and its epistemological root in anti-positivism (see 
table 4.6). Moreover, the interpretive paradigm embeds the sociology of regulation as the regulation is 
aimed to depict current practices and how an organisation’s affairs are regulated. Then, it offers 
suggestions for improvement consistent with the current stand. 
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4.4 Theory 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this research is to examine the impact of Saudi Arabian culture on CG and regulatory 
compliance with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ interests. The conceptual 
framework for understanding how Saudi Culture affects minority shareholder rights is based upon 
Hofstede’s (2010) cultural model linking societal constructs with the legal and political milieu.  
In addition, application of Institutional Theory as the main body of theory addressing both research 
questions, of how the Saudi culture influences its CG regulatory compliance in light of minority 
shareholders’ rights, seems to be suitable in terms of usage in the accounting literature (Scott, 1987). 
Even though there has been an ongoing debate regarding the definition of Institutional Theory as a 
body of knowledge, Scott (1987) provides a variously unified framework of what an Institutional 
Theory ought to be as it has been evolved and developed by institutional theorists. Hence, Scott (1987) 
presents Institutionalisation as a ‘Process of Creating Reality’ in explaining the evolution of the 
second, New Institutional Economic (NIE), and the third versions of the Institutional Theory, New 
Institutional Sociology. 
Specifically, the New Institutional Sociology version of Institutional Theory pertains strongly to this 
research’s questions, complemented by Scott’s (1987) categorisation of ‘Institutional System as a 
Class of Elements’. Therefore, presentation of Scott’s (1987) work of institutionalisation as a process 
of creating reality and institutional system as a class of elements will be discussed accordingly in the 
subsequent sections. Hence, illuminating lights will be shed on the appropriate methodology and 
paradigm this research follows to answer the core research question of how the Saudi Culture affects 
minority shareholder rights based upon Hofstede’s cultural model, linking societal constructs with the 
legal and political milieu. 
4.4.2 Institutionalisation as a Process of Creating Reality 
Scott (1987) shows how the work of Peter Berger on the sociology of knowledge is rooted in the work 
of German idealists and phenomenologists such as Dilthey, Husserl and Schutz, and how this has 
affected the dominant view of institutionalisation as a process. Scott (1987, p.3) explains, “the 
argument is that social order is based fundamentally on a shared social reality which, in turn, is a 
human construction, being created in social interaction”. Then, Scott (1987) substantiates how Berger 
and Luckmann (1967) are arguably accurate with their assumption that a social order 
“‘is a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human production...Social order comes into being as 
individuals take action, interpret that action, and share with others their interpretations. The process by which 
actions become repeated over time and are assigned similar meanings by self and others is defined as 
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institutionalization” (as quoted inScott, 1987, p. 54). 
 
This elaboration on the previous work of Berger and Luckmann (1967) viewing institutionalisation as a 
process according to Scott (1987) has led to more developed versions of the definition of 
institutionalisation order by Zucker (1977) and Meyer and Rowan (1977). Firstly, according to Scott 
(1987), Zucker’s (1977) assertion of institutionalisation as a process and ‘a property variable’ guided 
Zucker (1977) in defining institutionalisation as,  
“the process by which individual actors transmit what is socially defined as real and, at the same time, at any 
point in the process the meaning of an act can be defined as more or less a taken-for-granted part of this social 
reality. Institutionalized acts, then, must be perceived as both objective and exterior”.  
 
Secondly, Scott (1987) shows how Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) embracing of Berger and Luckmann's 
(1967) conception of institutionalised rules as “classifications built into society as reciprocated 
typifications or interpretations” encouraged them to define institutionalisation as, “the processes by 
which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought 
and action” (Scott, 1987). 
Therefore, and in an effort to conclude all relatively similar definitions of institutionalisation as a 
process and its implications, Scott (1987) states,  
“in Zucker's work, the emphasis on institutionalization as process has continued to dominate. The force of these 
models is in the cognitive convictions they evoke: ‘institutionalization is rooted in conformity—not conformity 
engendered by sanctions (whether positive or negative), nor conformity resulting from a ‘black-box’ 
internalization process, but conformity rooted in the taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life... – 
institutionalization operates to produce common understandings about what is appropriate and, fundamentally, 
meaningful behavior”. 
 
4.4.3 Institutional Systems as a Class of Elements 
The view of the institutional system as a class of elements should not be viewed as a successor version 
of institutionalisation as a process but rather as a continuity of literature advancements (Scott, 1987). 
The nature of this continuity is in the emphasis shift.  Specifically, Scott (1987) sees the emphasis in 
this version is placed on the institutionalised belief systems as constituting, “a distinctive class of 
elements that can account for the existence and/or the elaboration of organizational structure”.  
In addition, Scott (1987) views this shift as dated back to the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977). “The 
emphasis shifts from the properties of generalized belief systems to the existence of a variety of 
sources or loci of ‘rationalized and impersonal prescriptions that identify various social purposes’ and 
‘specify in a rule-like way… to pursue them” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977 as quoted in Scott, 1987, p. 56).  
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As a consequence, this shift in emphasis in accordance with Scott (1987) has caused a number of 
changes such as: 
1. The re-conceptualization of the organizational environments. The institutional environment has 
become refined to cultural elements such as “symbols, cognitive systems, normative beliefs 
and the sources of such elements (p.6)” as opposed to technical elements called upon by 
previous theories such as the contingency theory or the resource dependence theory (Scott, 
1987). As a result, Scott states,  
 
“[he, and Meyer (1983: 140, 149)] defined technical environments as ‘those within which a product or service is 
exchanged in a market such that organizations are rewarded for effective and efficient control of the work 
process’, in contrast to institutional environments that ‘are characterized by the elaboration of rules and 
requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy’” 
(Scott, 1987). 
 
2. Secondly, the view of institutionalisation as a distinctive process is deteriorating due to the fact 
that “organizations do not necessarily conform to a set of institutionalized beliefs because they 
‘constitute reality’ or are taken for granted, but often because they are rewarded for doing so 
through increased legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977 as 
quoted in Scott, 1987). As a result, institutional theorists begin to theorise 
 
“more explicitly about the variety of types of processes that might cause an organization to change its structure in 
ways that make it conform to—become isomorphic with—an institutional pattern. [Scott elaborates] The best-
known classification of this type is that developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who distinguished among 
coercive, mimetic, and normative processes leading to conformity” (Scott, 1987). 
 
3. Thirdly, less focus devoted to process, and more is given to the nature of the belief systems 
(Scott, 1987).   
 
4. This version of the institutional theory is causing attention to environmental elements such as 
“the market, the location of resources, customers, and the number and power of competitors” 
(Scott, 1987) to fade out as modern societies are getting more lawfully rationalised. “Elders' 
councils and other forms of traditional authority are replaced by the nation-state, the 
professions, and rationalized systems of law” (Scott, 1987). 
 
Furthermore, Scott concludes,  
“This version of institutional theory has both contributed to and benefited from the resurgence of interest in 
culture. Thus, this institutional theory provides a bridge for students of organizations to link to the insightful 
work of Berger, Bourdieu, Douglas, Foucault, Geertz, and Wuthnow, to name only some of the leading 
contributors to the ‘new’ cultural approaches” (1987). 
 
4.4.4 Variant Forms of Institutional Theory 
4.4.4.1 Old Institutional Economics: OIE 
According to Hoque (2006), the origin of this theory dates back over a hundred years to the work of 
Veblen (1898, 1899). Hoque (2006) then explains how this theory rejects the neo-classical economic 
theorising, placing emphasis on assumptions pertaining to rationality, optimisation, and market 
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equilibrium. Instead, he elaborates,  
“in order to capture the cumulative path(s) of economic life, individuals’ tastes and preferences (and, by 
implications, their choice, and decision making) cannot be taken as given or exogenous. Rather, OIE theorists 
argue that tastes and preferences must be analysed in their own right…OIE stresses the importance of power and 
politics, learning and (technological) innovation for shaping cumulative process over time.” (Hoque, 2006, 
pp.184-185). 
 
In addition, Hoque (2006) adds that only in recent times has the work of Nelson and Winter (1982), 
focusing directly on institutional phenomena within organisations, influenced major OIE theorists (e.g. 
Hodgson, 1982; and Vromen, 1995). Hoque (2006, p.185) concludes, “in a nutshell, Nelson and Winter 
highlight the habitual and routinised nature of business practices, including accounting practises (1982, 
p.482) and conceptualise how such routines, over time, underpin firm’s know-how, ‘passing on’ 
(mainly tacit) knowledge”. 
4.4.4.2 New Institutional Economics: NIE 
Hoque states,  
“a typical definition for an institution in NIE theory would be that of North who stated that; ‘institutions, 
composed of rules, norms of behaviour, and the way they are enforced, provide the opportunity set in an 
economy which determines the kind of purposive activity embodies in organisations (firms, trade unions, 
political bodies, and so forth that will come into existence. NIE assumes rational optimizing behaviour, 
although…many NIE theories incorporate ‘bound Rationality’ (Simon, 1976) into their work, thereby allowing 
for an explanation of institutions in the context of cognitive limits, incomplete information and / or difficulties in 
monitoring and enforcing agreements. Institutions, according to the NIE approach, essentially exist where their 
benefits exceed costs involved in creating and maintaining them-implying cost-minimising/efficiency term.” 
(2006, p.186). 
 
4.4.4.3 New Institutional Sociology  
According to Hoque (2006, pp.186-187), 
 “a starting point for most INS-informed studies is an assumption that intra-organisational structures and 
procedures, including accounting, are largely shaped by external factors rather than cost-minimizing objectives. 
Thus, organizations which operate in similar environment settings are assumed to be subject to comparable 
demands towards what is generally deemed as being appropriate behaviour, including its choice and design of 
internal structures and procedures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Scott, 
1983)”. 
 
Therefore, it should be recognised that 
 
“external rules, procedures, myths, and norms define the New Institutional Sociology. Theory: ‘institutions 
consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to 
social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers-cultures, structures, and routines-and they 
operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction (Scott, 1995, p. 33)” (Hoque, 2006, p. 187).  
 
Moreover, the New Institutional Sociology theory recognises, in practice, there is “a separation 
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between external image and actual structures and procedures which has been refereed to as ‘de-
coupling’ (Weick, 1976; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1992)” (Hoque, 2006, p. 187). 
Hence, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) set the stage for institutional isomorphism and broke it down 
further into three sub-categories: to address the implications of ‘de-coupling’ and trace its sources; 
Table 4.7: Institutional Isomorphism 
1. Coercive isomorphism, whereby impinging external factors (e.g. government policy, regulation, 
supplier relationships) exert force on organizations to adopt specific internal structures and 
procedures. 
2. Mimetic isomorphism-whereby organizations emulate the internal structures and procedures 
adopted by other organizations. 
3. Normative isomorphism-whereby organizations adopt the structures and procedures advocated by 
particular dominant professions, professional bodies and or consultants. 
Source: Hoque (2006, p.188). 
 
Most importantly, the New Institutional Sociology theory aids the conceptual framework for 
understanding how the Saudi Culture affects minorities based upon Hofstede’s (2010) Cultural Value 
Dimension (CVD) model linking societal constructs with the legal and political milieu. 
As seen in the literature review chapter, a review of the relevant CG literature pertaining to both 
research questions has provided that cultural, legal and political factors are to be considered to answer 
both research questions. As a result, the literature review chapter as a whole provides a multi-
dimensional framework for assessing CG regimes in developing countries such as Saudi Arabia in light 
of minority shareholders’ rights by integrating cultural, legal, and political factors. Such integration is 
motivated by the gaps found between those disciplines in the relevant CG literature.  
“The various authors in this debate know too much to deny altogether the relevance of each others’ variables: 
Politics, law, judges, the role of the state, norms, private mechanisms, and path dependence appear in all of their 
writings. They differ in how these variables act in a causal sequence and how they are privileged relatively in a 
model" (Gourevitch, 2003). 
 
Figure: 4.1 
Source: The Author 
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Hence, the New Institutional Sociology will bridge the gap between these disciplines to  
“help explain the observations that organizations are becoming more homogeneous and that elites often get their 
way, while at the same time enabling us to understand the irrationality, the frustration of power, and the lack of 
innovation that are so commonplace in organizational life (DiMaggio &Powell, 1983, p.157). 
 
Moreover, the justification for the use of the New Institutional Sociology theory as an appropriate 
framework for this thesis is also based on the following theoretical findings: 
Firstly, “national cultures can be seen metaphorically, as the mother of path dependence dynamics in 
the sense that they play a role in both the origin and in future development of corporate governance 
systems” (Licht, 2000). Hence, “One may thus imagine a pyramid of social norms in which cultural 
values constitute the foundations. Corporate governance systems build on these foundations to develop 
both formal and non-formal rules as well as structures (Licht, 2000). Likewise, the New Institutional 
Sociology theory has become refined to cultural elements such as “symbols, cognitive systems, 
normative beliefs and the sources of such elements (p.6)” (Scott, 1987) and how these cultural 
elements institutionalize rule-like norms. Furthermore, Scott concludes,  
“This version of institutional theory has both contributed to and benefited from the resurgence of interest in 
culture. Thus, this institutional theory provides a bridge for students of organizations to link to the insightful 
work of Berger, Bourdieu, Douglas, Foucault, Geertz, and Wuthnow, to name only some of the leading 
contributors to the ‘new’ cultural approaches” (1987). 
 
Secondly, “the social norms addressed in most of the current law and economics literature tend to be 
particular and context specific and may also change rather quickly. In contrast, values are more general 
and stable” (Licht, 2000). In fact such position has been previously explained by the work of Max 
Weber and Karl Marx in section 3.2.3 titled National Culture and Economic Developments, page 29. 
Modernisation theorists such as Karl Marx (1973) emphasise the convergence of values with economic 
development, and assume the death of religious beliefs in the long run.  On the other hand, the 
opposing school of Max Weber (1904) puts the emphasis on the persistence of traditional values 
despite economic and political changes. Max Weber’s view conforms with the notion that values are 
relatively independent of economic conditions (DiMaggio, 1994). Hence, such view of the persistence 
of cultural values is also supported by one of the founders or rather major contributor of this version of 
the institutional theory, New Institutional Sociology as illustrated in the statement above. 
Thirdly, and as a result, “the CVD framework can lend itself to developing rigorous comparative 
approaches to social norms and their interrelations with the law in different cultures” (Licht, 2000). 
Not only that but the use of the CVD framework in corporate governance research should provide 
researchers with “the shield of avoiding risks of relying on social myths and stereotypes”(Licht, 2000). 
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Hence, potential CVD model’s findings of this study are suitable to be interpreted by the New 
Institutional Sociology. Moreover, findings from the legal and political factors can also be evaluated 
by the New Institutional Sociology as it investigates such compliance of CG on three level of 
Institutional Isomorphism: Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative. Hence, effects of legal and political 
factors can be traced with these three levels accordingly. 
Moreover, this present research study is intended to employ a cross-sectional quantitative analysis 
design of the cultural section. Hence, the observational analysis of the data collected will only be done 
at a specific point in time without taking into account a time-series analysis, which would have been 
more indicatively explicit of a behavioural or a cultural change. However, as advised by Hofstede via 
his email (see Appendix D3), this should not be a point of concern as cultural values are resistant to 
change over time, which is in confirmation with Max Weber's (1904) emphasis on the persistence of 
traditional values despite economic and political changes. However, it should be recognised that the 
researcher kept "an open mind' regarding whether or not cultural values are persistent and considered 
opposing schools of thoughts such as Karl Marx's (1973) emphasising the convergence of values with 
economic developments.  Eventually, however, the researcher became more convinced of the 
persistence of cultural values when reporting the results of this present research. Moreover, such 
conclusion does not only conform with the main theory employed by this research, New Institutional 
Sociology theory, but it is also in line with Hofstede's advise expressed to the researcher in this regard. 
4.5 Summary 
The strand of the interpretive paradigm adopted for this study is Phenomenological Sociology, as it 
employs both Ethno-Methodology and Symbolic- Interactionism, which sets the research paradigm in 
accordance with the founders’ of NIS’s isomorphic theoratical stand. DiMaggio and Powell state, 
“we argue that a theory of institutional isomorphism may help explain the observations that organizations are 
becoming more homogeneous and that elites often get their way, while at the same time enabling us to 
understand the irrationality, the frustration of power, and the lack of innovation that are so commonplace in 
organizational life. What is more, our approach is more consistant with the ethnographic and theoretical literature 
on how organizations work” (DiMaggio &Powell, 1983, p. 157). 
 
Therefore, this research engages in an ethno-methodology, the sociological study of rules and rituals 
underlying ordinary social activities and interactions. Moreover, forms of inquiries and gathering data 
via questionnaires and semi-structured interviews will be methodologically appropriate to use. By 
doing so, some assumptions are embedded in the way of proceeding relating to language, issues of 
inter-subjectivity and communication. Therefore, symbolic-interactionism as suggested is 
“a theoretical perspective that grounds these assumptions in most explicit fashion. It deals directly with issues 
such as language, communication, interrelationships and community…symbolic interactionism is all about those 
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basic social interactions whereby we enter into the perceptions, attitudes and values of a community” (Crotty, 
1998). 
4.6 Method Section: 
4.6.1 Introduction 
On the methodological level, this research engages in an ethno-methodology, the sociological study of 
rules and rituals underlying ordinary social activities and interactions. As a result, the forms of inquiry 
and gathering data will be conducted via questionnaires and semi-structured interviews to enter into 
“the perceptions, attitudes and values of a community” (Crotty, 1998). 
The justification for the use of questionnaires in an ethno-methodological study stems from the fact 
that the interpretive paradigm of this research borders on functionalism (Table 4.5) as it deals with the 
codes and principles of CG as a function. In addition, the aim of the questionnaires is consonant with 
the ethno-methodology framework as the questionnaires, for this study, are designed to empirically 
measure Hofstede's (2010) CVD, composed of percepts and attitudes, of Saudi shareholders based on 
the principles of CG found in the OECD forum of 2004. Therefore, the use of questionnaires is 
appropriate to uncover potential correlations between Hofstede's (2010) CVD of Saudi shareholders 
and the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi 
Arabia. 
In addition, “ethnographers often also employ some structured interviewing. It may well be that an 
ethnographer wants or needs some more general data from the participants. They may need 
quantitative data as part of a larger study” (O’Reilly, 2012, p.121). Hence, both methods of data 
collection, questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, are suitable to be used methodologically in 
combination with the New Institutional Sociology theory adopted for this research. 
Therefore, two main methods will be used to serve the purpose of data collection, namely: 
1- Semi-Structured Interviews 
2- Questionnaires 
 
Moreover, both of these techniques are trimmed down during the pilot work which precedes the actual 
field work, where such tools are put under the microscope to produce the sort of data intended, either 
of idea collection as in the case of semi-structured  interviews or as a collection of data as it is the case 
of questionnaires. Such pilot work will be of great advantage in reducing the amount of bias and 
expediting the data-processing in terms of precoding close-ended questions, and assigning values to 
open-ended questions. Most importantly, piloting will serve as the main source of resolving issues of 
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objectivity for both methods. Therefore, each method will be presented in the subsequent sections 
along with its closely related objectivity issues and applicable resolutions through piloting. 
4.6.2 Interviews 
Table 4.8: Types of Interview: 
1- Exploratory interviews, in-depth interviews, or free-style interviews ( including group interviews) 
2- Standardized interviews such as used, for example, in public opinion polls, market research, and 
government surveys. 
Source: Oppenheim (2004, p.65). 
 
Each type of interviews has its advantages and disadvantages, and serves a specific purpose. For 
example, the purpose of an exploratory interview “is essentially heuristic: to develop ideas and 
research hypothesis rather than to gather facts and statistics. It is concerned with trying to understand 
how ordinary people think and feel about the topics of concern to the research” (Oppenheim, 2004, 
p.67).  As a result, the exploratory interview type is very specific in its domain, and is mainly used to 
discover deeply rooted feelings, and attitudes concealed behind conceptual ideas.  
However, the purpose of employing the semi-structured interview-techniqe for this research is to 
gather ideas and facts stemming from the experience of well defined segments of lawers and legislators 
to answer the second research question: what are the other factors influencing the level of compliance 
of listed Saudi Corporations’ with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority 
shareholders in Saudi Arabia. Hence, a ‘hidden agenda’ of general topics concerning the legal and 
political frameworks in Saudi Arabia and its effect on the rights of minority shareholders have been 
identified by the literature review phase. Therefore, extracted variables from the literature review phase 
are employed in the construction of the interview questions (See Appendices B2, B3). 
Moreover, the interviewer is adequately equipped in regard to being well-informed about orienting 
concepts in adjacent fields of the topics under investigation via the relevant literature of such topics 
and its associated areas of potential concerns and sensitive issues (Oppenheim, 2004). Therefore, a 
standardised interview type is employed as this research is essentially set to capture ideas and facts. 
Therefore, "the various research objectives…have long since been formulated; the interview schedule 
and the wording of the questions have been exhaustively tried out in pilot work; the sample has been 
drawn; the field force recruited (possibly)” (Oppenheim, 2004, p. 66).  
Moreover, the underlining assumption of standardised interviews is the ‘equivalence of stimulus’, “the 
notion that every respondent has been asked the same questions, with the same meaning, in the same 
words, same intonation, same sequence, in the same setting…that’s why we call these interviews 
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‘standardized’ though to achieve this kind of psychological ‘sameness’ is a manifest impossibility” 
(Oppenheim, 2004, p. 67).  
Therefore, in the piloting phase of the interview questions two Saudi nationals, who were police 
officers studying English as a second language at the University of Gloucestershire, were chosen to 
form a pilot sample.  Hence, interview questions, stemming from the relevant literature, were tested to 
improve their coherence. In addition, throughout both interviews a well-maintained level of ‘sameness’ 
was obtained.  A well-maintained level of ‘sameness’ is capable of paying generous dividends in terms 
of objectivity in acquiring information from various respondents of different backgrounds 
(Oppenheim, 2004). 
In addition, it should be noted that questions in this type of semi-structured interviews tend to be 
protectively open-ended; hence, the complementary probes are designed to be delicately directive as 
they are meant to confirm previously spoken thoughts (see Appendix B6). Nevertheless, a huge 
amount of skill is required of an interviewer to succeed in such proceedings as such interactive 
technique may cause discomfort when used inappropriately (Oppenheim, 2004). However, engaging in 
such proceedings is worthy as, “the series of initial interviews, together with ideas from the relevant 
literature, eventually [lead] to a conceptual framework and the decision to measure a number of 
variables by means of structured inventories” (Oppenheim, 2004, p.77). 
Moreover, the researcher attempted a series of social interactive techniques such as rapport to put 
interviewees at ease while creating zones of productive comfort for respondents (Saunders, 
Lewis &Thornhill, 2011) before conducting any of the actual interviews. In fact, the researcher strived 
to build a rapport within the first two minutes of each interview by looking around the offices of the 
interviewees and tried to relate accordingly. In addition, a follow up question technique was deployed 
whenever there was any confusion regarding an answer of a specific question (see Appendix B6). In 
addition, traffic management and probes do serve the purpose of exploring deeply into the spoken 
thoughts of interviewees (Bryman, 2012). Hence, during all conducted interviews, the interviewer 
utilised such technique to capture essential aspects of spontaneous thoughts already spoken by 
respondents.  
Furthermore, telephone interviewing is advantageous when the form of a standardised interview is 
used in terms of their low cost. In addition, they can be faster paced than normal interviews, and can be 
arranged on a shorter time-interval compared to normal interviews (Saunders et al., 2011). However, a 
major disadvantage when using telephone interviewing is that the refusal rate is higher compared to a 
normal interview, especially on weekends. Therefore, it is advisable to use a mixed method of 
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conventional and telephone interviewing if possible after conducting a detailed research into whether 
or not both methods will produce comparable data on similar respondents within the same study 
(Oppenheim, 2004). However, for the purpose of this research, one Skype/video interview was 
conducted with an ex-legislator due to his busy schedual.  
Moreover, it should be noted that, during the pilot interview phase, the researcher utilised a mixed 
method, including one face to face interview and one telephone interview, with participants. As a 
result, data collected from mixed method approaches yeilded comparable results on the condition that 
the telephone-interviewee was allocated the appropriate time to answer the questions. 
In addition, it should be illustrated that telephone interviews do have similar problems prevailing in 
conventional interviews. For instance, bias can be easily incorporated through the building of interview 
questions or use of ambiguous or biased language. Sometimes, bias can be presented in the tone or 
manner through which a question is asked (Saunders et al., 2011). In addition, bias can be present in 
the choice of exploratory interviewing techniques used such as projective statements and probes 
(Saunders et al., 2011). For example, an interviewer can lead an interviewee in a direction of his or her 
own preference regardless of the aim of the study. This is done through the use of, for instance, probes 
such as: when taking a phrase of interest to the interviewer out of a respondent’s mouth and probing 
with it: how can you justify….such a ‘phrase’ can lead the respondent to such bias.  
Therefore, when the Skype/video interview was conducted with the ex-legislator, the researcher paid 
close attention to his tone of voice and questions/probes were guided by the interview schedule (see 
Appendix B6). In addition, the interviewee was allocated the proper time to answer the questions as he 
pleased with no inturuptions. As Oppenheim recommends,  
“we must strive towards obtaining data that are ‘uncontaminated’ by the interviewing process…our attempts at 
creating a standardized situation would be regarded as ‘schematizing’ and falsifying the information being 
collected…the unit of analysis should not be of some ‘answer’ to a question but rather a social episode, a 
culturally determined dialogue between two strangers playing roles” (2004, p. 86).  
 
In addition, there are two types of errors likely to occur in interviews: random errors and systematic 
errors. Random errors“due to carelessness, inaccuracies, misunderstanding and the like, will cause our 
results to be distributed around an imaginary mid-point which constitutes the ‘true’ finding, rather like 
attempts to hit a bulls-eye” (Oppenheim, 2004, p. 87). On the other hand, systematic errors can make 
our final results of such a mixture of ‘true’ answers and ‘interviewer’s effect’ or ‘bias’ (Bryman, 2012). 
Below is a table of main causes of bias: 
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Table 4.9: Main Causes of Bias in Interviews 
Before the Interview 
1- Departures from the sampling instructions, by the interviewer 
2- Adverse impression management by the interviewer 
During the interview 
1- Poor maintenance of Rapport 
2- Rephrasing of attitude questions 
3- Altering factual questions 
4- Carless prompting 
5- Poor management of show cards 
6- Biased probes 
7- Asking questions of sequence 
8- Unreliable field coding 
9- Biased recording of verbatim answers 
10- Poor management of situational problems or of ‘special procedures’ 
Source: Oppenheim (2004, p. 97). 
 
Therefore, before each interview, the researcher had to revisit the interview questions guide to ensure 
consistency with the topics to be investigated. During interviews, rapport was essentially established in 
the first two minutes and rephrasing of attitude questions was aided by the clarification section of the 
interview guide (see Appendix B6). Alteration of factual questions was aided by the interview guide’s 
clarification section and carrful prompting was carried out in line with interviewees' motives. In 
addition, all probes were guided by the interview guide's clarification section.  In addition, questions of 
sequence were only asked when interviewees expressed enthusiasim to carry on the same topic. 
Moreover, all recording of verbatem answers was done via a recording device, and no situational 
procedures were raised during all interviews.  
4.6.2.1 Interview Approaches to Respondents 
The establishment of rapport is essential for effective interviews. Therefore, the interviwer strove to 
put his respondents at ease to collect the intended data while allowing for new ideas about the Saudi 
legal and political frameworks affecting the rights of minority shareholders to emerge. In addition, 
during the interviews, the interviewer used a list of short-answers such as agree, disagree, and strongly 
agree, which are called prompts. Probes were another verbal tool the interviewer utilised to engage 
respondents when an answer was unclear. Therefore, the interviewer used phrases such as ‘how come’ 
to get such respondent to add more data or ideas. Lastly, the order of questions and use of language 
were advantageous during all interviews due to the exhaustive pilot work previously carried out to 
ensure such ease. 
4.6.2.2 Resolving Issues of Objectivity in Relation to Interviews 
“Our key effort must therefore be directed towards the prevention or reduction of hidden, systematic 
bias in the interviews” (Oppenheim, 2004, p. 87). This central task of achieving meaningful interview 
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results should not be taken for granted.  Therefore, there are techniques used by interviewing agencies 
that can be of great significance in reducing bias along with bias indicators, as summed up below. 
These techniques are aimed at distinguishing types of questions into: 
Table 4.10: Types of Questions 
1- Factual questions with which an interviewer is expected to read out the questions as printed on the 
schedule but has some latitude to offer explanations, correct misunderstandings or offer previously 
agreed definitions. 
2- Attitude and opining questions, which an interviewer is forbidden to explain or reward in any way. 
3- Certain standard classification questions …with which an interviewer is expected to devise his or her 
own probes to ensure that he or she has correctly obtained all the information required. 
Source: Oppenheim (2004, p.87). 
 
“This goes a long way towards resolving the contradictions between the requirement for 
standardization and the need for flexibility and ‘equivalence’” (Oppenheim, 2004, pp. 87-88). 
Therefore, as this study aims to use a semi-structured interviewing approach, the professional 
categorisation of question types was carried out during the pilot phase. Hence, an interview guide (see 
Appendix B6) was developed to obtain the right balance between standardisation, flexibility and 
equivalence. 
4.6.3 Questionnaires 
In reaching a definition, it will be hard to define the term questionnaire quite narrowly as it overlaps in 
content with other data collection methods such as structured interviews, especially when the term is 
taken roughly to mean ‘fixed questions’. However, it will be helpful to consider its purpose as a data 
collection method to measure certain specifications directly linked to an operational statement of an 
issue being investigated and in accordance with the research design and paradigm (Bryman, 2012). 
Therefore, it is easier to distinguish a questionnaire from other research tools. For example, a 
questionnaire is not just a piece of paper with a list of questions to be answered as instructed, nor it is 
an empty paper to be filled out by respondents. Rather, it is a data collection method of measuring 
certain variables through a set of fixed questions arrived at after “many weeks of planning, reading, 
design and exploratory pilot work” (Oppenheim, 2004, p. 100). In fact, the researcher spent a period 
equivalent of five months to carry out the pilot work:  two months to testing the pilot work followed by 
three months’ worth of analysing the pilot study and developing the interview and questionnaire guides 
(an extract of the research time line is provided below). 
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Table 4.11: Research Time Line 
1 Pilot Study Months   Feb- March2014 Completed 
2 Analysis of Pilot Study and Development of  
Interview + Questionnaire guides 
Months   April-Jun2014 Completed 
Source: The Author 
In addition, there are several types of questionnaire, such as: 
 
Table 4.12: Types of Questionnaire 
A- Self-administrated questionnaire: where lists of questions are presented to participants by an interviewer or by 
an official accompanied with an introductory briefing in regard to its purpose. Respondents are allotted the 
appropriate time to fill out such inquiries. The main advantage of such method is “[ensuring] a high response 
rate, accurate sampling, and a minimum of interview bias, while permitting interviewer assessment, providing 
necessary explanations (but not the interpretation of questions) and giving the benefit of a degree of personal 
contact” (Oppenheim, 2004, p. 103). 
B- Group Administrated Questionnaires: these are normally assembled of a group of 40 to 50 respondents being 
carefully sampled and gathered together in a designated location where a list of questions, forming such a 
questionnaire, is given to each of them in the same manner at the same time. Administration of such a setting can 
vary from two interviewers supervising the whole stage or an audio recording instructing respondents on how to 
approach their tasks. 
Source: Oppenheim, (2004, p. 103). 
 
In fact, due to the natue of this research, the group administrated questionnaire technique was 
employed to ensure a correct sample of respondents. As the questionnaires were intended to be 
completed by classes of shareholders such as Majority, Sophisticated, and Minority shareholders, the 
knowledge of Saudi banks' trading rooms’, where the questionnaire was administrated, managers was 
needed and consequentally utilised. In addition, administration of such settings was carried by the 
researcher with the help of a trading room manager and his asssigned personnel. 
In addition, the main advantages of this method are: “respondents answer questions in the same order 
and that they all have the same amount of time to do so. But, contamination (through copying, talking 
or asking question) is a constant danger” (Oppenheim, 2004, p.103). Nevetheless, in analysing the 
questionnaires via the SPSS program, no contamination, ‘repeated same answers of different 
questionnairs’, was found as in such settings instructions were carfully given in a walk through 
procedures pertaining to the questionnaires before handing them out. 
Moreover, the medium in which questionnaires are presented plays a major role in their success rates 
(Bryman, 2012). Hence, the group-administrated questionnaires, due to the nature of this study, were 
approriate to use and aided in defining the targeted sample and enormously in the classficiation of the 
targeted sample.  
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4.6.3.1 Questionnaire Approaches to Respondents 
As questionnaires possess the tendency of low response rates when sent through distant mediums, such 
rates can significantly be improved through: 
Table 4.13: Questionnaires’ Approaches to Respondents 
1- Advanced warning; a letter or a postcard informing the respondent of the study in advance, and inviting 
participation 
2- Explanation of selection-explaining the method of sampling used, and how the respondent came to be 
chosen 
Source:  Oppenheim (2004, p. 104). 
Nevertheless, distant mediums were not used as the questionnaires were group-administrated via 
designated locations. Moreover, two reputable banks’ trading rooms were utilised to be of a great 
motivator to potential respondents (Saunders et al., 2011).  In addition, various techniques such as 
length of time incorporated in the design of questionnaires, thickness of questionnaire booklets, 
appearance of questionnaire layouts and quality of papers can be of great benefit (Saunders et al., 
2011) and were accordingly utilised.  
4.6.3.2 Resolving Issues of Objectivity in Relation to Questionnaires 
Questionnaires can be wasteful when careful planning had not been done in advance. For example, bias 
can still exist even in the none-existent physical appearance of such an interviewer.   
“In a sense, a ghost interviewer is still present because the respondent may conjure up an image or a stereotype of 
the organization which sent the questionnaires and of the kind of person who might be asking these questions. In 
other words, the respondents will interact with the questionnaire and may ‘project’ some kind of person or 
organization ‘behind’ the question, and this bias their responses” (Oppenheim, 2004, p.103). 
 
 Therefore, there are a few techniques presented below which reduce this sort of bias to a minimal 
acceptable level and have been employed by the researcher for the questionnaire, such as: 
Table 4.14: Questions’ Bias Reduction Methods 
1- Build up of question modules:  
 Question of ‘classifying or personal data’ should always be placed towards the end of such 
module as they tend to off-put respondents. 
 Inter-logic of the inquiry and reactions of respondents should be planned carefully 
 Balance of question types should be evenly and carefully presented. 
2- Order of questions within modules 
 ‘Funnel approach’ is so named because it starts off the module with a very broad question and 
then progressively narrows down the scope of the questions until in the end it comes to some 
very specific questions. 
 ‘Filter question’ technique is used to exclude some respondents from a particular question 
sequence if irrelevant. 
 Routing instruction: e.g., when an answer is negative, the interviewer is instructed to skip the 
next question and proceed to a specific section. 
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3- Question types 
 A closed question is one in which the respondents are offered a choice of alternatives replies. 
 An open-free question is not followed by any choice and its answer is recorded in full. 
Source:  Oppenheim (2004, pp.108-115). 
4.6.3.3 Closed and Open Ended Questions - Contextual effects 
The researcher was very careful about when both open and closed types of questions were applied. For 
example, when a participant was given a multiple-choice question via the questionnaire, such as: Your 
educational level? (Section 2, Q3 in the questionnaire). Accordingly, the researcher provided certain 
answer options to participants, such as: BA, Master’s, etc. along with an option of 'other' to avoid 
leading the respondent as it does have a contextual effect on subsequent open-ended questions due to 
guiding participants’ thinking along a particular line (Bryman, 2012). 
4.6.4 Resolution of Overall Method of Objectivity through Piloting 
The term piloting is concerned with designing and testing questions and procedures over a lengthy 
period of time before any fieldwork takes place. It can be regarded as a preparatory stage for carrying 
out an effective data or idea collection method. In piloting, the researcher used a judgmental sample 
composed of 13 respondents to the questionnaire and 2 for the interviews to try out internal techniques 
used in data or idea collection methods. A pilot stage covers every aspect of data collection and idea 
collection methods from designing, organising, wording, exploring precepts and attitude scaling, 
processing data, and finally reporting (Saunders et al., 2011). 
4.6.4.1 Question Wording 
A. Factual Questions 
There are some issues associated with asking factual questions, such as testing respondents on their 
‘periodical behaviours’ to obtain certain data. Therefore, the researcher asked respondents to do the 
time sampling through a multiple-choice question with a large time frame to avoid creating any sort of 
embarrassment. For instance, in Section 2, Q6: 
For how long have you been trading in the Stock Market?  
    < 1 years         1-3 years            4-10 years         11-20 years    
 
In addition, classification questions asking about issues such as age, sex were other areas of concern. 
Classification questions are investigative in nature. Therefore, the researcher carefully used 
classification questions as they possess some grading on scales of social class and prestige (Saunders et 
al., 2011). Therefore, the researcher strove to word classification questions as carefully as possible by 
Chapter Four: Research Methodology   P a g e  | 102 
 
 
 
inviting respondents to express, for instance, what they do for living in a way keeping the 
‘unclassifiable’ responses under ten percent (Saunders et al., 2011). For instance, Section2, Q4: 
Have you had any previous work experience related to share trading?  
   Yes            No      if Yes, Specify Occupation: 
 
In addition, factual questions are ‘loaded with prestige’ and so researchers need to phrase questions in 
ways allowing for low-prestige answers to avoid social desirability biases (Bryman, 2012). Due to the 
social desirability bias caused by factual questions, questions of ‘classifying or personal data’ were 
placed towards the end of the questionnaire, in Section 2.  
1. Reliability and Validity of Factual Questions 
Reliability of factual questions can be measured through various techniques of internal checks such as 
asking a sequence of questions pertaining to a single variable in different ways to maintain the 
consistency in given answers. Another technique is to introduce phony items; when chosen, they 
suggest guessing or carelessness (Bryman, 2012). Thus, within the questionnaire of this study, under 
each subtitle, an internal check was conducted by asking a sequence of questions pertaing to a single 
variable. For instance, Section 2, Q6 and Q7: 
For how long have you been trading in the Stock Market?  
  < 1 years             1-3 years                4-10 years             11-20 years    
 
What is the longest period you have held onto a certain class of shares? 
   <1 month           2-3 months           4-6 Months           6-12 months           1 year         2-3 years          >4 year 
 
B. Non-Factual Questions 
This type of question deals mainly with deep feelings, precepts and states of mind. Therefore, they are 
much more sensitive to “linguistics, situational and other biases” (Oppenheim, 2004, p.143). 
Nevertheless, the use of multiple-choice questions can be of a great advantage in simulating such 
attitude or perception while giving respondents some assurances that others ‘do’ feel the same way 
through the supply of alternatives in the form of answers. For example, Section 1, Q1, IA 
I. Rights of Shareholders Statements SA A N D SD 
A. Your basic shareholder rights should include the right to: 
 
1. Obtain relevant and material information on a timely and regular basics  
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1. Reliability and Validity of Non-Factual Questions 
Reliability measures of attitudinal questions are similar but trickier than in the case of factual 
questions. Therefore, a set of attitude questions or attitude scales were used with respondents as 
researchers cannot rely on a single opinion question (Oppenheim, 2004). “ By using SETS of 
questions, provided they all relate to the same attitude, we maximize the more stable components while 
reducing the instability due to  particular items, emphasis, mood changes and so on” (Oppenheim, 
2004, p. 147). For example, Section 1, Q1, IC. 
C. 
 
 
 
 
You shall participate effectively and vote in general shareholder meetings. Hence, you 
shall:  
2. Be Informed of Issues to be decided at the meeting  PD=LUA=L 
3.  Place items on the agenda of general meetings IND=H, PD=L 
4. Propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations IND=H PD=L 
5. Challenge resolutions benefiting controlling shareholders IND=H PD=L 
SA 
 
A 
 
N D SD 
  
Nevertheless, “the chief difficulty in assessing the validity of attitude questions is the lack of criteria 
[therefore,] what we need are groups of people with known attitude characteristics (criteria group), so 
that we can see whether or not our question can discriminate among them” (Oppenheim, 2004, p. 148). 
Hence, the validity of this questionnaire was measured through obtaining information from an 
independent source, namely Hofstede's website on Saudi CVD, to cross-check with the findings of the 
questionnaire analysis. In fact, the findings of the analysis were confirmatory of Hofstede's most recent 
findings pertaining to the Saudi CVD. 
4.6.4.2 Designing Attitude Statements 
In designing attitude statements, special attention should be paid to the tree model which shows the 
different layers of deep feelings, as constructed by Oppenheim (2004).  “For ease of understanding, 
social psychologists make a rough distinction between these different levels, calling the most 
superficial one ‘opinions’, the next one ‘ attitudes, a deeper level ‘values’ or ‘basic attitudes’, and a 
still deeper level ‘personality’” (Oppenheim, 2004, pp. 108-176). Therefore, when designing the 
questions for the questionnaire of this research, the CVD values to be captured were very clear to the 
researcher and so were the levels to be tackled as depicted in the figure below:  
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Figure 4.2 Designing Attitude Statements Tree Model 
 
Source: The Author 
Moreover, inclusion of positively and negatively expressed questions evenly throughout the whole 
inquiry was achieved in the build up of the questionnaires during the pilot phase. The logic behind 
such design is to reduce social desirability bias. In addition, favorable and unfavourable extremes were 
mixed up to the right and left of the rating forms to decrease the ‘halo effect’; which is when 
respondents allow themselves to be influenced by their feelings of like and dislike (Oppenheim, 2004). 
For example, the questionnaire questions and their corresponding answer-forms were phrased as 
follow: 
Q.1:  phrased Positively with a Positive corresponding Measure 
Q.2:  phrased Positively with a Negative corresponding measure 
Q.3:  phrased Positively with a Positive corresponding measure 
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Q.4:  phrased Negatively with a Negative corresponding measure 
In addition, the questionnaire as a whole was capable of reducing social desirability bias ‘acquiescence 
bias’ by designing a scale with balanced keying (an equal number of positive and negative statements) 
(Oppenheim, 2004). Therefore, acquiescence on positively keyed items can balance acquiescence on 
negatively keyed items, and ultimately reduces social desirability bias. 
A. Attitude Scaling 
There are numbers of attitude scaling techniques, such as social distance scale, Thurston scale, factorial 
scale and Likert scale (Saunders et al., 2011).  All of these scales are designed to measure a number of 
variables in accordance with certain principles, such as: 
Table 4.15: Attitude Scaling 
1. Uni- dimensionality or homogeneity-items should hang together to measure the same dimension with a 
little extraneous variance as possible. 
2. Reliability-the indispensible attribute of consistency. 
3. Validity- the degree to which the scale measures what it sets out to measure. 
4. Linearity and equal or equal intervals-to make quantitative scoring possible.  
Source: Oppenheim (2004, pp.189-201). 
 
For the purpose of this research, a Likert scale was chosen for appropriateness along with factorial 
analysis. In the Likert scale, a sample of around 13 respondents was drawn to resemble respondents on 
whom the scale was to be used. A set of questions was used followed by alternative answers for each 
question such as ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘uncertain’, ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. In addition, 
the scoring of the questionnaire was designed to represent a positive attitude towards principles of CG 
pertaining to minority shareholders’ rights.  
Therefore, a high score represents a positively desirable intake. The score for each answer ranges from 
5 to 1. Hence, based on the previous scoring technique, the researcher categorised all items into 
favourable, mildly favourable, and unfavourable categories to measure groups of respondents’ 
perceptions in totality. Moreover, an internal-consistency test for each item to measure its correlation 
coefficient to the total item pool was done during the preliminary factorial analysis phase (see 
Appendix C10). For example, to measure item 1’s correlation coefficient, as shown in the table below, 
adding up all item scores to obtain a total score, and then comparing it to the score of the items to be 
measured minus the total score, which gave a coeffeceint score of ( r = .96). Hence, item 1was 
retained. 
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Table 4.16: 
Respondent Total score Score on item 1 Total score minus item 1 
A 45 5 40 
Source: The Author 
Therefore, the Likert Scale is useful in terms of measuring principles such as homogeneity, reliability, 
validity, and linearity. However, its linearity is quite limited as the scale offers no metric or detailed 
interval measures (Saunders et al., 2011). 
Moreover, the factor analysis is “an internal–consistency method of item analysis provid[ing] some 
safeguard against the inclusion of unrelated items in a scale, but clearly a better way of ensuring uni- 
dimensionality” (Oppenheim, 2004, p.201). Hence, the researcher used factor analysis, during the 
piloting phase, for scale-building to eliminate items not belonging to a scale and to include items that 
did belong. The factor analysis simply breaks down homogenous attitudes into independent factors for 
a more precise measurement of dimensionality (Oppenheim, 2004). Therefore, as Oppenheim puts it, 
“factor analysis then becomes a tool for theoretical investigation, and new discoveries…[as] it can 
reveal similarities and differences between the scales as well as some of the underlying attitudes and 
value systems” (Oppenheim, 2004, p. 201).  
B. Ratings 
Rating is an effective tool that can be used to generate data and ideas. Specifically, rating is categorised 
into three ways 
Table 4.17: 
1- As objective assessments-for instance, a rating of the quality of fixtures and furnishings in a home during 
or after an interview 
2- In a subjective, projective way to tell us something about the rater’s precepts and attitudes 
3- A self rating of personality traits or attitudes 
Source: Oppenheim, (2004, p. 232). 
However, there is a substantial risk associated with rating as the margin for error of central tendency 
might affect the rating when opposing extremes of such views are adopted (Oppenheim, 2004). A 
difficulty to measure the mid-point and its relation to the favorable or unfavorable side has forced 
researchers either to adopt less extreme categories in their ratings or develop a ten-point scale to 
capture their required information (Bryman, 2012). In addition, favourable extremes should be mixed 
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up to the right and left of the rating forms to decrease the ‘halo effect’ (Oppenheim, 2004). For 
example, Section 1, Q1 and 3 have a mixed-up favourable and unfavourable extremes order on their 
answer forms: 
Q1: 
Q3: 
 
In addition, the force choice of not having a midpoint but rather a six-point scale is ignored for the 
purpose of capturing the lenient-collective attitude of participants along with their cultural value 
dimensions. In fact, it has been demonstrated by researchers that a five-point scale is just as good as 
any other (Parasuraman, Grewal & Krishnan, 2006; Sekaran, 2006). For example, Section 1, Q3 III 
A.3. 
Ex. Changes in voting rights shouldn’t be subject to approval by classes of shares negatively 
affected. 
Explanation: if a participant has no opinion on this statement and does not see it as a problem affecting 
his or her investment, then it can be inferred that this participant’s value dimension on the Power 
Distance scale is highly representative of his answer along with a low level of Femininity, and 
Individualism. Therefore, having a mid-point will help in the assessment of this research analysis in 
terms of Hofstede’s CVD of Saudi shareholders as the extensive piloting, pre-testing, and factor 
analysis aided in the selection process.   
C. Ranking 
“Ranking means arranging in order, with regard to some common aspect. We can rank children in 
terms of their school performance, soldiers in terms of leadership potential…etc” (Oppenheim, 2004, 
p.250). Therefore, ranking is projectively a powerful tool to use when inquiring into respondents’ 
perceptions, especially in an exploratory sequence of questions to reveal specific elements about a 
subject matter (Bryman, 2012). For instance, in Section 2, Q8 participants were asked to rank their 
knowledge regarding their rights: 
From this Questionnaire, how much information have you been aware of regarding your 
rights as a shareholder? 
<10%           20-30%            40-60%            70-80%           90-100% 
 
However, it should be clear that, “we would not use ranking technique if such knowledge were 
available (or if suitable assumptions could be made about the quality of the scale intervals); we would 
use some form of rating or scaling instead” (Oppenheim, 2004, p.250). 
I. Rights of Shareholder Statements SA A N D SD 
III. Equitable Treatment of ShareholdersProblems SD D N A SA  
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4.6.5 Summary 
The use of semi-structured interviews and questionnaires along with their applicable techniques serves 
as data and idea collections for the purpose of this research. In addition, special attention was paid to 
piloting as its associated techniques serve as objectivity resolutions in reducing biases, such as 
interview bias, group bias, systematic bias, social desirability bias, ordinal bias, and biased language. 
Moreover, the piloting work was extensively carried out on both research methods and covered every 
aspect from designing, organising, wording, exploring precepts and attitude scaling, processing data, 
and finally reporting. Other techniques such as rating and ranking were used in cases of potential 
difficulty employing an attitude scaling technique. 
4.6.6 Issues of Samples and Participants’ Selections:  
Figure 4.3: The Funnelling Technique for the Issues of Sampling. 
Quantity of Knowledge 
                              Interview population                                      Questionnaire Population 
  
  
    
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
                                       Quality of Knowledge 
Source: The Author and His Supervisor, Prof. Bob Ryan 
 
A better way of describing the process, giving focus and purpose, is through ‘funnelling’ where by the 
total domain of knowledge processed by the relevant population is filtered through a series of criteria 
which lead to the selection of the targeted participants in the qualitative phase. These participants are 
the ones judged, through the filtering process, to offer the highest quality of knowledge and 
understanding of the problem domain. 
Hence, the ‘funnelling approach’ is adopted initially by the researcher for the questionnaires to draft up 
targeted segments of Saudi Shareholders such as Majority, Minority, Sophisticated and non-
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shareholders. Therefore, in order to carry out a census, the population sample of interest has to be 
clearly and accurately defined by the researcher (Burns & Grove, 1993). 
1- The first step was to decide on the definition of Minority shareholder that would be used to 
define the population of interest. Conventionally, a Minority shareholder is any shareholder 
holding a significant amount of shares in a company but with total stock of less than 50% 
(Dignam & Lowry, 2014). In addition, SCGRs define Minority shareholders as “shareholders 
who represent a class not in control of the company so far as they are unable to influence it" 
(Al-Zahrani, 2013). 
2- The definition of what constitutes a Majority shareholder from the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(SSE: also known asTadawul) was adopted. According to the Saudi Stock Exchange website, a 
Majority shareholder is any shareholder “who owns 5% or more from a company’s shares”. 
Hence, a Minority shareholder will be any shareholder owning less than 5 percent, for the 
purpose of this study. 
3- The definition of what constitutes Sophisticated shareholders is based on their expertise 
derived from their profession. Hence, all share-brokers working for Saudi Brokerage Company 
are classified as Sophisticated shareholders for the purpose of this research.  
 Having decided on the definition to be used for the population sample of Minority, Majority, and 
Sophisticated shareholders in Saudi Arabia, the second step consisted of the selection of an official and 
reliable source of information to identify listed corporations in Saudi Arabia. The only official and 
reliable source was the website of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), as stated above.  
In the light of this, it should be noted here that the population of listed Saudi corporations identified by 
the researcher numbers less than 187, as prescribed on the Saudi Stock exchange as of the 25
th
 of April 
2014. In addition, due to potential difficulty of accessing listed Saudi corporations’ registries to 
identify suitable Saudi shareholders for the purpose of this study, a census to collect and analyse data 
from Saudi shareholders found in major banks’ trading rooms was considered as Saudi banks are the 
leading licensed brokers in Saudi Arabia trading on behalf of their millions of savings and retail 
banking customers.   
In summary, 50 participants was deemed to be sufficient for the purpose of this study, but a target of 
83 participants was reached, including at least 20 women to allow for a measure of gender balance. 
Moreover, all potential participants were clearly pre-defined, accessible, reliable and approachable via 
the proper channels, as detailed above. Hence, the risk of self-selection sampling, and non-probability 
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sampling, is minimized as the questionnaires do not provide a wide range of participants with the 
option to participate in the survey of their own accord (Lavrakas, 2008).  
In addition, the preliminary pilot analysis in the following chapter, Chapter 5, along with the 
redesigning phase of the questionnaire took into account all possible potential respondents and, 
accordingly, accounted for their demographic information. Hence, Section 2 of the questionnaire was 
designed to avoid any potential demographic bias that might be present in this study.    
In addition, the groups to be analysed, for the purpose of this research, will be Majority, Minority, 
Sophisticated, and Non-shareholders to uncover any sort of discrepancies between them. 
Moreover, the ‘funnelling approach’  was also adopted by the researcher for the interviews. As a result, 
a draft up of targeted segments was developed based on the legal and political expertise required to 
answer the second research question, regarding the political and legal factors influencing the level of 
compliance of listed Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights.  
Table 4.18: Drafted Segments for Interviews 
No Drafted Segment Approach Result 
1 Well-experienced lawyers in the area of 
corporate law 
Via social network 5 lawyers identified: 
2 participated 
2 Well-experienced CPAs in the area of 
corporate governance and investor rights 
Called and emailed all big 
four Audit companies in 
Saudi Arabia (See 
AppendixD4) 
A few participants 
promised but did 
not participate 
3 Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA) 
Emailed (See Appendix 
D4) 
No response 
4 Saudi Capital Market Authority (SCMA), 
Saudi Ministry of Finance: both responsible for 
regulating the Saudi Arabian capital markets 
(Tadawal). Their responsibilities include 
setting CG rules and monitoring Saudi 
corporations’ compliance 
Called, emailed, and there 
was no response. 
Researcher travelled to 
Riyadh to meet with one of 
the senior officials of 
Corporate Regulations (See 
Appendix D4) 
1 participant 
identified: 
However, refused 
for an interview to 
be recorded. Hence, 
his opinions were 
carefully 
generalized and no 
direct quotation was 
reported or given. 
5 Current and ex-Legislators 
 
Identified via social 
network 
2 identified: 1 ex-
legislator 
participated 
 Hofstede  Email with replies (See 
Appendix D3) 
Results reported in 
Chapter 5 
Source: The Author (See Appendices D3 & D4) 
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However, due to a series of criteria which lead to the selection of the targeted participants in the 
qualitative phase such as Willingness to Participate, Special Expertise, and Neutrality, only 4 
participants were identified as depicted in the table below: 
Table 4.19: Profile of Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
However, regardless of the small number of participants, these participants are the ones judged, 
through the filtering process, to offer the highest quality of knowledge and understanding of the 
problem domain to answer the second research question. 
4.6.7 Issues of Translation in Terms of the Interview Materials 
The Problem of the Arabic language is in the analytical setting. Arabic is not the most powerful 
language to deal with analysis. Hence, English is used when analysing interview materials and 
questionnaires’ written comments. 
Moreover, the interview guide was initially designed in English. Then, it was translated from English 
to Arabic by the researcher. Hence, all interviews were conducted in Arabic, as it is the business 
language in Saudi Arabia and to allow participants to respond to the interviews’ questions in the 
language that they are most comfortable with. A final translation to English was done when reporting 
and transcribing each interview right after its occurrence: initially by the researcher and further 
checked by a certified translator, Ahmed Al-Harbi to ensure that the meaning of each answer is as 
consistent as possible with the Arabic version. Hence, the researcher is initially providing translation 
validity at the potential expense of literal accuracy, which was taken into account after the initial 
translation by the researcher through the certified translator to ensure meanings of translated materials 
are as consistent as possible with the Arabic version.  
Moreover, and as mentioned above, the reporting and transcribing of each interview was right after its 
occurrence as advised by Saunders et al. (2007) “to create a full record of the interview soon after its 
Date of interviews Profession Participants 
07/09/2014 Lawyer 1 Participant 1 
(Enint 1) 
30/09/2014 Ex-Legislator Participant 2 
(Enint 2) 
26/08/2014 Lawyer 2 Participant 3 
(Enint 3) 
13 /08/2014 Senior Official in 
Corporate Regulations 
Participant 4 
(Enint 4) 
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occurrence [is] one means to control bias and to produce reliable data analysis”. Moreover, transcribing 
was done to capture only spoken words (Davidson, 2009).  
4.7 Ethical issues:    
A significant part of the research process is the careful consideration of ethical implications. In 
accordance with Saunders et al. (2007), research ethics deal with the appropriateness of researchers’ 
behaviours in regard to the rights of participants who will form the subject of such research work and 
are more likely to be affected by such study.  Hence, such ethical issues are more than likely to occur 
during the process of such research such as: in seeking access, data collection, data analysis and 
reporting (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). Therefore, in this research study, the following ethical 
considerations are explored in order to minimize any potential risks: consent, confidentiality, 
debriefing, protection of participants, and withdrawal from participation. 
A. Briefing  
Briefing is a useful way of explaining the purpose of such research to potential participants. Therefore, 
a verbal briefing of the purpose of this study was given to all participants before the questionnaires 
were handed out and before the conduct of the interviews. In addition, Interviewed participants were 
briefed on the purpose of this study via email and again on the spot before conducting the interviews. 
Most importantly, the initial consent, via email, was requested after allowing each participant to go 
over the interview topics as detailed in the initial email sent prior to organizing the face-to-face 
interviews. 
B. Consent  
Informed and written consents were sought from interviews’ participants to take part in the study prior 
to conducting the interviews. However, no written consent was sought from questionnaires’ 
participants; hence, they were informed that they should feel free to hand in uncompleted 
questionnaires as they wish during the process.   
For the Interviews, verbal testimonies of each participant were listed over an average of an hour and 
the discussion (although framed by a series of interview topic) was left relatively unstructured. The aim 
being was to draw formal responses that would illuminate key features of the quantitative analysis. In 
each case, the participant was asked for their consent prior via email and again on the spot was 
requested to sign the form of consent before conducting the interviews. Most importantly, the initial 
consent, via email, was requested after allowing each participant to go over the interview topics as 
detailed in the initial email sent prior to organizing the face-to-face interview.  As a result, three of the 
Chapter Four: Research Methodology   P a g e  | 113 
 
 
 
participants namely both lawyers and ex-legislator provided their consents and signed the consent 
forms. However, one participant, the senior government official in corporate regulations, was not 
willing to give any formal consent but was willing to participate in an unattributed discussion. 
The reluctance to give his formal agreement is due to, firstly, the reason discussed above and secondly, 
this individual was highly influenced in his views. Hence, he was not willing to sign the form of 
consent. Thirdly, his reluctance stems from the counter’s culture in Saudi Arabia where a written 
consent does not constitute indemnity but rather might substantiate a potential legal proceeding.  
Therefore, this individual’s identity has been carefully anonymized, as table 4.19, page 111depicts, and 
his opinions have been carefully generalized and no direct quotation was reported or given, in the 
conclusion of chapter 7 where they were only included as general points in the discussion, with no 
indication of participant 4.  
C. Confidentiality  
Regarding the questionnaire, the questionnaires were anonymous and participants were informed about 
that before they gave their verbal consents to participate and go to the designated locations where the 
questionnaires where handed out at designated trading rooms of two major banks in Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, to ensure anonymity of the questionnaire, participants were not asked to state their names, 
and addresses or their firms. However, questionnaires were numbered instead for identification 
purposes in the analysis phase.  
Moreover, particular barrier to people completing the questionnaire was a risk the researcher intended 
to reduce by using a 5-point Likert Scale (i.e. 5 point scale was chosen to encourage completion when 
an even number of scale was used). This tends to force participants to make a choice one way or the 
other and this was believed to reduce the risk of partial completion due to the purpose of measuring 
CVD of Saudi Shareholders using Hofstede’s (2010) model. In addition, regarding the (natural reserve 
about the additional written comments participants make), the researcher opted for using only a one 
open-end question at the end of each of the three main questions of the questionnaire. Hence, in given 
their views: participants’ views are more likely to be representative of generalized opinions instead of 
opinions specifically attributed to them. That was taken into account when interpreting the 
questionnaire data written comments as well. Hence, participants’ views are likely to be quite bias 
towards heresy as this can be readily uncoupled from their own believes if challenged. 
In addition, the anonymity of interviews’ participants was also carefully considered in the qualitative 
phase of this study.  For example, the anonymity of interviews’ participants was ensured during the 
whole process of the qualitative phase including reporting the results. Hence, the identities of 
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participants were anonymized and cannot be identified at any point when reporting the results of the 
qualitative phase. Furthermore, confidentiality was maintained throughout the process and made clear 
to all participants. For example, participants were informed that the information collected was only to 
be used for the purpose of this research study. Hence, the data collected was treated in a strict manner 
of confidentiality. For instance, the computers on which data were stored were protected via passwords 
and paper records were kept in a locked file cabinet. Hence, only the researcher has access to such 
data. On completion of the qualitative phase, all audiotapes of interviews will be destroyed.  
D. Protection of participants  
It is a primary responsibility of researchers to protect involved participants from any potential physical 
or mental harm during the data collection phase. Moreover, this primary responsibility may extend 
beyond the data collection stage. Therefore, involved interviewed participants were briefed and 
informed about specific means of contacting the researcher after the experiment in case they might 
perceive that they have suffered harm or have concerning questions to ask.  
E. Withdrawal from participation  
It was made verbally and in writing for questionnaire participants that they can withdraw from 
participation at any point.  In addition, both questionnaire and interviewed participants were both 
verbally advised that they were not obliged to take part in the study and may, at their discretion, not to 
fill in the questionnaire, or end the interview or make suggestions for a different approach at any stage, 
even after they have consented to take part.  
Moreover, for interview participants, the means of how identified participants can inform the 
researcher of their intentions to withdraw from the research was considered. Hence, contact details 
such as email and telephone of the researcher were provided to all of them to make it easy for them to 
contact and inform the researcher if they wish to withdraw. In addition, clearance from the University 
of Gloucestershire’s Ethics Committee was not required since this study involves adults over the age of 
18 years.  
4.8 Chapter Summary: 
This study represents a single country, through an explanatory and exploratory case study (see 
Appendix B11) that looks into the issue of CG from the cultural, legal, and political perspectives 
within a particular social, economic and culture environment represented by Saudi Arabia.  
Specifically, the first research question is explanatory in nature as it is intended to seek explanations of 
the nature of certain relationships (Schell, 1992) between cultural models, such as Hofstede’s (2010) 
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CVD, and the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in 
Saudi Arabia. Whereas, the second research question is exploratory in nature as it is intended to 
identify other key factors (Schell, 1992) influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi 
corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. 
In addition, the choice of following an interpretive paradigm for this case study is motivated by the 
main body of theory selected, the New Institutional Sociology theory, as the New Institutional 
Sociology theory is interpretive in nature as detailed in the methodology section of this chapter. 
Moreover, this case study utilised a mixed method approach, questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews, to serve as data and idea collection tools respectively. 
Furthermore, the quantitative method employed via questionnaires was designed to achieve the first 
objective of the study, which is to explore the extent that available cultural models (for example 
Hofstede, 2010) can explain the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by 
the OECD, in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the questionnaire is constructed in line with the normative 
values composing the New Institutional Sociology theory as depicted in the tree diagram recommended 
by Oppenheim (2004) and modified by the researcher (see figure 4.1, p. 91). Hence, when designing 
the questions for the questionnaire of this research, the CVD values of Saudi shareholders to be 
captured were very clear to the researcher and so were the levels to be tackled. Moreover, each of the 
variables of the questionnaire was assigned to the applicable CVD dimension in accordance with 
Hofstede’s criteria (1980-2010) (See Appendix B10). 
In addition, the questionnaire was designed using variables comprising the minority shareholder’s 
protection index found in the OECD principles of CG and corresponding to other indices aimed at 
measuring the level of minority shareholder protection found in prior studies such as La Porta et al.’s 
Anti-director rights Index (1997, 1998, 2006) and the Index of Self Dealing (Djankov et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the elements of the constructed index signified by the literature review phase (see Appendix 
B1) and inclusive of both indices mentioned above are:1) Transparency, 2) Disclosure, 3) Directors’ 
compensation, 4) Basic shareholders rights, 5) Equitable treatment of shareholders rights, and 6) Basic 
shareholder rights corresponding to short terms measures.  
Moreover, the purpose of employing the semi-structured interview technique for this research was to 
gather ideas, information and facts stemming from the experience of well defined segments of lawyers 
and legislators to answer the second research question: what are the other factors influencing the level 
of compliance of listed Saudi Corporations’ with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of 
minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. Hence, a ‘hidden agenda’ of general topics concerning the legal 
and political frameworks in Saudi Arabia and its effect on the rights of minority shareholders was 
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identified by the literature review phase. Therefore, variables extracted from the literature review phase 
were employed in the construction of the interview questions (see Appendices B2, B3). 
Furthermore, the relative purpose of employing questionnaires and semi-structured interviwes as 
research methods is that they provide mutual corroboration for this case study. Therefore, the 
questionnaires are intended to explore potential relationships between Saudi shareholders’ CVD and 
the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia. 
Whereas the semi-structured interviews are intended to explore the depth and richness of the legal and 
political factors influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations’ with the OECD 
principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholders,in Saudi Arabia. 
In addition, further piloting work pertaining to both research methods will be discussed in detail in the 
following two chapters, which are: Chapter 5, Quantitative Research Analysis and Discussion; and 
Chapter 6, Quanlitative Research Analysis and Discussion. 
Therefore, the following chapter, Chapter 5, will present how the preliminary piloting work pertained 
to the questionnaire of this study was carried out during the quantitative analysis phase. In addition, the 
preliminary piloting work will be analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
software (version 21.0). Initially, the exploratory factor analysis will be performed to assess the 
convergent and confirm the validity of the variable constructs of the questionnaire. Hence, such tests 
will justify whether or not the questionnaire is suitable for structure detection. Then, Cronbach’s alpha 
test will be performed to improve the overall reliability of the variable constructs of the questionnaire. 
Hence, and based on the results of the exploratory factor analysis and Cronbach's alpha, only 
significantly loaded items will be used in the inferential analysis. Below is a summary of the research 
design adopted by the researcher. 
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Figure 4.4: Research Design Flow Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
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5. Chapter Five: Quantitative Research Analysis and Discussions 
5.1 Introduction: 
On the methodological level, this research engages in an ethno-methodology, which is the sociological 
study of rules and rituals underlying ordinary social activities and interactions.  Accordingly, two 
forms of inquiry and data gathering are employed, namely:  questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews. Nevertheless, due to the nature of this chapter, which only deals with the quantitative 
research analysis, only the quantitative data collection method, the questionnaire, will be discussed.  
The primary objective in developing the questionnaire for this study was to adequately capture critical 
information (Dunn & Huss, 2004) needed to answer the first research question, which is 'To what 
extent do available cultural models (for example, Hofstede, 2010) explain the quality of the exercise of 
minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia' via a set of descriptive and 
inferential analyses of constructs motivated by the relevant literature review (see AppendixB1). In 
addition, cultural theory of CG based on the CVD framework addresses fundamental issues such as 
shareholding structures, the regulations of self dealing, insider trading and disclosure in previous 
research such as La Porta et al. (1999, 2000, 2002 & 2008). 
Moreover, the justification for the use of questionnaires in an ethno-methodological study stems from 
the fact that this research borders on functionalism in that it deals with the codes and principles of CG 
as a function. In addition, the questionnaire of this study is consonant with an ethno-methodology 
framework as it is set to empirically measure Hofstede's (2010) CVD, comprising precepts and 
attitudes of Saudi shareholders based on the principles of CG found in the OECD (2004) pertaining to 
minority shareholders’ rights.  Therefore, the use of the questionnaire is appropriate to uncover 
potential correlations between Hofstede's (2010) CVD pertaining to the Saudi shareholders and the 
quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, this chapter will begin with the research design of the questionnaire, which is composed of 
three phases, namely: a developmental phase, an implementation phase, and an analysis/validation 
phase. Then, the chapter will deal with the preliminary examination of the data analysis process such as 
cleaning, screening, and classifying the data collected, along with addressing associated biases. In 
succession, the quantitative analysis phase will report the reliability and validity of the questionnaire 
instrument. Subsequently, the Principle Component Analysis test will report the suitability of the 
questionnaire for structure detection since the questionnaire of this study was constructed by the 
researcher. Afterwards, the chapter will proceed to address the first research question of this study by 
reporting descriptive statistics, unfolding the basic features of the data. This will provide simple 
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summaries about the distribution of independent samples of shareholder types, which are: Majority, 
Sophisticated, Minority, and Non-shareholder, in relation to Hofstede’s (2010) CVD model.  
Thereafter, the chapter will test and discuss a set of hypotheses, generated by SPSS and motivated by 
the relevant literature review (see AppendixB1, B2 & B3) and first research question.  
1. Hypothesis 1: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG, is low in high COL Cultures such as Saudi Arabia. 
2. Hypothesis 2: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG, is low in high UA Cultures such as Saudi Arabia. 
3. Hypothesis 3: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG, is low in high PDI Cultures such as Saudi Arabia. 
4. Hypothesis 4: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG, is low in high MAS cultures such as Saudi Arabia. 
5. Hypothesis 5: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG, is low in low LTO cultures such as Saudi Arabia. 
 
Note: the meaning of CV dimensions such as Individualism, Power Distance, Collectivism, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Femininity, and Long Term Orientation is not simply that used in common language (see page 29). 
 
Overall, this chapter aims to test these hypotheses and ascertain whether they are true or false. Hence, 
Non-Parametric tests for several independent samples, such as Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney, are 
used to identify if the distributions of CV Dimensions are different across groups of Saudi shareholder 
types. In addition, Non-Parametric tests for categorical variables such as Chi-Square Test, Yates' 
Correction for small frequencies and Fisher Exact test are considered. Nevertheless, the Chi-Square 
Test was found not suitable with the data as the expected frequency in most cases was found less than 
5, which invalidates a major pre-test condition for the Chi-Square test. Hence, other tests such as Yates' 
Correction for small frequencies and Fisher Exact test were considered. However, the researcher opted 
for the Fisher Exact test as it offers a resolution for the invalidation of the Chi-Square’s assumptions of 
expected frequency of no less than 5, as recommended by Field (2005).  Finally, a quantitative analysis 
discussion section will merge all findings together and the responses to open-ended qualitative 
questions contained in the questionnaire will be analysed under the discussion of each CV dimension. 
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5.2 The Development Phase 
Figure 5.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
A. Questionnaire Design  
A structured questionnaire was designed for this study and a covering letter was attached at the 
beginning of the questionnaire to explain its purpose and give instructions on how to complete it. The 
primary objective in developing this questionnaire was to adequately capture critical information 
needed to answer the first research questions (Dunn & Huss, 2004), which is: To what extent do 
available cultural models (for example, Hofstede 2010) explain the quality of the exercise of minority 
shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia? The questionnaire’s constructs were 
selected by focusing on variables identified via a thorough review of the literature.  
Initially, the questionnaire was designed in English (see Appendix B9) and was composed of 48 items 
pertaining to four main questions and had seven demographical questions. Following the pilot phase 
and data analysis, via the SPSS programme, on preliminary data collected from a judgment sample of 
13 participants, items were shrunk to 35 covering three main questions (see Appendix C2). However, 
due to a printing error resulting in the deletion of two items from 35 of the questionnaires used during 
the data collection phase, the researcher opted to include only 33 items in the quantitative analysis. 
 In addition, each of the three main questions of Section 1 of the questionnaire was accompanied by an 
open-ended question, at the end of the Likert-scale answer form (see Appendix B4), to prompt in-depth 
insights pertaining to the variables under investigation. Moreover, the demographic questions, in 
Section 2, increased from seven to nine (see Appendix B4).  
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In addition, since the study was intended to be carried out in Saudi Arabia, the questionnaire was 
translated, initially by the researcher, from English to Arabic, and further checked by a certified 
translator, Ahmed Al-Harbi (see Appendix B5). 
B. Testing the Questionnaire  
As questions and items of the questionnaire needed to be tested for comprehension, clarity, and 
ambiguity, two methods of testing were used, as follow:   
1) Pre-Testing  
During the preliminary pilot stage of the questionnaire, as mentioned in the previous chapter, a 
preliminary sample of five participants was chosen and asked to fill out the questionnaires and 
comment on all questions and instructions given.  
The major finding of this pre-testing phase was that the wording of the negative scale measurements of 
the answer form used initially was challenging. Participants found it very difficult and confusing to 
process their answers as the negative scale of the answer form was excessively designed to restrict 
participants’ ordinal bias (see Appendix B9). Therefore, the researcher lessened the ordinal bias 
reduction technique used via “more simplification of the negative words guiding the answer form “to 
ensure that reliability of answers are higher when re-wording is done” (Krosnick & Berent, 1993). 
2) Field Testing  
The piloting of the field testing was conducted by choosing a sample of eight Saudi shareholders in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the questionnaires were self-distributed to friends who are well 
known to the researcher as share-traders. All participants were asked to fill out the questionnaires and 
comment on questions, ambiguous statements, and the instructions given. In addition, all participants 
were timed by the researcher to obtain an initial estimate of the time each questionnaire required to 
complete, which was 15 minutes.  
In addition, the major finding of this field-testing phase was that the wording of the negative scale 
measurements of the answer form used initially was still challenging, as found by the pre-testing phase. 
Hence, the researcher simplified the negative scales of the questionnaire answer form further. 
Following this, the researcher re-contacted the field test participants again to get their comments on the 
newer version of the questionnaire, which they all found easier and more pleasing to fill out. 
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5.3 The Implementation Phase: Questionnaire Administration 
Figure 5.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
A. Sample Used in the Quantitative Phase 
In order to carry out a census, the population sample of interest has to be clearly and accurately defined 
by the researcher (Burns & Grove, 1993). 
4- The first step was to decide on the definition of minority shareholder that would be used to 
define the population of interest. Conventionally, a minority shareholder is any shareholder 
holding a significant amount of shares in a company but with total stock of less than 50% 
(Dignam & Lowry, 2014). In addition, SCGRs define minority shareholders as “shareholders 
who represent a class not in control of the company so far as they are unable to influence it" 
(Al-Zahrani, 2013). 
5- The definition of what constitutes a major shareholder from the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE: 
also known asTadawul) was adopted. According to the Saudi Stock Exchange website, a major 
shareholder is any shareholder “who owns 5% or more from a company’s shares”. Hence, a 
minority shareholder will be any shareholder owning less than 5 percent, for the purpose of 
this study. 
 Having decided on the definition to be used for the population sample of minority and majority 
shareholders in Saudi Arabia, the second step consisted of the selection of an official and reliable 
source of information to identify listed corporations in Saudi Arabia. The only official and reliable 
source was the website of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), as stated above.  
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In the light of this, it should be noted here that the population of listed Saudi corporations identified by 
the researcher numbers less than 187, as prescribed on the Saudi Stock exchange as of the 25
th
 of April 
2014. In addition, due to potential difficulty of accessing listed Saudi corporations’ registries to 
identify suitable minority shareholders for the purpose of this study, a census to collect and analyse 
data from minority shareholders found in major banks’ trading rooms was considered as Saudi banks 
are the leading licensed brokers in Saudi Arabia trading on behalf of their millions of savings and retail 
banking customers.   
In summary, 50 participants was deemed to be sufficient for the purpose of this study, but a target of 
100 questionnaire participants was set as an objective, including at least 20 to 30 women to allow for a 
measure of gender balance. Moreover, all potential participants were clearly pre-defined, accessible, 
reliable and approachable via the proper channels, as detailed above. Hence, the risk of self-selection 
sampling, and non-probability sampling, is minimised as the questionnaires do not provide a wide 
range of participants with the option to participate in the survey of their own accord (Lavrakas, 2008).  
In addition, the preliminary pilot analysis along with the redesigning phase of the questionnaire took 
into account all possible potential respondents and, accordingly, accounted for their demographic 
information. Hence, Section 2 of the questionnaire was designed to avoid any potential demographic 
bias that might be present in this study.    
In addition, the groups to be analysed, for the purpose of this research, will be Majority, Minority, 
Sophisticated, and Non-shareholders to uncover any sort of discrepancies between them. 
B. Questionnaire Distribution & Collection  
In succession of the refinement process of the questionnaire, the questionnaires were distributed in the 
trading rooms of two commercial banks with the help of trading room personnel.  
1) Drop and Collect Phase  
This phase took place in August 2014.  
Table 5.1: Drop and Collect Time line 
4 Data Collection  
Conduct Interviews + Questionnaires 
Months 
Aug-Oct 2014 
Completed End of 2nd 
Source: The Author 
Trading room managers were approached via a referral from a well-known regional manager who is a 
friend of the researcher. This approach was taken because the researcher was advised that bureaucracy 
would delay the process if it were to be conducted via formal channels in Saudi Arabia. Hence, a 
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utilisation of a close network was recommended by the regional manager to achieve the data collection 
phase of the questionnaire.  
Therefore, two trading room managers from two different banks were contacted and offered a show up 
at any time to conduct the data collection. Hence, six days of data collection were organised, three at 
each bank, and access was granted to trading rooms. In addition, a few trading room personnel were 
assigned by their managers to aid the researcher in the process. During these days, the purpose of the 
study was explained to all participants, and they were briefed about the ethical considerations.  
The process was completed over a seven weeks period, and a total of 98 questionnaires were collected. 
Nevertheless, only 83 of those questionnaires were included in the analysis as the other 15 
questionnaires were missing all demographic data or had less than half of the questions answered. In 
addition, the trading room managers offered to hand over 20 questionnaires, 10 each, to majority 
shareholders that they are aware of to aid this research study. However, only 9 were successfully 
completed and the other majority shareholders were identified by the trading room managers, to the 
researcher on the spot while administrating the questionnaires to participants. Hence, a total of 16 
majority shareholders were surveyed.  
5.4 The Data Analysis Phase 
Figure 5.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
 
A. Data Preparation:  
Prior to the data analysis process to detect any missing responses via a frequency test, a process of 
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15 questionnaires because they were either missing the whole demographics section answers or partial 
answers were given to Section 1 of the questionnaire. Hence, only 83 questionnaires were analysed.  
This procedure is known as case-wise deletion and was preferred to other methods since it maintains 
consistency, ensuring that all analyses are conducted with the same cases (Kline, 2010). 
1) Editing the Data  
Editing the data ensures that all questionnaires are properly completed. This process involves checking 
data for omission, legibility and consistency in classification as well as discarding incomplete 
responses (Zikmund, 2003). Therefore, field editing was carried out to ensure that all questionnaires 
were completed and that the hand-written responses of participants were legible, since incomplete 
questionnaires could have a negative impact on the validity of the information collected (Emory & 
Cooper, 1991). In addition, the strategy followed under this category was to discard all incomplete 
questionnaires unless they could be used for scaling.   
2) Coding the Data  
Coding involves the assignment of numerics to answers; hence, enabling questionnaire responses to be 
grouped into limited categories (Cooper & Schindler, 2008). This process involves identifying, 
classifying and assigning numerics via: pre-coded and post-coded techniques (Luck & Rubin, 1987). 
In this study, pre-coding was used for the closed-ended Likert-scale questions since potential answers 
could be anticipated beforehand. Hence, a coding sheet was developed (see Appendix B8). However, 
for the open-ended question following each questionnaire's sectional questions, a post-coded technique 
was used, since potential answers are difficult to anticipate. 
3) Data Capturing  
Data capturing is the direct input of coded data into the SPSS program, which allows the researcher to 
transform and manipulate the raw data into useful information (Cant, Gerber-Nel, Nel & Kotze, 2003).  
4) Cleaning the Data  
Data cleaning is the process undertaken after the entry of data and before the data analysis phase to 
identify errors, missing values, and ambiguities in responses (Diamantopoulos & Schlegelmilch, 1997). 
This process was accordingly carried for the purpose of this research.   
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B. Data Classification 
Before analysing Hofstede’s (2010) CVD model influencing the rights of Saudi minority shareholders, 
it was necessary to distinguish between the types of shareholders during the data collection phase. 
Hence, the trading room managers helped enormously in identifying 16 majority shareholders holding 
valuable trading portfolios at those designated banks. Also, they helped enormously in identifying 17 
Sophisticated shareholders who were major brokers for licensed brokerage' companies. In addition, a 
number of questions were used, in the questionnaires, to test each shareholder's knowledge for 
classification as an internal classification technique (as it became evident to the researcher that the 
level of knowledge regarding shareholders' rights was correlating with the type of shareholders). 
Lastly, out of the 98 completed questionnaires, 15 responses were difficult to classify since they did 
not answer the demographic questions or had only partial answers. 
C. Response Format and Rate 
The Likert scale was used because it yields higher reliability coefficients with fewer items than the 
scales developed using other methods (Hayes, 1998). 
5.5 Quantitative Analysis Phase: 
5.5.1 Reliability 
The reliability of an instrument refers to the consistency with which it measures a construct. Generally, 
Cronbach’s alpha can be used to test the internal consistency of an instrument (Cronbach, 1951). In 
this study, the reliability of the questionnaire was evaluated by calculating the Cronbach’s alpha scores 
for all the variables. The higher the Alpha is, the more reliable the test. Generally, there is no agreed 
cut-off. Nunnally (1978) and Field (2005) argue that the score of 0.7 and above is acceptable. 
Table 5.2: Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based on 
Standardised 
Items No. of Items 
.861 .867 33 
Source: The Author 
Hence, for this study, Cronbach’s alpha is 86% and the Cronbach’s alpha based on standardised items 
is also 86% (see Appendix C1). Both scores are identical, which is a positive sign, thus providing 
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assurances of the internal consistency of the questionnaire as a whole with internally consistent and 
reliable variables. 
Moreover, to improve the overall reliability, the Cronbach’s alpha If Item Deleted was also calculated. 
The significance behind this calculation is to see if the Cronbach’s alpha If Item Deleted might become 
bigger than the Cronbach’s alpha of the whole study, which might indicate a major problem to the 
internal consistency test. Therefore, the criteria to assess this process are to compare the corrected 
item-total correlation between items and the composite score of all other items. Also, it is 
recommended that such comparison should fall between .2 -.7 (Field, 2005). For this study, out of the 
33 items, only five scored below the .2 criteria. However, their effect on the Cronbach’s alpha If Item 
Deleted was minimal compared to the overall Cronbach’s Alpha score of 86 %. Specifically, their 
effect was only shown in the 3rd decimals of the Cronbach’s alpha If Item Deleted; increasing by 1-5 
respectively. Hence, those five items did not affect the Cronbach’s alpha If Item Deleted significantly 
(see Appendix C1). Therefore, these five items have been retained as they were signified by the 
relevant literature review phase.  
Moreover, there is no such risk of specific variables inclusion in hypothesised testing as most of these 
33 variables are meant to measure the CVD of Saudi shareholders based on the attitudes of respondents 
towards their shareholder rights, with their attitudes measured through a 5 point Likert scale for the 
purpose of this study. In addition, the hypothesis testing was done on the cumulative scores of those 33 
items, measuring the five CV dimensions of Saudi shareholders.  
5.5.2 Validity 
The exploratory factor analysis test was performed to assess convergent and discriminate validity. The 
factor analysis was performed on Part 1 of the questionnaire that is designed to measure an overall 
score of Saudi shareholders’ CVD and compare it with Hofsted’s score of the Saudi CVD, provided on 
his website, to see if there might be any discrepancies. Then, the study aims to break down the overall 
CVD scores into groups of shareholder types: Majority, Sophisticated, Minority and Non-shareholders. 
In fact, this statistical technique is capable of conveying whether or not those different types of 
shareholders differ on their CVD scores based on their attitudes towards minority shareholder rights, as 
prescribed by the OECD principles of 2004. 
Therefore, without the exclusion of the five items with low internal consistency identified via the 
Cronbach’s alpha if Item Deleted due to their significance in the relevant literature, all 33 items were 
subjected to the factor analysis test using the principal component analysis as the extraction technique. 
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In addition, the Oblique rotation, Oblimin, was used with Kaiser Normalisation as the rotation method 
due to the researcher’s belief that all factors are related to each other (Field, 2005).  
Thus, 11 factors were specified and signified by the total variance explained. Moreover, all of those 11 
factors together account for 79% of the variability in the original variables.  
Figure 5.4: Scree Plot
 
Source: The Author 
This result suggests that all of those 11 factors were associated with the effect of Saudi shareholders’ 
CVD on the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights as defined by the OECD. In 
addition, 10 of those factors were found to be the sub-themes, identified via the literature review phase 
and used in the questionnaire, stemming from three broad constructs (see Appencdix C2). Moreover, 
one of these factors represents a combination of all three broad constructs put together.  
In addition, Steenkamp and VanTrijp (1991) argue that statistically significant factor loadings signify 
the existence of convergence validity with the recommended (P value > .40) in the Pattern Matrix 
(Field, 2005). Thus, the Pattern matrix graph (see Appendix C2) confirms the convergent validity of all 
the constructs by showing that all of the items loading making up the 11 factors were significant and 
well above the acceptable cut-off-point (P value > .40). 
5.5.2.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
A. Principle Component Analysis: PCA 
The logic of employing a particular data reduction technique such as the Principle Component Analysis 
for this research is to justify the suitability of the questionnaire for structure detection. In addition, 
since the questionnaires' constructs, for this study, were mainly selected from the relevant literature 
review (see Appendices B1, B2 & B3) and as no present study has produced a similar survey to adopt, 
the researcher felt the urge to ensure the suitability of this study's questionnaire for structure detection. 
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Therefore, the following Principles Component Analysis sub-tests have been performed: 1) The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) to verify the sampling adequacy for the analysis, and 2) Barlett's test to 
identify potential correlations between the questionnaires' 33 items. Other PCA’s tests such as the 
Patern Matrix test were performed to ensure the thematic orders of the questionnaires’ constructs and 
allow for new merging themes to be employed. Below is a brief description of these tests along with 
their findings: 
Table 5.3: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .518 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1341.198 
Df 528 
Sig. .000 
Source: The Author 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure test verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, (KMO 
= .518), which is above the acceptable limit recommended by Kaiser (1974). Moreover, the KMO 
score, of this study, is considered mediocre since it falls between 0.5 and 0.7 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 
1999).  
In addition, the Bartlett Test of Sphericity was highly significant at 0.000, suggesting large correlations 
between items for structure detection.  
Moreover, an initial analysis was run to obtain Eigen values for each component in the data. As a 
result, 11 components had Eigen values over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 79 % 
of the variances (see Appendix C2). In addition, the Pattern matrix confirmed all the research 
constructs with the emergence of interrelated themes under specific factors. The original themes were: 
Table 5.4: Original Themes 
Broad Theme Sub-themes Questions 
Rights of Shareholders Basic shareholder rights Q1:A1,A2,A3,A4,A5 
 Participation  on fundamental corporate 
changes 
Q1:B1,B2,B3,B4 
 Participation and voting in GM Q1;C1,C2 
 Participation in key corporate governance 
decisions 
Q1:D1,D2,D3 
 Voting power Q1:E1 
Disclosure and Transparency  Disclosure on material information Q2:A1,A2,A3,A4,A5 
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 Exercise of ownership rights by institutional 
investors 
Q:2:B1,B2,B3 
 Criteria of Disclosure  Q2:C1 
Equitable Treatment  Shareholders of the same series of a class  Q3:A1,A2,A3 
 Shareholders protection Q3;B1,B2,B3,B4,B5,B6 
Source: The Author 
 
The factor analysis, via the Pattern Matrix, produced a new order of the above constructs and merged 
the highly correlated items loading with each other on 11 factors. The eleven factors indicated are: 
Table 5.5: Pattern Matrix Themes 
Factor Broad Theme Sub-themes Questions 
1 Rights of shareholders 
Disclosure and transparency 
Shareholders voting power 
Exercise of ownership by institutional investors 
Disclosure regarding material information 
Q1;E1 
Q2;B3, B2,A3 
 
2 Equitable treatment of shareholders Shareholder protection Q3;B6, B4, B5, B3, 
B2 
3 Rights of shareholders Basic shareholder rights Q1:A2,A3,A1 
4 Rights of Shareholders 
 
Equitable Treatment 
Basic shareholder rights 
Participation in key CG decisions 
Shareholders of the same series of a class 
Q1:A4, D3 
 
Q3:A3 
5 Disclosure and transparency Exercise of ownership by institutional investors 
Criteria of Disclosure 
Q2:B1, C1 
6 Disclosure and transparency 
Rights of shareholders 
Disclosure on material information 
Participation and voting in GM 
Q2:A4 
Q1:C1 
7 Rights of shareholders Participation in fundamental corporate changes Q1: B2, B4, B3 
8 Rights of shareholders Participation in key corporate governance 
decisions 
Q1: D1, D2 
9 Equitable treatment 
Disclosure and transparency 
Shareholders of the same series of a class 
Disclosure on material information 
Q3: A2, A1 
Q2: A2 
10 Equitable treatment 
Rights of shareholders 
Disclosure and transparency 
Shareholder protection 
Participation and voting in GM 
Disclosure on material information 
Q3: B1 
Q1: C4 
Q2: A5 
11 Disclosure and transparency 
Rights of shareholders 
 
Disclosure on material information 
Participation  on fundamental corporate changes 
Basic shareholder rights 
Q2: A1 
Q1: B1, A5 
Source: The Author 
As the exploratory factor analysis highlights above, in terms of the relationship between some of the 
constructs, the choice of performing the Oblique rotation was reliable as the researcher expected the 
factors to be closely related to each other. 
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Hence, such results of the questionnaires' via the PCA test on constructs ensure the suitability of this 
study's questionnaire for structure detection to measure Saudi shareholders’CVD and to allow for 
further hypothesis testing. 
For example, in developing the questionnaire of this study, special attention was paid to the tree model, 
as previously discussed in Chapter 4 page 103, when designing attitude statements for the 
questionnaires, which shows the different layers of deep feelings, as constructed by Oppenheim 
(2004).  “For ease of understanding, social psychologists make a rough distinction between these 
different levels, calling the most superficial one ‘opinions’, the next one ‘ attitudes, a deeper level 
‘values’ or ‘basic attitudes’, and a still deeper level ‘personality’” (Oppenheim, 2004, pp. 108-176). 
Therefore, when designing the questions for the questionnaire of this research, the CVD values to be 
captured were very clear to the researcher and so were the levels to be tackled as depicted in the figure 
below:  
Figure 5.5 Designing Attitude Statements Tree Model 
 
Source: The Author 
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To illustrate, the table below is an extract from the questionnaire (see Appendix B8). This extraction is 
from section 1, sub-section B which includes variables of the Rights of Shareholders signified by the 
relevant literature and are part of the clauses of the OECD principles of CG of 2004. The logic of this 
sub-section B is to capture respondents’ opinions towards this section, which are basically OECD 
clauses. 
Table 5.6 
I. Rights of Shareholders Statements SA A N D SD 
B. You shall participate in and be sufficiently informed on decision concerning 
fundamental corporate changes such as: 
 
1. Amendments to the statutes or articles of incorporation PD=L, IND=H, UA=L 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 2 1 
 
2. Authorization of additional shares PD=L, IND=H, UA=L   
 
   
3. Assignment of Pre-Emptive Rights: given you the first opportunity to buy new issues 
of stock IND=H, UA=L, LTO=H 
     
4. Extraordinary transactions resulting in the sale of the company LTO=H 
     
Source: The Author 
These OECD clauses as articulated in the table above convey the Profession favourable norm to be 
complied with regarding shareholders’ participations on decision concerning fundamental corporate 
changes. Hence, the function of inclusion of these variables is to capture via the Likert scale whether or 
not respondents’ attitudes towards these norms either positive or negative. As implied in the favourable 
scale above, a strong agreement will score 5 and less favourable attitude is designed to score lower via 
the Likert scale used. In addition, each of these rights of shareholders is assigned to the proper 
Hofstede (2010) CV dimension as highlighted in blue ink. The logic behind each assignment is 
contextualized in the table below, which is an extract from Appendix B10: 
Table 5.7  
SPECIFIC 
CONSTRUCT 
ASSIGNEMNT OF HOFESTEDE DIMENTIONS 
 
Amendments to 
the statutes 
Triggers Power-Distance in shareholders as they see themselves equal and valuable to participate and decide 
on matters concerning amendments to the statutes of incorporation .In addition, it triggers Individualism in 
shareholders as they take matter into their own hands to look after themselves. Moreover, by doing so 
Uncertainty-Avoidance is triggered and such task won’t be considered threatening as it’s lawfully prescribed. 
 
Authorization of 
additional 
shares 
Triggers Power-Distance in shareholders as they see themselves equal and valuable to participate and decide 
on matters concerning authorization of additional shares .In addition, it triggers Individualism in shareholders 
as they take matter into their own hands to look after themselves. Moreover, by doing so Uncertainty-
Avoidance is triggered and such task won’t be considered threatening as it’s lawfully prescribed.  
 
Pre-Emptive 
rights 
It triggers Individualism in shareholders as they look after their wealth and opportunity to increase it. 
Moreover, by doing so Uncertainty-Avoidance is triggered as shareholders demand the right to hold first 
opportunity to buy new issues of stock. Hence, they reduce the risk of un-wanted control by an existing 
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major shareholder or a hostile outsider. In addition, it triggers Long-Term Orientation as shareholders look 
for better values to buy shares before bidding-inflation effect, a pragmatic approach towards their share 
investments, and allow them for better sale price in the future once the new shares are effectively accounted 
for as a companies’ capital in the Stock Market in the long run.  
Extraordinary 
transactions 
Triggers Long-Term Orientation as extraordinary transactions affect future reporting of profits and they are 
cautionary in nature in regard to future profits. In addition, extraordinary transactions trigger the LTO of 
shareholders in terms of their adaptabilities to changing circumstances in corporations they have invested in. 
Source: The Author 
The reason each of these variables is being assigned to the proper Hofstede (2010) CV dimension is to 
allow the questionnaire as a whole to measure, in content specific manner, Saudi shareholders’ CV 
dimensions and to allow comparison with Hofstede’s (2010) scores to see if there is any discrepancy 
and to allow for further hypothesis testing in the quantitative phase to answer the first research 
question.  
Moreover, the exploratory factor analysis test of Principle Component Analysis, PCA, confirmed all 
the research constructs including, for example, section 1 sub-section B with the emergence of 
interrelated themes under specific factors via the Pattern matrix report. For illustration, the original 
themes of the Rights of Shareholders were: in blue ink are the variables considered for this example. 
Table 5.8 
Broad Theme Sub-themes Questions 
Rights of Shareholders Basic shareholder rights Q1:A1,A2,A3,A4,A5 
 Participation on fundamental corporate changes Q1:B1,B2,B3,B4 
 Participation and voting in GM Q1;C1,C2 
 Participation in key corporate governance decisions Q1:D1,D2,D3 
 Voting power Q1:E1 
Source: The Author 
The factorial analysis has via the Pattern Matrix produced a new order of the above constructs and 
merged the highly correlated items loading with each other on 11 factors with each other. Below how 
the examined variables for the purpose of this demonstration has been re-ordered.  
Table 5.9 
Facto
r 
Broad Theme Sub-themes Questions 
7 Rights of shareholders Participation on fundamental corporate changes Q1: B2, B3, B4 
11 Disclosure and transparency 
Rights of shareholders 
 
Disclosure on material information 
Participation on fundamental corporate changes 
Basic shareholder rights 
Q2: A1 
Q1: B1, A5 
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As it can be seen from the table above, there is not that much difference regarding what the Pattern 
Matrix has suggested due to the heavy reliance of this research’s constructs on the relevant literature.  
Overall, based on the results of the exploratory factor analysis, which was performed on the items that 
measure the CVD of Saudi shareholders based on their attitudes towards the rights of minority 
shareholders as prescribed by the OECD principles of CG, all of the survey instrument’s constructs 
were deemed valid. 
Hence, the 33 items representing the 11 factors of CG principles drawn from the OECD (2004) are 
valid and hence retained to measure Hofstede’s (2010) five CVDs: namely, Individualism, Power 
Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Femininity, and Long Term Orientation.  
In addition, as those 33 items representing the 11 factors of CG principles were drawn from the OECD 
(2004) are validated and signified by the exploratory factor analysis phase, they were hypothetically 
tested in relation to shareholder’s type. Moreover, the significance of such test helps to answer the first 
research question: To what extent do available cultural models (for example Hofstede, 2010) explain 
the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia? 
5.5.3 Descriptive Analysis 
The describe statistic is used, for the purpose of this research, to describe the basic features of data 
collected from the questionnaires (Parasuraman et al., 2006). Hence, the descriptive analysis refers to 
the transformation of raw data into a form that would provide information to describe a set of factors in 
a situation that makes them easy to understand and interpret (Zikmund, 2003; Sekaran & Bougie, 
2010). 
For the purpose of this study, descriptive statistical techniques were used to inspect the data before 
testing formal research questions to provide simple summaries about the distributions of independent 
samples of shareholder types: Majority, Sophisticated, Minority and Non-shareholders in relation to 
Hofstede’s (2010) CVD.  In addition, the Mode was of significant value as it represents the score that 
occurs most frequently in the data set; hence, through which Hofstede’s (2010) CVD pertaining to 
Saudi shareholders can be measured for each shareholder type. Thus, the descriptive statistics, along 
with simple graphic analysis, form the basis of virtually every quantitative analysis of the data 
collected. 
In light of this, the descriptive characteristics of the research sample, for the questionnaire, are 
presented in the following sections and are divided into two main categories: 
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A. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents.  
1) An overall demographic characteristic analysis on the sample size (see Appendix C3 for full 
discussion). 
2) A shareholder type specific-demographic characteristic analysis ( see Appendix C3 for full 
depiction & discussion). 
 
 
B. Distributions of CVD Dimensions 
1) An overall depiction of the distribution of CVD pertaining to Saudi shareholders in 
comparison with Hofstede’s findings found on his website. 
2) The CVD distribution of each shareholder type. 
 
A. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
The questions in Section 2 of the questionnaire requested participants to provide general background 
information about their profiles, including gender, age, education, previous experience, and family 
background. To analyse the respondents’ profile data, frequency distributions were calculated for all 
cases in this research and are summarised as follow: 
1) An Overall Demographic Characteristics Analysis of the Sample Size 
Table 5.10: Demographic Characteristics 
Characteristics of respondents  Frequency  %  Cum %  
Gender  
Male  60 72.3 74.1 
Female  21 25.3 100 
Age  
25-45  61 73.5 75.3 
> 45  15 18.1 93.8 
18-24 5 6.0 100 
Education  
High school 5 6.0 6.3 
Diploma  19 22.9 30.0 
Doctorate  2 2.4 32.5 
Master’s degree  14 16.9 50.0 
Bachelor degree 40 48.2 100.0 
Shareholder’s Type 
Majority 16 19.3 19.3 
Sophisticated 17 20.5 39.8 
Minority 35 42.2 81.9 
Non-Shareholders 15 18.1 100 
Have you had any work experience related to share trading 
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Yes 29 34.9 35.8 
No 52 62.7 100 
Have you been trading in the stock market? 
Yes 40 48.2 50 
No 40 48.2 100 
For how long have you been trading in the stock market? 
11-20 years 2 2.4 3.0 
4-10 years 14 16.9 24.2 
1-3 years 28 33.7 66.7 
< 1 year 22 26.5 100 
What is the longest period you have held onto a certain class of shares? 
 4 years 6 7.2 9.0 
2-3 years 10 12.0 23.9 
1 year 10 12.0 38.8 
6-12 months 5 6.0 46.3 
4- 6 months 12 14.5 64.2 
2-3 months 9 10.8 77.6 
 1 month 15 18.1 100 
From this questionnaire, how much information were you aware of regarding your rights as a 
shareholder? 
90 – 100 % 4 4.8 5.2 
70- 80 % 13 15.7 22.1 
40- 60 % 19 22.9 46.8 
20-30 % 15 18.1 66.2 
< 10 % 26 31.3 100 
Will you require the blessing of a religious scholar to enforce these rights? 
Yes 61 73.5 77.2 
No 18 21.7 100 
Source: The Author. 
2) A Shareholder Type Demographic Characteristics Analysis: (See Appendix C3 for full 
depiction & discussion): 
The most intriguing findings of this section are the following: 
 Awareness Regarding Shareholder’s Rights 
 Majority: 75 % of respondents were aware of 70-80 % of their rights and the other 25 % were 
aware of 90-100 % of their rights. 
 Sophisticated: 100 % of them were aware of 40-60 % of their rights. 
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 Minority: 63.6% were aware of less than 10% of their rights, and the other 36.4%were aware 
of 20-30 % of their rights. 
Perhaps, based on the results of this sample size, the level of awareness was dependent on the close 
approximation between these segments and Saudi listed corporations’ boards. Hence, further 
assessment of this factor is taken into account for the qualitative analysis phase as it was signified by 
the literature review phase. 
 Requiring the Blessing of a Religious Scholar 
 Majority: 87.5 % of respondents required the blessing whereas 12.5 % did not require it 
 Sophisticated: 93.8 % of respondents required the blessing whereas 6.2 % did not require it 
 Minority: 74.3 % of respondents required the blessing whereas 25.7 % did not require it. 
These figures are indicative of the religious nature of Saudi shareholders and the Saudi Society as a 
whole. However, it seems that Minority Shareholders are more liberated from religious restrictions 
than any other segment. Further investigation of the religious factor will be conducted in the 
hypothesis phase of this section. 
Nevertheless, such hypothesis testing will be delayed until further descriptive analysis of the 
distributions of CV dimensions uncovers other basic features of the data. In addition, this undertaking 
will show whether or not assignments of Hofstede’s (2010) CVD corresponding to the OECD 
principles of CG pertaining to Saudi minority shareholders is capable of measuring the CVD of Saudi 
shareholders. Hence, a partial objective of the first research question: To what extent do available 
cultural models (for example Hofstede, 2010) explain the quality of the exercise of minority 
shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia? will be met. 
B. Distribution of CV Dimensions 
1) An Overall Depiction of CVD Distribution of Saudi Shareholders 
The descriptive statistics in this section quantify the center of distribution based on the CVD of Saudi 
shareholders. The variables of the questionnaire represent shareholder’s rights as defined by the OECD 
principles of CG. Each variable in the questionnaire was assigned to the corresponding CV dimension 
(see Appendix B8), as defined by Hofestede (2010). 
Therefore, the CVD of Saudi shareholders was measured by looking at the Mode of the central 
tendency, which represents the score that occurs most frequently in the data set. In addition, the scale is 
designed  from 0 to 100 with 50 as mid-level point; hence, as a rule of thumb,  if  a score using the 
Mode is under 50, the measured CV dimension is considered relatively ‘LOW’ on the measured 
Chapter Five: Quantitative Research Analysis and Discussions   P a g e  | 138 
 
 
 
dimension (Hofstede et al., 2010). Moreover, the Mean and Median together with simple graphics 
analysis form the basis of the CVD distribution analysis as prescribed in the table below. 
Table 5.11: CVD Distributions of Saudi Shareholders 
 
INDIVIDUALISE
M 
POWERDISTANCE
F 
UNCERTAINTYAVOI
DANCEF FEMININITY 
LONGTERMORIE
NTATIONF 
N Valid 73 70 69 73 73 
Missing 10 13 14 10 10 
Mean 51.2740 80.1143 79.8116 55.7945 30.1918 
Median 51.0000 80.0000 78.0000 54.0000 31.0000 
Mode 49.00 75.00
a
 74.00 48.00 32.00
a
 
Std. Deviation 6.34705 8.70206 8.88700 8.05357 3.66158 
Skewness -.017 .436 .383 .335 -.709 
Std. Error of Skewness .281 .287 .289 .281 .281 
Kurtosis -.278 -.467 -.109 -.746 .211 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .555 .566 .570 .555 .555 
Source: The Author 
Note: (For a full depiction of CVD Distribution of Saudi Shareholders via diagrams see Appendix C4) 
 
 Individualism: 
Respondents scored 49 on the Individualism dimension using the Mode. Hence, this score conveys a 
low level of Individualism which is also reflective of a tendency towards collectivism as also suggested 
by Hofstede’s et al. (2010) score of 25 on this dimension.  
Compared to Hofstede’s et al., (2010) score on this dimension, the Saudi Culture scored 25 on the 
dimension of Individualism, which makes it more of a collective culture. However, in this study, by 
taking a closer look at the Individualism dimension and contextually applying the corresponding 
shareholder rights found in the OECD Principles to it, Saudi shareholders scored higher on this 
dimension than indicated by Hofstede et al., (2010). Perhaps, this is due to the economic consequences 
of being a shareholder, which requires some sort of Individualism in terms of buying, holding onto, or 
selling shares. Therefore, shareholders are driven to think in terms of “I” as opposed to thinking in 
terms of “We” (Hofstede et al., 2010) as indicated by the Mean score of 51.2. 
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 Power Distance 
Respondents scored 75 on the Power Distance Dimension using the Mode, and scored 80.1 using the 
Mean. Hence, Saudi shareholders scored high on this dimension as the Saudi Culture is characterised 
by a high distance between more and less powerful individuals.  
Compared to Hofstede’s et al., (2010) score of 95 on Power Distance, there is not that much difference 
between Hofstede’s score and the score of this study: 80.1 using the Mean.  
Nevertheless, a further look at this dimension on the basis of shareholder’s type will be of great 
significance as it will convey the level of Power Distance based on an individual’s status, wealth and 
position as a shareholder. In addition, further analysis on shareholder type is capable of conveying how 
Saudi shareholders accept hierarchical orders, and their attitudes towards inequalities “in which 
everybody has a place and which needs no further justification” (Hofstede et al., 2010).   
 Uncertainty Avoidance: 
Respondents scored 74 on the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension using the Mode and 79.8 using the 
Mean. This score reflects the high level of Uncertainty Avoidance among Saudi Shareholders. 
Compared to Hofstede’s et al., (2010) score of 80 on this dimension, this study’s score is almost 
identical using the Mean, 79.8.  
Moreover, a high score on this dimension indicates a preference for “rigid codes of belief and behavior 
and are intolerant of unorthodox behavior and ideas. In these cultures there is “an emotional need for 
rules (even if the rules never seem to work)” (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hence, this dimension will be of 
great significant in further analysis as it is capable of explaining the amount of CG laws put in place in 
Saudi Arabia to avoid the unknown, as Security is a key element of shareholder motivation (Hofstede 
et al., 2010). 
 Femininity: 
Respondents scored 48 on the Femininity dimension using the Mode. Hence, this score indicates a low 
level of Femininity which is reflective of the masculine nature of Saudi shareholders as also suggested 
by Hofstede’s et al. (2010) score of 60 on the Masculinity dimension. 
Moreover, this dimension will be of a great significance in further analysis based on shareholder type 
as further analyses are capable of exposing how relatively masculine certain Saudi shareholders are 
compared to other shareholders. Hence, aspects of caring for other shareholders as indicated by the 
Femininity dimension are worth investigating, as a feminine society is one where quality of life is the 
sign of success, not the amount of money an individual has (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
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 LongTerm Orientation: 
Respondents scored 32 on the Long Term Orientation dimension using the Mode, and scored 30 using 
the Mean. Hence, both low scores reflect the Short Term Orientation of Saudi shareholders and their 
normative thinking (Hofstede et al., 2010). “People in such societies they are normative in their 
thinking. They exhibit great respect for traditions, a relatively small propensity to save for the future, 
and a focus on achieving quick results” (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Compared to Hofstede’s et al., (2010) score of 36 on this dimension, this study’s score of 32 using the 
Mode makes both results relatively close.  
This dimension will be of a great significance in further analysis based on Saudi shareholder types as 
such analysis is capable of conveying how certain Saudi shareholders are more interested to achieve 
quick results and what they contribute to achieve such desires. 
In summary, from the table presented below, it is clear that the data collected for this study and the 
statistical technique used produced relatively similar outputs to Hofstede’s et al., (2010) scores on 
CVD pertaining to the Saudi culture. Hence, dissecting Saudi shareholders’ CVD on a shareholder’s 
type basis seems to be a progressive step that is capable of strengthening the descriptive analysis phase. 
In addition, potential insights arising from this phase are deemed appropriate to aid the subsequent 
hypothesis-testing phase. 
Table 5.12: CVD of Saudi Shareholders 
 Individualism Power Distance Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Masculinity/ 
Femininity 
Long Term 
Orientation 
Hofstede 25 95 80 60 36 
This study 49 75 74 48 32 
Source: Source: Hofstede et al., (2010) and the Author  
2) The CVD Distribution of Shareholder Types 
By taking a step further, and looking at how each shareholder type, namely: Majority, Sophisticated, 
Minority and Non-Shareholder scored on the CVD, new findings emerge regarding the Saudi sub-
cultures that exist using the Central Tendency Distribution technique: 
Table 5.13: CVD Distribution-Shareholder Type 
SHARE HOLDER TYPE 
INDIVIDUALISEM
F 
POWERDISTANC
E 
UNCERTAINTYA
VOIDANCEF FEMININITY 
LONGTERMORIE
NTATIONF 
MAJORITY N Valid 16 16 16 16 15 
Missng 0 0 0 0 1 
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Mean 47.6250 74.2500 72.8125 50.6875 27.2667 
Median 49.0000 74.0000 74.5000 50.0000 27.0000 
Mode 49.00 75.00 74.00
a
 48.00 27.00 
Std. Deviation 5.48787 3.94124 6.76480 2.98259 2.65832 
Skewness .337 .773 -.173 1.018 1.617 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.564 .564 .564 .564 .580 
Kurtosis .269 .059 -.627 -.315 4.893 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
 
1.091 1.091 1.091 1.091 1.121 
SOPOSTICATED N Valid 14 13 12 13 16 
Missing 3 4 5 4 1 
Mean 51.5714 79.6923 79.0000 53.3846 30.4375 
Median 52.0000 82.0000 78.5000 53.0000 30.5000 
Mode 51.00
a
 69.00
a
 72.00 53.00 28.00
a
 
Std. Deviation 5.40248 7.80368 6.53661 5.48541 3.75888 
Skewness -.343 -.705 .574 -.640 -1.217 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.597 .616 .637 .616 .564 
Kurtosis -1.400 -.452 -.547 2.803 3.007 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
1.154 1.191 1.232 1.191 1.091 
MINORITY N Valid 31 29 28 30 28 
Missing 4 6 7 5 7 
Mean 52.2903 82.0345 82.1071 58.2667 30.7500 
Median 53.0000 84.0000 82.0000 60.0000 32.0000 
Mode 52.00
a
 80.00
a
 82.00 53.00
a
 32.00 
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Std. Deviation 6.01772 8.97808 8.19367 9.02844 3.67801 
Skewness -.624 -.195 .076 -.425 -1.565 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.421 .434 .441 .427 .441 
Kurtosis 1.082 -.772 -.675 -.887 2.231 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
.821 .845 .858 .833 .858 
NONSHAREHOLD
ERS 
N Valid 12 12 13 14 14 
Missing 3 3 2 1 1 
Mean 53.1667 83.7500 84.2308 58.5714 31.9286 
Median 51.5000 79.5000 82.0000 56.5000 32.5000 
Mode 43.00
a
 75.00 82.00
a
 70.00 35.00 
Std. Deviation 7.94107 10.38465 10.03456 8.89005 2.89467 
Skewness .307 .707 .682 .200 -.650 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.637 .637 .616 .597 .597 
Kurtosis -1.392 -1.273 -1.017 -1.575 -.460 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
1.232 1.232 1.191 1.154 1.154 
Source:The Author 
 Individualism 
From the table, Minority shareholders scored higher on this dimension as compared to Majority and 
Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean and the Mode. The Mean of Minority shareholders on this 
dimension is 52.2, Sophisticated 51.5 and Majority 47.6. The Mode of Minority is 52, Sophisticated 
51, and Majority 49. 
 Power Distance 
From the table, Minority shareholders scored higher on this dimension as compared to Majority and 
Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean and the Mode. The Mean of Minority shareholder on this 
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dimension is 82, Sophisticated 79.6 and Majority74.2. The Mode of Minority is 80, Sophisticated 69, 
and Majority 75 
 Uncertainty avoidance 
From the table, Minority shareholders scored higher on this dimension as compared to Majority and 
Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean and the Mode. The Mean of Minority shareholder on this 
dimension is 82.1, Sophisticated 79 and Majority 72.8. The Mode of Minority is 82, Sophisticated 72, 
and Majority 74. 
 Femininity 
From the table, Minority shareholders scored higher on this dimension as compared to Majority and 
Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean. The Mean of Minority shareholder on this dimension is 
58.2, Sophisticated 53.3 and Majority 50.6. The Mode of Minority is 53, Sophisticated 53, and 
Majority 48 
 Long Term Orientation 
From the table, Minority shareholders scored higher on this dimension as compared to Majority and 
Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean and the Mode. The Mean of Minority shareholder on this 
Dimension is 30.7, Sophisticated 30.4 and Majority 27.2. The Mode of Minority is 32, Sophisticated 
28, and Majority 27. 
Taking all the above findings into consideration, marginal differences in the distribution of the CV 
Dimension framework regarding each shareholder type are captured. However, it is too early for these 
new findings to form any conclusion as reliance on the descriptive statistics is meant to underline the 
basic features of the data. Therefore, no such assumption is made at this stage of the analysis. 
Summary of Descriptive Statistics Findings: 
A. Reliability Test: 
In this study, the reliability of the questionnaire was evaluated by calculating the Cronbach’s alpha 
scores for all the variables. The higher the Alpha, the more reliable the test is. Generally, there is no 
agreed cut-off point. Nevertheless, Nunnally (1978), and Field (2005) argue that 0.7 and above is 
acceptable. Hence, for this study, Cronbach’s alpha is 86% and the Cronbach’s alpha based on 
standardised items is 86%. Both scores are identical, which is a positive sign, and both provide 
assurances of internally consistent reliable variables. 
B. Validity Test: 
The Pattern Matrix confirms the convergent validity of all the constructs by showing that all of the 
item loadings making up the 11 factors of the questionnaire were significant and well above the 
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acceptable cut-off-point of .40. In addition, all 33 items from the questionnaire were subjected to the 
factor analysis testing using the principal component analysis (PCA). The PCA test suggests that all of 
33 items representing the 11 factors of CG principles drawn from the OECD (2004) were valid and 
hence retained. Therefore, the questionnaire is justified to be suitable for structure detection. 
C. Descriptive statistics:  
The Descriptive statistics provide simple summaries about all demographic characteristics and 
shareholder type specific-demographic characteristics. In addition, the descriptive statistics provide 
simple summaries about the overall depiction of the distribution of CVD pertaining to Saudi 
shareholders in comparison to Hofstede’s et al., (2010) findings: 
 Table 5.12: CVD of Saudi shareholders 
 Individualism Power 
Distance 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Masculinity/ 
Femininity 
Long Term Orientation 
Hofstede 25 95 80 60 36 
This study 49 75 74 48 32 
  Source: Hofstede et al., (2010) and the Author 
Moreover, the data collected for this study and the statistical techniques used produced relatively 
similar outputs to Hofstede’s et al. (2010) scores on CVD pertaining to the Saudi culture. Hence, 
assignment of Hofstede’s et al. (2010) CVD to the OECD principles of CG pertaining to minority 
shareholders was capable of measuring Saudi shareholders CVD via the questionnaires. 
In addition, dissecting Saudi shareholders’ CVD on a shareholder type basis is a progressive step that 
strengthens the descriptive analysis phase and provides potential insights deemed appropriate to aid the 
subsequent hypothesis-testing phase. For instance, the marginal differences in the distribution of the 
CV Dimensions regarding each Saudi shareholder type will assist the hypothesis-testing phase in the 
general picture they depict and where anomalies are to be expected. However, it is too early for these 
new findings to form a conclusion as reliance on the descriptive statistics is meant to underline the 
basic features of the data. Therefore, no such assumption is made at this stage of the analysis. 
5.5.4 Hypotheses Testing 
Part 1: Non-Parametric Tests for Several Independent Samples: 
The first objective of this research study was to explore the extent that available cultural models (for 
example Hofstede, 2010) explain the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined 
by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia? 
To achieve this, a set of hypotheses, generated by the SPSS and motivated by the relevant literature 
review (see Appendices B1, B2 & B3) will be discussed in this section. Therefore, Kruskal-Wallis and 
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Mann-Whitney tests are used to establish whether the distribution of CV Dimensions differs across 
shareholder types. 
A. Kruskal-Wallis Test: 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to compare all four independent samples of Saudi shareholder type at 
once on each of the CVD framework elements. The results indicated rejections of all null hypotheses 
that the distribution of CVD framework is the same across categories of shareholder type, except for 
Individualism. 
Table 5.14: Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
 Null Hypothesis Test Sig Decision 
1 The distribution of Individualism is the 
Same across categories of Share Holder 
Type 
Independent Samples Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
.052 Retain the Null 
Hypothesis 
2 The distribution of Power Distance is 
the Same across categories of Share 
Holder Type 
Independent Samples Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
.010 Reject the Null 
Hypothesis 
3 The distribution of Uncertainty 
Avoidance is the Same across 
categories of Share Holder Type 
Independent Samples Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
.005 Reject the Null 
Hypothesis 
4 The distribution of Femininity is the 
Same across categories of Share Holder 
Type 
Independent Samples Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
.009 Reject the Null 
Hypothesis 
5 The distribution of Long Term 
Orientation is the Same across 
categories of Share Holder Type 
Independent Samples Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
.001 Reject the Null 
Hypothesis 
Source: The Author 
In addition, the most interesting findings of the Mean rank of the Kruskal-Wallis test on CV 
Dimensions across all categories of Saudi shareholders’ type are as follow: 
 Kruskal-Wallis test shows Minority score 71% higher on Individualism as compared to 
Majority shareholders. Hence, the Mean rank of the Individualism dimension captures the 
anomalies of the Individualism distribution across categories of shareholder type even though 
the null hypothesis, in the table above, was rejected on a relatively high significance level at 
.052.  
 Kruskal-Wallis test shows Minority score 95% higher on Power distance and 100% higher on 
Uncertainty Avoidance as compared to Majority shareholders. 
 Kruskal-Wallis test shows Minority shareholders score 90% higher on Femininity as compared 
to Majority shareholders. 
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 Kruskal-Wallis test shows Minority shareholders score 129% higher on Long-Term 
Orientation as compared to Majority. 
Table 5.15: Mean Ranks of Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 SHARE HOLDER TYPE N Mean Rank 
INDIVIDUALISEMF MAJORITY 16 24.09 
SOPHISTICATED 14 38.96 
MINORITY 31 41.21 
NON-SHAREHOLDERS 12 41.04 
Total 73  
POWERDISTANCEF MAJORITY 16 20.78 
SOPHISTICATED 13 36.42 
MINORITY 29 40.64 
NON-SHAREHOLDERS 12 41.71 
Total 70  
UNCERTAINTYAVOIDANCEF MAJORITY 16 20.28 
SOPHISTICATED 12 32.92 
MINORITY 28 40.73 
NON-SHAREHOLDERS 13 42.69 
Total 69  
FEMININITYF MAJORITY 16 22.69 
SOPHISTICATED 13 33.35 
MINORITY 30 43.17 
NON-SHAREHOLDERS 14 43.54 
Total 73  
LONGTERMORIENTATIONF MAJORITY 15 17.97 
SOPHISTICATED 16 38.75 
MINORITY 28 41.18 
NON-SHAREHOLDERS 14 47.04 
Total 73  
Source: The Author 
Table 5.16: Kruskal-Wallis level of Significance 
 
INDIVIDUALISEMF 
POWERDISTANCE
F 
UNCERTAINTYAV
OIDANCEF FEMININITYF 
LONGTERMORIEN
TATIONF 
Chi-Square 7.721 11.388 12.978 11.614 16.569 
Df 3 3 3 3 3 
Asymp. Sig. .052 .010 .005 .009 .001 
Source:The Author 
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B. Mann-Whitney Test: 
Mann-Whitney test was used to compare the level of CVD elements across a paired category of 
shareholder types. Results indicate no significance between comparisons of paired groups except 
between Minority and Majority shareholder types. (See Appendix C8 for all tables) 
Table 5.17: Mean Ranks of Mann-Whitney Test  
 
SHARE HOLDER TYPE N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
INDIVIDUALISEMF MAJORITY 16 16.50 264.00 
MINORITY 31 27.87 864.00 
Total 47   
POWERDISTANCEF MAJORITY 16 15.03 240.50 
MINORITY 29 27.40 794.50 
Total 45   
UNCERTAINTYAVOIDANCEF MAJORITY 16 13.94 223.00 
MINORITY 28 27.39 767.00 
Total 44   
FEMININITYF MAJORITY 16 15.84 253.50 
MINORITY 30 27.58 827.50 
Total 46   
LONGTERMORIENTATIONF MAJORITY 15 13.67 205.00 
MINORITY 28 26.46 741.00 
Total 43   
Source: The Author 
Moreover, the most interesting findings of the Mann-Whitney test using the Mean Rank are as follow:  
 Mann-Whitney test shows Minority shareholders score 68% higher on Individualism 
compared to Majority. 
 Mann-Whitney test shows Minority shareholders score 82% higher on Power Distance and 
96% higher on Uncertainty avoidance compared to Majority shareholders. 
 Mann-Whitney test shows Minority shareholders score 74% higher on Femininity compared to 
Majority. 
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 Mann-Whitney test shows Minority shareholders score 93% higher on Long Term Orientation 
compared to Majority.  
Table 5.18: Mann-Whitney Test level of Significance   
 
INDIVIDUALIS
EMF 
POWERDISTA
NCEF 
UNCERTAINTY
AVOIDANCEF FEMININITYF 
LONGTERMO
RIENTATIONF 
Mann-Whitney U 128.000 104.500 87.000 117.500 85.000 
Wilcoxon W 264.000 240.500 223.000 253.500 205.000 
Z -2.701 -3.028 -3.348 -2.834 -3.211 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .002 .001 .005 .001 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .002 .001 .004 .001 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .003 .001 .000 .002 .000 
Point Probability .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Source:The Author                  a. Grouping Variable: SHARE HOLDER TYPE 
 
Interpretation of Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Results: 
Based on the independent samples of shareholder types, the following assumption holds true: 
1. The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, is 
affected by the level of CVD for each shareholder type. 
The CVD of Minority was 95% higher on Power Distance and is 100% higher on Uncertainty 
Avoidance as compared to Majority shareholders’ CVD, as indicated by the Kruskal-Wallis test. In 
confirmation, the Mann-Whitney test conveys that Minority shareholders were 82% higher on Power 
Distance and 96% higher on Uncertainty avoidance. These results are possibly due to the level of 
awareness and power to exercise these rights by the type of Saudi shareholders as indicated by the 
analyses of the demographic section of the questionnaires (see Appendix C3). 
For example, the analyses of the demographic section of the questionnaires show that 75% of Majority 
shareholders were aware of 70-80 % of OECD principles of shareholder’s rights and the other 15% 
were aware of 90-100% of these rights. On the other hand, 63 % of Minority shareholders were aware 
of less than 10 % of these rights and the other 37% were aware of 20-30 % of these rights. 
In addition, Minority shareholders scored 90% higher on Femininity as compared to Majority 
shareholders, as indicated by the Kruskal-Wallis test. In confirmation, the Mann-Whitney test shows 
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that Minority scored 74% higher on Femininity compared to Majority. Hence, Saudi Majority 
shareholders are two times more masculine than Minority and are driven by competition, achievement 
and success (Hofstede et al., 2010).  Therefore, Majority shareholders’ concern for Minority and their 
quality of life is expected to be minimal, especially when they are in the position to run corporations on 
a day to day basis, control the agenda of AGMs and the amount of information attached to shares and 
their rights.  
Regarding Long-Term Orientation, Minority scored 129% higher on this dimension as compared to 
Majority, as indicated by Kruskal-Wallis. In confirmation, the Mann Whiteny test shows that Minority 
scored 93% higher on this dimension. Hence, the higher score of Minority shareholders on LTO 
implies their pragmatic approach towards their investments and represents their higher orientation 
towards future dividends and their higher willingness to wait longer for dividends as compared to other 
Saudi shareholder groups. In addition, the distribution of Individualism was found the same across all 
categories of shareholder types, as indicated by the Kruskal-Wallis hypothesis test. However, the 
Mean rank of the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whiteny tests show that Minority shareholders scored 
71% and 68% higher on Individualism compared to Majority shareholders respectively, as had been 
slightly indicated by the descriptive statistics: the Mean of Minority shareholders on this dimension is 
52.2, Sophisticated 51.5, and Majority 47.6. 
Part 2:Non-Parametric Tests for Categorical Variables 
A. Chi-Square Test 
The Chi-Square Test was found not suitable with the data, after thorough testing, as the expected 
frequency in most cases was found less than 5, which invalidates a major pre-test assumption for the 
Chi-Square test. Therefore, other tests such as the Yates' correction for small frequencies and Fisher 
Exact tests were considered. The researcher opted for the Fisher Exact test as it offers a resolution for 
the Chi-Square’s invalidated assumptions of expected frequency of no less than 5 (Field, 2005). 
B. Fisher’s Exact Test 
The significant relationships found between ‘Categorical Variables’ using Fisher’s Exact are as follow: 
1) CVD In Relation to Demographics: 
Table 5.19: CVD in Relation to Demographics 
CVD Null Hypothesis Between Decision 
Individualism There is no significant relationship 
between:   
Individualism    &   Information 
awareness 
Reject The Null Hypothesis 
Power 
Distance 
There is no significant relationship between Power Distance  &  Information 
Awareness,  
Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between Power Distance  &   Age Reject The Null Hypothesis 
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Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
There is no significant relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance & Information 
Awareness 
Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance  & Length of 
Shareholding 
Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship 
between: 
Uncertainty Avoidance  &  Age Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance  &  Gender Reject The Null Hypothesis 
Femininity There is no significant relationship between Femininity  &  Information Awareness, Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between Femininity  &   Gender Reject The Null Hypothesis 
LongTerm 
Orientation 
There is no significant relationship between Long Term Orientation  & Education 
Level 
Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between Long Term Orientation  & Religion Reject The Null Hypothesis 
Source: The Author 
 
2) CVD in Relation to Shareholder Type: 
Table 5.20: CVD in Relations to ShareholderType 
CVD Null Hypothesis Between Decision 
Femininity There is no significant relationship 
between:   
Femininity & Shareholder type Reject The Null Hypothesis 
LongTerm 
Orientation 
There is no significant relationship 
between 
Long Term Orientation & Shareholder 
Type 
Reject The Null Hypothesis 
Source: The Author 
 
5.6 Quantitative Analysis Discussion: 
1- To what extent do available cultural models (for example Hofstede, 2010) explain the quality 
of the exercise of minority shareholder rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia? 
In order to answer the above research questions: The following hypotheses are developed: 
5.6.1 Hypothesis Development: 
1) Individualism (IND): 
The norm of shareholder wealth maximisation stems from the CVD of Individualism found in Hofstede 
(Licht, 2001). Moreover, the Individualism dimension focuses on equality and independence of 
individuals, whereas Collectivism (COL) is the opposite as it shifts the focus onto a group’s interest. 
Hence, the norm in individualistic countries is more of an “egalitarian” nature (Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998; Hofstede, 2001).   
Therefore, listed corporations in individualistic countries tend to give “equal priority to protecting 
inside and outside investors…by providing more transparency to the public and enhancing minority 
shareholders’ voting rights” (Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li & Shao et al., 2014). On the other hand, 
listed corporations in collectivist countries are more concerned with giving priority to “maintaining the 
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interests of inside investors (i.e., large shareholders and major creditors)” (Griffin et al., 2014).  Hence, 
Individualism promotes transparency of information and discourages information asymmetry 
benefiting insider investors such as large shareholders and creditors.  
Moreover, individuals in countries scoring high on Individualism strive for their fair treatment by 
corporations because highly individualistic societies prefer reward allocations based on equity and the 
same rights for all (Armstrong, 1996; Chan & Cheung, 2008, 2012; Hofstede, 2005). 
In addition, this link between individualism and transparency and its effect on Minority shareholders is 
well documented. Recent research has shown Individualism to be positively correlated with risk taking 
(Li, Griffin, Yue & Zhao, 2013; Shao, Kwok & Zhang, 2013). Hence, high risk taking calls for a high 
level of information asymmetry between managers and outside investors such as Minority 
shareholders. Therefore, in highly individualistic countries, there is “a greater need for transparency 
and protection of outside investors’ rights” (Griffin et al., 2014). 
Similarly, disclosure is also expected to be high in individualistic countries as Individualism calls for 
reducing the agency conflict faced by outside investors. As a consequence, the level of information 
asymmetry between managers and outside investors is expected to be high (Griffin et al., 2014). In 
fact, stakeholders in countries where Individualism is strong are more likely to punish firms for bad 
behaviours than those in countries where Collectivism is higher (Williams & Zinkin, 2008). 
Unlike in individualistic countries, agency issues between stakeholders are severe in collectivist 
cultures (Zhang, Liang & Sun, 2013). Listed corporations in collectivist countries rely more on in-
group relationships. Hence, there is a higher level of information sharing within groups of insider 
investors such as large shareholders and creditors. Therefore, a lower CG rating on transparency and 
disclosure is expected and their overall effects are transformed into a lower level of Minority 
shareholder protection (Griffin et al., 2014). 
Based on the previous studies, the following hypothesis is developed:  
1. Hypothesis 1: the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in high COL Cultures such as the 
Saudi 
Using variables of disclosure and transparency comprising the Minority shareholders’ protection Index 
constructed for this study, Saudi shareholders scored 49 on the Individualism dimension using the 
Mode. This low score is reflective of the high level of Collectivism of Saudi shareholders as also 
suggested by Hofstede’s et al., (2010) score of 25 on this dimension. This finding is confirmatory of 
Hofstede’s score of 25 on this dimension. However, the difference in the score between Hofstede’s et 
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al. (2010) findings and this study’s is might be due to the different techniques used to reach both scores 
or rather due to the specific scope of this study compared to the general capturing of a society’s 
variable employed by Hofstede et al., (2010). Moreover, it should also be noted that the reason this 
study is more focused on the level of Individualism of Saudi shareholders, as opposed to the level of 
Collectivism, is due to its direct corresponding effect on the quality of compliance with OECD 
principles of CG pertaining to Minority shareholder rights (see Appendix B10). 
Regardless, what can be inferred from the Individualism score of this study is that the expected level of 
transparency and disclosure in Saudi Arabia is low. In fact, most Saudi listed corporations comply with 
the minimum mandatory requirements of disclosure, while assigning less significance to voluntary 
disclosure (Al-Saeed, 2006). In addition, the quality of reporting in Saudi Arabia is at a very low level 
with an average score of 36% regarding mandatory disclosure, and an average score of 32% regarding 
voluntary disclosure (Al-Janadi, Rahman & Omar, 2012). 
Moreover, there was a slight difference in the level of Individualism among Saudi shareholder groups 
using the scores derived from the descriptive statistics: The Mean of Saudi Minority shareholders on 
this dimension was 52.2, Sophisticated 51.5 and Majority 47.6. The Mode of Minority shareholders 
was 52, Sophisticated 51, and Majority 49. However, the non-parametric test of Kruskal-Wallis and 
Mann-Whitney show that Saudi Minority shareholders scored 71% and 68% higher on Individualism 
compared to Majority shareholders respectively. This result implies a high level of information 
asymmetry between managers and insider investors (such as Majority shareholders) at the expense of 
Minority shareholders. It also implies the need for a greater amount of transparency and disclosure to 
establish a better reward allocation system based on equity, equal rights and protection for all 
stakeholders. Therefore, the higher level of Individualism scored by minority shareholders gives a clear 
indication of the need to establish fair treatment for all shareholders, which translates into a better level 
of transparency and disclosure in Saudi Arabia.   
Furthermore, in the qualitative section of the questionnaire, when minority shareholders were asked 
how their transparency and disclosure rights, as prescribed by the OECD principles presented to them 
in the questionnaires, relate to their own practical experiences, only 5 out of 35 Minority shareholders 
answered as follow: 
1- Form 52:  
A- The relationship between the shareholders and the corporations is very mysteriously ambiguous:  
2- Form: 48 
A- The percentage of transparency is zero. Hence, transparency measures are put in place to serve 
majorities 
3- Form 45:  
A- None: even if any exist, it is only nominal and serves an advertising purpose. 
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4- Form 43:  
A- It has not been clarified to me. 
5- Form 41: 
A- There is no such relationship.  
 
In addition, some correlations were highly significant through the Fisher hypothesis test. This shows a 
significant correlation between Individualism as a dimension and information awareness. Undoubtably, 
the amount of information provided through transparent and extensive disclosure aids shareholders in 
making informed decisions regarding their investments. Hence, their high level of risk taking will be 
better rewarded accordingly in terms of equity.  
Moreover, the amount of information provided through transparent and extensive disclosure promotes 
and enhances Individualism in discouraging information asymmetry, which benefits insider investors 
such as large shareholders and creditors. This finding is confirmed by Griffin et al. (2014), who asserts 
“assuming a causal relation, a one standard deviation increase in individualism increases the 
accountability and transparent disclosure index by 0.311 standard deviations”.  
Therefore, the underlining reasons behind the low level of disclosure and transparency and high level 
of information asymmetry between managers and majority shareholders, as highlighted by the 
Individualism dimension, is worthy of further investigations in the qualitative phase of this research.  
As advised by the relevant literature review conducted, this research will aid in unfolding whether or 
not the low level of compliance by listed Saudi corporations stems from legal, political or economic 
factors in Saudi Arabia. 
Overall, support for Hypothesis 1, the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in high COL cultures such as the Saudi is found. 
Moreover, support for Hypothesis 1 was established via the descriptive statistics and the Mean ranks of 
the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests. In addition, findings of both performed tests had 
previously been indicated and supported by the relevant literature. 
2) Uncertainty Avoidance (UA): 
The Uncertainty Avoidance dimension captures a society’s level of intolerance for ambiguity and 
unclear situations (Hofstede, 2005). Hence, high Uncertainty Avoidance cultures tend to mitigate stress 
and anxieties caused by ambiguity by looking for conditions of security such as excessive amount of 
rules (Hofstede, 2001).  
In addition, people in high Uncertainty Avoidance cultures are highly compliant with formal rules, as 
found by Vitell, Nwachukwu & Barnes (1993); Husted (2000) and Weaver (2001). However, those 
same people do not recognise the ethical dilemma in business decisions when no formal rules exist 
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(Schepers, 2006). Moreover, those same people value ethical values set by themselves within a group 
and find it hard to respect or comply with ethical guidelines set by outside members (Schepers, 2006). 
As a result, CG rules set by international accounting bodies such as the OECD to serve all stakeholders 
are found to score low on compliance in countries with a high level of Uncertainty Avoidance. 
In addition, the information asymmetry affecting the level of transparency and disclosure, as it does 
under the Individualism dimension, is also severe under the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension. In fact, 
high Uncertainty Avoidance countries tend to reduce the need for transparent disclosure as effective 
information is systematically meant to be shared among corporate insiders (Griffin et al., 2014). As a 
consequence, this tendency shapes a preference for debt over equity capital structures and financing 
(Licht, 2001) and controlling shareholders devise concentration of equity ownership as a mechanism to 
protect themselves against ambiguities (Aguilera, Castro & Cladera, 2011). Moreover, in these high 
Uncertainty Avoidance countries, bank-based over stock market-based financial systems are more 
common as a mechanism to monitor CG (Kwok &Tadesse, 2006). 
Moreover, the nature of compensation schemes used in high Uncertainty Avoidance countries differs 
from the once used in low Uncertainty Avoidance countries. For example, compensation based on 
performance is common in low Uncertainty Avoidance cultures and less common in high Uncertainty 
Avoidance cultures due to a preference for clarity and security (Griffin et al., 2014). In fact, 
international corporations in high Uncertainty Avoidance countries are found to offer more certainty in 
their compensation schemes through seniority- or skill-based compensation, whereas compensation 
based on performance was found a better fit in low Uncertainty Avoidance cultures accompanied with 
a high level of Individualism (Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998). 
Hence, based on all previous studies, the following hypothesis is developed: 
Hypothesis 2: the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by 
the OECD principles of CG, is low in high UA Cultures such as the Saudi 
Using variables of disclosure, transparency, and compensation schemes composing the minority 
shareholder’s protection Index constructed for this study, Saudi shareholders scored 74 on the 
Uncertainty Avoidance dimension using the Mode. This score reflects the high level of Uncertainty 
Avoidance among Saudi Shareholders. Compared to Hofstede’s et al. (2010) score of 80 on this 
dimension, this study’s score is almost identical using the Mean, 79.8.  
Moreover, a high score on this dimension, as the case in Saudi Arabia, indicates a preference for “rigid 
codes of belief and behaviour” and shows a high level of intolerance regarding “unorthodox behaviour 
and ideas” (Hofstede et al., 2010). The logic behind such observation stems from an emotional need for 
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rules (even if the rules never seem to work) (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hence, security is a key element of 
shareholder motivation in countries scoring high on Uncertainty Avoidance. This is clearly seen in the 
amount of rules guiding the accounting profession in Saudi Arabia, as discussed in chapter 2, such as 
SCC, SMCI, SOCPA, SHEC, and OECD. Nevertheless, when there is such a CG conflict to be 
resolved in a Saudi court of law, such case will be judged on Islamic principles instead. Therefore, this 
indicates the excessive amount of laws found in countries scoring high on Uncertainty Avoidance, as 
advised by the relevant literature review, which is worthy of further investigation in the qualitative 
phase to find out whether such excess stems from the legal or political environments in Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, Saudi Minority shareholders scored higher on the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension as 
compared to Majority and Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean and the Mode. The Mean of 
Minority shareholder on this Dimension was 82.1, Sophisticated 79 and Majority72.8. The Mode of 
Minority was 82, Sophisticated 72, and Majority 74. Still, the descriptive statistics slightly indicate 
differences in the orientation of Uncertainty Avoidance across the spectrum of Saudi shareholder types. 
However, the non-parametric tests of Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis show that Saudi Minorities 
scored 96% and 100% higher on Uncertainty Avoidance as compared to Majority shareholders.  This 
result shows a high level of uncertainty among Minority shareholders compared to Majority 
shareholders in Saudi Arabia. Similar to the Individualism dimension, this result implies a high level of 
information asymmetry between managers and insider investors, Majority shareholders, at the expense 
of Minority shareholders. This was documented in an answer by a Sophisticated shareholder via the 
qualitative section of the questionnaire: 
1- Form: 23 
A- Some listed corporations don’t comply with transparency enough. There is a need to clarify and be 
transparent with all shareholders, majority or minority. There is a need for transparency, clarity and 
disclosure regarding all aspects pertaining to listed corporations to all shareholders. 
 
In addition, the agency problem between mangers and outside shareholders is expected to be severe, as 
indicated by the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension, given that Saudi corporations are highly leveraged 
via bank debt (Osman &Mohammed, 2010). Moreover, in these high Uncertainty Avoidance countries, 
bank-based over stock market-based financial systems are more common as a mechanism to monitor 
CG (Kwok &Tadesse, 2006). Hence, this finding implies the reliance of Saudi corporations on debt 
financing over equity financing, which explains the low level of disclosure required of them to outside 
investors such as Minority shareholders as they might be perceived to be insignificant and less worthy 
of owing a duty to by managers. In turn, Minority shareholders attach lower significance to requesting 
information directly from listed corporations as compared to other groups such as creditors, who highly 
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value direct information from corporations due to their premium position to acquire information 
directly (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004). 
Moreover, the high level of Uncertainty Avoidance found among Saudi shareholders also implies that 
the need for greater amount of transparency and disclosure would not necessarily solve the problem, as 
high Uncertainty Avoidance culture have an obsession with legislating new measures of security:  
"Uncertainty avoiding countries will have a greater need for legislation than less-Uncertainty Avoiding 
countries" (Hofstede, 2005).  Therefore, any increase in the amount of disclosure in a high Uncertainty 
Avoidance country should be accompanied with a high level of compliance and monitoring to ensure 
that formal rules put in place to serve all stakeholders are complied with. 
In addition, the result of the high level of Uncertainty Avoidance among Saudi shareholders also 
implies that the compensation scheme employed by listed Saudi corporations is not highly driven by 
performance (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam, 2003). Moreover, most listed Saudi Corporations do 
not provide information regarding their directors’ qualifications, skills, training or number of shares 
owned, which is why SCMA should improve on the requirements directors have to possess before 
taking charge (Al-Janadi et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between Uncertainty Avoidance 
and Information Awareness.Speculatively, the amount of information provided through transparent and 
extensive disclosure reduces ambiguity. In turn, it reduces the level of uncertainty among Minority 
shareholders as they are provided with the appropriate level of information to make informed 
decisions. Hence, such appropriate disclosure and transparency practice accompanied with the right 
level of compliance would aid in discouraging the kind of information asymmetry that benefits insider 
investors such as large shareholders and creditors. This result is confirmed by Griffin et al. (2014): 
“assuming a causal relation; a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty avoidance decreases the 
accountability and transparent disclosure index by 0.298 standard deviations”. 
In addition, the descriptive statistics confirm the above causation as they show that 63 % of Minority 
shareholders were aware of less than 10 % of their rights and the other 37% were aware of 20-30 % of 
their rights. Hence, their Uncertainty Avoidance level was 96% higher as compared to Majority 
shareholders, indicated by the Mann-Whitney test. On the other hand, 75% of Majority shareholders 
were aware of 70-80 % of OECD principles of shareholder’s rights and the other 15% were aware of 
90-100% of these rights, which explains their overall lower level of Uncertainty Avoidances compared 
to Minority, as shown by the Mann-Whitney test. 
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Moreover, the causation between Uncertainty Avoidance and the strength of Minority shareholder 
protection is justified. The overall distribution of Uncertainty Avoidance was not the same across all 
categories of Saudi shareholder types, as the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates. This finding is consistent 
with the findings of Griffin et al. (2014), who observed that “assuming a causal relation, a one standard 
deviation increase in uncertainty avoidance reduces the minority shareholder protection index by 0.332 
standard deviations”. Moreover, “low Uncertainty Avoidance cultures are associated with greater level 
of minority shareholders’ protection (Lubetsky, 2008). Hence, people in low Uncertainty Avoidance 
cultures are more encouraged to speak about poor governance practices and, in turn, corporations are 
"more accustomed to handling such diversity, conflict, and feedback from shareholders" (Sweeney, 
2008). 
In addition, the dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance is found to have a significant relationship with the 
ownership concentration in previous research. The logic behind the association is that when 
Uncertainty Avoidance is high in such cultures, large shareholders are less willing to take risks. Hence, 
they devise a concentration of equity ownership as a mechanism to protect themselves against 
ambiguities (Aguilera, Castro & Cladera, 2011).  
Issues of compliance and disclosure with CG principles in listed Saudi companies partially stem from a 
highly concentrated ownership structure within the country. Moreover, the determinants promoting or 
influencing that ownership structure are not clear: families own 75% of listed companies, while 
government and individual founders own just 25% of listed companies (Al-Zuhair, 2008).  
Overall, support for Hypothesis 2, the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in high UA Cultures such as the Saudi, is found via the 
descriptive, and hypothesis tests as indicated and supported by the relevant literature. 
3) Power Distance (PDI): 
The dimension of Power Distance is a measure of accepting hierarchy or power distribution within a 
society (Griffin et al., 2014). Hence, in high Power Distance countries, when power is unequally 
distributed in such society, the less powerful will be more culturally driven to accept their existent 
reality of powerful people reaping the benefits of control (Hofstede, 1984).On the other hand, people 
from Low Power Distance countries tend to have more control over their dealings. Hence, authorities 
in these countries are culturally obliged to hear and accept their citizens’ opinions (Chan & Cheung, 
2012). 
Moreover, the implications of the Power Distance dimension on CG should be looked at in terms of 
protecting interests of all stakeholders.  For instance, individuals in high Power Distance countries are 
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“usually powerful and wealthy, and consider their own interests to be more important than those of 
other stakeholders” (Blodgett, Lu, Rose & Vitell, 2001). On the other hand, individuals from low 
Power Distance countries are more inclined to make decisions guaranteeing the fair treatment of all 
stakeholders since power is more equally distributed (Chan & Cheung, 2012).   As a result, those 
individuals in low Power Distance countries act in accordance with their beliefs and produce more 
ethically appropriate behaviours (Hofstede, 2005).  In fact, shareholders in Low Power Distance 
countries are culturally equipped to apply more pressure on corporations to improve accountability, 
openness, and ultimately governance (Sweeney, 2008). Therefore, “high power distance societies are 
less likely to protect minority shareholders and to justify their corporate actions through defining 
explicit corporate standards” (Griffin et al., 2014). 
In addition, people from cultures with a high level of Power Distance convey less trust in listed 
corporations’ owners and their appointments of managers. Therefore, in these high Power Distance 
cultures, listed corporations’ owners are less likely to develop “the separation of shareholding and 
management… corporate owners in countries where PD is high show greater desire to maintain 
personal control over a firm and ensure that it remains within their families” (Lubetsky, 2008). 
Based on previous studies, the following hypothesis is developed: 
Hypothesis 3: the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by 
the OECD principles of CG, is low in high PDI Cultures such as Saudi 
Using variables of basic shareholders rights composing the Minority shareholder protection Index 
constructed for this study, the Saudi shareholders scored 75 on the Power Distance dimension using 
the Mode, which makes the Saudi shareholders high on this dimension. This finding is confirmatory of 
Hofstede’s et al. (2010) score of 95 on the scale of Power Distance. Compared to Hofstede’s et al. 
(2010) score of 95 on Power Distance, there is not that much difference between Hofstede’s score and 
the score of this study: 80.1 using the Mean.  
Moreover, what can be inferred from the Power Distance score of this study is that the expected level 
of Minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia is low. In fact, Saudi managers’ perceptions of the 
OECD governance principles have previously been found not favourable to issues concerning 
shareholder rights, the treatment of shareholders, and financial disclosure (Robertson, Diyab, Al-
Kahtani, 2013). 
In addition, a further look at this dimension on the basis of shareholder types will be of a great 
significance in viewing the level of Power Distance based on an individual’s status, wealth and 
position as a shareholder. It will clearly show how Saudi shareholders accept hierarchical orders, and 
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their attitudes towards inequalities (Hofstede et al., 2010). Based on the descriptive statistics 
conducted, Saudi Minority shareholders scored higher on this dimension as compared to Majority and 
Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean and the Mode. The Mean of Minority shareholder on this 
Dimension was 82, Sophisticated 79.6 and Majority 74.2. The Mode of Minority was 80, Sophisticated 
69, and Majority 75.  
Even though there was a slight difference in the level of Power Distance found in each Saudi 
shareholder group using the scores derived from the descriptive statistics, the non-parametric test of 
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney show that Minority shareholders scored 95% and 82% higher on 
Power Distance compared to Majority.  This result implies the following: 
1- A low level of participation by minority shareholders in listed corporations’ in the activities 
they are entitled to by CG procedures, such as: participation in AGM, election and removal of 
members of the board, approval of remuneration policy and compensation schemes…etc.  
2- The inability of Minority shareholders due to their higher level of Power Distance compared to 
Majority, to challenge resolutions benefiting controlling shareholders. 
3- A low level of compliance by listed Saudi corporations with basic Minority shareholder rights 
prescribed in the OECD principles of CG.   
For example, in the qualitative section of the questionnaire, when Minority shareholders were 
asked to rate how their practical experiences related to their rights as prescribed by the OECD 
principles, and how many of these rights they had exercised, 5 out of 35 Minorities answered as 
follow: 
6- Form 52:  
B- Regarding the relation between the rights of shareholders and my experience: there is no such thing. 
7- Form: 48 
B- There are no rights you can rely on 
8- Form 45:  
B- No rights. None: even if any exist they are only nominal and serve an advertising purpose. 
9- Form 43:  
B- I don’t know about these rights 
10- Form 41: 
B-   There is no such relationship between shareholders rights and my experience as a shareholder by any 
measure. In fact, shareholders have none of these rights in reality. Therefore, these rights have to be 
activated appropriately, and have to be disclosed to all shareholders to figure out what’s happening 
around them. 
Moreover, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between Power Distance as a 
dimension and information awareness. Speculatively, an increase in the amount of information 
provided to Minority shareholders regarding their basic rights and how they can exercise them would 
decrease the gap between powerful stakeholders such as board members, Majority shareholders, 
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managers and Minority shareholders. Not only that, more information also improves the overall level 
of compliance with CG procedures by listed corporations as Minority shareholders would become a 
part of the process of monitoring their corporations. Hence, Minority shareholders can protect their 
investments through their appropriate participation, as prescribed by the OECD principles of CG, 
pertaining to their rights as Minority shareholders. This finding is consistent with the findings of 
Griffin et al. (2014) that “power distance is negatively and significantly associated with minority 
shareholder protection”. As a result, Minority shareholders in countries where Power Distance is high 
are less likely to assist in the process of improving CG compliance and challenging bad practises as 
compared to Minority shareholders in low Power Distance cultures. 
In addition, the high level of Power Distance of the Saudi shareholders also implies that there is no 
clear separation of management from ownership control. Hence, it is not surprising that families own 
75% of listed companies in Saudi Arabia, while government and individual founders own 25% of 
listed companies (Al-Zuhair, 2008). The logic behind such phenomena is best explained by Hammoud 
(2011), “the family remains the strongest and fundamental unit of social and business organization in 
the Arab World…Moreover, family members form family associations which organize activities and 
hold regular meetings to care for the affairs of the family and its members”. 
As a consequence, this unclear separation of management and ownership translates into a culturally 
specific kind of reporting. In the Saudi environment, information about powerful individuals is “more 
understandable, believable and appreciable by the society than information of policies, regulations or 
laws [regulating the financial statements]” (Al-Nodel & Hussainey, 2010). This helps to explain the 
high gratitude attached to powerful individuals by Saudi shareholders as highlighted by the Power 
Distance dimension, which is worthy of further investigations in the qualitative phase to investigate the 
factors, whether  legal or political, that shape this gratitude and make it relative to the success of 
shareholder investments on the economical level. 
Overall, support for Hypothesis 3, the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in high PDI Cultures such as the Saudi, is found via the 
descriptive, and hypothesis tests as indicated and supported by the relevant literature. 
4) Femininity (FEM)): 
Masculine (MAS) societies are found to have less ethical sensitivity (Blodgett et al., 2001). In fact, 
individuals in such societies are less likely to be affected by codes of ethics and are more concerned 
with their personal achievements and material wealth (Lu, Rose & Blodgett, 1999). By contrast, in a 
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culture that possesses a high level of Femininity individuals tend to act more compassionately and tend 
to have a strong ethical sensitivity (Hofstede, 2001; Nadler, 2002).  
Thus, feminine orientated cultures are more inclined to improve their CG than highly masculine ones 
on the basis of their care for others. Therefore, it is expected that “high masculine societies are less 
likely to protect minority shareholders” (Griffin et al., 2014). 
As a matter of fact, in the OECD principles of CG pertaining to Minority shareholders rights, key 
ownership functions and equitable treatment of shareholders are all written in terms of “feminine 
values of care and protection, to counter the masculine spirit of competition and pursuit of personal 
gains” (Chiper, 2010). Hence, aspects of caring for others construct the Femininity dimension.  “A 
feminine society is one where quality of life is the sign of success” (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Based on previous studies, the following hypothesis is developed: 
Hypothesis 4: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by 
the OECD principles of CG, is low in high MAS cultures such as the Saudi. 
Using variables of equitable treatment of shareholders’ rights composing the Minority shareholder 
protection index constructed for this study, the Saudi shareholders scored 48 on the Femininity 
dimension using the Mode. This low score is reflective of the high level of Masculinity of Saudi 
shareholders as also suggested by Hofstede’s et al. (2010) score of 60 on the Masculinity dimension. 
Moreover, it should also be noted that the reason this study is more focused on the level of Femininity 
of Saudi shareholders, as opposed to the level of Masculinity, is due to its direct corresponding effect 
on the quality of compliance with OECD principles of CG pertaining to Minority shareholder rights 
(see Appendix B10). 
Moreover, what can be inferred from the Femininity score of this study is that, the expected level of 
Minority shareholders protection is low in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the descriptive statistics of this 
study show that Minority shareholders scored higher on the Femininity dimension as compared to 
Majority and Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean and the Mode. The Mean of Minority 
shareholders on this dimension was 58.2, Sophisticated 53.3 and Majority 50.6. The Mode of Minority 
was 53, Sophisticated 53, and Majority 48. Moreover, the non-parametric tests of Kruskal-Wallis and 
Mann-Whitney show that Minority shareholders scored 90% and 74% higher on Femininity compared 
to Majority shareholders respectively. Hence, Saudi Majority shareholders are two times more 
masculine than Minority shareholders and are driven by competition, achievement and success.  
Therefore, their care for Minority shareholders and their rights as prescribed by the OECD principles 
may be expected to be minimal. In fact, this observation is signified by the Fisher Exact test, which 
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shows a significant relationship between Femininity and shareholder type. This is especially true when 
those Majority shareholders are in the position to run corporation on a day to day basis, control 
General Meeting agenda, and the amount of information attached to shares, as it is the case in Saudi 
Arabia.  
In addition, this result of a higher level of Masculinity among Majority shareholders also implies their 
low level of willingness to involve Minority shareholders in listed corporations’ activities, as they are 
entitled to by the OECD principles of CG. Moreover, as Majority shareholders are driven by their 
personal achievements, material wealth, and due to their less feminine nature, they will assist in the 
process of shaping corporate policies and procedures entitling them to exercise more control through 
their voting rights (Bebchuk, 1999). Hence, there is so much at stake for Majority shareholders to be in 
control as they can reap the private benefits of control (Bebchuk, 1999).  
Moreover, the implication of powerful Majority shareholders shaping CG policies and procedures in 
Saudi listed corporations to protect their sources of the ‘Private benefits of control’ was validated by 
the qualitative section of the questionnaire. When Minority shareholders were asked to rate how their 
practical experiences related to their equitable treatment rights, as prescribed by the OECD principles, 
3 out of 35 Minority shareholders answered as follow: 
1- Form: 48 
C- There is no such principle for equitable treatment 
2- Form 45:  
C- No equitable treatment 
3- Form 41: 
C- There is no equitable treatment unfortunately. 
 
Note: One Majority shareholder offered his insight on the issue of discrimination between shareholders in the 
qualitative section of the questionnaire as he sees it affecting the efficiency of the CG procedures: 
 
4-    Form 14: 
A- Getting the information on time aids a lot in preventing problems and obstacles disrupting investments. 
Hence, the level of information must be made available to all shareholders. There must not be any sort 
of discrimination between shareholders such as those investing in a small number of shares. Therefore, 
small shareholders must be given the voting and nominating rights because this will increase the degree 
of relationship between them and higher management. 
B- Transparency is very important especially in money-oriented dealings. Hence, holding onto information 
regarding money produces in-confidence. 
C- There must be equitable treatment between all shareholders in terms of transparency, getting the 
information regarding their investments even if their investments form a small percentage of the overall 
capital structure. In fact, discrimination between shareholders on getting information will weaken 
investments and productivities.  
 
Moreover, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between Femininity as a 
dimension and information awareness. Speculatively, the amount of information provided to Minority 
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shareholders regarding their basic voting rights and how they can exercise them decreases the private 
benefits of control enjoyed by Majority shareholders. Not only that, but it also improves the overall 
level of compliance with CG procedures as Minority shareholders become a part of the process of 
monitoring their corporations. As a result, the private benefits of control will be curbed if such exercise 
of OECD Principles of Minority shareholders is guaranteed.  
In addition, globalisation has aided in the creation of the OECD principles and compliance with its 
procedures is required of the profession by all member countries to produce better protection for 
Minority shareholders. Moreover, the media effect on public opinion is highly recommended as a 
mechanism of curbing private benefits of control, as it is capable of exposing inequitable corporate 
practices and inducing corporate managers to bow to social and environmental pressures (Dyck & 
Zingales, 2002, 2003).  
Interestingly, Religion and Femininity are found not to be significant in this study even though it was 
expected they would have some sort of correlation. The assumption was based on the observation that 
religions, including Islam, were expected to have some effect on ensuring equitable treatment of 
individuals. Nevertheless, this finding is confirmed by other studies which found no significant 
correlation between Religions and Masculinity in regard of investor protection and market 
development around the world (Matoussi & Jardak, 2012). 
Overall, support for Hypothesis 4, the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in high MAS cultures such as the Saudi, is found via the 
descriptive and hypothesis tests as indicated and supported by the relevant literature. 
5) Long Term Orientation (LTO):  
Long Term Orientation (LTO) is defined as the fostering of virtues of future rewards–in particular, 
perseverance and thrift (Hofstede, 2005). In contrast, the Short Term Orientation (STO) stands for the 
fostering of virtues related to the past and present–in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of 
face, and fulfilling social obligations (Bae, Chang & Kang, 2012). 
Hence, normative societies, who score low on LTO dimension, prefer to maintain time honoured 
traditions and norms while viewing societal changes with suspicions. Therefore, people in such 
societies have a strong concern with establishing the absolute truth. Hence, they are normative in their 
thinking: “they exhibit great respect for traditions, a relatively small propensity to save for the future, 
and a focus on achieving quick results” (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
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On the other hand, cultures scoring high on the LTO dimension take a more pragmatic approach: they 
encourage thrift and efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future (Hofstede et al., 
2010). 
“Past Orientation in the time and space outlook of Arabs shows the most as they reconsider their view of 
themselves in comparison with others in the face of current crises they face. Having stopped short in their march 
toward modernization, Arabs have been having difficulty coping with globalization and its associated rapid pace 
of change. The result has been one of an identity crisis intensified by a perception of being under attack from the 
West especially with regard to their religion. Accordingly, Arabs turn to their past where they find comfort in 
their ancestors’ glories and achievements” (Hammoud, 2011). 
 
This “trace back” effect has been documented in the qualitative section of the questionnaire. When 
Minority shareholders were asked whether or not they would require the blessing of a religious scholar 
to enforce their rights as shareholders prescribed in the OECD principles of CG, they answered as 
follow: 
1- Form: 48 
Yes, on the condition that this opinion comes from an independent religious committee with no relation 
to the government or listed corporations. 
2- Form 41: 
Yes, to avoid the forbidden and earn money in a permissible way by staying away from any suspicion. 
3- Form 57: 
Yes, permissibility and formidability. 
4- Form: 23 
Yes, because we are Muslims. Hence, before I take a step or deal financially: I need to know the     
religious decree and opinions of the religious scholars. 
5- Form 25: 
              Yes, to get a clarification regarding the permissibility of such rights or formidability. 
6- Form30: 
              Yes, to get the religious opinion regarding these corporations. 
7- Form 27: 
             Yes, to get the clarification and transparency from the religious decree regarding dealings with certain 
shares. 
8- Form18: 
            Yes, I need to know the religious opinion regarding these investments. 
9- Form 14: 
            Yes, I need the opinion of religious scholars because entering and participating in financial dealings may 
get into some usury. Hence, I must take preventive measures 
10- Form 1: 
         Yes, to make sure there are no Riba “Usury” dealings clashing with Islam 
 
Hence, based on the previous studies and the observations above: hypothesis 5 is developed 
Hypothesis 5: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by 
the OECD principles of CG, is low in low LTO cultures such as the Saudi. 
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Using variables of basic shareholders rights corresponding to future profit measures such as: obtaining 
relevant information on a regular basis, share in profits of corporations via dividends, 
acknowledgement of extraordinary transactions, knowledge of the financial and operating results of a 
company, and foreseeable risk factors composing the Minority shareholder’s protection Index 
constructed for this study, Saudi shareholders scored 32 on the LTO dimension using the Mode. 
Hence, this low score is indicative of the Short Term Orientation of Saudi shareholders and their 
normative thinking (Hofstede et al., 2010). In addition, this finding is confirmatory of Hofstede’s et al., 
(2010) score of 36 on LTO. There is not that much difference between Hofstede’s score and the score 
of this study using the Mode. 
Moreover, Minority shareholders scored higher on this dimension as compared to Majority and 
Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean and the Mode. The Mean of Minority shareholder on this 
Dimension was 30.7, Sophisticated 30.4 and Majority 27.2. The Mode of Minority was 32, 
Sophisticated 28, and Majority 27. Even though there was a slight difference in the level of LTO found 
in each Saudi shareholder group using the scores derived from the descriptive statistics, the non-
parametric test of Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney show that Saudi Minority shareholders scored 
129% and 93 % higher on the LTO as compared to Majority shareholders, respectively. Hence, the 
higher score of Minority on LTO implies their pragmatic approach towards their investments and 
represents their higher orientation towards future dividends and their higher willingness to wait longer 
for dividends as compared to other Saudi shareholder groups. In fact, this observation is shown highly 
significant by the Fisher Exact test as it indicates a significant relationship between LTO and Saudi 
shareholder type. 
Therefore, these results have concrete implications related to the level of dividends and their due time 
as distributed by listed Saudi corporations. Specifically, due to the low level of LTO of Saudi 
shareholders as a whole and higher level of LTO of Minority shareholders, implying their higher level 
of pragmatism towards their investments compared to other Saudi shareholder groups, Saudi 
corporations are culturally compelled to pay future rewards in the form of dividends to all shareholders 
on a regular basis regardless of Minority shareholders’ willingness to wait longer (Bae, Chang & Kang, 
2012). 
Moreover, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between LTO and information 
awareness. Speculatively, the amount of information provided to Minority shareholders regarding their 
basic financial rights contributing to their wealth maximisation influences the size and time of 
dividends distributed to them. 
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In addition, listed Saudi corporations were found to usually distribute 100% of their generated income 
as dividends (Osman & Mohammed, 2010). Also, the agency cost was found not a critical driver of the 
dividend policy due to the fact that Saudi listed corporations are highly leveraged via bank debt (Al-
Ajmi & Hussain, 2011). However, Zakat (an Islamic tax: 2.5 percent of a company’s unused assets in 
hand) is found to play a critically driving role in explaining dividends policies employed by Saudi 
listed corporations (Al-Ajmi & Hussain, 2011). 
In addition, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between LTO and Religion and 
LTO and Education. These correlations are significant as they indicate that education can reduce the 
effect of using religion as a point of reference and a source of information regarding the application of 
the CG principles prescribed in the OECD forum. For example, 73.5% of all respondents required a 
religious permit from religious scholars to call for the application of the OECD principles of CG 
pertaining to shareholders’ rights: 87.5% of Majority respondents required a blessing whereas 74.3% 
of Minority respondents required a blessing. Hence, the level of awareness regarding shareholders 
rights did not cause a decrease in the religious effect but rather the level of LTO as Minority 
shareholders’ scored higher on this dimension compared to other groups of Saudi shareholders. In 
addition, 91% of Minority shareholders, on average, were found to hold high qualification compared to 
87.5% of Majority, on average (see Appendix C3). 
Overall, support for Hypothesis 5, the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in low LTO cultures such as the Saudi, is found via the 
descriptive and hypothesis tests as indicated and supported by the relevant literature. 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
The questionnaire as a whole was capable of measuring the CVD of the Saudi shareholders based on 
the OECD principles of CG pertaining to Minority shareholders’ rights. Not only that, but the 
measurements, via the descriptive statistics, are in confirmation with Hofstede’s et al. (2010) findings: 
Table 5.12: CVD of Saudi Shareholders based on OECD Principles of CG 
 Individualism Power Distance Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Masculinity/ 
Femininity 
Long Term 
Orientation 
Hofstede 25 95 80 60 36 
This study 49 75 74 48 32 
Source: The Author 
Moreover, the non-parametric tests, Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney, revealed significant 
correlations between each of Hofstede’s et al. (2010) CV dimension across shareholder type and the 
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quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD principles, in Saudi 
Arabia.  
In addition, support for all research hypotheses was established. Moreover, the potential causations 
between Hofstede’s (1980-2010) CV dimensions and the level of Minority shareholder’s protection are 
also well grounded in the relevant literature, as detailed in the discussion section of this chapter. 
Therefore, undoubtedly, Hofstede’s (1980-2010) CV dimensions have the explanatory power to reveal 
differences in CG worldwide (Chan & Cheung, 2012). Hence, it is common to realise weak Minority 
shareholder protection and a low level of CG compliance in emerging markets such as Saudi Arabia’s 
characterised as high on Power Distance, Collectivism, Uncertainty Avoidance and low on Femininity 
(Rafiee & Sarabdeen, 2012).  
Moreover, the distribution of all CV dimension via the Mean rank of the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-
Whitney, except for Individualism via the Kruskal-Wallis hypothesis test, was found not to be the 
same when comparing the groups of Majority with Minority shareholders. Hence, significant 
correlations were found when comparing the CVD of Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Femininity, and Long Term Orientation between Majority and Minority shareholders. 
Hence, the significant correlations expose two different cultures pertaining to Majority and Minority 
shareholders in Saudi Arabia and the implications are detailed in the discussion of this chapter.  
In addition, the most commonly presented finding through the Fisher Exact test is how each CVD 
dimension except LTO correlates significantly with the level of information shareholders are aware of 
concerning their rights. The implications of these findings are consistent with the effect of 
globalisation and the media found in relevant literature in raising awareness.  In fact, globalisation 
aided in the creation of the OECD principles of 2004 and compliance with its procedures is required of 
the international accounting profession by all member countries. Moreover, not only is compliance 
with its procedures monitored by the OECD, the design of shareholder awareness programmes 
explaining their rights in emerging markets such as Saudi Arabia is requested by the OECD, as noted 
by Koldertsova’s (2011) OECD report. 
Overall, due to a number of discussions the quantitative phase could not effectively cover all issues 
raised by the research questions. Therefore, the qualitative phase, in the following chapter 6, is capable 
of adding new nuances to the interpretations and sophistication to the understandingof other factors 
influencing the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders' right in Saudi Arabia in light of 
culture. Hence, such qualitative findings will corroborate the quantitative findings and ultimately 
expose the depth of the issue being explored by this research via both research questions. In addition, 
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the relations between the qualitative findings and quantitative findings will be fully integrated in the 
conclusion chapter when applying the main research theory, New Institutional Sociology, to both 
findings to assess how organisations’ legitimise themselves by conforming to societal values while 
exposing how elites can define appropriate models of organisational structures and policies which then 
go unquestioned for years to come.  
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6. Chapter Six: Qualitative Research Analysis and Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
On the methodological level, this research engages in an ethno-methodology, which encompasses the 
sociological study of rules and rituals underlying ordinary social activities and interactions. 
Accordingly, two forms of inquiry and data gathering are employed, namely: questionnaires, as seen in 
the previous chapter; and semi-structured interviews, which will be discussed under this chapter to 
enrich and corroborate the outcomes of the understanding generated by the questionnaires.  
Hence, the primary objective in developing the interviews for this study was to adequately capture the 
in-depth information needed to answer the second research question, which is 'What other factors 
influence the level of compliance of listed Saudi Corporations with the OECD principles with respect 
to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights?’ Moreover, the semi-structured interviews are in full 
accordance with the interpretive paradigm of this study, as discussed earlier in chapter 4. Therefore, 
this phase of the research focuses on idea collection- to discover deep-rooted feelings and attitudes 
behind conceptual ideas concerning the legal and political factors influencing the exercise of minority 
shareholders' rights in Saudi Arabian in light of the culture. 
 Moreover, the qualitative findings will corroborate the quantitative findings, presented in chapter 5, in 
terms of shedding light on the legal and political factors influencing the level of compliance of listed 
Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ 
rights. In addition, such corroboration is capable of revealing new nuances of deeper social and cultural 
phenomena explored within this research and examined in part through the more formal analysis 
discussed in chapter 5. Therefore, the legal and political factors are further explored as justified and 
indicated by the relevant literature review conducted for the purpose of this research to provide a 
comprehensive account of CG practice in Saudi Arabia in relation to minority shareholders’ rights. 
Therefore, such corroboration will expose the depth of the issue being explored by this research via 
both research questions.  
This chapter will begin with the research design of the interviews, which is composed of three phases, 
namely: a developmental phase, an implementation phase, and an analysis phase. Then, the chapter 
will deal with the profiles and assessment of interviewees and the qualitative data analysis process. In 
succession, the qualitative analysis phase will report the analyses and discussions of both the legal and 
political factors influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations with the OECD 
principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. 
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complexity of the Saudi political and religious environments  tion, it should be noted that theIn addi
needs to be navigated with great care in the discussion of this thesis. Hence, the researcher is 
. ferences in viewsendeavouring to be a fair writer to the truth but recognises dif 
6.2 The Development Phase: Interview Design and Guide 
Figure 6.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
  
A. The Interview Strategy 
Semi-structured interviews were used as they are flexible in process and allow interviewees’ own 
perspectives to be explored in regard to other factors influencing the level of compliance of listed 
Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ 
rights (Bryman, 2012). Hence, this interview technique is capable of achieving the second objective of 
this study. 
B. Interview Design and Guide 
Saunders et al. (2011) argue that the quality of qualitative data to a large extent depends not only on the 
structure of interviews but also on the design of each individual question. According to Cornford and 
Smithson (2006) interviews should be kept to the topic at all times to avoid any potential deviation 
from the main issues to be explored. Hence, researchers need to carefully plan their questions and take 
control. Therefore, one way of doing so is by developing an interview guide in order to provide 
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guidance and to ensure consistency throughout an interview process. For the purpose of this research, 
an interview guide was developed with a flexible design taken into account (see Appendix B6). 
The flexible design of the interview guide was inspired by the advice of Hammersley and Atkinson 
(2007, p. 117): 
“Ethnographers do not usually decide beforehand the exact questions they want to ask, and do not ask each 
interviewee precisely the same questions, though they will usually enter the interviews with a list of issues to be 
covered. Nor do they seek to establish a fixed sequence in which relevant topics are covered; they adopt a more 
flexible approach, allowing the discussion to flow in a way that seems natural”.  
 
Therefore, the researcher opted to use an open-ended question technique in the form of a semi-
structured interview. Hence, his intentions are not to use directional prompting or even to ask all 
questions at every interview, but rather to cover the subject matter of the topic during the course of the 
interviews. 
As a result, the interview guide consisted of an introduction, main questions, emphasis, and clarifying 
questions (see Appendix B6). In addition, the main questions sought to explore what the other factors 
influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect 
to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights are. Moreover, in order to obtain more information on 
perceptions and views of these factors, clarifying questions were developed in the form of asking 
interviewees to give examples to expand more on any issue of interest to elicit the maximum amount of 
information. In addition to that, the emphasis section in the interview guide was composed of 
significant elements taken from the relevant literature and included in the guide to ensure consistency 
in covering important elements of the main questions. Moreover, the inclusion of such emphasis added 
a calculated flexibility to the interviews, providing the researcher with significant sub-topics that the 
interviewee might find intriguing. In addition, having this flexibility aided in avoiding asking too many 
questions, and consistently ensured that interviewees were put at ease as those sub-topics could be 
gently inserted into the conversations.  
Moreover, the interview guide was initially designed in English. Then, it was translated from English 
to Arabic by the researcher. A final translation to English was done when reporting and transcribing 
each interview right after its occurrence: initially by the researcher and further checked by a certified 
translator, Ahmed Al-Harbi. As advised by Saunders et al. (2007) “to create a full record of the 
interview soon after its occurrence [is] one means to control bias and to produce reliable data analysis”. 
Moreover, transcribing was done to capture only spoken words (Davidson, 2009). In addition, all 
interviews were conducted in Arabic as it is the business language in Saudi Arabia. 
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Also, it is worth noting that the interview constructs, extracted from the relevant literature (see 
Appendices B2 &B3) are well grounded in theory and purpose. However, these constructs have limited 
applicability on the quantitative level in an emerging economy such as Saudi Arabia’s due to its fragile 
institutional infrastructure, about which credible quantitative data are difficult to obtain. Hence, these 
constructs were used qualitatively to investigate the other factors influencing the level of compliance of 
listed Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights’: taking into account the legal and political mediums affecting the nature of 
compliance as justified and indicated by the relevant literature.  
6.3 The Implementation Phase: Sampling and Conducting of Interviews 
Figure 6.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
 
A. Sampling of Respondents for the Qualitative Phase 
As the interviews are meant to reveal in-depth information regarding the legal and political factors 
influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect 
to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights, a careful consideration of the population sample had 
to be exercised. Therefore, with regard to the selection of particular participants based on their areas of 
expertise pertaining to the legal and political factors influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi 
corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights, 
a snowballing technique was deemed appropriate to identify a hidden population. 
“Snowballing is a non-probability sampling technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from 
among their acquaintances. Thus the sample group appears to grow like a rolling snowball. As the sample builds 
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up, enough data is gathered to be useful for research. This sampling technique is often used in hidden populations 
which are difficult for researchers to access” (Goodman, 1961). 
 
In addition, Morgan (2008) in relation to snowballing mentions the following stepwise approach:  
1. Draft up a participation’s programme (likely to be subject to change, but indicative). 
2. Approach stakeholders and ask for contacts. 
3. Gain contacts and ask them to participate. 
4. Community issues groups may emerge that can be included in the participation programme. 
5. Continue the snowballing with contacts to gain more stakeholders if necessary. 
6. Ensure a diversity of contacts by widening the profile of persons involved in the snowballing 
exercise. 
However, a better way of describing the process, giving focus and purpose, is through ‘funnelling’ 
where by the total domain of knowledge processed by the relevant population is filtered through a 
series of criteria which lead to the selection of the targeted participants in the qualitative phase. These 
participants are the ones judged, through the filtering process, to offer the highest quality of knowledge 
and understanding of the problem domain. 
 
Figure 6.3: The Funnelling Technique of Snowball Sampling. 
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Therefore, the ‘funnelling approach’ was adopted initially by the researcher and then followed by the 
snowballing technical steps recommended by Morgan (2008) to draft up targeted segments. By doing 
so, the advantage of using the snowballing technique is that identifying and locating a hidden 
population of experts in a specific field will be gained (Morgan, 2008). As a result, a draft up of 
targeted segments was developed based on the legal and political expertise required to answer the 
second research question, regarding the political and legal factors influencing the level of compliance 
of listed Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights. Below is the list of these targeted segments: 
Table 6.1: Drafted Segments for Interviews 
No Drafted Segment Approach Result 
1 Well-experienced lawyers in the area of 
corporate law 
Via social network 5 lawyers identified: 
2 participated 
2 Well-experienced CPAs in the area of corporate 
governance and investor rights 
Called and emailed all big 
four Audit companies in 
Saudi Arabia (See 
AppendixD4) 
A few participants 
promised but did not 
participate 
3 Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA) 
Emailed (See Appendix D4) No response 
4 Saudi Capital Market Authority (SCMA), Saudi 
Ministry of Finance: both responsible for 
regulating the Saudi Arabian capital markets 
(Tadawal). Their responsibilities include setting 
CG rules and monitoring Saudi corporations’ 
compliance 
Called, emailed, and there 
was no response. 
Researcher travelled to 
Riyadh to meet with one of 
the senior officials of 
Corporate Regulations (See 
Appendix D4) 
1 participant 
identified: However, 
refused for an 
interview to be 
recorded. Hence, his 
opinions were 
carefully 
generalized and no 
direct quotation was 
reported or given. 
5 Current and ex-Legislators 
 
Identified via social 
network 
2 identified: 1 ex-
legislator 
participated 
 Hofstede  Email with replies (See 
Appendix D3) 
Results reported in 
Chapter 5 
Source: The Author (See Appendices D3 & D4) 
6.3.1 Disadvantages of Using Snowballing: 
1. Community Bias:  
“The first participants will have strong impact on the sample. Snowball sampling is inexact, and can produce 
varied and inaccurate results. The method is heavily reliant on the skill of the individual conducting the 
actual sampling, and that individual’s ability to vertically network and find an appropriate sample. To be 
Chapter Six: Qualitative Research Analysis and Discussion   P a g e  | 175 
 
 
 
successful requires previous contacts within the target areas, and the ability to keep the information flow 
going throughout the target group” (Morgan, 2008). 
 
Resolution: the researcher had already established previous contacts with targeted segments while 
conducting the preliminary questionnaire analysis. In addition, due to the difficulty of establishing a 
sampling frame for the snowball population in the qualitative phase, the literature review conducted by 
the researcher along with his proposed model enormously aided in identifying the areas where potential 
experts might be located to conduct the interviews. Therefore, vertical network logic was utilised; 
hence, the risk of bias of recruiting a friend was reduced, no such friend was interviewed. In addition, 
the risk imposed by the first participant was resolved by adhering to Morgan’s (2008) recommendation 
that “the success of this technique depends greatly on the initial contacts and connections made. Thus it 
is important to correlate with those that are popular and honorable to create more opportunities to 
grow, but also to create a credible and dependable reputation”. Therefore, the first participant was one 
of the most reputable lawyers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Hence, further referrals were made, but only 
after careful consideration by the researcher, were they accepted. 
2. Not Random:  
“Snowball sampling contradicts many of the assumptions supporting conventional notions of random 
selection and representativeness. However, social systems are beyond researcher’s ability to recruit 
randomly. Snowball sampling is inevitable in social systems” (Atkinson & Flint, 2004). 
 
Resolution: as the snowball sampling is selected for the qualitative idea/data collection phase, its 
representativeness is strengthened by the researcher’s proposed model, which was built in accordance 
with the relevant literature available in the area of CG. Hence, selection of participants is well 
grounded in the relevant literature based on their areas of expertise. For example, legal studies focusing 
on CG such as La porta et al. (1997, 1998 and 2006) and Djankov et al. (2008) considered lawyers at 
law offices as targeted segments. Hence, the researcher opted for interviewing experienced lawyers for 
the legal section of the interviews. 
In addition, the constructs for the qualitative phase of this research were quantitatively driven from the 
literature. Therefore, they provide well-cemented criteria upon which potential participants’ 
contributions can be evaluated and assessed; resulting in either the continuation or dismissal of 
participants in this phase of the idea/data collection. Hence, the non-randomness of the technique did 
not jeopardise the results. In addition, the researcher’s criteria, driven by the relevant literature, assisted 
in increasing the level of randomness in selection. 
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3. Vague Overall Sampling Size:
 
“There is no way to know the total size of the overall population” (Morgan, 2008). 
Resolution: there was no need to know the total size of the overall population as the qualitative phase 
of the study was intended to reveal in-depth information regarding the subject matter. Hence, the 
quality of the information was not assessed on the quantity of participants but rather on the quality of 
information provided by participants. Moreover, such quality can be measured via assessing 
participants’ data against the norms of the relevant literature for the validity and reliability of 
interviewees' feedback.  
In addition, the researcher decided to use a judgmental sampling strategy which was deemed 
appropriate for this phase of the study since this phase was exploratory in nature. The intention of the 
researcher was to explore perceptions and views of the legal and political experts on the factors 
pertaining to their areas of expertise influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations 
with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights.  
In addition, the outcome of this phase of the research pertaining to the second research question was 
not to generalise the results to a wider population but rather to provide depth of insight into the subject 
matter. As for the size of the sample, in judgmental sampling, the researcher uses his/her judgment to 
decide when enough participants have been selected. As suggested by Kvale (1996), new interviews 
might be conducted until a point of saturation, where further interviews yield little new knowledge. In 
fact, after the first three interviews, it became obvious to the researcher that a point of saturation had 
been reached due to the level of repetition within the ideas/data collected from the three different 
participants. 
4. Incorrect Anchoring:  
“Another disadvantage of snowball sampling is the lack of definite knowledge as to whether or not the 
sample is an accurate reading of the target population. By targeting only a few select people, it is not always 
indicative of the actual trends within the result group” (Morgan, 2008). 
 
Resolution: the multi-dimensional literature review conducted by the researcher along with its 
quantitatively driven constructs in the CG literature provided the researcher with sufficient knowledge 
regarding areas of expertise needed and targeted segments required to qualitatively answer the second 
research question. Therefore, the research was deemed competent with regard to the framework and 
knowledge needed for this phase of the study.  
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6.4 Trustworthiness of the qualitative results 
Trustworthiness is a measure of the qualitative research's quality and the concept is closely associated 
with the terms validity and reliability in quantitative research (Marshall & Rossman, 2014).  
1. Credibility  
In qualitative research, the term Credibility is associated with the focus of such research and is closely 
related to the level of confidence in regard to how well the data and the analyses processes address the 
intended focus (Polit & Hungler, 1999). 
Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to measure the level of credibility in qualitative research. 
Arguably, there is not a single reality to be discovered as each participant constructs a personal reality 
of his or her own (Smith & Ragan, 2005). However, one method to increase the Credibility of 
qualitative research is via the inclusion of an external member checking into the findings (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985) 
Therefore, the qualitative findings aimed at answering the second research questions were member-
checked by two academic colleagues, from the University of Hail (the researcher's employer) along 
with the researcher’s academic supervisors at the University of Gloucestershire, to gain further 
feedback on the findings. 
2. Transferability  
In qualitative research, the concept of Transferability, comparable to the concept of validity in 
quantitative research in terms of the generalisation of findings, indicates the extent to which such 
qualitative findings can be transferred to other settings (Polit & Hungler, 1999). 
Hence, as advised by Seale (1999), Transferability in qualitative research is achieved by providing a 
detailed description of settings explored to provide readers with sufficient information. This 
undertaking enables readers to assess their judgments about the applicability of qualitative findings to 
other settings they can relate to, as Transferability is primarily a matter of readers' judgment of 
phenomena explored in their context (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003). 
Therefore, a thick description of the qualitative findings of this research is provided to allow readers to 
assess qualitative findings and judge their Transferability. In addition, qualitative constructs, legal and 
political factors, signified by the relevant literature (see Appendices B2 & B3) are further discussed 
under each qualitative finding.  
 
 
Chapter Six: Qualitative Research Analysis and Discussion   P a g e  | 178 
 
 
 
3. Dependability  
Dependability refers to the extent to which such qualitative findings can be replicated (Merriam, 1998). 
Hence, it entails a judgement of whether, if a similar study were to be repeated in the same context, 
using the same participants and applying the same methods, similar results would be obtained.  
Therefore, one way of ensuring Dependability is through the process of auditing a researcher’s 
documentation of data, methods, and decisions made (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Hence, the researcher is 
responsible for ensuring that the qualitative process is logical, traceable and properly documented 
(Schwandt, 2007). 
In this research, Dependability is achieved by providing an in-depth coverage of the processes of the 
qualitative phase as detailed in chapters 4 and 6, along with their designated appendices, B & D.  
4. Confirmability 
Confirmability is concerned with establishing that interpretations of findings are derived from the data 
(Tobin & Begley, 2004). As under the Dependability concept, the audit trail is one way to ensure 
Confirmability of interpretations from such data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Hence, an audit trail is provided via a transparent description of the qualitative phase of this research: 
covering the design phase, the development phase, the implementation phase and the reporting phase, 
as detailed in chapters 4 and 6 along with their designated appendices, B & D. In addition, 
interpretations of data findings are supported by the relevant literature throughout the qualitative 
discussion section in Chapter 6. 
5. Ethical Issues  
Research ethics refer to the appropriateness of researchers’ behaviour in relation to the rights of those 
who become the subject of research and are affected by such work (Saunders et al., 2007). Hence, in 
this research, the following ethical considerations were carefully considered in order to minimise any 
identified risks: consent, confidentiality, debriefing, protection of participants, and withdrawal from 
participation.  
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6.5 The Qualitative Analysis Phase: 
Figure 6.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
 
A. Profile of Participants of the Qualitative phase: 
Table 6.2: Profile of Participants 
Date of interviews    Characteristics  Participants   
 Education  Age Gender Representations  Profession  
Participants 
07/09/2014 PhD  47 Male Law Practise Lawyer 1  Participant 1 
(Enint 1) 
30/09/2014 Master  55 Male House of 
Consultancy 
Ex-Legislator Participant 2 
(Enint 2) 
26/08/2014 Master 63 Male Law Practice Lawyer 2 Participant 3 
(Enint 3) 
Source: The Author 
 
Most importantly, it should be noted that the complexity of the Saudi legal, political and religious 
environments needed to be navigated with great care in the discussion of this thesis. Hence, the 
researcher was endeavouring to be a fair writer to the truth but recognises differences in views when 
interpreting the data. Therefore, the following techniques were considered to analyse the reported 
outcome 
 A content analysis involving the identification of keywords, paragraphs, and themes.   
 A relational analysis involving the identification of concepts and exploration of relationships 
between concepts. 
 Coding and themes were pre-constructed via the literature review. Hence, there was no need to 
use such qualitative software or a manual technique to establish them. Nevertheless, a few 
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 All key quotes from all interviews were summarized on a single form for ease of 
comprehension, reporting, and transferability (see Appendix D2). 
 
In addition, as mentioned in the sampling section, the qualitative phase of this study is meant to reveal 
in-depth information regarding the subject matter. Hence, the quality of the information is not assessed 
on the quantity of participants but rather on the quality of information provided by participants. 
Moreover, such quality can be measured via assessing interviewees’ data against the norms of the 
relevant literature for validity and reliability of interviewees' feedback. Hence, the outcome of this 
phase of the research pertaining to the second research question is not to generalise the results to a 
wider population but rather to provide an insight depth of the subject matter. 
Moreover, the interview guide was initially designed in English. Then, it was translated from English 
to Arabic by the researcher. Hence, all interviews were conducted in Arabic, as it is the business 
language in Saudi Arabia and to allow participants to respond to the interview questions in the 
language that they are most comfortable with. A final translation to English was done when reporting 
and transcribing each interview right after its occurrence: initially by the researcher and further 
checked by a certified translator, Ahmed Al-Harbi to ensure that the meaning of each answer is as 
consistent as possible with the Arabic version. Hence, the researcher is initially providing translation 
validity at the potential expense of literal accuracy, which was taken into account after the initial 
translation by the researcher through the certified translator to ensure meanings of translated materials 
are as consistent as possible with the Arabic version.  
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6.6 Analysis and Discussion 
6.6.1 1. Legal Factors 
A. Assessing the Legal Environment 
1) The effect of the legal environment in Saudi Arabia on CG compliance can be 
evaluated through the existence of specialised courts, legal rules and level of law 
enforcement.   
Regarding the specialised courts, all participants agreed that specialised courts were 
practically non-existent in Saudi Arabia: 
En 2:"I am not aware of such specialised courts as of yet - There is not a worthy court capable of 
protecting any one". En3: "I personally view these courts are not specialised even if you title them 
specialised courts: because the people occupying the seats within are not specialised." En3 was 
hinting at the incompetence of judges: a view which was confirmed by En1 who held a slightly 
different view regarding courts' specialties while providing some insights, En 1:"No, there are 
specialised courts, but the personnel in them are incompetent. We are also talking about the personnel, 
who are responsible for executing the laws of CG at CMA, are unspecialised personnel." 
The reason behind the incompetence was explained by En1 thus:"the qualifications of these judges, we 
have, are not properly suitable with the nature of the specialised commercial law suits. Judges are 
Islamic Principles graduates and that is a must, and is a legal requirement to practice law. However, 
someone who studies historically traditional books; Amlogney, Almatlob, Almorbiah, I wonder how he 
can judge cases he does not understand? This is what is causing the delay and stretching of all 
commercial lawsuits in the commercial courts ". The same issues were touched on by the other lawyer: 
En 3:"the subject of always referring to Islamic scripts and Quran-ic verses needs to be stopped". 
In addition, the state of CG enforcements was explained by En 3 as “the laws [of CG] exist but the 
dilemma is in the execution. Perhaps, the dilemma we have in execution might be due to not having a 
proper ‘judgment authority’’’. The same view was held by the ex-legislator regarding the state of CG 
enforcements, En 2: "It suffers from lacking not in legislating new laws but in executing them". Hence, 
these laws pertaining to the rights of minority shareholders as described by the ex-legislator, En2:"are 
draining people and oppressing them. There is no discipline [in enforcing the law] and you cannot 
redeem your rights anywhere". 
The same tone and word choice“oppressive" was used by one of the lawyers, En3, when he explained 
how minority shareholders’ rights have not been made clear to them, or how the CG laws are judged 
on the scale of maintenance contracts. En3: "No, the public is not aware of them. They are measured on 
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the scale of 'maintenance contracts', maintenance contracts are oppressive….a shareholder has not 
bought a defective product; he bought something managed by you. How come when you miss-manage 
it, and you hold him responsible!” He further explained, En3:"Unfortunately, the rights of the small 
shareholders, not the big ones, are not beneficial. Hence, their risks are bigger than the big 
shareholders’ risks due to the lack of significance given to them by the environment".  
As a consequence, all participants viewed the legal environment with its legal rules, law enforcement 
and specialised courts as, in the words of En2: "Suffers from disability and needs to be modernised" as 
put by the ex-legislator. The well-experienced lawyer, En1, offered an insight regarding this disability 
suffered by the legal environment that will be expanded on in the next section; En1:"we borrow laws 
that don’t suit the size of the work we have, nature of society or nature of businesses we have, 
unfortunately". 
2) The effect of corporate law and company law in terms of their origin and modifications 
by interested parties: 
 
The participants offered the following insights on this topic: En1:"The origin of the law here in Saudi 
Arabia was a 'Copy and Paste’ from Egypt in the 1960’s. We have gone through so many phases of 
'copying and pasting laws’”. The same opinion was provided by the other lawyer regarding importing 
laws from Egypt, En3:"originally". Hence, when the law was imported from Egypt, En 1: "We 
imported experts from Egypt…They brought their laws as are, they just changed the title from the 
United Republic of Egypt to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." 
Moreover, regarding the modification of these laws by interested parties, the ex-legislator offered these 
views, En2: "the interest groups are the powerful and the biggest and closest to the decision makers. 
Laws in Saudi Arabia are not legislated. Powerful people in the country are the ones who have an 
opinion”. This view is substantiated by one of the lawyers when he explained how, En3:"the origin of 
the law has not been modified in an educated or planned manner". 
3) The effect of distribution of power within the law-either allowing top management to 
take control or major shareholders and its consequential effect on the nature of listed 
Saudi companies’ compliance with CG laws. 
 
The ex-legislator explained, En2: "The major shareholders. I think, they are the most powerful. Hence, 
CEOs are executing whatever comes from the top." This view was also well documented by the 
personal experience of one of the lawyers when he said, En1:" I have seen this with my own eyes in 
one of the corporations which I am a lawyer of. There is someone who owns 17 % in this listed 
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company and this guy has an influence on the running of the everyday aspect of the company…you as 
a [small] shareholder have no role". 
This insight was also supported by the second lawyer, En3:"CEOs treat majority holders as royals 
when they 'are not'”. Therefore, he offered a practical resolution for this issue, En3:"First you need to 
appoint unions and associations. Each union and watchdog represents a segment of society like it is in 
England: they have labor unions, union of politicians, merchants, CEOs…etc. Thus, you can select 
some of them to choose the laws that suit them and you give it to the government to impose these laws". 
4) The effect of institutional investors using their legal empowerment to influence 
management to increase their share values in the short run- on the nature of listed 
Saudi companies’ compliance with CG laws pertaining to minority shareholders’ 
rights? 
 
One of the participants agreed there was an influence on management: En3:"Yes. [This effect] exists, to 
a degree, 10 years ago that degree was 90 percent, but now people have learned….It is not 
economically normal or possible for the Share Market’s points to increase from 6,000 to 21,000 over a 
week… Look this effect… is not healthy”.  He then listed some of the reasons why this effect was 
apparent: En3:"There is a problem in legislating, executions, unions available, and promotion of the 
capital market. For those who have certain advantages it became clear that their advantages were 
personal gains not commercial ones". 
The other experienced lawyer substantiated the previous participant's data that the size of this effect 
was due to not having proper legal measures in place. He stated: En1:" institutional investors… They 
get in with billion and billons... See, those people are well experienced in bidding and they play 
without being caught…You can't make them behave unless you legislate and execute". 
5) The effect of the nature of legislation of either the market supporting focus or policy 
implementing focus on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance with CG laws 
This question was not answered in accordance with the literature by all participants. However, 
evidence provided in this regard is indicative of the nature of legislation in Saudi Arabia. 
 Firstly, it seems as if no care was exercised in the legislation, as explained by the experienced 
lawyer, En1:" why, you are changing the head of the Capital Market but the bidders are the 
same. Do you understand...the life cycle of the 'Copy and Paste’ effect here?  We wait for 
someone to make them [referring to Capital Markets’ laws] then we come, copy them and 
shorten them as well. We shorten them in a shameful way. And, in the end, we never execute 
them”. 
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 Secondly, importing laws was based on a political need not a market demand, as explained by 
the experienced lawyer, En1:" So the problem we have is not because it is a common law or 
civil law system we have, but rather we still don’t know how to start. When we first started we 
did not start within [internally], we imported from overseas. Just like we imported cars, 
labour, and teachers. We imported laws as well. It is a part of our love of importing. Seriously, 
even when we imported, we did not figure out whatever suits us". 
A great example of the cumulative effect of the imported laws in Saudi Arabia is: 
En1:"For instance, the Saudi Marine law was written by the Greeks… When World War II finished, 
Aristotle Onassis…bought the depreciated American ships from the American Navy, and turned them 
into commercial ships. ..He came and met King Saud, and you know the approach of the Saudi Kings 
back then. They just want to improve the country in whichever way. So, he [Aristotle Onassis] told him 
[King Saud], ' what do you think of me establishing a Saudi Merchant-Shipping company and 
establishing a Saudi Naval college, graduating ship labourers? On the top of that I transport oil from 
the east to the west coast of Saudi Arabia for free! Not to mention, these ships will raise the Saudi flag 
and I will pay royalties to you!'  So, the king said, ' that's fine'. However, he [Aristotle Onassis] said, 
'on one request, you give me a priority right to transfer the Saudi oil of ARAMCO ' [the main oil 
production company in Saudi Arabia]….  The king said, ' ok'. Then, a royal decree was issued to 
establish this company, SATCO [Saudi Arabia Tanker Company, established by Aristotle 
Onassis]…part of the agreement was that SATCO would set up the Saudi Marine Law.  And, he 
[Aristotle Onassis] said, ' I will bring the lawyers to set it up'. He brought two Greek lawyers, and laid 
down the Saudi Marine law. And, it was a 'Copy and Paste' of the Greeks' Marine Law.  At the end, we 
come back to the nature of our culture" . 
Thirdly, evidence suggests that execution of existing laws has been for the benefit of powerful 
individuals, as illustrated by the other lawyer, En3:"They execute these legislations for the powerful. 
Actually, when the individual is powerful and well integrated into the system, then, these laws will be 
brought up and be executed against their opponents”. 
Cumulatively, all of the previous insights show support that the nature of legislation in Saudi Arabia 
regarding CG law leans towards a policy focus nature. Hence, the nature of the Saudi legislation has a 
civil law tendency guided by precondition-strong mandatory rules as exposed by the ex-legislator, 
En2:"the power to legislate is in the hands of the powerful". This statement is worthy of further 
investigation under the political section of this qualitative analyses when dealing with the effect of the 
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possible existence of constant reinforcements between the Saudi government and controlling families 
on the nature of CG compliance. 
B. Assessment of the Strength of Minority Legal Protection 
 
1) The effect of the existing minority shareholder legal protection put in place in Saudi 
Arabia on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance with CG laws 
 
Regarding the existing minority shareholders’ legal protection put in place in Saudi Arabia, 
participants’ comments were as follow: En3: "It is just a picture [referring to the roles of SCMA’s 
legal procedures protecting minority shareholders]. En2:"There is none. Now, they have just started; 
hence, these rules are still nominal". Then, the ex-legislator provided some cultural insights behind 
this nominal phenomenon: En2: “There is a case here in Saud Arabia. They legislate nominal laws 
and they keep them in the drawers. They never work or activate them. Perhaps, it is there to claim we 
have these laws!" 
In addition, the level of extensive disclosure required of listed Saudi corporations was not touched on 
by any of the participants. 
2) The effect of the quality of law enforcements regarding the means of redress provided 
to minorities on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance with CG laws. 
 
All three participants agreed that there was no quality of law enforcement: En3: "Yes, there is no 
quality. If there was quality, there would have been some consistency in applying and executing the 
law…again I am going to refer to our previous point. For those who are powerful the law will be 
applied, and for the weak they should just bear!" En2: "They might exist [referring to the laws 
protecting minority’s rights] but in reality they have no existence. Laws are not reflective in legislation 
even though legislators are doubtful people. However, the laws are reflective in execution and these 
laws are not executed here. These laws will only be taken out of the cabinet if you have a powerful 
individual to look after you." 
In addition, the third participant made a gesture that the existing low quality of law enforcements in the 
CG arena in Saudi Arabia is no different than in any other area. En1: "I say, the execution of the CG 
legislation is the same as the execution of any other law.  Just like the traffic system …etc."  Hence, the 
level of compliance with laws and their enforcement is a big issue in all aspect of regulations in Saudi 
Arabia as hinted by the well-experienced lawyer. 
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Moreover, regarding ease of litigation, low burden of proof, and specialty of court: a great example 
was given by one of the participants: 
En3:"I know of a lawyer who handled a financial matter against a bank and he approached the Saudi 
Monetary Agency…So, they replied 'it is not our specialty'. Then, he approached the SCMA and they 
replied, ‘it is not our specialty”. Then, he approached the court of Grievance and they replied, it is not 
our specialty'. Then, he wrote to the king: then, the king…commanded an appointment of a committee 
designating the specialty of the case.  This committee was great but it stopped in a place -What 
happened?  This majority shareholder [involved in the case] gave an order to sell his various shares 
via his bank but that command was not executed by the bank for a whole week which caused him to 
lose more money. This is the case in short! Why did the bank not execute the order? Why did it delay 
the order? The delay by the bank caused that investor to go bankrupt...The majority shareholder gave 
an order to sell. The bank, according to its regulations and laws imposed by the Saudi Monetary 
Agency, should have executed such a transaction on the same day. Why did the bank delay him for a 
week?... Unfortunately, banks do not treat all of their clients the same. So, who should hold them 
responsible?  When the king asked for that committee to decide the specialty of the government 
organisation that was responsible to look into this case, he commanded the committee to be formed for 
this case only! But, due to some attempts, he kept the committee. Then, this committee did not study or 
figure out how to filter similar cases so that these [potential cases] can be rightly filed to the 
specialised organisation. Nor has this committee legislated how similar cases should be treated and by 
which governmental organisation!" 
C. Assessment of Stock Market Development 
 
1) The effect of the existing Saudi CG laws regulating the problem of Selfdealing on the 
nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance with CG laws pertaining to minority 
shareholders’ rights. 
 
All participants agreed that the problem of insider dealing was a big one and very common in Saudi 
Arabia. In addition, they all agreed that the appropriate preventive measures had not been put in place 
to deteriorate the widespread practice of insider dealings. En1:"Insider dealing is a big issue here.  
[For example] When it comes to a company that is about to pay out dividends, the people within will 
tell their friends that this company is going to pay dividends. Hence, before the announcement is made, 
the share price will go up…Our problem with the insider dealing is very big. And, you're telling me 
you could wipe it out at once; you can't unless insider dealing is considered a crime! … Then, minority 
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shareholders will be protected from the price fluctuations caused by the betrayal of loyalties within 
that specific listed corporation."  
Moreover, the same participant expressed frustration regarding the level of fines imposed by SCMA, 
En1: “financial fines are equivalent to 20,000 or 40, 000 SR. These are small un-detrimental 
fines…See, our problem is with the insider dealing. The disclosure exists, but the insider dealing is the 
problem. And, second is the culture of the minority shareholders!” In addition, the other lawyer 
supported the insights of the previous participant regarding insider dealing, En3: "unfortunately it 
exists and is very common. And, it is an evidence of owners’ ignorance in running their listed 
corporations. Unfortunately, these owners don’t possess high qualifications”. The same participant, 
then, provided further insights regarding the nature of disclosure provided by those listed corporations 
with regard to the concept of on-going disclosure of self-dealings. He illustrated this point thus: 
En3:"Unfortunately, some people in the Ministry of Finance allow those individuals to present their 
[diluted] financial statements. Not only that, but also the public organisations with professional 
licenses in legal accountancy [referring to the Saudi Authority of Certified public Accountants and the 
Big Four accounting firms] are not serving the profession in good faith.  They are not monitored and 
their punishments are not even imposed properly. They even produce fake financial statements. Ask me 
personally, because I did that myself for my clients. Yes, to serve a financial purpose of theirs. Why 
should I do so?  It is because if I don’t do as they say ' THERE MIGHT BE A CONFLICT OF 
OPINIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS'… Look, unfortunately, you cannot provide evidence against them 
in this regard. You can't because they deal with you [regarding this topic] through their employees and 
representatives. And, they always blame that employee for not being honest!" 
In addition, the ex-legislator viewed the insider-dealing problem as being partially caused by the 
Minister of Finance’s appointment. He explains, En2:"He is one of those guys with political power or a 
companion of them who tries to please them. [Therefore,] minorities only have to wait for the orders to 
come from the top to tag along with whatever benefits majority shareholders". 
D. Convergence through Congruence 
 
1) The effect of expedited privatisation on the level of minority shareholder protection 
and adequate disclosure in Saudi Arabia, and its overall effect on the nature of listed 
Saudi companies’ compliance with CG laws. 
 
Participants had mixed points of view regarding the expedited privatisation that took place in Saudi 
Arabia. One lawyer saw it as having a positive effect, En3:" It is true the privatisation has been done 
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fast. But it came with something positive on the capital market; it created liquidity and availability of 
shares. Before, there was none”. Nevertheless, the ex-legislator views were that expedited 
privatisation was negative, he explained, En2:"privatisation in corrupt countries is a gift to the 
institutions of the corrupted class. Its effect [in Saudi Arabia] has been very negative I believe. At the 
end, it was a gift, to whom did [these institutions] go?”The ex-legislator further illustrated how this 
issue affected minority shareholders’ rights, En2:"Privatisation has been done via the people’s money. 
True, people have bought [shares] voluntarily in some corporations, but they cannot ask about 
anything regarding their shares.  They don’t have a representative either. We are a group of people 
with no community or union to represent us. When your voice is singular, you have no worth". 
Moreover, regarding adequate disclosure, a cultural problem in reviewing the appropriate financial 
statements by minority was highlighted by the experienced lawyer. He explained: En1:"even those 
organisations before they were privatised, they were disclosing their financial statements. So, the 
information was there, but minority shareholders don’t know how to acquire the right information. 
Even if financial statements fall onto their hands, they are not able to read them". 
2) The potential existence of interest groups, other than controlling families and 
institutional investors, may affect the CG level of convergence with international CG 
standards regarding minority shareholders’ rights and ultimately the nature of listed 
Saudi companies’ future compliance with CG laws. 
 
Both lawyers disagreed with the assumed positive effect of the existence of potential interest groups. 
En1 gave the opinion: “Perhaps, I would disagree with you on this". The other lawyer addressed the 
manipulative existence of the current interest groups as an obstacle to the potential existence of other 
interest groups: En3:"There are big beasts in the market. With their money, they play the market 
around. They bring the market up and down and shares prices up and down. They play as they please. 
Those have all doors open and nobody dares to get close to them." 
However, the same participant disagreed with the benefits of the potential existence of other interest 
groups: En3:"you can't equalise the balance by adding and subtracting and 'adding and subtracting'. If 
you don’t filter, clean, rinse the existent interest groups, things might not get straightened out. But, you 
have a problem, and you bring another problem to the scale to balance it out. You will just add to the 
problem". Nevertheless, the ex-legislator was infavour; as he put it:  En2:“Indeed, indeed, anything 
that will aid in voicing the opinions of minorities and representing them will have a positive effect with 
no doubts. Anything that gives the voice of the minorities will play a role but still such voice does not 
exist as of now."  
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Moreover, the ex-legislator further touched on the effect of bringing in appropriate CG laws regulating 
the rights of minority shareholders, such as the OECD principles in Saudi Arabia and how such laws 
are more likely to be nominal. He explained: En2:"From a nominal point of view, we can bring these 
international laws and execute them. But, from a practical point of view, it will never happen…We are 
nominally beautiful. On paper, we are exposed. Any researcher and every knowledge seeker must 
know, don’t rely on talk and papers in Saudi Arabia, but rely on practice". 
3) Regarding whether or not the transfer of legal knowledge between the Saudi legal 
system pertaining to minority shareholders’ rights and other systems might benefit the 
nature of listed Saudi companies’ future compliance with CG laws. 
 
All participants were in favour of the effect of the transfer of legal knowledge as best put by the ex-
legislator, En2:"Indeed, indeed, I believe being open to globalisation, marriage of thoughts and 
international trade has a benefit. They may impose on us certain laws to reach their acceptable level of 
exchange” 
However, participating lawyers conservatively hinted that some caution was necessary in the 
application of international standards as what might have suited one country may not suit other 
countries: En1:"You can't bring something from country A and execute it in country B. [Hence,] 
legislation should stem from within to fulfil our own needs”. En3:"The process of transfer requires 
phases of transfers. Hence, when anyone considers this step, he must require extensive studies, 
analysis, and monitoring so that we won’t have any loopholes."  
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6.6.2 2. Political Factors 
A. Political factors shaping CG 
 
1) The effect of the Saudi proportional voting system on the nature of listed Saudi 
companies’ compliancewith CG laws pertaining to minority shareholders’ rights 
 
Under this category, participants provided substantial evidence that Saudi Arabia’s House of 
Consultancy resembles a right-wing En2:"This [house of consultancy] is appointed. Its members are 
appointed by the government and appointed by people who they represent! [Members] are told to do 
this and that…They give him a great salary; hence, his role is to sing along". En3:"Look our 
parliament 'House of Consultation', the existence of its members is just a 'picture' and it was not in 
accordance with their preferences. It is the preference of the one who holds them". 
Hence, from the quotes above, it is apparent that the majority or perhaps all of the Saudi parliament’s 
members do not represent a pro-CG left-wing or a segment of middle class as they are appointed by 
politicians to serve a conservative agenda. Therefore, their roles are to conform with what they are told 
to do.  Moreover, those members as described by one of the lawyers as, En3:“scholars in religion or 
other areas, and the elites of the public". Hence, this reinforces the previous observation from the 
above quotes that the Saudi Parliament is dominated by a right-wing party composed of powerful elites 
of the public.  
In addition, legislation in Saudi Arabia is reactive to current situations as expressed by one of the 
lawyers, En1: "Legislation here stems from a problem. However, the effect of certain individuals 
having a hand on legislation I see this as the biggest door for chaos". Therefore, when there is a 
problem, the House of Ministers appoints a special committee of experts to look into the issue. Then, 
En1:"the committee of experts, in the House of Ministers, is the one which prepares the daft: They are 
the once who suggest. Then, that draft goes to the House of Consultations and its members vote on it 
based on the views of the committee of experts. Then, the draft goes back to the committee of experts. 
Then, they refer it to the House of Ministers to approve it ". 
In summary, it is clear that ‘appointment of members’ is the dominant technique of recruiting in the 
Saudi Parliament, including the House of Ministers and the House of Consultations. Moreover, as 
explained by the ex-legislator, En2:"[legislations] are issued by a royal decree from the top. Hence, 
these decrees were not carefully considered on many dimensions including appointment of members". 
Therefore, the level of policy swing is speculatively low as legislation is politically shaped by 'un-
institutionally' appointed members of parliament. 
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2) The effect of Saudi Arabia’s Institutions on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ 
compliance with CG laws pertaining to minority shareholders’ rights 
 
All participants saw this effect as negative, as stated clearly by one of the lawyers: En3:"It leans 
towards negativity". In addition, the well-experienced lawyer shed some light on one of the root causes 
behind this perceived negativity by all participants. He stated: En1:"Our problem here in Saudi Arabia 
is not a problem with the government. It is a problem with the government’s service sector which falls 
short on its responsibilities". 
Moreover, the ex-legislator provided an insight regarding the nature of these institutions, En2:"the 
biggest and strongest institutional role is preserved for the religious institution. It has a major role, 
and it has got claws…they are normally taken into account by the decision makers when about to make 
decisions, which are, at the end, nominal decisions. This is the only institution with an effective role. 
The other governmental institutions have no worth." 
Moreover, controlling families are also considered as institutions as perceived by one of the lawyers 
and the ex-legislator. Their answers regarding that questions included: En3: "true, true, true”. And, 
En2:" indeed, very much so". 
In addition, when participants were asked if the lack of effective public institutions, other than the 
religious one, might have slowed the existence of potential interest groups capable of improving the 
status of minority shareholders’ rights in Saudi Arabia, one of the lawyers stated: En3:"well, here, you 
have entered into practical procedures aimed at growth obstructed by political factors. Exactly, but 
again back to our first point, there are no such clear governmental organisations or institutions where 
minorities can go, refer to, or approach for their sakes". He further explained: En3: "unfortunately, we 
are in an environment where you have to knock the doors of different governmental organisations [to 
find out which organszation is responsible for the protection of minority shareholders].  There should 
be a clear governmental organisation for minority shareholders where they could voice their 
opinions.”  
Moreover, the lawsuit which was filed by a lawyer, participant (En3) knew of, against a Saudi bank, 
upon which this lawyer approached different Saudi institutions and they replied that the issue was not 
within their speciality as mentioned under the effect of the quality of law enforcements section, 
explains the dimensional effects of this dilemma even further. It exposes the weak legal infrastructure 
of Minority shareholder protection in Saudi Arabia. 
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3) The effect of interest group lobbying on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ 
compliance with CG laws pertaining to minority shareholders’ rights. 
Out of all participants, the ex-legislator was very clear and insistent that the two dominant interest 
groups in Saudi were 1) controlling families and 2) the religious institution. This observation was 
stressed throughout all sections touching on relevant topics. Here, he further emphasises this 
phenomenon ironically: En2:"I only know of two interest groups in Saudi who are capable: the 
religious institution and the rich people. Let me tell you an example here in Saudi, teachers represent a 
large segment of the population. Still, they don’t have a union or an association that represents them to 
have their rights! They have rights, which they have been tracing for 20 years, and they have not got a 
penny yet. Because, they are not capable of taking any industrial action [class action]. They can't, 
their claws as citizens and unions are ripped out of their places.  So, how can you have such power?” 
Moreover, the ex-legislator’s evidence was well substantiated through evidence provided by other 
participants that current interest groups are creating barriers to entry and future policies for foreign 
investors. Hence, they are de-promoting private initiatives: pro-diffusion and ultimately the positive 
effect that foreign investors might have on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance with CG 
laws pertaining to minority shareholder’s rights. One participant illustrated this: En3:"now the Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority has opened the door for all foreign corporations to come here 
on their own without the need to have a local partner. Why do you tax them 20% a year! They came to 
Saudi and opened up their businesses, built their facilities, and factories. But, do they sell and buy on 
their own? No…They still out-source distribution, storages, and contract big supermarkets such as 
Aldanub, Manuel, Abo Dawod, [for instance].  These supermarkets [ironically] take supplies from 
them and they impose a quota on their production and what to produce. This has made international 
corporations not foster the idea of selling or buying on their own in Saudi Arabia. If there were such 
legislation, those [international corporations] could handle this whole task on their own!” 
In addition to that the other lawyer stated: En1:"honestly, these companies faced difficulties, most of 
my clients are foreigners…Seriously speaking, go on the website of the Authority of Investments- which 
I call the ‘authority of hell’.  You will see ' big lies' red carpeted. Once you step foot in this country, 
you find things are too fuzzy. They [government agencies] will conflict each other. So, we are speaking 
of a political system promoting foreign investments, but you will be faced by bureaucracy and 
governmental organisations that are self-driven. Everyone [referring to governmental agencies] has 
their own legislations.  I know of some international companies, which came and stayed for 2,4 or 5 
years. They could not even get ‘A’ project. These are big corporations- they may have got one project 
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and they acquired their licenses. But, the simplest thing such as bringing their equipment across the 
Saudi border, they were not capable of!” 
4) The effect of the level of Saudi government involvement in the economy on the nature 
of listed Saudi companies’ compliance with CG laws pertaining to minority 
shareholders’ rights? 
 
All participants agreed that the Saudi economy was a mixture of a centralised and free economy even 
though it leans towards a centralised economy, as the economy is dependent on relationships. 
En3:"[Do] we have a centralised economy or a free economy?  Here, we have a big mix between the 
two." However, the same participant stated that, En3:"unfortunately.  This is a country of 
relationships". Hence, this is direct evidence of a centralised economy.  
In addition, the level of the governmental involvement, as described by the ex-legislator, is: En2:"not 
partial, it is 100 percent direct. It is essential. Our government has exclusive power over the market." 
Moreover, when participants were asked how the direct governmental involvement in the economy had 
aided CG compliance, one participant stated: En3:"[CG laws] exist but their effect is very weak 
though.  It is not just a picture. It is becoming to be apparent. They have established its pillars but its 
acceptance by the individuals with governmental power is! … They try to fight it". 
Moreover, the ex-legislator provided some insights regarding the apparent low level of CG compliance 
caused by governmental interventions not being efficient in this regard. He explained: En2:"It is a 
cause of its short-term vision. This is what is causing corruption. However, if the government was 
mature enough, then, it is for the benefit of all to apply the laws and criteria that will lead to balanced 
powers: creating a healthier environment for trade for both big and small [shareholders]. But, when it 
[referring to nature of interventions] is for the dominantly powerful groups at the expense of the other 
less powerful groups, it is an end". 
Overall, two participants saw the level of the Saudi government’s involvement in the economy on the 
nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance so far to have been negative. In fact, only one participant 
saw it as positive and explained his logic thus: En 1:"It has been positive indeed. The government hand 
has to be strong. Look at America and the collapse happening there; it is all because the market was 
legislating for itself. So, we need the strong man to control us. Without him we are lost". 
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5) The effect of the absence of a Constitutional Process on the nature of listed Saudi 
companies’ compliance with CG laws pertaining to minority shareholders’ rights. 
 
Law practitioners seemed to have a mixed view on the current political system in Saudi Arabia and 
whether or not it formed a solid constitution that suited the nature of its society. One lawyer argued 
that: En 1:"we have a constitution…It exists and it tells how legislation is to be made and executed.  It 
is there. People just misunderstand… Because we, as Muslims, our Constitution is the Quran. But, the 
Quran, you can’t execute it as is. It is filled with enlightenment and wisdom and you can't execute it as 
is...We have the legal political system and it includes everything written in 1412. It is a complete 
constitution". 
Nevertheless, the other lawyer questioned this so-called Islamic oriented constitution by saying: En3: 
"truthfully, here, comes the issue of having an existing constitution and legalisation of Islamic 
principles- why, I am saying there is a mix which is because people interpret Islamic legislation as 
they please.  But, if the government along with an Islamic committee agreed on regulating and 
legalising Islamic principles, then, it would be possible to agree on specific interpretations of Islamic 
legislations. Based on it, they will have created a solid constitution even if you don’t call it a 
constitution…Unfortunately, they don’t want to do so to leave the doors wide open to let the 
interpretations be in accordance with their [desires] and moods.  It’s got nothing to do with politics 
but with the mood!” 
From above, it can be interpreted that both law practitioners were skeptical over the applicability of 
this so-called constitution in Saudi Arabia. They both directly admitted the difficulty of interpreting 
Islamic legislation found in the Quran. Nevertheless, they both still perceived it as a constitution even 
though what is 'available' does not explain how power is distributed legally over the whole spectrum of 
the population. Hence, this is the point the ex-legislator was emphasising: En2:"[Having a clear 
constitution] is a principle factor. This will improve the economical and political dimensions in any 
country. It will even lead to the distribution of power between people instead of having the power in 
certain hands of the population. Hence, decisions will be more mature". 
Therefore, it can be interpreted that the existence of this so called Islamic-oriented constitution, in 
terms of not showing how power is distributed legally and the intentionally vague interpretations, is 
equivalent of having no constitution. Hence, this lack of a solid constitution creates potential 
governmental inventions by centralised authorities (Gourevitch, 2008). This observation is 
substantiated by the word choice "moods and desires" as used by one of the law practitioners as the 
reason behind the government not agreeing with the religious committee on specific interpretations of 
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Islamic legislation stemming from the Quran. Perhaps, this can explain the inefficient governmental 
involvement in the economy to improve the level of CG compliance of listed Saudi corporations. 
B. Political Economy 
 
1) The effect of the size of private benefits of control on the nature of listed Saudi 
companies’ compliance with CG laws pertaining to minority shareholders’ rights 
 
Evidence of high surplus extracts was suggested in the Saudi Stock Market at the IPO stage as 
illustrated by participants: En1:"For instance, Almoajel Company, they inflated their share price at the 
IPO stage when it was worthless. The portion that was sold was triple the value of the corporation 
itself! They had a problem and it was stopped last year because their losses exceeded their capital. [it 
was] very exaggerated".En2:"Indeed, it is very apparent, very apparent because the whole process is 
involved with insider deals and insider information.  There is no protection, and no one has been 
judged… We see people buy and sell in the market based on insider information. Indeed, those guys 
with private benefits are destroying the market indeed". En3 agreed with this proposition, 
remarking:"Oh yes". 
Moreover, it is not surprising to see this large degree of private benefits of control when the existing 
institutions are weak, and the law is lax as it does not fine offenders for inside dealings properly, as 
explained by one of the lawyers, En1:" The same fine company A gets, company B will get as well. But 
again…‘it is still a small amount’. For instance, in insider dealings, or share price manipulations: you 
sell when the share price is high and when it drops you buy it back.  In Europe and advanced 
countries, they will catch you for that. The difference you made [arbitrage], you have to return it. But 
here, when it happens, they fine offenders 10,000 SR whereas those offenders have already made 60 or 
70 millions out of such wrongdoing!.. So, it goes back to the lack of proper law". 
In addition, a further insight was shed by the same lawyer explaining the logic in the Saudi market 
when it comes to the IPO stage, En1:" Here, usually, the announcement of the IPO is for the founders 
to leave the corporation. Or, perhaps, their corporations would have no future!  For example, in ten 
years, the technology of that corporation won't aid it. You see, it would need a big chunk of money to 
be reinvested and the profit expected is not worth it. Here, they [the founders] try to get rid of it." 
2) The effect of having a persuasive political voice in creating a concentrated ownership 
structure and its overall effect on the nature of listed Saudi companies’compliance 
with CG laws pertaining to minority shareholders’ rights. 
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All participants agreed that the need of a persuasive political voice was essential for the success of 
listed corporations in Saudi Arabia: En1:"Yes of course, you will NEED a big shoulder.  For example, 
Atheb Corporation, which has been bearing lots of losses and many other problems, has the presence 
of such and such on the board served them well? I am just saying having a big name at the IPO stage 
gives comfort to potential shareholders. That’s all, but after that, you deal with numbers not with 
people". En3: “First of all, you have not reached this governmental and financial position except by 
your network". Hence, this participant was hinting at how some founders of big corporations reached 
such high financial status via their political networks. 
As a result, it is really difficult for potential entrepreneurs seeking external capital to succeed in the 
Saudi Capital Market without having a persuasive political voice. Moreover, this realisation sheds light 
on the excessive control by states and families and their cumulative contribution to crony capitalism 
and promotion of concentrated ownership structure. Hence, the overall result is a negative effect on the 
nature of listed Saudi companies’compliance with CG laws pertaining to minority sharholders’ rights. 
3) The effect of constant reinforcement by the Saudi Government and controlling families 
for each other on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance with CG laws 
pertaining to minority shareholders’ rights 
 
One participant disagreed with the logic of this effect and doubted its existence in Saudi Arabia 
without providing relevant evidence. Nevertheless, the other two participants acknowledged the 
existence of such reinforcement to a degree and they provided further insights into the nature of this 
effect. En2:"Look, those controlling families are the ones who protect their immunity in the 
government. It is not like the government has a policy for them. But rather, those families are powerful, 
and their powers allow them to get into legislation.  Hence, whatever is for their benefit will happen 
and what does not benefit them, will not? This is because their voices are well heard". En3:"Look, it 
does unite the ruler with certain families and this is politics. Honestly, the Saudi government was 
created upon this [referring to King Abdullaziz, the founder, and how he acquired the help of the big 
tribes’s leaders to establish Saudi Arabia as a country]…It is true. How they [referring to commercial 
families] rely on their culture: they always rely on someone close to the ruler to protect them. So, it 
comes back to the same circle again". Hence, the effect of the law becomes minimal in such an 
environment and culture becomes an alternative substitute for the law (Coffee, 2001). 
C. Propositions 
What kind of institutional mechanisms of curbing private benefits of control can have a 
positive effect on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance with CG laws pertaining to 
minority shareholders’ rights 
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1. Courts 
All participants envisoned potential specialised courts with ‘authoritative and administrative powers’ 
as being infrastructurally necessary to improve the level of listed Saudi corporations’ compliance with 
CG laws pertaining to the rights of minority shareholders. One of the participants illustrated this: 
En1:"Let me tell one thing, SCMA should be headed by a judge. … This is to activate the role of the 
financial lawsuit transactions.  This CG compliance department at SCMA, you want its role to be 
'active'. Or, let's say ‘cancel them out of SCMA and implement such departments in Commercial 
Courts’, it will be better. Why is because you need a court to justify you. Nothing is more detrimental 
than the judgment of a court". 
2. Unions 
Two participants: one of the lawyers and the ex-legislator favoured the existence of unions and 
regarded it as essential in the process. En 2:"Indeed, unions will give those who don’t have voices –a 
voice to protect their rights. It will give them the negotiation power and ability to have a voice…Their 
political voice will make part of the process of legislation which they are [currently] distant from”. En 
3:"Labour unions, creating a labour union [referring to one of the ways to improve the level of CG 
compliance of Listed Saudi Corporations]. You cannot approach things in this country via trade and 
the capital market”. 
3. Diffusion of the Press- Media 
All participants expressed a negative perception of the media based on their exposures. 
En2:"Globalisation and media is not an absolute virtue or evil. If the infrastructure you have is good 
to protect people and the law, you will take the best out of them. But, in countries like this, the negative 
effect will outweigh the positive effect". En3:"Believe it or not, the media, in the world, is it free or 
not? [I replied free]. He then asked; Give me any other country in this world besides Saudi Arabia that 
has a Ministry of Media". 
En1:"Look, this is more blackmailing. This is my intake. This is all blackmailing from start to end. Yes, 
the Saudi journalists, I am not saying all of them but most don’t move unless they have a personal gain 
in it. At the end, he [referring to any journalist] is just a journalist, a paperboy, and empty talk. And, I 
don’t think it has any effect”. 
4. Better Accounting Standards 
En3:"Look, having accounting standards is very important. But, if there is no authority with legislative 
and administrative powers to create the necessary laws, then, you are hiding from this responsibility". 
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6.7 Chapter Summary 
The state of CG enforcement in terms of its legal rules and their enforcements (La Porta et al., 1997) is 
lacking a judgmental authority as implied by the low level of execution of CG laws in Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, the current legal environment guiding the CG procedures in Saudi Arabia attaches a low 
level of significance to minority shareholders, which is indicative of an agency conflict between 
controlling shareholders, families, and minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1997).  
Moreover, as indicated by the qualitative evidence, ease of litigation, low burden of proof, specialty of 
courts, and access to information to examine self dealing by minorities (Djankov et al., 2008) are basic 
legal privileges not provided to Saudi minority shareholders by the Saudi legal environment. 
Moreover, the arms length approval by disinterested shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008) in legal 
proceedings is considered an unprecedented practice in the Saudi Legal environment.  
In addition, all participants agreed that the problem of insider dealing was serious and very common in 
Saudi Arabia, and it is the central problem of CG (Djankov et al., 2008). As a consequence, when 
examining the criteria for the quality of legal protection provided to Saudi minority shareholders, such 
as effectiveness, in regulating self dealing transactions, appropriate disclosures via private channels 
and public enforcements, the conclusion is reached that not only is the Saudi legal environment 
premature but also directors of listed Saudi corporations have not been meeting their fiduciary duties to 
the best of their knowledge (Djankov et al., 2008). 
Hence, it can be interpreted that functional convergence, and the transfer of legal knowledge via 
globalisation, will not have a positive effect in Saudi Arabia. Unless a reform of the legal environment 
takes place in terms of: ease of litigation, establishment of specialised courts, appointment of 
competent qualified judges, and creation of awareness programmes for minority shareholders’ rights. 
Moreover, as it stands, the quality of law enforcement regarding the means of redress by minority 
shareholders is very low due to the weak legal infrastructure of Minority shareholders’ protection put 
in place in Saudi Arabia.  
In addition, the qualitative evidence provided by participants indicates that current interest groups such 
as wealthy families have created barriers to future policy in Saudi Arabia (Claessens et al., 2000). 
Those well-lobbied interest groups are found to aid in the de-promotion of private initiatives and a 
barrier to genuine interest in foreign investments worldwide (Gourevitch, 2008). 
Furthermore, the absence of a solid constitution in Saudi Arabia creates potential for governmental 
interventions by centralised authorities, weakens popular pressure to safeguard shareholders’ rights and 
promotes block-holding model of corporate control (Gourevitch, 2008). 
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Moreover, evidence of constant mutual reinforcement by the Saudi government and controlling 
families (Coffee, 2001) was provided sporadically throughout the interviews. Nevertheless, it was 
clarified by the majority of participants that those controlling families, En2:" are the ones who protect 
their immunities in the government. It is not like the government has a policy for them”. Therefore, the 
majority of participants suggested the promotion of unions and regarded it as essential in the process of 
curbing the private benefits of control enjoyed by controlling families.  
Overall, the qualitative findings of this chapter have corroborated the quantitative findings in the 
previous chapter in terms of shedding lights on other factors, such as the legal and political, 
influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect 
to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. Moreover, such corroboration has exposed the depth 
of the issue being explored by this research via the research questions. However, the relations between 
the qualitative findings and quantitative findings will be fully integrated in the following chapter, 
chapter 7: the conclusion chapter. This chapter will apply the main research theory, New Institutional 
Sociology. Hence, the application of such theory will show how organisations legitimise themselves by 
conforming to societal values while exposing how elites can legally and politically define appropriate 
models of organisational structures and policies which then go unquestioned for years to come (Scott, 
1987, 1995). 
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Chapter Seven: Research Conclusion 
7.1 First Research Question: 
 
1- To what extent do available cultural models (for example Hofstede, 2010) explain the 
quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi 
Arabia? 
7.1.1 Answer: 
In order to answer the first research question, a questionnaire was constructed in line with the 
normative values composing the New Institutional Sociology theory because CG systems are highly 
influenced by cultural values and norms which can be best explained through the institutional system 
as a class of elements (Scott, 1987, p.5).    
   Figure 7.1: Designing Attitude Statements in Light of OECD Principles and Hofstede’s CVD 
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Source: The Author 
In addition, the questionnaire was designed using variables comprising the minority shareholder’s 
protection index found in the OECD principles of CG and corresponding to other indices aimed at 
measuring the level of minority shareholder’s protection found in prior studies such as La Porta et al.’s 
Anti-director Rights Index (1997, 1998, 2006) and the Index of Self Dealing, derived from the 
historical legal principle of fiduciary duties, by Djankov et al., (2008) who observed: 
“self-dealing is the central problem of corporate governance in most countries, the law’s effectiveness in 
regulating this problem is the fundamental element of shareholder protection. Not to mention, regulating self-
dealing is compatible with any legal system, and is appropriate for both rich and developing countries"(Djankov 
et al., 2008).  
 
Therefore, the elements of the constructed index for this study, inclusive of both indices, are: 1) 
Transparency, 2) Disclosure, 3) Directors’ compensation, 4) Basic shareholder rights, 5) Equitable 
treatment of shareholder rights, and 6) Basic shareholders’ rights corresponding to profit measures.  
In addition, each of the variables of the questionnaire was assigned to the applicable dimension in 
accordance with Hofstede’s (1980-2010) criteria (see Appendix B10). As a result, the questionnaire as 
a whole via the Mode of the descriptive statistics was capable of measuring the CVD of the Saudi 
shareholders based on the OECD principles of CG pertaining to minority shareholders’ rights. Not only 
that, but the measurements were in confirmation with Hofstede’s et al. (2010) findings. 
Table 7.1: CVD of Saudi Shareholders based on OECD Principles of CG Using the Mode 
 Individualism Power Distance Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Masculinity/ 
Femininity 
Long Term 
Orientation 
Hofstede 25 95 80 60 36 
This study 49 75 74 48 32 
Source: The Author 
 Moreover, the researcher contacted Hofstede to inquire about the higher score found under the 
Individualism dimension and was advised by Hofstede (email, March 12
th, 2015) that, “at the national 
level, individualism increases with per capita national wealth".  
In addition, table 7.2 below using the Mean of the descriptive statistics along with the design leading to 
the results were communicated to Hofstede via email and he implied no concerns in this regard (see 
Appendix D3). 
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Table 7.2: CVD of Saudi Shareholders based on OECD Principles of CG Using the Mean 
 Individualism Power Distance Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Masculinity/Femininity Long term Orientation/ 
Short Term Orientation 
Hofstede’s Results 25 95 80 60 36 
This Study’s result 51.2 80.1 79.8 55.7 30 
Source: The Author 
However, it should be noted that the researcher opted for using the Mode when reporting the results of 
the CVD of Saudi shareholders within this research as the Mode represents the score that occurs most 
frequently in the data set. Furthermore, what is implied from the descriptive findings of this study is 
that Hofstede’s (1980-2010) CVD framework is capable of measuring content specific constructs such 
as the OECD principles of CG to produce relevant information regarding Saudi shareholders’ CVD. 
Moreover, it should be noted that Hofstede’s (2010) view of the limits of his CVD framework is that 
they can only be valuable on a macro level, which in his correspondence to the researcher noted via 
(email, March 16
th
, 2015) when he was asked by the researcher, (see Appendix D3 for all emails). 
“Considering your warnings against confusing levels of analysis, when I attempted to major the Saudi Cultural 
Value Dimensions, I split my data for further statistical analysis on groups to strengthen my findings. The 
descriptive statistics showed an anomaly only between the groups of Majority and Minority shareholders. Hence, 
I performed further tests and found the distribution of each CV dimension, except for individualism, was not the 
same when comparing the groups of Majority with Minority shareholders. Hence, significant correlations 
emerged. The non-parametric test of Kruskal-Wallis and Man U Whitney showed that Minority shareholders 
scored 50 % higher on average on Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Femininity dimensions 
compared to Majority shareholders” 
Hofsted Reply was (email, March 18
th
, 2015),  
"Dear Mr Alfordy, these national dimensions do not apply to groups like minority and majority shareholders… 
The dimensions approach belongs to organizational anthropology, whereas your study [referring to the 
comparison between groups] belongs to organizational sociology" (Hofstede, email, March 18
th
, 2015). 
 
The following is the researcher’s reply (Hofstede, email, March 18th, 2015):  
"Initially, my study aimed at exploring the effect of organizational anthropology pertaining to Saudi Arabia on 
the nature of CG compliance and its level. In fact, the corporate governance literature has been enriched by the 
use of your dimensions in this regard including the referenced work of Semenov (2000) in Hofstede (2001). In 
fact, the majority of my study falls within that line of investigation. However, breaking down the analysis and 
applying the national dimensions to groups like minority and majority shareholders is… where I tried to move 
from a macro-investigating level of anthropology to more of a micro-sociological level…I admit that’s where I 
disagreed with the literature on the applicability of your national dimensions being "static" or even applicable 
only on a "macro scale… I have been highly influenced by the approach of Amir Licht [(2001)]who has referred 
to your work as valuable in understanding social institutions.  He has theoretically switched focus between 
anthropology and sociology on values and their dynamics, stating "national cultures can be seen, metaphorically, 
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as the mother of path dependence dynamics in the sense that they play a role in both the origin and in future 
development of corporate governance systems … In their very essence, values are social norms, as social norms 
affect individual behavior and social institutions" (Licht, 2001).” 
 
As it can be interpreted from above, the reason why Hofstede limits the application of his CVD 
framework is not due to a pure statistical logic but because he views his dimensions play a role only in 
the origin of values as most anthropologists believe. However, other contributors to this debate such as 
Licht (2001) sees that national cultures are more dynamics and they play a role both in the origin and 
the future developments of CG systems worldwide. Moreover, this is why Hofstede does not, “envision 
the effect of "Modernization" as Karl Marx proposed leading to the convergence of values with 
economic developments to be responsible for potential changes in the numeric measurements of your 
CVD (assuming effects of Media and Globalization are inevitable in the process)?” (Hofstede, email, 
March 12
th
, 2015)  He states, “No, I have followed value differences for almost half a century, and I 
did not see convergence” (Hofstede, email, March 12th, 2015). 
Therefore, in the researcher’s view and in the view of other contributors to this debate such as Licht 
(2001), and Patel and Rayner (2012), there are more national cultures and social groupings than those 
at the macro-anthropological level to which Hofstede restricts himself. In fact, when Hofstede was 
asked about the work of Patel and Rayner (2012) and their social groups, he replied, “Unfortunately I 
am not familiar with this subject, and presently my priorities lie elsewhere” (Hofstede, email, March 
12
th
, 2015). Hence, the researcher has applied the CVD framework to more highly restricted social 
classes and grouping which Hofstede in his reply would contest but which the researcher believes 
naturally follows from the construct definition that forms the CVD framework. Hence, There is no 
unequivocal answer apart from the pragmatic one that the CVD framework appears to capture well 
“cultural nuances” at such group level used in this study.  
Hence, such proceedings entailed a theoretical contribution firstly in substantiating the value of CVD 
framework at a micro sociological level, secondelly in the assignment of Hofstede’s dimensions to the 
OECD principles of CG (see Appendix B10), and, thirdly in the quantification of Institutional theory, 
which is deemed “difficult to measure” (Hoque, 2006, p. 197). For instance, this study takes advantage 
of the elements composing Institutional theory such as cultural values and norms as prescribed by its 
founders, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Scott (1987), and integrates such constructs into the well-
known CVD framework of Hofestede (1980-2010). As such, the study recognises the observation that 
“institutionalization is rooted in conformity—not conformity engendered by sanctions … but 
conformity rooted in the taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life ... fundamentally, meaningful 
behaviour" (Zucker, 1983, p. 5). As a result the questionnaire, via the descriptive statistics, was capable 
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of measuring the CVD of the Saudi shareholders based on the OECD principles of CG pertaining to 
minority shareholders’ rights. 
Moreover, Hofstede’s (1980-2010) CVD framework was chosen, after a thorough review of the 
relevant literature (see Appendix B1), to provide a rigorously suitable mean to reveal potential 
relations between Saudi national culture, based on a sample of Saudi shareholders, and the quality of 
the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the OECD, in Saudi Arabia. Not only that, 
but Hofstede's (1980-2010) CVD framework was found capable of providing "a theory-driven, 
universally validated operationalization of fundamental societal orientations [enabling] us to derive and 
empirically test hypotheses about relations between national culture and corporate governance” 
(Breuer and Salzmann, 2012). 
Hence, a set of hypotheses generated by SPSS and motivated by the relevant literature review (see 
Appendices C7, C8 & C9: Appendices B1, B2 & B3) was developed to answer the first research 
question. These Hypotheses are:  
1. Hypothesis 1: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG, is low in high COL Cultures such as the Saudi. 
2. Hypothesis 2: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG, is low in high UA Cultures such as the Saudi. 
3. Hypothesis 3: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG, is low in high PDI Cultures such as the Saudi. 
4. Hypothesis 4: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG, is low in high MAS cultures such as the Saudi. 
5. Hypothesis 5: The quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights, as defined by the 
OECD principles of CG, is low in low LTO cultures such as the Saudi. 
 
7.1.1.1 Answer to the Five Hypotheses:  
1. Individualism 
Saudi shareholders scored 49 on the Individualism dimension using the Mode. This mid-level score is 
reflective of the high level of Collectivism of Saudi Shareholders as suggested by Hofstede’s et al., 
(2010) score of 25 on this dimension. 
Furthermore, what is inferred from the Individualism score of this study is that the expected level of 
transparency and disclosure was low in Saudi Arabia. As a matter of fact, most of Saudi listed 
corporations comply with the minimum mandatory requirements of disclosure, while assigning little 
significance to voluntary disclosure (Al-Saeed, 2006). In addition, the quality of reporting in Saudi 
Arabia is at a very low level with an average score of 36 % regarding mandatory disclosure, and an 
average score of 32 % regarding voluntary disclosure (Al-Janadi et al., 2012). 
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Moreover, the Minority shareholders’ score was higher on this dimension as compared to Majority and 
Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean. The Mean of Minority shareholders on this dimension was 
52.2, Sophisticated 51.5 and Majority 47.6.  
Even though there is a slight difference in the level of Individualism found in each of the Saudi 
shareholder groups using the scores derived from the descriptive statistics, the non-parametric test of 
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney show that Minority shareholders scored 71% and 68% higher on 
Individualism compared to Majority shareholders respectively. This result implies a high level of 
information asymmetry between managers and insider investors (Majority shareholders), at the 
expense of outside investors (Minority shareholders). It also implies the need for greater transparency 
and disclosure to establish a better reward allocation system based on equity, equal rights and 
protection for all stakeholders in Saudi Arabia.  
In addition, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between Individualism as a 
dimension and information awareness. Undoubtedly, the amount of information provided through 
transparent and extensive disclosure helps shareholders make informed decisions regarding their 
investments. Hence, their high level of risk taking will accordingly be better rewarded on equity. 
Hence, the amount of information provided through transparent and extensive disclosure promotes and 
enhances Individualism in discouraging information asymmetry benefiting insider investors. This result 
is confirmed by Griffin et al.,(2014) “assuming a causal relation, a one standard deviation increases in 
individualism increases the accountability and transparent disclosure index by 0.311 standard 
deviations”.  
Overall, support for Hypothesis 1, the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in high COL Cultures such as the Saudi, is found via the 
descriptive statistics, and Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests as indicated and supported by the 
relevant literature. 
2. Uncertainty Avoidance 
Saudi shareholders scored 74 on the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension using the Mode. This score 
reflects the high level of Uncertainty Avoidance among Saudi Shareholders and is confirmatory of the 
score of 80 found by Hofstede et al., (2010) for Saudi culture as a whole.  
Hence, a high score on this dimension, as was the case in Saudi Arabia, entails a preference for “rigid 
codes of belief and behavior” (Hofstede et al., 2010). The logic behind this observation stems from “an 
emotional need for rules even if the rules never seem to work" (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hence, security 
is a key element to shareholders’ motivation in countries scoring high on Uncertainty Avoidance. This 
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is clearly noticed in the amount of rules guiding the accounting profession in Saudi Arabia. More than 
a few Saudi governmental agencies play key roles in setting the stage for implementing appropriate CG 
standards in Saudi Arabia and are still considered as crucial for future CG legislation such as SCC, 
SMCI, SOCPA, and SHEC, as discussed in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, when there is a CG conflict to be 
resolved in Saudi courts of law, this CG case is more likely to be judged on Islamic principles. 
“ The dual legal system is problematic and it affects audit performance: Shari’ah Courts here are not capable of 
solving auditing disputes not only due to their lack of awareness of the auditing profession but also their ruling is 
based on their knowledge and interpretation of fiqh [Islamic jurisdictions]… Having two types of judges with 
differing judicial backgrounds and forcing judgments to be made on two ‘incompatible’ sets of laws have caused 
confusion and frustration (Vogel, 1993)…A lack of faith in the dual legal system and a lack of consistency in 
solving disputes have caused many foreign companies to specify in their covenants that any disputes should be 
solved according to the law of their home country” (Al-Saleh, 1994 cited in Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). 
 
Consequentially, a high level of compliance with CG procedures will not necessarily aid a Saudi listed 
corporation’s case in a court of law, especially when there is a confusing dual legal system in place. 
Minority shareholders scored higher on this dimension as compared to Majority and Sophisticated 
shareholders using the Mean. The Mean of Minority shareholders on this dimension was 82.1, 
Sophisticated 79 and Majority 72.8.  Even though there was a slight difference in the level of 
Uncertainty Avoidance found in each Saudi shareholder group using the scores derived from the 
descriptive statistics, the Non-parametric tests of Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis show Minority 
shareholders scored 96% and 100% higher on Uncertainty Avoidance as compared to Majority 
shareholders respectively.  This result shows a high level of uncertainty among Minority shareholders 
compared to Majority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. Similar to the Individualism dimension, this result 
implies a high level of information asymmetry between managers and insider investors. 
In addition, Minority shareholders attached lower significance to requesting information directly from 
Saudi listed corporations as compared to other groups such as creditors who highly value direct 
information from corporations due to their premium position to acquire information directly from listed 
corporations (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004). 
Moreover, previous research has found that people from high Uncertainty Avoidance cultures value 
ethical values set by themselves within a group membership. Consequently, they find it hard to respect 
or comply with ethical guidelines set by outside members (Schepers, 2006). As a consequence, CG 
rules that are set to serve all stakeholders have been found to score low in countries with high levels of 
Uncertainty Avoidance such as Saudi Arabia, which averages 36 % on the quality of reporting 
regarding mandatory disclosure (Al-Janadi et al., 2012).  
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In addition, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between Uncertainty Avoidance 
and Information Awareness. Speculatively, the amount of information provided through transparent 
extensive disclosure reduces ambiguity. In turn, this reduces the level of uncertainty among Minority 
shareholders, and their overall Uncertainty Avoidance level as they are provided with the appropriate 
level of information to make informed decisions. Hence, such appropriate disclosure and transparency, 
accompanied with the right level of compliance, will aid in discouraging information asymmetry 
benefiting insider investors. This result is confirmed by Griffin et al., who state “assuming a causal 
relation; a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty avoidance decreases the accountability and 
transparent disclosure index by 0.298 standard deviations" (2014). 
Moreover, the descriptive statistics of this study implicitly confirm the above causation, showing that 
63% of Saudi Minority shareholders were aware of less than 10% of their rights and the other 37% 
were aware of 20-30% of their rights. Hence, it is not surprising to find their Uncertainty Avoidance 
level was 96% higher when compared to Majority shareholders as shown via the Mann-Whitney test.  
On the other hand, 75% of Saudi Majority shareholders were aware of 70-80 % of the OECD 
principles of shareholder’s rights and the other 15% were aware of 90-100% of these rights, which 
explains their overall lower level of Uncertainty Avoidance compared to Minority shareholders, as 
indicated by the Mann-Whitney test. 
Moreover, the documented causation between Uncertainty Avoidance and the strength of Minority 
shareholders’ protection via the relevant literature is reasonably justified by the findings of this study. 
The overall distribution of Uncertainty Avoidance was not the same across all categories of shareholder 
types as the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates. This finding is consonant with the findings of Griffin et al., 
(2014) that “assuming a causal relation, a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty avoidance 
reduces the Minority shareholder protection index by 0.332 standard deviations”. On the other hand, 
low Uncertainty Avoidance cultures are associated with greater level of Minority shareholder 
protection (Licht et al., 2005; Lubetsky, 2008). Hence, people in low Uncertainty Avoidance cultures 
are  more encouraged to speak about poor governance practices and, in turn, corporations are "more 
accustomed to handling such diversity, conflict, and feedback from shareholders" (Sweeney, 2008). 
In addition, the dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance was found to have a significant relationship with 
ownership concentration in previous research. The logic behind the association is that when 
Uncertainty Avoidance is high in such cultures, large shareholders will be less willing to take risks. 
Hence, they devise concentrations of equity ownership as a mechanism to protect themselves against 
ambiguities (Aguilera et al., 2011). This logic is tested and confirmed by Licht et al. (2005) and De 
Jong and Semenov (2006). Moreover, issues of compliance and disclosure with CG principles in listed 
Chapter Seven: Research Conclusion   P a g e  | 208 
 
 
 
Saudi corporations partially stem from a highly concentrated ownership structure within the country 
(Al-Zuhair, 2008), meaning that CG legislations in Saudi Arabia “ is still slowly moving from 
voluntary to obligatory as family-owned firms are stifling corporate growth by their reluctance to open 
their equity to outside shareholders” (Koldertsova, 2011). 
Overall, support for Hypothesis 2, the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in high UA Cultures such as the Saudi, is found via the 
descriptive, statistics and hypothesis tests as indicated and supported by the relevant literature. 
3. Power Distance 
Saudi shareholders scored 75 on the Power Distance dimension using the Mode. This finding is 
confirmatory of the score of 95 found by Hofstede’s et al., (2010) on the scale of Power Distance for 
Saudi culture as whole, which makes Saudi Culture high on this dimension. 
What is inferred from the Power Distance score of this study is that the expected level of Minority 
shareholder protection is low in Saudi Arabia. In fact, managers of listed Saudi Corporations' 
perceptions of the OECD principles were found unfavourable and those mangers were found less 
sensitive to governance related issues concerning shareholder rights, treatment of shareholders, and 
financial disclosure (Robertson et al., 2013). 
Moreover, Saudi Minority shareholders scored higher on this dimension as compared to Majority and 
Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean. The Mean of Minority shareholder on this dimension was 
82, Sophisticated 79.6 and Majority 74.2. Even though there was a slight difference in the level of 
Power Distance found in each Saudi shareholder group using the scores derived from the descriptive 
statistics, the non-parametric test of Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney showed Minority shareholders 
scored 95% and 82% higher on Power Distance compared to Majority and Sophisticated shareholders 
respectively.   
Moreover, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between Power Distance as a 
dimension and information awareness. Speculatively, the amount of information provided to Minority 
shareholders regarding their basic rights and how they can exercise them decreases the gap between 
powerful stakeholders such as board members, Majority shareholders, managers and Minority 
shareholders. Not only that , but it also improves the overall level of compliance of CG procedures by 
listed Saudi corporations as Minority shareholders become part of the process of monitoring the 
corporations they have an interest in. Hence, Minority shareholders can better protect their investment 
through their appropriate participation, for instance in General meetings, as prescribed by the OECD 
principles of CG pertaining to their rights as Minority shareholders. This finding is consistent with the 
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findings of Griffin et al. (2014) who state “power distance is negatively and significantly associated 
with Minority shareholder protection”.  
As a result, Minority shareholders in countries where Power Distance is high are less likely to aid in 
the process of improving CG compliance and challenge bad practise as compared to Minority 
shareholders in low Power Distance cultures. 
In addition, the high level of Power Distance of Saudi shareholders implies there is no clear separation 
of management from ownership control and legitimises the high pay structure for executives from 
controlling families (Licht, 2001). It is therefore not surprising that families own 75% of listed 
corporations in Saudi Arabia (Al-Zuhair, 2008). The logic behind this phenomenon is best explained 
by Hammoud (2011), “the family remains the strongest and fundamental unit of social and business 
organization in the Arab World ... family members form family associations which organize activities 
and hold regular meetings to care for the affairs of the family and its members”. This phenomenon is 
also confirmed by Claessens et al., (2000) who found that 60 % of managerial personnel of 2,980 listed 
corporations in Asia were related to controlling families.  
As a consequence, this unclear separation of management and ownership translates into a culturally 
specific kind of reporting. For instance, in the Saudi environment, information about powerful 
individuals is “more understandable, believable and appreciable by the society than information of 
policies, regulations or laws [regulating the financial statements]” (Al-Nodel & Hussainey, 2010). 
Furthermore, the high score on the Power Distance dimension is indicative of a low level of disclosure 
and transparency by Saudi corporations “so as to avoid conflict and competition and to preserve 
security” (Licht, 2001). Therefore, it is common to see high hierarchical structures of stock pyramids in 
Saudi Arabia as “the entire populace, rich and poor… are likely to perceive such shareholding 
structures as just another facet of a proper social order ... [This is] why small investors in some 
countries put their savings in suspicious stock pyramid schemes or subject them to the whims of 
controlling families" (Licht, 2001). 
In fact, a look at the Social Network Theory (SNT) graph designed by the researcher, inspired by the 
work of Barabasi (2002), below confirms the previous findings:   
Figure 7.2: Application of SNT Theory on Listed Saudi Corporations  
 
 
Source: The Author 
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In addition, it is noteworthy to mention that the high Power Distance of the Saudi society stems from 
the Islamic concept of Fatalism. 
“Fatalism in Arab culture emanates from interpretation of religious principles that seem to require total 
submission to the power and will of god. Even though, such principles do exist, their implications are in fact 
taken out of context because they ought to be understood and interpreted in balance with other principles that 
urge Muslims to make choices and expect them to impact their destinies. Islamic scholars have for long engaged 
in philosophical debates regarding the question of choice versus submission and schools of thought have argued 
for one or the other” (Hammoud, 2011). 
Overall, support for Hypothesis 3, the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in high PDI Cultures such as the Saudi, is found via the 
descriptive statistics and hypothesis tests as indicated and supported by the relevant literature. 
4. Femininity: 
Saudi shareholders scored 48 on this dimension using the Mode. This low score on the Femininity 
dimension is reflective of the high level of Masculinity of Saudi shareholders as suggested by 
Hofstede’s et al. (2010) score of 60 on the Masculinity dimension.  
According to the descriptive statistics of this study, Minority shareholders scored higher on the 
Femininity dimension as compared to Majority and Sophisticated shareholders using the Mean. The 
Mean of Minority shareholders on this dimension was 58.2, Sophisticated 53.3 and Majority 50.6.  
Moreover, Minority shareholders scored 90 % higher on Femininity as compared to Majority 
shareholders, according to the Kruskal-Wallis test. In addition, Mann-Whitney test showed that 
Minority shareholders scored 74% higher on Femininity compared to Majority shareholders. Hence, 
Saudi Majority shareholders were found two times more masculine than Minority and were driven by 
competition, achievement and success. Therefore, their concern for Minority shareholders and their 
rights as prescribed by the OECD principles of CG is expected to be minimal, especially when those 
Majority shareholders are in the position to run corporations on a day to day basis. As a result, Saudi 
Arabia under the lights of the Femininity dimension is clearly a classical case of how “corporate 
governance regimes around the world shaped by different sets of cultural values, are also divided with 
regard to the question: for whose benefit should corporations be governed” (Rossouw, 2009).  
In addition, this result of a higher level of Masculinity among Saudi Majority shareholders also implies 
their low level of willingness to involve Minority shareholders in listed corporations’ activities, which 
they are entitled to by the OECD principles. The logic behind such unwillingness is due to the size of 
private benefits of control Majority shareholders can enjoy (Bebchuk, 1999). For example, “when 
private benefits are large, initial owners, maintain a lock on control to increase fraction of 
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surplus"(Bebchuk, 1999). Therefore, initial owners strive to maintain their private benefits of control, 
especially when control is valuable, to keep rivals away from capturing these private benefits.  
Moreover, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between Femininity as a 
dimension and information awareness. Speculatively, the amount of information provided to Minority 
shareholders regarding their basic voting rights and how they can exercise them decreases the private 
benefits of control enjoyed by Majority shareholders. Not only that, but it would also improve the 
overall level of CG compliance of listed Saudi corporations as Minority shareholders become part of 
the process of monitoring their corporations. Hence, private benefits of control, enjoyed by Majority 
shareholders, would be curbed if the exercise of OECD Principles of Minority shareholders’ rights was 
guaranteed.  
Moreover, the media effect on public pressure is highly recommended by Dyck and Zingales (2004) as 
a mechanism of curbing private benefits of control. Also, Dyck and Zingales's previous research 
suggests that the media is capable of exposing bad corporate practices and inducing corporate 
managers to bow to social and environmental pressures (Dyck & Zingales, 2002; 2003).  
Interestingly, Religion and Femininity were found not to be significant in this study even though it was 
expected they would have some sort of correlation via the null hypothesis testing, Fisher test. The 
assumption was based on the observation that religions, including Islam, were expected to have some 
effect on ensuring equitable treatment of individuals. Nevertheless, the lack of support for this 
assumption indicated by this study is confirmed by other studies, which found no significant 
correlation between Religion and Femininity (e.g. Matoussi & Jardak, 2012). 
Overall, support for Hypothesis 4, the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in high MAS cultures such as the Saudi, is found via the 
descriptive statistics and hypothesis tests as indicated and supported by the relevant literature. 
5. Long Term Orientation 
Saudi shareholders scored 32 on the LTO dimension using the Mode. Hence, this low score on LTO is 
indicative of the Short Term Orientation of Saudi shareholders and their normative thinking (Hofstede 
et al., 2010). This finding is reflective of Hofstede’s et al. (2010) score of 36 on LTO.  
Moreover, Minority shareholders scored higher on LTO as compared to Majority and Sophisticated 
shareholders using the Mean. The Mean of Minority shareholder on this Dimension was 30.7, 
Sophisticated 30.4 and Majority 27.2. Even though there was a slight difference in the level of LTO 
found in each Saudi shareholder group using the scores derived from the descriptive statistics, the non-
parametric test of Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney show that Saudi Minority shareholders scored 
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129% and 93% higher on LTO as compared to Majority and Sophisticated shareholders respectively. 
Hence, the higher score of Minority shareholders on LTO implies their pragmatic approach towards 
their investments and represents their higher orientation towards future dividends and their higher 
willingness to wait longer for dividends as compared to other Saudi shareholders’ groups. In fact, this 
observation is confirmed by the Fisher exact test, which shows a significant relationship between LTO 
and Saudi shareholder type. 
Therefore, these results have concrete implications related to the level of dividends and their due time 
as distributed by listed Saudi corporations. Specifically, due to the low level of LTO of Saudi 
shareholders as a whole and higher level of LTO of Minority shareholders, implying their higher level 
of pragmatism towards their investments compared to other Saudi shareholders’ group, Saudi 
corporations are culturally compelled to pay future rewards in the form of dividends to all shareholders 
on a regular basis regardless of Minority shareholders’ willingness to wait longer (Bae, Chang & Kang, 
2012).   
Moreover, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between LTO and information 
awareness. Speculatively, the amount of information provided to Minority shareholders regarding their 
basic financial rights contributing to their wealth maximisation influences the size and time of 
dividends distributed to them. In fact, this causal relationship has been well documented through 
regressions, revealing a negative association between listed corporations' levels of dividends and the 
LTO score (Bae et al. 2012).   
In addition, listed Saudi corporations have been found to usually distribute 100% of their generated 
income as dividends (Osman & Mohammed, 2010). Also, agency cost is found not to be a critical 
driver of dividend policy due to the fact that Saudi listed corporations are highly leveraged via bank 
debt (Al-Ajmi & Hussain, 2011). However, Zakat (an Islamic tax: 2.5 percent of a company’s unused 
assets in hand) has been found to play a critical driving role in explaining dividend policies employed 
by Saudi listed corporations (Al-Ajmi & Hussain, 2011).  
In addition, the Fisher hypothesis test shows a significant correlation between LTO and Education and 
LTO and Religion. This correlation is significant as it shows how education can decrease the effect of 
using religion as a point of reference and a source of information regarding the application of the CG 
principles prescribed by the OECD.  
For example, 73.5% of all respondents required a religious permit from religious scholars to call for 
the application of the OECD principles of CG pertaining to shareholders’ rights: 87.5% of Majority 
respondents required a blessing whereas 74.3% of Minority respondents required a blessing. Hence, 
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the level of awareness regarding shareholders’ rights, Majority were aware of 70-80% of their rights on 
average, whereas Minority shareholders were aware of 10%, did not cause a decrease in the religious 
effect but rather the level of LTO as Minority shareholders’ scored higher on this dimension compared 
to other groups of Saudi shareholders. In addition to that 91% of Minority shareholders, on average, 
were found to hold high qualification compared to 87.5% of Majorities, on average (see Appendix C3). 
Overall, support for Hypothesis 5, the quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights, as 
defined by the OECD principles of CG, is low in low LTO cultures such as the Saudi, is found via the 
descriptive and hypothesis tests as indicated and supported by the relevant literature. 
In summary, undoubtedly Hofstede’s (1980-2010) CVD model has the explanatory power to reveal 
differences in CG worldwide (Chan & Cheung, 2012). In fact, it is common to find weak Minority 
shareholders’ protection and a low level of CG compliance in emerging markets such as Saudi Arabia 
characterised as high on Power Distance, Collectivism, Uncertainty Avoidance and low on Femininity 
(Rafiee & Sarabdeen, 2012). Furthermore, self dealing and insider trading are expected to be high in 
Saudi Arabia due to the low score on Individualism and high score on Power Distance, and 
Uncertainty Avoidance (Licht, 2001). 
Moreover, the distribution of each CVD dimension was found not to be the same when comparing the 
groups of Majority with Minority shareholders. Nevertheless, segmenting the CVD dimensions into 
groups of shareholders was criticised by Hofstede via a researcher’s exchange with him. He advised 
the researcher, 
"Dear Mr Alfordy, these national dimensions do not apply to groups like minority and majority shareholders… 
The dimensions approach belongs to organizational anthropology, whereas your study [referring to the 
comparison between groups] belongs to organizational sociology" (Hofstede, email, March 18
th
, 2015) (see 
Appendix D3). 
The following is the researcher’s reply to Hofstede:  
"Initially, my study aimed at exploring the effect of organizational anthropology pertaining to Saudi Arabia on 
the nature of CG compliance and its level. In fact, the corporate governance literature has been enriched by the 
use of your dimensions in this regard including the referenced work of Semenov (2000) in Hofstede (2001). In 
fact, the majority of my study falls within that line of investigation. 
However, breaking down the analysis and applying the national dimensions to groups like minority and majority 
shareholders is rather a crime I shall be charged for. Actually, that’s where I tried to move from a macro-
investigating level of anthropology to more of a micro-sociological level. 
 I admit that’s where I disagreed with the literature on the applicability of your national dimensions being "static" 
or even applicable only on a "macro scale". The existence of alternative sources of inspirations is either limited or 
currently proposed such as the work of Patel and Rayner (2012) which I have used in my analysis. 
In other words, I have been highly influenced by the approach of Amir Licht who has referred to your work as 
valuable in understanding social institutions.  He has theoretically switched focus between anthropology and 
sociology on values and their dynamics, stating "national cultures can be seen, metaphorically, as the mother of 
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path dependence dynamics in the sense that they play a role in both the origin and in future development of 
corporate governance systems … In their very essence, values are social norms, as social norms affect individual 
behavior and social institutions" (Licht, 2001). 
 
Moreover, the reason the researcher segmented the groups of Saudi shareholders was due to pure 
statistical logic to find whether any discrepancies between groups might call for further testing, which 
in this study was found to be the case. Hence, significant correlations were found when comparing the 
CVDs of Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Femininity, and Long Term 
Orientation between Majority and Minority shareholders.  
Thus, these significant correlations expose two different cultures pertaining to Majority and Minority 
shareholders in Saudi Arabia. The Majority shareholders belong to the ‘egalitarian culture’ (Patel & 
Rayner, 2012) whereby members of this culture distinguish themselves from non-members (Gross & 
Rayner, 1985). Hence, those members frequently interact with each other on an organisational level, 
and “are close knit, consensual and egalitarian internally, they are unrelenting in criticizing what goes 
on outside their ‘walls of virtue’ ” (Thompson, 1996 cited in Patel & Rayner, 2012, p. 10).  
On the other hand, Minority shareholders belong more to the ‘fatalistic Culture’ where “behaviors are 
strongly regulated by socially assigned classifications (Gross & Rayner, 1985). Hence, individuals 
have little free choice (Coyle & Ellis, 1994) and even lesser group support. Therefore, the rationality 
these individuals adhere to is fatalistic because they do not perceive themselves as controlling 
anything” (Patel & Rayner, 2012).  
As a consequence, Saudi Minority shareholders, due to their passively fatalistic culture, align their 
interests with the interests of the dominantly active culture of Majority shareholders (Patel & Rayner, 
2012). As a result, there is no doubt that “national culture is an essential determinant for the design of 
corporate governance systems” (Breuer & Salzmann, 2012). Therefore, the nationally active culture of 
the egalitarian Majority is responsible for the design of the CG system in Saudi Arabia while the 
passively fatalistic culture of Minority aligns itself to their interests. 
In addition, the most commonly presented finding through the Fisher Hypothesis test was how each 
CVD except LTO correlated significantly with the level of information shareholders were aware of 
concerning their rights. The implications of these findings are consistent with the effect of 
globalisation and media found in relevant literature in raising awareness.  In fact, globalisation aided in 
the creation of the OECD principles of CG and compliance with its procedures as required of the 
profession by all member countries. Moreover, not only is compliance with the OECD principles 
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monitored by the OECD, but also the design of shareholders’ awareness programmes in emerging 
markets such as the Saudi is requested by the OECD, as noted by Koldertsova’s (2011) OECD report. 
There is no doubt that compliance with the OECD principles of CG pertaining to Minority 
shareholders’ rights is capable of creating better adoption of local accounting standards, and 
consequentially will produce better protection of Minority rights. In addition, globalisation will 
continue to have a major effect on CG systems as exchange of ideas about laws and regulations is more 
likely to increase the transfer of legal knowledge (La Porta et al., 2008).  Notably, Siems (2006) points 
out, 
“as the social, political and economic conditions that form the background to shareholder law come closer 
together internationally, the law itself will also grow more similar (‘convergence through congruence’). 
Secondly, individual interest groups will press for a greater approximation of laws (‘convergence through 
pressure’)". 
 
Most importantly, the CVD of Saudi Culture has a major implication for the institutional development 
of the Saudi accounting profession and its existing procedures, as illuminated by Institutional theory.  
Institutional theory, with its macro focus, predicts and offers “a wide range of applicability for 
understanding the practice of accounting… draw on a broad variety of insight from cognitive science, 
cultural studies, psychology and anthropology … draw attention to multiple levels of analysis ranging 
from the individual organization to society” (Scott, 2001 as quoted in Hoque, 2006, p. 188).  
Accordingly, listed Saudi corporations are expected, in accordance with institutional theory, not to 
“conform to a set of institutionalized beliefs because they ‘constitute reality’ or are taken for granted, 
but often because they are rewarded for doing so through increased legitimacy, resources, and survival 
capabilities” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977 as quoted in Scott, 1987, p. 6).   
Moreover, this theoretical implication of Institutional theory will be further discussed in the upcoming 
sections under the legal and political conclusions drawn from the qualitative phase of this research. 
This is because the "starting point for most INS-informed studies is an assumption that intra-
organisational structures and procedures, including accounting, are largely shaped by external factors 
rather than cost-minimizing objectives” (Hoque, 2006, pp.186-187). 
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7.2 Second Research Question: 
1- What other factors influence the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations’ with the 
OECD principles with respect to the protection of Minority shareholders’ rights? 
7.2.1 Answer  
In order to answer this research question, a thorough traditional literature review was conducted. This 
review signified the legal and political factors to consider as variable constructs for the semi-structured 
interview questions (see Appendices B2 & B3). Moreover, the semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in full accordance with the interpretive paradigm of this study as discussed earlier in chapter 
4. 
Moreover, the qualitative findings of this section corroborate the quantitative findings in terms of 
shedding light on the legal and political factors influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi 
corporations’ with the OECD principles with respect to the protection of Minority shareholders’ rights.  
In addition, such corroboration is capable of revealing new nuances of deeper social and cultural 
phenomena explored within this research and examined in part through the more formal analysis 
discussed in the previous section. Therefore, the legal and political factors are further explored for the 
purpose of this research to provide a comprehensive account of CG practise in Saudi Arabia in relation 
to Minority shareholders’ rights.  
Therefore, three in-depth face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with two highly 
regarded commercial lawyers and one interview with an ex-legislator, forming a judgmental sample, to 
explore their attitudes, beliefs, and experiences in regard to the legal and political factors influencing 
the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations with the OECD principles with respect to the 
protection of Minority shareholder rights.  
The data analysis process of the interviews involved both functional and interpretive analysis as 
detailed in Chapter 6 and the findings were as follow: 
7.2.1.1   Legal Factors 
A. Assessing the Legal Environment on CG Compliance in Saudi Arabia: 
Courts of laws are not specialised to deal with commercial cases in Saudi Arabia. The absence of 
specialised courts through which Minority shareholders can redeem their rights legally is currently an 
obstruction to the growth of CG compliance (Djankov et al., 2008). 
In addition, Saudi judges, due to the requirement that they hold Islamic qualifications, are not properly 
equipped to deal with the nature of specialised commercial law suits such as CG. The emphasis of their 
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qualifications is purely based on Islamic Principles, which has, according to one of the participants, 
caused "the delay and stretching of all commercial lawsuits in the commercial courts". 
Therefore, the state of CG enforcement in terms of its legal rules and their enforcements (La Porta et 
al., 1997) is lacking a ‘judgment authority’ as implied by the low level of execution of CG laws. 
Moreover, the current legal environment guiding CG procedures in Saudi Arabia attaches a low level 
of significance to Minority shareholders, which is indicative of an agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders, families, and Minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1997). 
Perhaps, this low level of significance given to Minority shareholders might be due to the origin of the 
Saudi Arabian Companies Act of 1965 and the SCGRs of 2006 issued by SCMA being the products of 
a historical process shaped by interested parties (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Moreover, the Saudi CL 
of 1965 was not collectively "modified in an educated planned manner" as stated by one of the 
participants but rather in a manner serving the elites. In addition, the current state of the Saudi CL of 
1965 is considered outdated and its outdated version fails to protect Saudi Minority shareholders (Al-
Madani, 2011, Al-Zahrani, 2013). Despite the Saudi government’s intention to reform CG, the Saudi 
CL of 1965 “has not been modified to any significant degree; it is still not sufficiently effective, and 
does not address many important points relating to shareholders’ rights in listed companies" (Al-
Zahrani, 2013).  
In addition, Saudi Corporate law has suffered from the ‘Copy and Paste’ effect of the adoption of 
Egyptian civil law. Hence, this kind of civil law is indicative of power vested in the hands of 
politicians and wealthy elites (La Porta et al., 2000, 2000b). Moreover, this ‘civil law effect’ can be 
seen in the distribution of power within the CG laws in Saudi Arabia allowing top management to 
establish control or enabling major shareholders to have the most consequential effect.   
Evidence from the Saudi legal environment shows that major shareholders hold the ultimate power in 
listed corporations as the law empowers them to appoint boards and hold them accountable (Cools, 
2005), a fact also noted by one of the participants, who is aware of a lawer representing two listed 
corporations.  
In addition, institutional investors have utilised their powers excessively in the market over the last 
decade to increase their share prices, as indicated by one of the participants. Hence, it is evident that 
institutional ownership has weakened the quality of earnings as institutional investors appear to have 
used their increased empowerment to influence management so that they could increase the value of 
their shares in the short run (Jiang & Rajan, 2009).   
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Moreover, qualitative evidence gathered from the interviews is indicative of the policy implementing 
focus of the nature of legislation (La Porta et al., 2008) in the Saudi legal environment. Participants 
stated that "no care" is exercised in CG legislations as the implementation of care is responsible for 
protecting shareholders (Lele & Siems, 2007).  Not to mention, most of the CG imported laws, in 
Saudi Arabia, have a policy focus basis, stemming from a political need as summed up by one of the 
participants with the Aristotle Onassis example with ARAMCO. 
 These political needs have aided the construction of strong mandatory rules (Coffee, 2001) at the 
expense of a strong market creating a demand for legal rules (Coffee, 2001). In fact, "there is at least 
some evidence that strong legal rules hindered the growth of [stock markets], the reverse does seem to 
be true: Strong markets do create a demand for stronger legal rules" (Coffee, 2001). As indicated by all 
the participants, the role of CG laws, in Saudi Arabia, has been activated for the benefits of powerful 
individuals and there is no remedial legislation for minorities. Hence, the nature of legislation is not in 
favour of establishing Minority rights (Coffee, 2001).  
Cumulatively, all of the previous insights show that the nature of legislation in Saudi Arabia regarding 
CG laws leans towards a policy focus. Hence, Saudi CG legislation has a civil law tendency guided by 
precondition-strong mandatory rules (La Porta et al., 2000b) as explicitly stated by the ex legislator, 
"the power to legislate is in the hands of the powerful". Hence, “the policy implementing focus of civil 
law versus the market supporting focus of common law—explains well why legal rules differ" (La 
Porta et al., 2008). 
B. Assessing the Strength of Minority Legal Protection: 
All participants were of the opinion that the existing Minority shareholders’ protection put in place in 
Saudi Arabia was purely nominal. This nominal effect has translated into the low level of extensive 
disclosure via private enforcement channels such as licensed auditing firms (La Porta et al., 1999). In 
addition, the low level of awareness and the absence of awareness programmes have contributed to the 
low quality of law enforcement regarding the means of redress provided to Minority shareholders 
whose rights are not made explicit by the responsible authorities (Berglof, 1997). As explained by one 
of the participants, “if there was quality, there would have been some consistency in applying and 
executing the law”.  
Moreover, ease of litigation, low burden of proof, specialty of courts, and access to information for 
Minority shareholders to examine self dealing (Djankov et al, 2008) are basic legal privileges not 
provided to Minority shareholders by the Saudi legal environment as it stands. Hence, the Saudi legal 
environment does not possess an acceptable level of quality enforcement as prescribed by Djankov et 
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al. (2008). Furthermore, the arms length approval by disinterested shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008) 
in legal proceedings is considered an unprecedented practice in the Saudi legal environment, as noted 
by all participants. 
C. Assessing the Saudi Stock Market’s Development: 
All participants agree that the problem of insider dealing was serious and very common in Saudi 
Arabia, and it is the central problem of CG (Djankov et al., 2008). In addition, they all agreed that the 
appropriate preventive measures had not been put in place to deter this widespread insider dealing. 
Effectiveness in regulating self-dealing is the fundamental element of shareholders’ protection and a 
strong predictor of stock market development (Djankov et al, 2008). For instance, one of the 
participants expressed his frustration regarding the level of fines imposed by SCMA and stated that 
these fines were "small and un-detrimental". Hence, the public enforcements via small fines for 
corporate offences are not considered as an effective mechanism (Djankov et al, 2008). Nevertheless, it 
seems to be the convention in Saudi Arabia as the qualitative evidence indicates. 
In addition, solving the agency conflict between controlling families and Minority shareholders 
through improving the legal environment via extensive disclosures (La Porta et al., 1999) has not been 
beneficial in Saudi Arabia. In fact, participants provided evidence and testimony regarding the nature 
of disclosure provided by some Saudi listed corporations. There seems to be a practice of presenting, 
En 3: "diluted" or rather “artificially cosmetic" financial statements. Hence, private enforcement via 
ongoing disclosure of self-dealings transactions with ease of litigation provided to aggrieved 
shareholders is a basic privilege Minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia are unable to exercise. 
Moreover, the Big Four audit firms are part of this common practice in the Saudi market, as testified 
by one of the participants who used to prepare fake financial statements for his law office clients! 
Therefore, the qualitative evidence as mentioned above substantiates the findings of La Porta et al., 
(1999) that "such strategies [extensive disclosure] won't succeed as long as those controlling families 
are hiding behind their pyramidal structures ". As a result, and as predicted by Institutional Theory 
Normative Isomorphism, Saudi listed corporations are well-adopted to “the structures and procedures 
advocated by particular dominant professions, professional bodies and/or consultants"(Hoque, 2006, p. 
188). Nevertheless, these adopted structures and procedures advocated by the accounting profession in 
Saudi Arabia suffer from external forces such as powerful controlling families, owning 75% of listed 
corporations (Al-Zuhair, 2008), causing the application of CG procedures to be kept to the minimum 
level. As noted by the OECD report of 2010, “disclosure in the MENA region [including Saudi Arabia] 
is kept to the statutory minimum, and accountability is exclusively to the top, not to a broader public or 
an independent regulator” (Koldertsova, 2011). Moreover, SCMA is also responsible for this practice 
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as a legislating, implementing, and monitoring agency of CG as prescribed by the laws of SMCI 
(2015) and SCMA (2015). 
Once again, and as indicated by the Institutional theory Coercive Isomorphism, SCMA failed in 
exerting the appropriate level of forces to ensure that listed Saudi corporations adopted the appropriate 
CG internal structures and procedures (Hoque, 2006). As a consequence, the level of compliance with 
CG laws in countries such as Saudi Arabia is kept to the statutory minimum (Koldertsova, 2011).   
Moreover, the ex-legislator viewed the insider dealing problem as partially caused by the Minister of 
Finance because he is appointed. He explained, "he is one of those guys with political power or a 
companion of them who tries to please them…[Therefore,] minorities only have to…tag along with 
whatever benefits Majority shareholders". Hence, this piece of qualitative evidence supports the 
insights indicated by the Institutional Theory that  
“a theory of institutional isomorphism may help explain the observations that organizations are becoming more 
homogeneous and that elites often get their way, while at the same time enabling us to understand the 
irrationality, the frustration of power, and the lack of innovation that are so commonplace in organizational life" 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 157). 
 
As a consequence, when examining the criteria for the quality of legal protection provided to Saudi 
Minority shareholders such as effectiveness in regulating self dealing transactions, their appropriate 
disclosures, and their public and private enforcements, the conclusion must be that not only is the legal 
environment premature but also directors of listed Saudi corporations have not been serving their 
fiduciary duties to the best of their knowledge. As clearly stated in the OECD principles of CG of 
2004, directors are part of the process of regulating the issue of self dealing (Djankov et al., 2008).  
Moreover, the legal environment as characterised by legal rules and their enforcement has a major 
impact in determining the size of any given country's capital market (La Porta et al., 1997).  The logic 
behind such associations is that "a good legal environment protects the potential financier against 
expropriation by entrepreneurs-it raises their willingness to surrender funds in exchange for securities, 
and hence expands the scope of capital markets" (La Porta et al., 1997). Therefore, the strong 
relationship revealed between weak investor protection and the size of capital markets is indicative of 
the Saudi capital market’s  'unfriendly' investor laws which “kept investors relatively weak and assured 
controlling families and states larger roles to play in economic developments” (La Porta et al., 1997). 
D. Assessing the Effect of Convergence Through Concurrence: 
Moreover, the majority of participants expressed negative views regarding the potential existence of 
interest groups, other than controlling families and institutional investors, and perceived their potential 
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effects on the level of CG convergence through pressure (Siems, 2006) to be negative. Hence, as it 
stands, all participants doubted the ability of potential individual interest groups pressing for a greater 
approximation of the Saudi CG laws with international CG standards regarding Minority rights. The 
reason behind their suspicion was due to initially the need to "filter, clean, and rinse the existent 
interest groups", En3. 
However, this view was contradicted by the ex-legislator, who saw not having a left-wing party 
oriented towards interest groups voicing the opinions of Minorities and representing their interests as 
responsible for the current state of weak Minority shareholder protection. In fact, leftist parties are 
considered one of the best means through which CG reforms can be accomplished because 
shareholders, in countries such as Saudi Arabia, are too poorly organised to constitute an effective 
coalition on the political continuum (Cioffi & Hopner, 2006: Gourevitch,  Pinto & Weymouth , 2010).  
Nevertheless, the disagreement between participants can be best explored by the interest of the Saudi 
government in foreign investments and private initiatives. Interest group alignments capable of 
producing pro-diffusion policies in authoritarian regimes require "a strong interest by that regime in 
foreign investment and in private initiatives" (Gourevitch, 2008). However, an exception to this rule in 
certain countries such as Saudi Arabia might speculatively be due to the size of its natural resources 
and oil wealth (Gourevitch, 2008). Hence, such country can operate without being attractive to foreign 
investors.  
Perhaps, this insight can explain the slow introduction of a leftist party in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, due 
to the high level of ownership concentration by powerful families, it can be speculatively expected that 
the dominant lobby in Saudi Arabia resembles a right leaning party that is pro-business. Hence, the 
resistance of this right-leaning party in Saudi Arabia is to be expected as this party will be tempted to 
“protect established reforms of organized capitalism, [and] concentrated stock ownership" (Cioffi & 
Hopner, 2006). 
“Through lobbying, Wealth concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and other 
institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It 
could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform… Concentration of control might also have been a 
detriment to the evolution of the countries' legal systems. A concentrated control structure of the whole corporate 
sector could lead to the suppression of minority rights and hold back the institutional development of legal and 
regulatory channels to enforce these rights" (Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000). 
 
Hence, convergence through congruence (Siems, 2006) is less likely to happen in a country where 
Minority shareholders are not well represented at the legislative level. Therefore, it can be said that the 
current low level of Saudi Arabia’s CG convergence with international CG standards regarding 
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Minority rights is caused by "lack of awareness on the part of the law executers and minority 
shareholders, En1" as put by of one of the participants.  
In addition, all participants agreed that the effect of functional convergence at the level of security 
regulations (Coffee, 1999b), bringing in the appropriate CG laws regulating the rights of Minority 
shareholders such as the OECD principles, in Saudi Arabia was most likely to have a nominal effect.  
This nominal effect can be best explained by the Institutional Theory Normative Isomorphism as it 
sheds some light on the Accounting Profession and its governing bodies in Saudi Arabia, failing short 
on advocating the appropriate CG internal structures and procedures to aid   listed Saudi corporations 
in reaching an acceptable level of compliance with international CG standards. In addition, the 
adoption of better accounting standards per se will not lead to an increase in earnings quality, in the 
opinion of the participants. Rather, the earnings quality increases when mandatory IFRS is adopted in a 
country where such investors' protection regimes are found strong (Houqe, Van Zijl, Dunstan & Karim, 
2012). 
Hence, it can be interpreted that functional convergence, in Saudi Arabia, will not have a positive effect 
unless reform of the legal environment takes place in terms of: ease of litigation, establishment of 
specialised courts, appointment of competent qualified judges in CG commercial cases, and creation of 
awareness programmes for Minority shareholders regarding their rights. Perhaps, making the legal 
reform more radical in giving Minority shareholders explicit rights, enabling them to be remedied, 
might prove to be a progressive step as suggested by Berglof (1997). Therefore, the Coercive 
Isomorphism, "whereby impinging external factors (e.g. government policy, regulation, supplier 
relationships) exert force on organizations to adopt specific internal structures and procedures" (Hoque, 
2006, p.188), might be a good starting point in Saudi Arabia. In particular, when the qualitative 
evidence points to how the accounting profession and its monitoring agencies such as SCMA and 
SOCPA have failed in their normative attempts as they claim to improve the level of accountability. 
Therefore, there is a substantial need for the CG guiding professions, in Saudi Arabia, to improve their 
operations as also implied by institutional theory: 
“ a review of accounting studies is also suggestive that public sector accounting researchers have probably paid 
more attention to institutional theory than others have…this focus is understandable because public sector entities 
are required to demonstrate accountability and in this regard accounting is seen as one way in which public sector 
entities can legitimate their operations” (Hoque, 2006, p. 196). 
 
Moreover, globalisation, as indicated by the qualitative evidence, is more likely to have a major effect 
on the Saudi legal system because exchange of ideas about laws and regulations is more likely to 
increase the transfer of legal rights (La Porta et al., 2008). As best put by the ex-legislator, En2, 
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"Indeed, I believe being open to globalisation, marriage of thoughts and international trade has a 
benefit. They may impose on us certain laws to reach their acceptable level of exchange”. In addition, 
the view that, "the social, political and economic conditions that form the background to shareholder 
law come closer together internationally, the law itself will also grow more similar 'convergence 
through congruence'" (Siems, 2006) was also supported by all participants. However, the majority of 
participants expressed some caution in the application of such transfer of legal knowledge on the 
grounds that what might have suited one country may not suit another. 
7.2.1.2 Political Factors 
A. Assessing the Political Factors Shaping CG in Saudi Arabia: 
Participants provided substantial evidence that the Saudi Arabian House of Consultancy resembles a 
proportional majority voting system where the majority wins. Hence, that explains the low degree of 
shareholder protection politically provided under proportional voting systems, as indicated by Pagano 
and Volpin (2005). In addition, the 'appointment' recruiting technique of members of the Saudi House 
of Consultancy, as expressed by all participants, has cultivated a conservative party. As a result, this 
party has not fashioned new interest group alliances of the middle class making up a leftist, pro- CG 
reform party in Saudi Arabia (Cioffi & Hopner, 2006). Instead, the preferential treatment of appointing 
members to the Saudi Arabian House of Consultancy has resulted in recruiting members of controlling 
families, resembling a right-leaning party that is pro-crony capitalism and concentrated ownership 
structure (Cioffi & Hopner, 2006). As a result, those appointed members serve a conservative agenda 
of a right-leaning party that protects established forms of organised capitalism embracing the 
concentrated ownership choices of corporate structures (Cioffi & Hopner, 2006).  
Therefore, the level of policy swing is expected to be low as legislation is politically shaped by 'un-
institutionally' appointed members of parliament who serve a right-leaning party agenda protecting 
established forms of organised capitalism (Cioffi & Hopner, 2006). Hence, fewer policy swings are 
considered the reason that block holding remains an attractive option, as indicated by Gourevitch 
(2008). Most importantly, the theory of Roe (1994) regarding policies being capable of discouraging 
ownership concentration is considered doubtful as "ownership concentration is a consequence of poor 
legal protection of Minority shareholders" (La Porta et al., 1999). 
In addition, all participants’ views of the effect of Saudi Arabia’s institutions on the nature of listed 
Saudi corporations’ compliance with CG laws pertaining to Minority rights were negative. The root 
cause behind this perceived negativity, according to one of the participants, was due to the 
"government service sector failing short on its responsibilities” En1.  
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As a consequence of governmental institutions falling short on their responsibilities, controlling 
families are practically considered as an institution as perceived by the majority of participants. These 
controlling families own 75% of listed Saudi corporations (Al-Zuhair, 2008). "Controlling families are 
primary institutions- in the governance of economic systems -produces a new model of governance 
representing an alternative template to the Anglo American model" (Steier, 2008). Hence, the existence 
of this familial institution is more likely to continue to manifest itself in the governance of transitional 
and emerging economic systems such as the Saudi one (Steier, 2008). In addition, its survival is 
dependent on the institutional context of whether or not familial capitalism is potentially favourable or 
unfavourable to economic developments (Steier, 2008). 
Moreover, according to one of the participants "there is no such clear governmental organisation or 
institution where minorities can go to, refer to, or approach for their sakes, En3". As a result, the 
quality of law enforcement regarding the means of redress by minorities in respect to suspected 
offences committed against them is very low due to the weak legal infrastructure of Minority 
shareholders’ protection in Saudi Arabia. Hence, this finding reinforces a previous finding that the 
agency problem in countries such as Saudi Arabia is expected to be severe because such contractual 
conflict is between controlling families and Minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999).  
In addition, the qualitative evidence provided by participants indicates that current interest groups such 
as wealthy families and religious institutions have created barriers to future policies (Claessens et al., 
2000). These interest groups have powerful lobby influence which has aided in the de-promotion of 
private initiatives and genuine interest in foreign investments (Gourevitch, 2008). 
Moreover, the majority of participants perceived the effect of the Saudi government's involvement in 
the economy on the nature of CG compliance of listed Saudi corporations as negative. This negativity 
was felt to be partially due to individuals with governmental power such as controlling families trying 
to fight the proper application of CG laws. In addition, the majority of participants perceived those 
governmental interventions to have been for the benefits of the elites. Thus, "centralized institutions 
can be too powerful, leading to anxiety, which then produces the defensive reflex of block holding" 
(Gourevitch, 2008), which is the case in Saudi Arabia where controlling families own 75% of listed 
corporations (Al-Zuhair, 2008). 
In fact, Institutional theory sheds light on this phenomenon as found in Saudi Arabia. DiMaggio and 
Powell view the spread of such familial corporations as firstly due to ‘the natural selection’ occurring 
“in government agencies or in faltering corporation on political rather than [on] economic ground … 
[secondly] key elites guide and control the social system through their command of crucial positions in 
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major organizations”(1983, p.157). Therefore, the use of Institutional Isomorphism is theoretically 
sufficient in explaining the widespread of homogeneous organisational structures in a developing 
country like Saudi Arabia where the homogeneity of block holding can be better explained on political 
grounds rather than economical ones.  
Moreover, the growth of security markets and increase in dispersed ownership structures have been 
found to correlate, “closely not with specific legal rules or protections, but with the appearance of a 
private sector that is relatively free from direct governmental interference” (Coffee, 2001). Hence, 
economies characterised as decentralised are capable of nurturing the growth of security markets by 
allowing entrepreneurs to invent their own techniques to make their investments credible for 
stakeholders to invest in (Coffee, 2001). 
In addition, regarding the effect of the absence of a constitutional process on the nature of listed Saudi 
companies’ compliance with CG laws pertaining to Minority rights, both law practitioners were 
skeptical over the applicability of this so called constitution in Saudi Arabia in terms of aiding the level 
of CG compliance.  This was because, "[the Quran] is filled with enlightenment and wisdom but you 
can't execute it as is” En 1. However, both still perceived it as a constitution even though what is 
'available' does not explain how power is distributed legally over the whole spectrum of the population, 
as emphasised by the ex-legislator. “[Having a clear constitution] is a principle factor. This will 
improve the economical and political dimensions in any country. It will even lead to the distribution of 
power between people instead of having the power in certain hands of the population.” 
Therefore, it can be interpreted that the existence of this so called Islamic oriented constitution, in 
terms of not showing how power is legally distributed and the intentionally vague interpretations, is 
equivalent of having no constitution. Hence, the absence of a solid constitution creates the potential for 
market interventions by centralised authorities (Gourevitch, 2008). Also, the lack of a solid constitution 
weakens popular pressure to safeguard Minority shareholders' rights; as a result, this effect will 
promote a block holding model of corporate control instead (Gourevitch, 2008). In fact, some existing 
CG regimes around the world have been found to benefit key politicians and controlling families, as 
confirmed by La Porta et al., (1997. 2000b), This observation was substantiated via the qualitative 
analyses of this research's interviews.  
Specifically, the word choice "mood and desires" were used by one of the law practitioners as the 
reason behind the government not agreeing with the religious committee on specific interpretations of 
Islamic legislation stemming from the Quran. Perhaps, this can explain the inefficient governmental 
involvement in the economy to improve the level of CG compliance. Nevertheless, institutional theory 
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provides a better explanation for these phenomena as found in Saudi Arabia. 
" A consideration of isomorphic process also leads us to bifocal view of power and its application in modern 
politics…The first as March and Simon (1958) and Simon (1957) pointed out years ago, is the power to set 
premises, to define the norms and standards which shape and channel behaviour. The second is the point of 
critical intervention (Domhoff, 1979) at which elites can define appropriate models of organizational structure 
and policy which then go unquestioned for years to come (Katz, 1975) such a view is consonant with some of the 
best recent work on power ” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 157). 
 
B. Assessing the Political Economy: 
It is safer to assume a multi-dimensional framework when determining the factors influencing the 
development of an economy and its capital market. Moreover, there are no doubts that the legal system 
has a major effect on the development of any financial system, the size of its security market and 
ultimately its economy as a whole (La Porta et al., 1997. 1999, 2000b, 2002, 2006, 2008). 
Nevertheless, political changes and power drives are found to have critically influenced financial 
developments worldwide (Haber, 1991, 1997). 
Evidence of high surplus extracts was substantiated via the qualitative interviews in the Saudi stock 
market at the IPO stage. In fact, one of the participants provided an insight that the announcement of 
IPO is commonly perceived, in Saudi Arabia, as an indicator of founders trying to divest their 
corporations due to future-profit feasibility issues such as rapid changes in technology requiring major 
investment in production lines. Moreover, the existence of large benefits of control is also indicative of 
high concentrated ownership structure, weak institutions contributing to weak shareholder protection, 
and laxity of Minority shareholder laws (Bebchuk & Zingales, 2000; Dyck & Zingales, 2004: Coffee, 
2001b), as found in Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, in such an environment allowing the extraction of high surplus at the IPO stage, founders 
are encouraged to go for control transfers despite the socially optimal choice (Bebchuk & Zingales, 
2000). Furthermore, when private benefits of control are found high in any given country, its publicly 
traded companies chose to have a few controlling shareholders, or rather choose not to go public at all 
to reap the rewards of the private benefits of control (Bebchuk, 1999). This explains the high 
percentage of concentrated ownership by controlling families in Saudi Arabia, who own 75% of listed 
corporations (Al-Zuhair, 2008). 
Moreover, a "corporate law system that effectively limits private benefits of control can produce more 
efficient choices of ownership structure" and eventually leads to a dispersed ownership structure that is 
accompanied by a strong shareholder protection regime (Bebchuk, 1999). As a result, such weak legal 
protection can also lead to limiting the development of any security market and in turn compels initial 
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owners to opt for the choice of offering too little public ownership (Bebchuk & Zingales, 2000). 
Hence, “any source of private control benefits is of concern if a goal of the legal system is to ensure 
that all shareholders participate proportionally in the value of the company" (Bebchuk & Kahan, 1999). 
This means that    
" many institutional variables, taken in isolation, seem to be associated with a lower level of private benefits of 
control: better accounting standards, better legal protection of minority shareholders, better law enforcement, 
more intense product market competition, a high level of diffusion of the press, and a high rate of tax 
compliance" (Dyck & Zingales, 2004).   
 
In addition, all participants agreed that the existence of a persuasive political voice was essential for 
the success of listed Saudi corporations. Hence, it is really difficult for potential entrepreneurs seeking 
external capital (Coffee, 2001) to succeed in the Saudi market without a persuasive political voice (La 
Porta et al., 1999) as substantiated by the qualitative evidence. 
Moreover, evidence of constant reinforcement by the Saudi government and controlling families 
(Coffee, 2001) was provided sporadically but shyly throughout the interviews. Nevertheless, "much 
contemporary evidence demonstrates that concentrated ownership systems can serve as a means by 
which powerful families and governments reinforce each other and control economies in some areas of 
the Third World" (Coffee, 2001). Hence, crony-capitalism is the political outcome of such mutual 
reinforcing techniques and is the dark side of concentrated ownership (Coffee, 2001). Moreover, once 
the concentrated ownership structure transforms into crony-capitalism, uniting both the political and 
the economical powers, the effect of the law becomes minimal (Coffee, 2001).  
However, it was explicitly clarified by one of participants, the ex-legislator, that those controlling 
families, “are the ones who protect their immunities in the government. It is not like the government 
has a policy for them. But rather, those families are powerful, and their power allows them to get into 
legislations, En2". As witnessed by Gourevitch, 
“Governments are controlled by small numbers of officials who restrict access to authority, police, courts, and the 
media. The two oligarchies interact. The corporate insiders use their special path to political power to get money 
and contracts, and to prevent entry or competition into their business. The state authorities rely on the corporate 
types for financial and economic resources useful to keeping power and restricting access of outsiders to political 
influence. The relationship has acquired the label ‘crony capitalism’" (2008). 
 
Thus, controlling families in Saudi Arabia have the power and interest to expropriate Minority 
shareholders. In fact, controlling families are found to neither support nor encourage legal reforms 
enhancing Minority shareholders’ rights; instead, these families are found to lobby against such 
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reforms (La Porta et al., 1999). Hence, the legal effect becomes minimal in such an environment 
(Coffee, 2001) as indicated by the qualitative interviews. 
Consequently, it is not surprising to find that three Saudi families dominate more than 41% of 
executive board positions in listed Saudi corporations trading on the Saudi Stock Market (Saad, 2015). 
In addition, these three families occupy the boards of 68 listed corporations out of 168 listed Saudi 
corporations trading in the stock market. In addition, 17 other families dominate other boards of Saudi 
Listed Corporations. These families are: 
Table 7.3: Saudi Families Dominating Executive Board Positions 
Number of Board members Economic Sector involved in Number of Listed corporations 
present in 
Family Name 
66 9 55 AL-Saud 
52 36 55 Al-Aissa 
52 9 39 Al-Rajhi 
31 1 2 Al-Zamil 
33 7 33 Aba Alkhail 
33 7 33 Al-Quaiz 
33 3 31 Al-Rashed 
31 2 31 Al-Gammdy 
31 7 9 Al-Saif 
31 5 9 Al-Suilm 
9 7 9 Al-Turki 
9 7 9 Al-Shiekh 
9 3 9 Al-Twaijri 
9 3 9 Al-Amran 
9 3 2 Al-Muhidib 
9 5 2 Al-Rasheed 
9 5 9 Al-Saleh 
9 5 2 Ali Rida 
9 7 2 Al-Mulhim 
9 1 5 Al-Ageel 
Source: Saad (2015) Maaal Economic Newspaper on the 18
th
 of March 2015 
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Moreover, these families are found to concentrate in the Banks, Petrochemical, Cement, Insurance, and 
Building and Real Estate sectors (Saad, 2015). In fact, a look at the Social Network Theory (SNT) 
graph designed by the researcher below confirms the previous findings of Saad (2015). (See Appendix 
E for a full description of the SNT Theory on listed Saudi Corporations). 
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7.3 Research Contribution 
7.3.1 Theoretical Contribution 
A. In terms of theory building 
i. “Questionnaire based research approaches are unsuitable since many concepts underpinning 
the institutional explanations are difficult to measure” (Hoque, 2006, p.197). Nevertheless, this 
research has, unprecedentedly, quantified the application of institutional theory by employing 
elements composing the institutional theory such as cultural values, (Hofstede et al., 2010), 
and norms as prescribed by its founders, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and  Scott (1987) in the 
build-up of the questionnaire. As a result, the questionnaire as a whole was capable of 
measuring the CVD of the Saudi national culture based on the principles of CG found in the 
OECD forum pertaining to Minority shareholders rights. Not only that, but the measurements 
were in confirmation with Hofstede’s et al. (2010) findings. 
 
ii. The assignments of Hofstede's et al. (2010) dimensions to the OECD principles of CG 
governance pertaining to Minority shareholders in this study should be seen as a 
comprehensive contribution when other studies such as Chiper, (2010) have tentatively 
suggested the possibility of interpreting OECD principles from a cultural value context such as 
Hofstede et al. (2010). 
 
iii. This study confirms the suitability of using Hofstede’s (1980-2010) CVD model as a 
paradigm, in line with the interpretive paradigm of this study, to discover potential correlations 
between culture and the quality of compliance with CG principles.  
 
iv. This is the first study that has investigated the OECD principles of CG pertaining to the rights 
of Minority shareholders from a cultural perspective using Hofstede’s et al. (2010) CVD 
model. 
 
v. This study reinforces the strength of Hofstede's et al. (2010) unit of analysis being the culture, 
not the individual, in countries with a low level of ethnic variety (Khastar et al., 2011) such as 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
vi. Moreover, “a review of accounting studies is also suggestive that public sector accounting 
researchers have probably paid more attention to institutional theory than others have…this 
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focus is understandable because public sector entities are required to demonstrate 
accountability and…legitimate their operations” (Hoque, 2006, p. 196).  However, in 
developing countries where familial capitalism prevails with governmental blessing, the 
accountability of the CG regime is of a major source of concern for-profit firms. Therefore, 
application of Institutional theory, as demonstrated by this research, is not only suitable to 
assess Saudi listed corporations' accountability but also capable of shedding further light on 
potential correlations between Saudi culture and the level of compliance with CG codes and 
principles by Saudi listed corporations, taking into account legal and political factors. 
 
vii. In addition, the legal and political sections of this research are the first attempts to look into the 
issue of Minority shareholders’ rights in Saudi Arabia from a CG perspective. In fact, recent 
research papers have only looked at the issue only from a legal perspective; for example: (Al-
Madani, 2011; Al-Zaid, 2012; Al-Zahrani, 2013; Al-Kahtani, 2013; Al-Habshan, 2015). In 
addition, no research papers were found that looked at the political influence of the Saudi 
Arabia system on CG in regard to Minority shareholders’ rights. 
 
A. In terms of the way the literature is steered,  
i. This research study has taken advantage of integrating the cultural literature bordering on 
anthropology, psychology and sociology in hand with the counting theory of Institutional 
Isomorphism. Not only that, but also the nature of previous CG literature has been 
considered in terms of their common epistemological and ontological grounds.  Hence, the 
potential researcher can find this study's cultural section of the literature review 
dimensionally comprehensive to utilise for potential research focused on the impact of 
culture on CG. 
 
ii. This research has provided a dimensional framework for assessing CG regimes in 
developing countries by integrating cultural, legal, and political factors in a unified 
framework. Such integration was motivated by the gaps found between these disciplines. 
For instance, the well-known scholars in each of those disciplines, to name a few: La Porta 
et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008) in the legal discipline; Licht (2000, 2001 & 
Licht et al., 2002, 2005) in the cultural discipline; Pagano and Volpin (2005) and Coffee 
(1999, 2001) in the political discipline, insisted on the appropriateness of their singular 
factor assessments when assessing the strength of Minority shareholders' regimes 
worldwide. Hence, such integration, based on the positive results of the empirical and 
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qualitative phases, confirms the criticality of the variables extracted from the literature, 
which validates the adopted one-dimensional model of this study. Therefore, other 
countries of similar culture can rely on the proposed model to assess the strength of their 
CG regime in light of Minority shareholders’ rights. 
Figure 7.3: Proposed multi-dimensional Model 
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As the diagram depicts, cultural factors in terms of Hofstede (2010) CVD model, as confirmed by this 
study, do have an affect on the application of OECD principles of shareholders’ rights. Specifically, 
the affect of these CV dimensions can be seen on their influences on the broad constructs derived from 
the literature review phase such as 1) rights of Shareholders, 2) Self Dealing, 3) Insider Trading, 4) 
Executive Compensation, and 5) Disclosure. In addition, a positive effect as depicted by the green 
arrow in the diagram shows how these CV dimensions can aid the functional convergence in terms of 
the broad constructs resulting in the development of such capital market that is characterized of an 
audit-oriented performance. Hence, a higher level of compliance and dividends pay-out is expected.  
Moreover, such outcome confirms with the view of Karl Marx that Modernization leads to the decline 
of traditional values and their replacement with modern values that are capable of producing a 
‘governance friendly culture’. Such governance friendly culture is highly receptive of the effects of 
globalization and media, which transcends into an openness convergence of values and trade 
regulations. Otherwise, the CV dimensions of such society as the Saudi as confirmed by this thesis can 
have a negative effect on the application of the OECD principles of CG which will interplay with the 
legal and political factors as depicted by the red arrow that connects all factors together. Hence, here is 
where Max Weber’s theory that traditional values are stable and persistent will come into a play. 
Hence, the effect of globalization through the OECD organization is constrained by cultural factors 
leading to undeveloped market and weak institutions’ infrastructures via the legal and political factors 
as confirmed by this thesis in Saudi Arabia.  
Moreover, as the diagram depicts legal factors do have a direct influence on CG. For instance, legal 
factors in terms of the quality of the legal environment and its enforcement procedures do have and 
affect on the application of OECD principles of minority shareholders’ rights. Such influence can be 
negative as depicted by the red arrows leading to low quality of law and law enforcements resulting in 
creating sources of private benefits for major shareholders and ultimately undeveloped market that is 
characterised of a compliance audit seeking to convey legitimacy and pays lower level of dividends. 
However, a positive effect of legal factors will translate into proper evolution of regulations such as 
security law, common law and civil law as depicted by the green arrows. As a result, the institutional 
environment will be strengthened to reflect positively on the application of OECD principles of 
minority shareholders’ rights. 
Moreover, as the diagram depicts political factors in terms of the political system of such country and 
its interest groups do have a direct influence on CG. Such influence can be negative as depicted by the 
red arrows leading to the preference of concentrated ownership structures, pyramid structures and 
ultimately paving the way for crony capitalism. Such outcome also produces, as seen in the negative 
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effect of legal factors on CG, undeveloped market that characterised of a compliance audit seeking 
legitimacy and paying lower level of dividends. However, the green arrows depict positive effects of 
the political factors. These arrows show how such political system and interest groups can positively 
influence the legal factors to evolve its regulations, which can ultimately lead to the development of 
the institutional environment and consequentially will have a positive effect on the application of 
OECD principles of minority shareholders’ rights.  
7.3.2 Empirical Contribution:  
Hofstede’s CVD (1980-2010) has been demonstrated by this study to be capable of providing a 
rigorously suitable mean to reveal relations between the Saudi national culture and the quality of the 
application of CG principles found in the OECD forum regarding Minority shareholders' rights (Breuer 
& Salzmann, 2012). Nevertheless, it should be noted that due to the limited size of the data pertaining 
to this study and the time frame imposed, the researcher utilised the relevant literature to address 
possible causations driven by strong correlations found in this study. Hence, the below, empirical 
contributions of this study are moderately generalizable since the extent of this research findings and 
conclusions conform with the findings of external resources. For instance, Hofstede’s (2010) results 
regarding the Saudi society’s CVD are in line with this research’s findings and the reported 
correlations, found between those CV dimensions and the application of OECD principles of CG, are 
well grounded in the relevant CG literature. However, the dependability of the extension of this 
research’s findings is not absolute; however, statistically probable as sound generalizability requires 
data on large populations. Therefore, the reported empirical results below should be extended with care 
and due diligence taken into account the limited size of data used. 
The measurements of Saudi Shareholders’ CVD based on OECD principles of CG 
Table 7.1: CVD of Saudi Shareholders based on OECD Principles of CG Using the Mode 
 Individualism Power Distance Uncertainty Avoidance Masculinity/ 
Femininity 
Long Term Orientation 
Hofstede 25 95 80 60 36 
This study 49 75 74 48 32 
Source: The Author 
 The study provides significant correlations between each of Hofstede’s CV dimension and the 
quality of the exercise of Minority shareholders’ rights as defined by the OECD principles in 
Saudi Arabia. Hence, all hypothesis derived from the literature were supported.   
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 One of the most interesting finding of this study is the substantiation of the value of CVD 
framework at a micro sociological level. The researcher believes that the application of the 
CVD framework is not restricted to the arbitrary boundaries of national states at the 
anthropological level, as set by Hofstede (2010) and discussed on Page (202-203) of this 
chapter, but rather to the boundaries that define social clusters of social groups on the micro-
sociological level as seen in the work of Patel & Rayner (2012). What matters here is the 
identification of significant cultural value dimensions of differences between sub-groups. 
These CVD dimensions are different as explored in this thesis relating to social classes of 
Saudi Shareholders. In addition, the prevailing attitudes of sub-groups such as Majority 
shareholders, who in countries of weak institutions, do provide another model of CG. Hence, a 
priori will differ along a number of dimensions from Minorities as indeed confirmed by this 
thesis. So, to a large extent, the researcher would argue that the CVD framework is self-
justified to be used on a micro-sociological level and such proceeding is productive in 
unveiling significant correlations between sub-groups and their effects on the level of CG 
compliance. For example in this study, the distribution of each CV dimension was found not to 
be the same when comparing the groups of Majority and Minority shareholders. Hence, 
significant correlations were found when comparing the culture value dimensions of 
Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Femininity, and Long term 
Orientation between Majority and Minority shareholders. Hence, the significant correlations 
expose two different subcultures an active culture pertaining to Majority and a passive culture 
pertaining to Minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. It is therefore safe to assume that the 
nationally active culture of Majority is responsible of the design of the CG system in Saudi 
Arabia while the passively fatalistic culture of Minority aligns itself to Majority interests (Patel 
& Rayner, 2012).   
 In addition, each CVD except LTO correlated significantly with the level of information 
shareholders were aware of concerning their rights. The implications of these findings are 
consistent with the effect of globalisation and media found in the relevant literature.  In 
summary, this research study suggests that Hofstede’s dimensions have the explanatory power 
to uncover differences in corporate governance worldwide, as has been previously noted in the 
CG literature (Chan & Cheung, 2012). Therefore, it is typical to find weak Minority 
shareholders protection and a low level of CG compliance in emerging markets characterised 
as high on Power Distance, Collectivism, Uncertainty Avoidance and low on Femininity 
(Rafiee & Sarabdeen, 2012).  
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7.4 Research limitations:  
This present research study has its limitations. These limitations stem mainly from the size of the data 
collected, research methodologies employed, and interpretation of findings. Hence, even though the 
findings of this research study are valuable, they should be viewed in light of the limitations of this 
present research.
 
1. The present study was conducted in two major commercial cities in Saudi Arabia: Riyadh, the 
capital, and Jeddah, which is considered the commercial capital. Therefore, even though the majority 
of Saudi listed corporations are located in the specific geographical areas of the cities of Riyadh and 
Jeddah, some of the findings pertaining to Saudi CVD might be specific to these locations. 
Nevertheless, the CVD of Saudi shareholders’ of this study is confirmatory of Hofstede's et al. (2010) 
findings for Saudi Arabia. Hence, many of the findings of this research can be considered 
representative of Saudi Arabia as a whole since the units of analysis were Saudi groups of 
shareholders, and the majority of listed corporations are located in these two cities of Riyadh and 
Jeddah. However, caution should be exercised since generalisation of the results could be limited based 
on the size of the data used. 
2. A further limitation of this present study is that the population sample of 83 participants 
classified as Majority, Sophisticated, Minority and Non-shareholders was identified via trading room 
managers and further tested by the researcher on the level of information awareness possessed. Due to 
the size of the data, and the locations for the survey, it is possible that these shareholders were not 
representative of all listed corporations across all sectors. Some of the findings might be sector-specific 
and generalisation of such findings to all other sectors might be inappropriate. However, the findings 
regarding the limited amount of information provided to all type of shareholders pertaining to their 
rights, as prescribed by the OECD principles of CG, via the Saudi Capital Market Authority provides 
this research with an ability to generalise such findings across all sectors, but with caution.  
3. Due to the limited size of the data, 83 participants, the quantitative analysis was not capable of 
producing causation. Hence, the majority of the findings were correlations. However, reliance on the 
existing literature has aided in addressing the correlations to a well-established level of 'causation' in 
the research analysis.   
4. This present research study employed a cross-sectional quantitative analysis design of the 
cultural section. Hence, the observational analysis of the data collected was only done at a specific 
point in time without taking into account a time-series analysis, which would have been more 
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indicatively explicit of a behavioural or a cultural change. However, as advised by Hofstede via his 
email (see Appendix D3), this should not be a point of concern as cultural values are resistant to 
change over time, which is in confirmation with Max Weber's (1904) emphasis on the persistence of 
traditional values despite economic and political changes. However, it should be recognised that the 
researcher kept "an open mind' regarding whether or not cultural values are persistent and considered 
opposing schools of thoughts such as Karl Marx's (1973) emphasising the convergence of values with 
economic developments.  Eventually, however, the researcher became more convinced that the 
persistence of Cultural values confirms the views of the  present research study as not only does this 
view conform with the main theory employed by this research, Institutional  theory, but it is also in 
line with Hofstede's advise expressed to the researcher in this regard. 
5. The findings of the semi-structured interviews were subject to the 'memory and recall bias' of 
the participants (Alwin, 1977). Nevertheless, the researcher believes that such bias can be reduced by 
the careful selection of highly educated experienced participants to mitigating this limitation to some 
extent.  
6. The sample of the semi-structured interviews was quite limited due to the nature of knowledge 
required, sensitivity of issues, and the limited time frame of this present research study. Consequently, 
two well-educated experienced lawyers were interviewed along with a highly educated ex-legislator. 
The interviews were designed to explore their personal perceptions of the legal and political factors 
that influence the strength of Minority shareholders' protection in Saudi Arabia. Hence, generalisations 
of the qualitative findings to other stakeholders beyond the scope of this present research are limited as 
the segments chosen were carefully considered on the ground of the interview constructs.  
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7.5 Research Implications 
This present research study has generated a number of findings that might have relevant implications 
for policy makers, CG practitioners, and potential CG researchers. However, the implications to be 
discussed below should not be viewed as being by any means exhaustive as they are intended to 
stimulate ideas on how such insights from this study might aid policy makers, CG practitioners and 
future CG researcher with respect to the impact of cultural, legal, and political factors on the rights of 
Minority shareholders. 
7.5.1 Implications for the Accounting Profession and its Monitoring Bodies: 
The findings derived from this study pertaining to the cultural, legal, and political factors' impacts on 
the rights of Minority shareholders and their interplay will be very valuable for practitioners as they 
seek to enhance the level of CG compliance of listed Saudi companies. For instance: 
1. The findings present valuable evidence that the majority of Minority shareholders are aware of 
only 10 % of their rights as prescribed by the OECD principles. Hence, awareness programmes 
carried out by SCMA can be valuable to Minority shareholders because they will enable them 
to become part of the monitoring process of listed corporations they have an interest in. 
2. Moreover, the findings of this study present undisputable evidence that Minority shareholders 
lack appropriate courts of law where their disputes with listed corporations can be settled. 
Furthermore, traditional courts in Saudi Arabia suffer from the dual judiciary system. Hence, 
there is a need for a commercial court that can judge cases on CG grounds to preserve the 
rights of Minority shareholders. To this end, SCMA can initiate or implement a temporary 
monitoring agency over listed Saudi corporations to look into disputes until appropriate 
commercial courts can be established. 
3. In addition, the findings of this study present insights into the credibility of financial reports 
produced by licensed audit firms in Saudi Arabia. Hence, there is a need for the SCMA to look 
into this issue and try to rejuvenate the inactive role of SOCPA to tackle this issue. 
4. The Saudi accounting profession should realise the fact that effectiveness in regulating self-
dealing is the fundamental element of shareholder protection and a strong predictor of stock 
market development. Hence, their 'auditing attempts' should highly scrutinise and be on the 
lookout for these sort of activities when auditing listed Saudi corporations which, due to their 
concentrated ownership structure, have tempting tendencies for potential self-dealing activities 
that benefit major shareholders. 
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5. The Culture value diminution of Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Power Distance 
imply a high level of information asymmetry between managers and insider investors, 
Majority shareholders, at the expense of outside shareholders. Hence, this implies the need for 
greater transparency and disclosure to establish a better reward allocation system based on 
equity, equal rights and protection for all stakeholders by the accounting profession.
 
7.5.2 Implications for Policy Makers 
The implementation of a concrete legal system is crucial for the development of a strong Minority 
shareholder protection regime that ultimately covers the whole Saudi Arabian economy. Hence, some 
of this present study’s findings have potentially important policy implications, which are: 
1. The high score of the Saudi culture value dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance is indicative of 
the excessive amount of CG laws put in place in Saudi Arabia to avoid the unknown, covered 
by the institutions of SCC, SMCI, SOCPA, and SHEC. Moreover, the dual legal system 
complicates the CG process and not only makes it problematic but also affects audit 
performance. Therefore, policy makers should take into account how such culture value 
dimensions have caused the accumulation of excessive amount of laws guiding the CG regime 
in Saudi Arabia, which eventually has contributed to the low level of CG compliance by listed 
Saudi Corporations.  
2. The high score of Masculinity by Saudi Majority shareholders should direct Policy makers 
attention to the fact that Saudi Majority shareholders concern for Minority shareholders and 
their rights as prescribed by the OECD principles is expected to be minimal, especially when 
those Majority shareholders are in the position to run corporation on a day to day basis. Hence, 
future CG legislations should place Majority shareholders under scrutiny to ensure no wrong 
doing by them might affect the rights of Minority shareholders as prescribed by the OECD 
principles of Minority shareholders' rights.  
3. Policy makers should take notice of institutional investors’ increased power to influence 
management so that they could increase the value of their shares in the short run.  Therefore, 
future legislation should place institutional investors under scrutiny to ensure no privileges are 
lawfully given to them to excessively exercise influence against Minority shareholders. 
4. The absence of specialised courts through which Minority shareholders can redeem their rights 
legally is currently an obstruction to the growth of CG compliance. Hence, policy makers 
should strive to bring about specialised commercial courts capable of producing 'authoritative 
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judgment' in line with OECD principles of CG pertaining to the rights of Saudi Minority 
shareholders.   
5. In addition, Saudi judges, due to their requirement of Islamic qualifications, are not properly 
equipped to deal with the nature of specialised commercial law suits such as CG. Hence, 
policy makers should strive to appoint appropriate commercial judges who are academically 
well equipped with the necessary knowledge to judge cases on the merits of OECD principles 
of CG pertaining to the rights of Saudi Minority shareholders. 
6. Moreover, ease of litigation, low burden of proof, specialty of court, and access to information 
to examine self dealing by minorities (Djankov et al, 2008) are basic legal privileges not 
provided by the Saudi legal environment as it stands. Hence, the Saudi Legal environment does 
not possess an acceptable level of quality of law enforcement, as prescribed by Djankov et al. 
(2008). Moreover, the arms length approval by disinterested shareholders (Djankov et al, 
2008) in legal proceedings is considered an unprecedented practice in the Saudi Legal 
environment, as noted by all participants. Hence, policy makers should ensure the existence of 
the necessary authorities to address all of the above obstructive issues to the growth of a strong 
Minority shareholder protection regime in Saudi Arabia.  
7. Policy makers should realise the fact that this low level of significance given to Minority 
shareholders might be due to the origin of the Saudi Arabia corporate law, which is a product 
of a historical process shaped by interested parties.  The ‘civil law effect’ can be seen in the 
distribution of power within CG laws in Saudi Arabia. Evidence from the Saudi legal 
environment shows that major shareholders possess the ultimate power in listed corporations 
because the law empowers them to appoint the boards and hold them accountable. Hence, 
current CG laws should be carefully examined with the aim of protecting the weakest link: 
Saudi Minority shareholders. 
8. Policy makers should be aware of the fact that Saudi legislation has historically contained  ‘a 
civil law' tendency guided by precondition-strong mandatory rules stemming from a political 
view as opposed to a market need. Hence, policy makers should ensure that new CG 
legislation reflects a need for the market to re-organise its activities.  
9. Perhaps, making the legal reform more radical in giving Minority shareholders explicit rights 
to be prevented from expropriation and enabling them to be remedied might prove to be a 
progressive step, as suggested by Berglof (1997). 
10. Saudi Political Legislators should realise that having a leftist party presence at the Saudi 
Consultative Council will aid in voicing the opinions of Minorities and represent their interests 
as the current dominant right-wing party at the Consultative Council is partially responsible of 
the current state of weak Minority protections. Left-leaning parties are considered one of the 
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best means through which CG reforms could be accomplished because shareholders, in 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, are too poorly organised to 'constitute an effective coalition' on 
the political continuum. 
11. Saudi Political legislators should consider whether the absence of a solid constitution has 
created the potential for market interventions by centralised authorities. Hence, the lack of a 
solid constitution has weakened the popular pressure to safeguard Minority shareholders' 
rights. 
12. In addition, political legislators should take into account how the existence of a persuasive 
political voice has become essential for the success of listed Saudi corporations. Hence, it is 
really difficult for potential entrepreneurs seeking external capital to succeed in the Saudi 
Market without a persuasive political voice. As such, this effect has highly contributed to an 
immature capital market in Saudi Arabia. 
 
7.5.3 Implications for Future Studies  
As a good research study tends to generate more questions than answers, the conclusions as well as the 
limitations of this research suggest possible venues for future research, as follow.  
 
1. The dynamics of culture can only be fully understood in light of longitudinal studies that seek 
to monitor the conditions of CG compliance over a period of time. Hence, to generate richer 
findings, longitudinal studies of listed Saudi corporations’ compliance with OECD principles 
of CG can be conducted over a period of time. Such a study would be able to investigate any 
shift in the Saudi culture and its corresponding effect on the quality of compliance with OECD 
principles of CG due to global harmonisation efforts carried out by the OECD. 
 
2. In addition, future studies can investigate the level of CG compliance of the Saudi Accounting 
Profession, such as SOCPA and SCMA, with the OECD principles in light of the Saudi 
culture. The researcher found a discrepancy between SCMA answers on the OECD survey of 
2011 aimed at “identifying priorities for regional and country specific CG reforms” (OECD, 
2011), and the reality of the practice as detailed in the qualitative discussion of this research.  
 
3. Due to the limited size of the data collected (83 participants); the scope of the quantitative 
study of this research can be expanded numerically by future research to uncover further 
findings. 
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4. The analysis of the quantitative section of the questionnaire revealed that 73.5% of all 
shareholders required a religious permit from religious scholars to call for the application of 
the OECD principles of CG pertaining to shareholders’ rights in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this 
observation should be of great significance for future research as it sheds light on the effect of 
religion on CG application of OECD principles and the level of compliance with CG principles 
pertaining to Minority Shareholders’ rights in Saudi Arabia. In fact, the present research could 
not establish such a correlation. Perhaps a bigger sample with a particular focus on the effect 
of religion might uncover significant findings. In addition, the dominant Islamic sects of a 
country such as Saudi Arabia should be taken into account with such investigations, as Islamic 
sects differ in their orientations. For example, some Islamic sects are more focused on justice; 
hence, a higher level of Femininity is expected to be associated with a better level of CG 
compliance compared to other sects. By contract, other sects focus more on hierarchy and on 
followers’ unquestioning submission; hence, a higher level of Power Distance associated with 
a lower level of CG compliance is to be expected. 
 
5. The legal and political factors influencing the level of CG compliance of listed Saudi 
corporations can be examined in terms of the extent to which they are caused by cultural 
selection criteria. Hence, future research can explore how the Saudi culture has shaped the 
legal and political framework of CG in Saudi Arabia. 
 
6. One of the most interesting avenues for future research can be a further substantiation of the 
value of CVD framework at a micro sociological level.  Hence, future researchers can take 
advantage of the application of Hofstede (2010) model on a micro-Sociological level to unveil 
prevailing attitudes of sub-groups such as Majority shareholders, who in countries of weak 
institutions do provide another model of CG. Hence, a priori will differ along a number of 
dimensions from Minorities as indeed confirmed by this thesis. So, to a large extent, future 
researchers can argue that the CVD framework is self-justified to be used on a micro-
sociological level and such proceeding is productive as confirmed by this thesis. 
 
7. In addition, future researchers can take advantage of the dimensional framework for assessing 
CG regimes in developing countries by integrating cultural, legal, and political factors in a 
unified framework as seen in this thesis. Moreover, such integration confirms the criticality of 
the variables extracted from the literature, which validates the adopted one-dimensional model 
of this study. Therefore, other countries of similar culture can rely on the proposed model to 
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assess the strength of their CG regime in light of Minority shareholders’ rights. Moreover, 
future researchers can focus on the interplay between these factors. And, they can qualitatively 
or quantitatively measure the political, legal, and political factors all at once as they see fit in 
accordance with the objectives and paradigms of their studies.  
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9. APPENDIX A: LITERATURE REVIEW APPENDIX 
9.1 APPENDIX A.1: Data Extraction Form 
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9.2 APPENDIX A.2: A Sample of Reviewed Studies  
A Sample Table of Culture, CG and Minority Shareholders’ Interests 
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political 
processthat 
influences the law 
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and political 
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testable hypotheses with 
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finance. 
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governance 
systems 
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further 
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governance 
research and 
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framework should 
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of evidence 
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article are 
anecdotal at best. 
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individualism and 
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2-This study also 
indicates that 
earnings 
managementis 
unrelated to 
religiosity or specifi 
creligious 
denominations 
despite the social 
stigmaengendered 
by major religions 
against 
manipulativeactiviti
es. This result can 
be rationalizedin 
several ways. Unlike 
tax evasion for 
example,earnings 
management is not 
necessarily 
viewedby religious 
adherents as being 
solely manipulative. 
Earnings 
management may be 
morenuanced and 
may be ascribed, at 
least someof the 
time, to a positive 
economic 
activity,namely, 
management ’ s 
attempt to signal 
firmproductivity. An 
alternative 
explanation is that 
religious 
denomination and 
religiosity matter 
but they are 
subsumed by other 
cultural variables. 
 
In our opinion, . 
 
resu
lts 31 
countr
ies 
 
Used 
for 
this 
study 
mitigating 
earningsmanagemen
t is dependent upon 
culture. 
 
In particular, 
controlling for 
culture, the Leuzet 
al (2003) result that 
legal enforcement 
mitigatesearnings 
management can no 
longer be 
demonstrated. 
However, we find 
that 
earningsmanagemen
t continues to be 
inversely relatedto 
outside investor 
rights. 
 
Limitation and 
future research 
 
Our earnings 
management study 
is limited 
by the aggregated 
cross-country 
research designof 
Leuz et al (2003) 
which we adopt in 
this study. Our study 
could benefit from 
moredisaggregated 
measures of 
religious 
affiliationand 
religiosity and from 
a more 
comprehensiveset of 
country-level data. 
Furthermore,extendi
ng the study of 
religiosity and 
earningsmanagemen
t beyond the country 
level to the CEO-
firm level is clearly 
a desideratum.Does 
the religiosity or 
religious affiliation 
of 
the CEO mitigate 
earnings 
management? 
Weleave these 
issues for future 
research. 
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9.3 APPENDIX A.3: Results of the Descriptive Analysis 
 
Distribution of studies by articles, conference proceedings, reports and doctoral theses: 
 
Document type Total documents 
Articles 155 
Books 93 
Theses 10 
Working Papers 7 
Conference Proceedings 3 
Reports 5 
Electronic Lectures 3 
News papers 1 
Total  277 
 
9.4 APPENDIX A.4: literature review technique 
Introduction 
The network theory of model developed by Hesse (1966-1980) has been used as a literature 
review technique. The technique of such model is based on the assumption that well-
established literature in any subject area "represents a series of nodes in an interlinked network 
of theoretical and empirical developments" (Ryan, Scapens & Theobald, 2002). Hence, 
articles containing significant theoretical developments and at the core of the literature have 
been defined and referred to as the 'grandmothers': "other articles, which are still important in 
developing significant strands within the literature, we describe as 'mothers’ and the remaining 
as 'daughters' (Ryan et al 2002). In fact, such model has been heavily relied on when 
constructing the theoretical, cultural, legal, and political literature reviews of this research 
paper. 
In addition, the most cited articles in a subject area were selected for initial readings. 
Moreover, ‘the key articles' cited by the authors as principally generative were identified and 
read. Such process as advised by (Ryan et al, 2002) was repeated back through time to map 
out all nodes constructing the elements of such grounded assumption pertaining to the subject 
and adjacent areas of this research. In addition, an exhaustive literature search process of 
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published and unpublished studies was transparently carried out and aimed to provide an audit 
trail of the researcher's procedures and conclusion (Tranfield, Denyer & Smart, 2003). (See 
APPENDIX A.2). 
F. Searching  
The first stage of the process was aimed at identifying the cultural impact on the rights of 
minority shareholders. The second stage was aimed at unveiling the legal factors affecting the 
strength of minority shareholders rights. The third stage was aimed at exploring the political 
factors affecting the strength of minority shareholders rights. No studies were found in the 
Saudi context. Hence, the searching process was set to focus on findings of international 
studies. Moreover, the literature review was conducted over the period between October 2012 
and March 2015. A review strategy was developed to include resources to be looked at and 
search terms to be used for each resource. 
G. Use of Search Terms  
 In this research study, keywords were systematically generated based on their relevance to the 
predefined research questions' words as keyword search is a common method of identifying 
relevant literature (Ely and Scott, 2007).Hence, the strategy used to construct the key words is 
as follows: 
4. Identify major conceptual framework derived from the research questions. 
5. Identify synonyms for key terms; Allowing databases' Boolean and Boolean AND to incorporate 
alternative synonyms. 
6. The total number of selected papers was reduced to by investigating the titles and the abstracts in order 
to exclude articles not addressing the research topic and adjacent areas.  
H. Screening  
The screening process was performed to select publications, stemming from search terms, 
meeting the pre-specified inclusion and exclusion criteria. As the pre-determined inclusion 
criteria recognize a set of characteristics classifying such publication as suitable for analysis, 
the exclusion criteria identifies a set of characteristics making such publication 
inapproriate.The tables below show both sets:
3. Inclusion Criteria: 
Rational for inclusion  CRTITERIA 
To gain a wide picture of cultural factors impacting CG In all countries: barriers to CG compliance 
APPENDIX B: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   P a g e  | 267 
 
 
 
To identify the legal factors affecting the strength of 
minority shareholder's protection  
In all countries: barriers to strength  
To identify the political factors affecting the strength of 
minority shareholder's protection  
In all countries: barriers to strength 
To capture all sort of  evidence Quantitative & qualitative methods used 
 
4. Exclusion Criteria: 
Rational for exclusion CRITERIA 
The researcher can only review studies written in English 
and Arabic 
Studies in other languages than Arabic, and 
English 
Beyond the scope of the current study Studies not   
 
I. Data Extraction  
The data extraction form included five sections: bibliographic information; focus of the study; 
methodology; findings; and analysis (see APPENDIX A.1). 
J. Reporting & Dissemination  
Reporting and dissemination of knowledge is the final stage of the systematic literature review 
process. It requires writing up the findings of the review process and circulating them to 
potential interested parties. In fact, the results of this review process were reported in at the 
2015 BAM conference at the University of Portsmouth on the 8
th
 of September 2015. 
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10. APPENDIX B: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
10.1 APPENDIX B.1: Conceptualization & Operationalization of 
Constructs: Culture Factors 
 
BROAD 
CONSTR
UCT 
Semi-Broad 
Construct 
SPECIFIC CONSTRUCT THEME OF 
ITEMS OF 
CONSTRUCT 
ITEMS 
OF 
CONSTR
UCT 
 
Factors 
 
Norms 
 
CVD Framework 
Norms = Value Dimensions 
Theme for Indices 
of Investor Legal 
rights: OECD 
Principles 
 
Items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cultural 
 
 
 
 
Shareholders’ 
Structure and 
Rights 
 
 
Disclosure 
 
Self-Dealing 
 
Executive 
Compensation 
 
Insider trading 
 
 
 
CVD & 
Economic 
Developm
ent 
 
CVD & 
Institutional 
Environment 
and CG 
 
CVD & 
Strength of 
Investor 
Protection 
 
CVD & 
Market 
maturity 
 
CVD & 
Dividend
s Pay out 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rights of 
Shareholders 
 
 
Disclosure and 
Transparency 
 
Equitable Treatment 
of Shareholders 
 
 
 
 
 
Q.1To 
Q. 33 
 
Individualis
m 
 
Individualism 
 
Individualism 
  
 
Power-
Distance 
 
Power-
Distance 
 
Power-
Distance 
 
Power-
Distance 
 
 
Uncertainty-
Avoidance 
 
Uncertainty-
Avoidance 
 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Uncertaint
y 
Avoidance 
 
Masculinity 
 
Masculinity 
 
Femininity 
 Masculinit
y 
 
Long-Term 
Orientation 
 
Long-Term 
Orientation 
 
Long-Term 
Orientation 
 Long-
Term 
Orientatio
n 
Socio-
Demogr
aphic  
 Age of Shareholder Age Q. 34, 
and Q35 
 Gender of Shareholders Gender 
 
 
 
Backgro
und 
Charact
eristics 
 Level of Education of Shareholder Education  
 
 
 
Q. 36 - 
Q. 42 
  Work 
Experience 
 Work Experience related to Stock Trading Stock 
  Period of 
trading 
  
 
Longest Period 
held onto shares 
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 Trading Experience Ownership 
Percentage 
  Awareness of 
Shareholders’ 
rights 
Note: 
Ethical Sensitivity: Stems from 
 Femininity Individualism 
Less Ethical Sensitivity: stems from 
Masculinity Uncertainty Avoidance 
 
Constructs for the Questionnaire: Cultural Factors,  
BROAD 
CONSTRUCT 
THEME OF 
ITEMS OF 
CONSTRUCT 
SPECIFIC 
CONSTRUCT 
HOFESTEDE 
CORESPONDENCE 
ITEMS OF 
CONSTRUCT 
OECD 
PRINCIPLES 
Of Shareholder’s 
Rights 
Basic shareholders’ 
rights 
information on a 
regular basis 
LTO=H Q.1 
  Participate & vote in 
general meetings 
PD=L, IND=H Q.2 
  Call a shareholders’ 
meeting  
 Q.3 
  Elect and remove 
board 
PD=L, IND=H Q.4 
  Share in the profits LTO=H Q.5 
 Shareholders’ 
participations on 
decision concerning-
fundamental 
corporate changes 
Amendments to the 
statutes 
PD=L, IND=H, UA=L 
 
Q.6 
  Authorization of 
additional shares 
PD=L,  IND=H,  UA=L Q.7 
  Pre-Emptive rights IND=H, UA=L LTO=H Q.8 
  Extraordinary 
transactions 
LTO=H Q.9 
 Shareholders’ 
participations in 
general shareholder 
meetings 
Issues to be decided at 
the meeting   
PD=L, UA=L Q.10 
  Challenge resolutions IND=H, PD=L Q.11 
 shareholders’ 
participations in key 
corporate governance 
decision 
Remuneration policy 
for board members 
IND=H, PD=L,UA=L Q.12 
  Approval of 
compensation 
schemes 
IND=H,PD=L,UA=L Q.13 
  Self-dealing 
transaction 
IND=H, PD=L, UA=L Q.14 
 Shareholders voting 
Power 
Equal effects given to 
all shareholders’ votes 
 
IND=H, FEM=H 
Q.15 
OECD Principles of Disclosure regarding financial and LTO=H, UA=L Q. 16 
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Disclosure and 
Transparency 
material information 
on: 
 
 
operating results 
  Major share 
ownership 
PD=L, UA=L 
 
Q. 17 
  Related party 
transactions 
PD=L, UA=L 
 
Q. 18 
  Foreseeable risk 
factors 
LTO=H ,UA=L Q. 19 
  Capital structures UA=L,  FEM=H Q.20 
  exercise of 
Institutional  
ownership disclosure 
to Shareholders  
corporate governance 
and voting policies 
FEM=H,PD=L,UA=L 
 
Q. 21 
  Procedures on the use 
of their voting rights. 
FEM=H,  UA=L Q. 22 
  Material conflicts of 
interest 
UA=L,  PD=L 
 
Q. 23 
 Disclosure should 
provide 
external and objective 
assurances 
FEM=H, LTO=H, UA=L Q. 24 
OECD Principles of 
Equitable 
Treatment of 
Shareholders’ 
shareholders of the 
same series of a class 
should NOT be 
treated equally 
shares not carrying 
the same rights 
FEM=H, PD=L Q. 25 
  Info about rights 
attached 
IND=H,UA=L Q. 26 
  Changes in voting 
rights 
IND=H, PD=L, FEM=H Q. 27 
 All minority 
shareholders should 
NOT be protected 
from 
Actions by controlling 
shareholders 
FEM=H, PD=L Q. 28 
  (gm) procedures 
disallowing equitable 
treatment 
FEM=H, PD=L , UA=L 
 
Q.29 
  Insider trading FEM=H, PD=L Q.30 
  Board members not 
disclosing material 
interest 
FEM=H,   PD=L 
 
Q. 31 
  (CP) disallowing 
effective means of 
redress by minorities   
FEM=H,UA=L Q. 32 
  (CP) making  it 
difficult and 
expensive for (cp) 
minorities to cast 
votes 
FEM=H, UA=L Q. 33 
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Sources for Questionnaire's Constructs:  
I. Rights of Shareholders Statements: OECD Principles Source Norm 
 
A. 
 
Your basic shareholder rights should include the right to 
 
6. Obtain relevant and material information on a timely and regular basics 
 
LLSV (1999) 
Lichet (2001) 
 
Shareholder’s Rights 
 
7. Participate and vote in general shareholder meetings 
LLSV (1999) 
Grossman's and 
Hart's(1987). 
Shareholder’s Rights 
 
8. Elect and remove members of the board 
 
OECD 2004 
Shareholder’s Rights 
 
9. Share in the profits of the corporation 
(LLSV, 2002). Shareholder’s Rights 
 
10. Call a shareholders’ meeting 
La Porta et al 
(1997,1998, 2006) 
Shareholder’s Rights 
 
 
B. 
 
You shall participate in and be sufficiently informed on decision concerning 
fundamental corporate changes such as 
 
1. Amendments to the statutes or articles of incorporation 
 
,. (Bebchuk, Cohen, 
Ferrell, 2009). 
 
Shareholders’ 
Structures 
2. Authorization of additional shares 
La Porta et al 
(1997,1998, 2006) 
Shareholders’ 
Structures 
3. Pre-Emptive rights: hold first opportunity to but new issues of stock 
La Porta et al 
(1997,1998, 2006) 
Shareholders’ 
Structures 
4. Extraordinary transactions resulting in the sale of the company 
Lichet (2001) Disclosure 
 
C. 
 
 
 
 
You shall participate effectively and vote in general shareholder meetings and be 
informed of 
 
11. Issues to be decided at the meeting 
 
OECD 2004 
 
 
Shareholder’s Rights 
 
 
12. Challenge resolutions benefiting controlling shareholders 
La Porta et al 
(1997,1998, 2006) 
Shareholder’s Rights 
& 
Self-Dealig 
 
D. 
 
You shall participate in key corporate governance decisions: Thus, Approve 
 
1. Remuneration policy for board members and key executives. 
 
(Lichet, 2001). 
Executive 
Compensation 
 
2. Compensation schemes for board members and employees 
(Lichet, 2001). Executive 
Compensation 
 
3. Disinterested shareholders regarding Self-dealing transaction 
Djankov et al 
(2008) 
Executive 
Compensation& 
Isidetrading/ 
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E. 
 
Your  votes should be given: 
1. Equal effect whether cast in person or in absentia or by Mail. 
 
La Porta et al 
(1997,1998, 2006) 
 
Shareholder’s Rights 
 
II. Disclosure and Transparency Statements; OECD Principles Source Norm 
A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: 
 
1.  The financial and operating results of a company. 
 
 
(Houqe, Zijl, Karim, 
2012) 
(Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, Lang, 
1999a). 
 
Disclosure 
2.  Major share ownership and voting rights. 
 
 
LLSV (1999) 
Shareholder 
Structures & 
Disclosure 
3.  Related party transactions. all material facts about the transaction or 
the following three items: (a) description of the assets; (b) nature and amount of 
consideration; and 
(c) explanation for the price. 
 
Djankov et al 
(2008) 
Self-Dealing& 
Disclosure 
4. Foreseeable risk factors. 
LLSV (1999) 
(Lichet, 2001). 
Disclosure 
5. Provide an external and objective assurances to shareholders 
 OECD 2004 Disclosure 
1. Capital structures enabling certain shareholders to obtain a degree of control 
disproportionate to their shares  
LLSV (1999) 
Shareholder 
Structures & 
Disclosure 
B.  
1. Institutional Investors’ overall corporate governance and voting policies 
 
 
( Jiang, Rajan, 
2009). 
Shareholder 
Structures & 
Disclosure 
 
  
2. Procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of their voting rights. 
( Jiang, Rajan, 
2009). 
Shareholder 
Structures & 
Disclosure 
 
3. Material conflicts of interest affecting the exercise of key ownership rights 
 
( Jiang, Rajan, 
2009). 
Shareholder 
Structures & 
Disclosure 
 
 
III. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders’ Problems; OECD Principles Source Norm 
 
A. 
 
All shareholders of the same series of a class should NOT be treated equally. 
 
1. Within any series of a class, all shares should not carry the same rights. 
 
La Porta et al 
(1997,1998, 2006) 
 
Shareholder’s Rights  
& Structures  
 
 
 
Info about rights attached to shares shouldn’t be obtained before purchasing 
 
 
( Bebchuk, 1999) 
 
Disclosure 
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2. Changes in voting rights shouldn’t be subject to approval by classes of shares 
negatively affected (Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, Lang, 
1999a). 
 
Shareholder’s rights 
& Structures 
Self-Dealing 
 
B. 
 
All minority shareholders should NOTbe protected from: 
 
1. Actions by controlling shareholders acting directly or indirectly for the benefits of 
their substantially invested capital 
 
 
( Bebchuk, 1999). 
(Bebchuk and 
Kahan, 1999). 
 
Self-Dealing: 
Source of Private 
benefit 
2. General meetings’ (gm) procedures disallowing equitable treatment of all 
shareholders. OECD 2004 Shareholder’s rights 
& Structure 
3. Insider trading benefiting majority shareholders. 
 
( Lichet, 2001). 
Insider Trading 
 
 
4. Board members not disclosing material interest in transactions they have stake in 
 
Lichet (2001) Disclosure  
Self-Dealing 
 
5. Company procedures (cp) disallowing effective means of redress by minorities 
 Djankov et al 
(2008) 
 
Self-dealing 
6. Company procedures making  it difficult and expensive for (cp) minorities to cast 
votes La Porta et al 
(1997,1998, 2006) 
Self-Dealing 
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10.2 APPENDIX B.2: Conceptualization & Operationalization of 
Constructs: Legal Factors: Interviews 
BROAD 
CONSTR
UCT 
Semi-Broad 
Construct 
SPECIFIC CONSTRUCT Sources Nature 
Input: Legal Environment Agency Conflict between controlling families and minorities LLSV (1999)  
A. Legal Environment  Legal rules + Their enforcements (LLSV, 1997)  
Legal Characteristics Size of capital market (LLSV, 1997) Explanator
y 
 Corporate Law Product of a historical process shaped by interested parties (Jensen and  
Mecklin, 1976) 
 
 Company Law Legal origin    civil vs. common   (LLSV, 2000).  
 Distribution of Power Management’s legal  power  to run a firm-no effect of other 
constituencies 
(Coffee, 2005)  
 Within the law Law Empowers majority holders to appoint board and hold 
accountable 
(Coffee, 2005).  
 Institutional 
Ownership 
 Use their legal empowerment to influence management to 
increase their share values in short run- effect of quality of 
earnings 
( Jiang, Rajan, 2009)  
  Policy Implementing Focus (LLSV, 2008)  
 Legislators Market supporting focus (LLSV, 2008)  
  Care exercised is responsible for protection of shareholders ( Lele and Siems, 
2006).   
 
  Level of Extensive Disclosure -Private enforcement LLSV (1999)  
B.  One-share-one-vote mechanism-voting rights LLSV (1999)  
Strength of 
minority legal 
protection 
Investor Protection Nature of  legal reform Berglof (1997) Explanator
y 
  Explicit shareholders rights Berglof (1997)  
  Arms’ and Length approval by disinterested  shareholders (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez, Shleifer, 
2008). 
 
  Mandatory dividends-   
 Quality of law  Ease of litigation= standing to sue (Djankov et al 
2008). 
 
 Enforcement Low burden of proof  (Djankov et al 
2008). 
 
  Specialty of court of Law   
  Access to information to examine self dealing (Djankov et al 
2008). 
Developme
nt 
Output:  Dispersed Ownership Structures of shares (LLSV, 2000) 
(Coffee, 1999) 
Explanator
y 
C. Criteria for the 
Quality of Legal 
Liquidity of security market  (Coffee, 1999) Explanator
y 
Stock market Protection Efficient allocation of capital (LLSV, 2000) Explanator
y 
Development  Capital market growth -Broad Financial Market (LLSV, 2000), 
(Coffee, 1999) 
Explanator
y 
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  Self dealing is the central problem of CG (Djankov et al 
2008). 
Explanator
y 
 Fiduciary duties Effectiveness in regulating Self-dealing is the fundamental 
element of shareholder protection and Strong Predictor of  
stock market development 
(Djankov et al 
2008). 
 
  Private enforcement: Ongoing disclosure of self-dealing 
transaction with ease of litigation by aggrieved shareholders 
Djankov et al 2008).  
  Public enforcement: Prison terms + Fines for self-dealing is 
not effective as a mechanism 
Djankov et al 2008).  
D. Degree of Legal 
Protection 
 Its effect on the valuations of firms LLSV (2002) Explanator
y 
Valuation of 
firms and 
Earnings 
Quality of earnings Increased with IFRS adopted in a strong investor protection 
countries 
(Houqe, Zijl, Karim, 
2012) 
Explanator
y 
 Strong Investor rights  = high returns+ high valuations and performance (Gompers, Ishii, 
Metick, 2003). 
Explanator
y 
 Dividends Pay Strong protection of minorities  = higher paid dividends ( LLSV,2000). Explanator
y 
 Takeover regulations  Setting  cost of control as high as possible is for the benefit of  
minorities 
(Grossman and Hart, 
1987). 
Explanator
y 
E. Expedited 
privatization 
With no minority protection and adequate disclosure leads to 
expropriation of minorities 
(Coffee, 1999)  
 Interest Groups Convergence through Pressure Siems (2006)  
  convergence through congruence Siems (2006)  
Convergence 
through 
concurrence 
Functional 
convergence 
At the level of security regulation than level of  corporate law 
Globalization: in terms of OECD principles, and other 
Accounting Standards such as IFRS 
(Coffee, and Berle, 
1999) 
 
 Globalization Transfer of legal knowledge between different  legal systems (LLSV, 2008).   26 items 
from here 
be taken 
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10.3 APPENDIX B.3: Conceptualization & Operationalization of 
Constructs: Political Factors: Interviews 
BROAD 
CONSTR
UCT 
Semi-Broad 
Construct 
SPECIFIC CONSTRUCT Sources Natu
re 
Input:  Proportional- majority wins: low degree shareholder protection (Pagano and Volpin, 
2005). 
 
 Voting System Majoritarian-more district wins : high degree shareholder protection (Pagano and Volpin, 
2005). 
 
  Left Parties:-preference for pro-shareholder CG reforms (Cioffi and Hopner, 
2006). 
 
 Parties Left party-fashions new interest group alliance of middle class (Cioffi and Hopner, 
2006). 
 
A.  Right Party;-protects reforms of crony capitalism-concentrated 
ownership 
(Cioffi and Hopner, 
2006). 
 
Political 
factors 
shaping CG 
in transition 
or emerging 
economy 
 
Institutional 
factors 
 
A country’s institutions may speed up or slow interest group 
activities 
Rajan and Zingales 
(2003). 
 
  Provides strong investor protection + developed market or opposite Bebchuk and Zingales 
,2000). 
 
  Entrepreneurs compelled to choose socially optimal choice of 
ownership structure 
Bebchuk and Zingales 
,2000). 
 
 Depending on 
institutional 
context 
Controlling families are primary institutions- in the governance of 
economic systems -produces a new model of governance 
representing an alternative template to the Anglo American model 
Steier (2008)  
 Interest group Interest in foreign investment Gourevitch (2008)  
  Private initiatives Gourevitch (2008)  
 Lobbying Barriers to future policy by families (Claessens, Djankov, 
Lang, 2000). 
 
  
Level of 
government 
involvement 
Centralized Economy- use banks to achieve purpose-facilitate control 
over investments-non democratic countries 
(Coffee, 2001).  
  Decentralized Economy- democratic countries:allowing 
entrepreneurs to invent their own techniques to make their 
investments credible for stakeholders 
(Coffee, 2001)  
  Free-Private sector from Gov interventions (Coffee, 2001).  
 Absences of 
Constitutional 
Process 
Creates potential for  government  interventions by centralized 
Authority 
Gourvevitch (2008)  
  Weakens popular pressure to safe guard shareholder’s rights Gourvevitch (2008)  
   Cause block holding model of corporate control Gourvevitch (2008)  
  Precondition- Strong Mandatory Rules Coffee (2001)  
 Nature of 
legislation 
Strong MKT Creates a demand for legal rules Coffee (2001)  
  Remedial Legislation- Desirable to establish minority rights Coffee (2001)  
 Policy Fewer policy swings-cause block holding remains an attractive (Gourevitch, 2008).  
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option 
Output: Private Benefit 
of Control 
 
Size of Private benefits Shapes the choice of ownership structure 
Either concentrated  Or diffused 
( Bebchuk, 1999).  
B. 
Political 
Economy 
1-psychic-check Institutional factors such as weak shareholder protection (Bebchuk and Zingales, 
2000). 
 
 2-Perquisites-
check 
Law is lax= private benefits of control is large "( Bebchuk and 
Zingales, 2000). 
 
  Surplus at IPO stage from control transfers despite socially optimal 
choice  
Bebchuk and Zingales 
(2000). 
 
 3-Dilution Separation of cash flow rights and voting rights ( Bebchuk, 1999)  
  Large Private Benefit of control= high concentrated ownership 
structure 
( Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). 
 
  Freeze out value (Bebchuk and Kahan, 
1999).   
explan
atory 
  Excessive Control by States and Families   
 Ownership Top  management-Members of controlling families (Claessens, Djankov, 
Lang, 2000). 
 
 Concentration Pyramidal Structures   
  Crony Capitalism (Coffee, 2001).  
  Difficulty for Potential Entrepreneurs seeking external Capital   
  Government & Powerful Families- reinforce each other  (Coffee, 2001)  
 Reinforcement Crony Capitalism: uniting both Gov and families (Coffee, 2001).  
  Law effect becomes  minimal (Coffee, 2001).  
  High cash flow rights =high market valuation (Claessens, Djankov, 
Fan, Lang, 1999a). 
Explan
atory 
 Firms valuation High voting right= lower market valuation (Claessens, Djankov, 
Fan, Lang, 1999a). 
Explan
atory 
  Separation of control from ownership= lower market valuation  (Claessens, Djankov, 
Fan, Lang, 1999a). 
Explan
atory 
  Higher control right= lower market valuation (Claessens, Djankov, 
Fan, Lang, 1999b). 
Explan
atory 
  Cash flow right low and control right high=expropriation of minority (Claessens, Djankov, 
Fan, Lang, 1999b). 
Explan
atory 
  Tax enforcement in reducing size of Private benefits ( Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). 
 
C. Institutional Better accounting standards ( Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). 
 
 Mechanism of Better legal protection of minority shareholders "( Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). 
 
Proposition Curbing Private Better law enforcement "( Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). 
 
 Benefit of 
control 
Intense product market competition "( Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). 
explan
atory 
  Rate of tax compliance "( Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). 
 
  High level of diffusion of the press & Media "( Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). 
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10.4 APPENDIX B.4: Survey Questionnaire: English 
A Questionnaire of the impact of Saudi Arabia Culture on Corporate 
Governance on Minority Shareholder’s Rights 
Introduction  
Dear Minority Shareholder,  
Recognizing that the future of the Saudi Stock Market will be largely based on investments of mass-minority 
shareholders’ segment, we are very eager to learn about your own experiences. In particular, we seek information 
on what you consider to be key factors of the success of your investments. Your contribution in this survey is 
therefore very important to identify these factors. By completing this questionnaire, the data you provide will 
lead to a series of recommendations to ensure the success of minority shareholders’ trading in the Saudi Stock 
Market.  
Purpose of Questionnaire: 
To Measure Saudi Minority Shareholder’s value dimensions in Relation to OECD principles of Corporate 
Governance pertaining to Minority Shareholders’ rights 
Instruction  
• Please complete this questionnaire accurately and objectively. In the absence of an option that accurately 
reflects your views, please choose the answer that seems relevant, and add any comment or explanation that you 
deem useful to illustrate your answer. Otherwise, SKIPto the next question 
• Most questions can be answered simply by ticking a box.  
• All of the answers you provide in this questionnaire WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. All information 
given will be used for the purpose of this research only. The study is being carried out in accordance with the UK 
Market Research Society’s guidelines.  
• The questionnaire should take ABOUT 15 MINUTESto complete.  
• The results of this research will be presented in the thesis to be submitted to the University of Gloucestershire, 
as required by the doctoral degree.  
• If you want a copy of the results of the study, please fill out your name, address or e-mail in the last page of the 
questionnaire.  
• Please return the completed questionnaire BEFORE 4th of  NOVEMBER 2014.  
. Rapid Feedback Scoreis provided at the end of the questionnaire; instruction of calculation‘s method is 
presented for each section to generate accumulative score on your success rate as an investor along with 
personalized , level-specific financial advice for you. 
Post : Faisal Alfordy    
           The Park, Cheltenham 
           GL50 2RH, UK 
Email : f.alfordy@glos.ac.uk 
Mobile Phone: (0044) 7747581144 Fax : (0044) 07747581144 
 
Feel free to contact us if you would like any additional information. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation 
Faisal D Alfordy 
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1. As an investor, to what extent you believe the following statements concerning your Rights 
are    autonomously important to ensure the success of your investments? 
(Please indicate your opinion regarding each statement by ticking the appropriate box) 
  (SA = Strongly agree; A = Agree; N = Neutral; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly disagree) 
 
I. Rights of Shareholders Statements SA A N D SD 
A. Your basic shareholder rights should include the right to : 
 
13. Obtain relevant and material information on a timely and regular 
basics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
14. Participate and vote in general shareholder meetings 
 
 
 
 
   
15. Call a shareholders’ meeting   
  
 
   
16. Elect and remove members of the board  
     
17. Share in the profits of the corporation  
     
B. You shall participate in and be sufficiently informed on decision 
concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: 
 
5. Amendments to the statutes or articles of incorporation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
6. Authorization of additional shares 
     
7. Assignment of Pre-Emptive Rights: given you the first opportunity to 
buy new issues of stock  
     
8. Extraordinary transactions resulting in the sale of the company  
     
C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You shall participate effectively and vote in general shareholder meetings. 
Hence, you shall:  
 
18. Be Informed of Issues to be decided at the meeting   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
19. Place items on the agenda of general meetings  
 
 
    
20. Propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations  
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21. Challenge resolutions benefiting controlling shareholders  
     
D. You shall participate in key corporate governance decisions: Thus, you 
shall Approve: 
 
4. Remuneration policy for board members and key executives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
5. Compensation schemes for board members and employees  
     
6. Self-dealing transaction affecting disinterested shareholders such as 
yourself 
     
 
E. 
 
Your  votes should be given: 
2. Equal effect whether cast in person or in absentia or by Mail.  
  
 
   
 
How do these shareholders’ rights relate to your own practical experience? 
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3. Listed below are some Disclosure and Transparency factors that may contribute to your 
success as an investor in assessing your decisions of whether to hold onto you’re shares 
or sell them. How important do you believe these factors are? 
(Please select the appropriate answer by ticking the appropriate box) 
 (VI = Very important; I = Important; N = Neutral; NI = Not important; NVI = Not very important) 
 
II. Disclosure and Transparency Statements VI I N NI NVI 
A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: 
 
1.     The financial and operating results of a company.  
 
     
 
2.     Major share ownership and voting rights.  
 
     
 
3.    Related party transactions: all material facts about such transaction or 
the following : 
         (a) description of the assets; (b) nature and amount of consideration; 
and c) explanation for the price 
 
     
6. Foreseeable risk factors.  
     
7.   Capital structures enabling certain shareholders to obtain a degree of 
control disproportionate to their shares  
 
     
B. The exercise of ownership rights by institutional investors, should be 
facilitated and disclosed: therefore, Institutional investors should 
Disclose: 
 
1. Their overall corporate governance and voting policies  
     
 
 
2. Procedures they have in place for deciding on the use of their voting 
rights. 
     
 
3. Material conflicts of interest affecting the exercise of key ownership 
rights  
 
     
C. 
Disclosure should: 
1. Provide an external and objective assurances to shareholders  
 
     
 
How do these disclosure and transparency principles relate to your own practical 
experience? 
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3. With reference to your investments, please evaluate the extent to which the following 
Equitable      Treatmentproblems impact on your success as a shareholder?  
 (Please indicate your opinion regarding each statement by ticking the appropriate box) 
  (SA = Strongly agree; A = Agree; N = Neutral; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly disagree) 
 
III. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders’ Problems SD D N A SA  
 
A. 
 
All shareholders of the same series of a class should NOT be treated 
equally: 
 
3. Within any series of a class, all shares should not carry the same 
rights.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
4. Info about rights attached to shares shouldn’t be obtained before 
purchasing.  
 
  
 
   
5. Changes in voting rights shouldn’t be subject to approval by classes of 
shares negatively affected. 
  
 
   
 
B. 
 
All minority shareholders should NOTbe protected from: 
 
7. Actions by controlling shareholders acting directly or indirectly for the 
benefits of their substantially invested capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
8. General meetings’ (gm) procedures disallowing equitable treatment of 
all shareholders.  
 
     
9. Insider trading benefiting majority shareholders.  
  
 
   
 
10. Board members not disclosing material interest in transactions they 
have stake in. 
 
  
 
   
11. Company procedures (cp) disallowing effective means of redress by 
minorities. 
 
     
12. Company procedures making it difficult and expensive for (cp) 
minorities to cast votes. 
     
 
How do these equitable treatment principles relate to your own practical experience? 
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SECTION 2: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
1. Your age: 
18-24             25-45            > 45   
 
2. Your gender: 
 Male             Female   
 
3. Your educational level? 
  None                              High School                      University diploma  
 
  Bachelor degree            Master degree                 PhD degree   
 
  Other (Please specify):   
 
4. Have you had any previous work experience related to share trading?  
   Yes               No      if Yes, Specify Occupation: 
 
5. Have you been trading in the stock market?  
Yes            No     if No, Move to Q.8 
 
6. For how long have you been trading in the Stock Market?  
  < 1 years              1-3 years              4-10 years            11-20 years    
 
7. What is the longest period you have held onto a certain class of shares? 
   <1 month          2-3 months           4-6 Months            6-12 months         1 year         2-3 years             >4 years 
 
8. From this Questionnaire, how much information have you been aware of regarding your rights as a 
shareholder? 
<10%           20-30%            40-60%            70-80%           90-100% 
 
9. Will you require the blessing of a religious scholar to enforce these rights of yours to make sure these 
rights don’t interfere with Islamic Commercial Laws? 
     Yes           No     if yes, Explain why:  
 
  
 482 |  e g a P   YGOLODOHTEM HCRAESER :B XIDNEPPA
 
 
 
 cibarA :eriannoitseuQ yevruS :5.B XIDNEPPA 5.01
 
 التأثير الثقافي على حوكمة الشركات وحقوق صغار المساهمين
 في المملكة العربية السعودية
 
 مقدمة
  المساهم الأخ
الأسهم السعودييستندإلىحدكبيرعلىاسثمارات فئة صغار المساهمين،نحنحريصونجداًللتعرفعلىالخبراتالخاصةبكم، إدراكاًمنابأنمستقبلسوق 
  .ونسعىعلىوجهالخصوصللحصولعلىمعلوماتحولالعواملالرئيسيةالتيتعتقدونأنهاتساهمفينجاحاستثماراتكم في سوق الأسهم
  . ذهالعواملمنهذاالمنطلق،فانمشاركتكمفيهذاالاستبيانمهمةجداًلتحديده
مملكة العربية البياناتوالمعلوماتالتيستوفرونهامنخلالإجابتكمعلىأسئلةهذاالإستبيانسوفتساهمفيتقديمسلسلةمنالتوصياتوالمقترحاتلهيئة سوق المال في ال
 السعودية منأجلضماننجاحاسثمارات فئة صغار المساهمينفيسوق الأسهم السعودي.
 
  الإستبيان هدف
الثقافي على حوكمة الشركات وحقوق صغار المساهمينفي المملكة العربية السعودية، والذيسيؤديإلىتقديمتوصياتبشأنكيفيةوضع معرفة التأثير 
لخدمة  استراتيجياتلتشريعات قانونية تحفظ حقوق صغار المساهمين، بحيث تكون متلائمة مع التركيبة الاجتماعية لسكان المملكة العربية السعودية
  ارية.أبعادها التج
 
  عامة تعليمات
ارالإيرجىالإجابةعلىكلأسئلةهذاالاستبيانبصدقوبأقصىقدرممكنمنالدقة،وفيحالةعدموجودخيارمنالخياراتالمعطاةيعكسوجهةنظركمعلىنحودقيق،يرجىاختي•
  .جابةالأقربللصواب،والقيامبوضعأيتعليقأوتفسيرترونأنهمناسبلتوضيحإجابتكم
  .علامةفيالمربعالمناسبيمكنالإجابةببساطةعلىمعظمالأسئلةبوضع•
. جميعالمعلوماتالمقدمةسوفتستخدملأغراضهذاالبحثالعلميفقط. كونواعلىثقةأنجميعالأجوبةالتيستقدمونهافيهذاالإستبيانسوفتعاملبسريةتامة•
  .هذهالدراسةتنفذوفقاللمبادئالتوجيهيةللجمعيةالبريطانيةلأبحاثالسوق
  .لهالإستبيانينبغيأنيأخذحواليثمانيةعشردقيقةلإكما•
  .نتائجهذاالبحثسوفتعرضفيرسالةالدكتوراهالتيستقدمإلىجامعةجلوسترشير البريطانية•
  إذاكنتمترغبونفياستلامنسخةمننتائجالدراسةيرجىكتابةاسمكموعنوانكمفيالصفحةالأخيرةمن•
  .هذاالإستبيان
  4102نوفمبر  4يرجىإعادة أو ملئهذاالإستبيانقبلتاريخ•  
  ف:رقم الهات البريد الالكتروني: 
 0004030350 as.ude.hou@ydrofla.f
 
  .لاتترددوافيالإتصالبناإذاكنتمترغبونفيأي معلوماتإضافية
 شاكرينلكمحسنتعاونكم،ولكمخالصالتقديروالإحترام
 فيصل بن حماد الفريدي
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 استبيان عن تأثير الثقافة السعودية على حوكمة الشركات فيما يختص بحقوق صغار المساهمين
 
 1- كمستثمر في مجال الأسهم: إلى أي درجة تؤمن أن المبادئ المعروضة (أدناه) والمتعلقة في حقوقك كمساهم  مهمة لنجاحك ؟
 
لا 
أوافق 
 بشدة
لا 
 أوافق
أوافق  أوافق محايد
 أولاا  مبادئ حقوق المساهمين بشدة
      
 تشتمل حقوقك الأساسية كمساهم على التالي:
 
 الحصول على المعلومات الخاصة بالشركة في الوقت المناسب وبصفة منتظمة
 
  -أ
      
 المشاركة والتصويت في الاجتماعات العامة للمساهمين
      
 طلب إقامة اجتماع للمساهمين
 
      
  انتخاب أو إزاحة أعضاء مجلس الإدارة 
 
      
  الحصول على حصص من أرباح الشركة 
 
      
لك الحق كمساهم في المشاركة والحصول على معلومات كافية عن القرارات المتصلة 
 بالتغيرات الأساسية في الشركة ومن بينها:
 
  التعديلات في النظام الأساسي أو في مواد تأسيس الشركة 
 
 
  -ب
      
  طرح أسهم إضافية 
 
  الاستباقي: حيازة الفرصة الأولى لشراء الاصدارات الجديدة من الأسهمتخصيص الحق      
      
  أي من التعاملات الغير عادية والتي قد تسفر عن بيع الشركة 
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ينبغي أن تتاح لك كمساهم فرصة المشاركة الفعالة والتصويت في الاجتماعات العامة 
  :للمساهمين عن طريق
 
  قرارات بشأنها خلال الاجتماعات ذإخطارك بالمسائل التي تستهدف اتخا 
 
  -ج
     
  إتاحة الفرصة لك لإضافة موضوعات إلى جداول أعمال الاجتماعات العامة 
      
  لك)ذإتاحة الفرصة لك لاقتراح بعض الحلول (مشروطة بوضع حدود معقولة ل
 
      
  على كبار المساهميناعتراض الحلول العائده بالفائده 
      
ينبغي لك المشاركة الفعالة في القرارات المختصة في حوكمة الشركات والإفصاح عن 
 رأيك وموافتك فيما يتعلق بـ :
 
 سياسة المكافأة والأجر لأعضاء مجلس الإدارة والمدراء التنفيذيين
 
 
  -د
     
  والموظفينالمرتبات والمزايا الممنوحة لأعضاء مجلس الإدارة 
أعضاء مجلس الإدارة والمدراء مصلحة  اتتنافر فيه  الذاتيهالتيالعمليات      
  واجبهم تجاه الشركه و تضر بك كمساهمويينذالتنفي
 
      
 تصويتك كمساهم ينبغي أن:
  يعطي نفس الوزن للأصوات المختلفة سواء كنت حاضرا ًأو بالنيابة 
 
  -هـ
 
 
  حقوق المساهمين (في الأعلى)وتجربتك كمساهم؟كيف  تجد العلاقة بين 
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2- هناك مبادئللشفافية والإفصاح قد تساعد على نجاحك كمساهم عند تقييم قراراتك بالاحتفاظ ببعض الأسهم أو بيعها, إلى أي درجة تؤمن بأهمية هذه 
 المبادئ فيما يختص باتخاذ قراراتك الاستثمارية؟
غير 
مهم 
 جد ا 
مهم  مهم محايد غير مهم
 ثاني ا  مبادئ الإفصاح والشفافية جد ا 
      
  :يجب أن يشتمل الإفصاح لك كمساهم (ولكن دون أن يقتصر) على الأمور التالية
 النتائج المالية والتشغيلية للشركة
 
  -أ
      
 كبار الملاك وحقوق التصويت
والمدراء التنفيذيين بمسائل العمليات المالية مع ذوى العلاقة من أعضاء مجلس الإدارة      
 تضر الشركة وحقوقك كمساهم
 
   المخاطر المتوقعة      
الهياكل والترتيبات الرأسمالية التي تمكن أعداد معينة من المساهمين ممارسة درجة من      
 الرقابة لا تتناسب مع حقوق الملكية التي بحوزتهم
 
الخاصة و الحكومية المالكة لبعض الأسهم ينبغي على أصحاب المصالح من ( الشركات      
 ) عند ممارسة حقوق ملكيتها في نفس الشركة التي تمتلك أسهم بها الإفصاح عن:
  آلياتهم الموضوعة لحوكمة الشركة المعنية وقواعد تصويتهم -
 ب
   قواعدهم الموضوعة لاستخدام حقوقهم في التصويت في الاجتماع العام للمساهمين -     
  أي تضارب في المصالح بينهم وبين الشركة المعنية والذي قد يؤثر على حقوقك كمساهم     
 الافصاح يجب أن :     
يقدم ضمانات عادلة و موضوعيه لك كمساهم عن القوائم المالية وغير المالية للشركة 
 المساهمة
  -ج
 
  مبادئ الافصاح والشفافيه (في الأعلى) و تجربتك كمساهم؟ كيف  تجد العلاقة بين
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  :بالرجوع إلى استثماراتك في مجال الأسهم, الرجاء تقييم درجة تأثير مشاكل المعاملة المتكافئة لجميع المساهمين على نجاحك -3
 مشاكل المعاملة المتكافئة لجميع المساهمين ثالث ا 
لا 
أواف
ق 
 بشدة
لا 
أواف
 ق
 أوافق بشدة أوافق محايد
 
  -أ
 
 
  :يجب التمييز بين جميع فئات المساهمين
ففي داخل كل فئة من فئات المساهمين يجب أن لا يحصل جميع المساهمين على نفس 
 حقوق التصويت
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
المعلوماتالخاصةبحقوقالتصويتالممنوحةلكلفئةمنفئاتالمساهمينينبغيألاتتوفرقبلقيامهمبالشر
 اء
     
  
 لا ينبغيموافقةصغارالمساهمينعلىأي منالتغيراتفيحقوقتصويتكبارالمساهمين
     
 
  -ب
 
 
 
 لا ينبغي حماية صغار المساهمين من:
 العملياتالماليةلكبارالمساهمينوالتيمنشأنهاخدمةمصالحهمالخاصةبشكلمباشرأوغيرمباشر
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      قراراتالاجتماعاتالعامةللمساهمينالتيتمنعحقالمساواةفيالمعاملةلجميعالمساهمين
عمليات تداول الأسهم التي تستند إلى معلومات داخلية من شأنها خدمة مصالح كبار  
 المساهمين
     
       عدمإفصاحأعضاءمجلسالإدارةعنمصالحشخصيةفيبعضالتعاملاتالتجارية 
النظام الأساسي للشركة الذي قد يعيق توفير أي آلية لصغار المساهمين تمكنهم من  
 إعادة المطالبة بحقوقهم
     
       النظامالأساسيللشركةالذيقديصعبأوقديكونمكلفماديا ًلصغارالمساهمينللإدلاءبأصواتهم 
 
  المعاملة المتكافئة للمساهمين (في الأعلى) و تجربتك كمساهم؟ مبادئ كيف  تجد العلاقة بين
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  معلومات ديموغرافيهالقسم الثاني:
 الرجاء وضع دائره على الإجابة المناسبة :
  عمرك: -1
 
  22سنة     > 22 -24سنة      24 -18
 2- جنسك
 ذكرأنثى 
 
  تعليمك: -3
  بكالوريوس     ماجستير     دكتوراه     أخرى (الرجاء التحديد)دبلوم عالي     ثانوية عامة     لا يوجد     
 
  ؟هل تمتلك خبرة عمل سابقة في مجال الأسهم  -4
 
 نعم     لا     في حالة الإجابة بنعم (الرجاء وصف مسمى العمل السابق)  
 
  هل  تتاجر في سوق الاسهم؟-5
 
  )  8نعم     لا     في حالة الإجابة ب لا (الرجاء الذهاب السؤال الثامن 
 
  كم هي عدد سنوات تبادلك في سوق الأسهم ؟ -6
 
  سنة 10 -11سنوات      11 -4سنوات      3 -1سنة      1< 
 
  كم هي أكثر فترة احتفظت بها بسهم معين ؟ -7
 
  سنوات 4سنوات     >  3 -2سنة      1شهر      21 -6أشهر      6 -4شهور      3 -2شهر      1< 
 
  من هذا الاستبيان كم هو حجم المعلومات المتعلقة بحقوقك كمساهم كنت تمتلك معلومات سابقه عنها أو تم أخطارك بها ؟ -8
 
  % 113 -19%      12 -17%      13 -11%      16 -15%     13< 
  العلماء بشان حقوق المساهمين الدولية قبل أن تطالب بتطبيقها في سوق الأسهم السعودي؟هل تحتاج مسبقا ًالى رأي هيئة كبار -9
 نعم     لا     في حالة الإجابة بنعم (الرجاء التوضيح لماذا) 
  
  الرجاء كتابة أي اقتراح أو ملاحظة بخصوص المواضيع التي تم تغطيتها في هذا الاستبيان راء و اقتراحات:آ
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10.6 APPENDIX B6: Interview Guide: English 
Interview Guide: 
Introduction of interviewer Hello, my name is _____________________________. Following the 
results of the quantitative study, I would like to ___________________.  
During the interview, I would like to discuss the different external factors: economic factors, technological 
factors, socio-cultural factors, political-legal factors and micro-environment factors. With these topics in mind…         
Source Main Question emphasis  Clarifying 
Question 
 
A. 
Legal 
Environment 
 
 
What could you say about the effect of the legal 
environment; legal rules, their enforcements and specialized 
courts on the nature of listed Saudi Companies’ compliance 
with CG laws pertaining to minorities’ rights 
 
*Legal rules 
*Law enforcements 
*Specialized Courts 
 
Could you 
expand a little 
on this? 
 What could you say about the effect of corporate law and 
company law: in terms of their origin and modification by 
interested parties on the nature of  
listed Saudi companies’ compliance? 
 
*Interested parties: 
controlling families 
*Legal origin-Egypt-
“French civil-law” 
Is there an 
Agency 
Conflict 
between 
controlling 
families and 
minorities? 
 What could you say about the effect of the distribution of 
power within the law-either allowing top management to 
run the show or major shareholder on the nature of listed 
Saudi companies’ compliance? 
*Top management 
   Vs major shareholders 
Is the top 
management a 
part of 
controlling 
families who 
are the major 
shareholders? 
 What could you say about the effect of institutional 
investors using their legal empowerment to influence 
management to increase their share values in the short run- 
on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance?  
*Legal empowerment 
*Short term profit drive 
 
 What could you say about the effect of the nature of 
legislation of either the market supporting focus or policy 
implementing focus on the nature of listed Saudi 
companies’ compliance? 
*Policy focus- Precondition- 
Strong  Mandatory Rules-Civil 
*Market focus- MKT 
creates a demand for 
legislation- common 
*Care exercised 
 
 
B. 
Strength of 
minority legal 
protection 
 
 
What could you say about the effect of the existing minority 
protection’s legal procedures put in place in Saudi Arabia on 
the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance?? 
*Extensive Disclosure 
*One-share-one-vote 
*Mandatory dividends 
*Explicit shareholders 
rights 
*Arms’ and Length   --
approval by disinterested  
shareholders 
A specialized 
lawyer capable 
of answering 
these questions 
Or  Audit firms 
–partners 
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What could you say about the effect of the quality of law 
enforcement regarding the means of redress by minorities 
on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance? 
*Ease of litigation 
*Low burden of proof 
*Specialty of court of Law 
*Access to information to  
_examine self dealing 
 
Could you give 
an example on 
this? 
 
C. 
Stock market 
Development 
 
 
What could you say about the effect of the existing Saudi 
Arabia CG law regulating the problem of Self-dealing on 
the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance? 
*Ongoing disclosure of 
self-dealing 
*ease of litigation by 
aggrieved shareholders 
*Prison terms + Fines for  
self-dealing 
 
 
Could you give 
an example on 
this? 
 
E. 
Convergence 
through 
concurrence 
 
What could you say about the effect of the expedited 
privatization on the level of Minority protection and 
adequate disclosure existed in Saudi Arabia? and ultimately 
its overall effect on  the nature of listed Saudi companies’ 
compliance? 
*expedited privatization 
*minority protection 
*adequate disclosure 
Can you give an 
example? 
Which led to 
expropriation to 
minorities? 
 
 
Do you think the potential existence of interest groups, other 
than controlling families and institutional investors, may 
affect the CG level of convergence with international CG 
standards regarding minority rights and ultimately the nature 
of listed Saudi companies’ future compliance? 
*Interest groups 
*OECD principles 
*IFRS 
What do you 
expect this sort 
of interest 
group to be 
made of? 
Will 
globalization 
have such an 
effect on that? 
 Do you think the transfer of legal knowledge between the 
Saudi legal system pertaining to Minority’s rights and other 
systems might benefit the nature of listed Saudi companies’ 
future compliance? 
*Civil 
*Common 
Which legal 
system is more 
likely to benefit 
the Saudi 
System? Why? 
 
Source Main Question Emphasis  Clarifying 
Question 
 
 
 
 
What could you say about the effect of the Saudi proportional 
voting system on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance 
with CG laws pertaining to minorities’ rights? 
*Left Party- Pro CG Reform 
& creates Interest group-Mid 
Class 
*Right Party- Pro Crony & 
concentrated Ownership 
*Level of Policy Swings 
 
 
 
Political factors 
shaping CG 
 
 
 
 
What could you say about the effect of Saudi Arabia’s Institutions 
on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance?  
*Speed or Slow Interest - 
group Activities 
*Provides strong investor  
protection 
*Entrepreneurs compelled  to 
choose ( Dispersed) 
*Controlling Families as an 
institution -producing a new 
model of CG  
 
 
 
Could you 
expand a little 
on this? 
APPENDIX B: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   P a g e  | 292 
 
 
 
  
What could you say about the effect of interest groups’ lobbying on 
the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance?   
*Interest in foreign investment 
*Private initiatives: Pro-
diffusion 
*Barriers to future policy by 
families as an interest group 
 
Could you give an 
example of 
Barriers to future 
policy by 
families? 
  
What could you say about the effect of the level of Saudi 
government’s Involvement in the economy on the nature of listed 
Saudi companies’ compliance?   
*Centralized Economy- use 
banks to facilitate control  
* Decentralized Economy- 
Free-Private sector 
 
 
  
 
What could you say about the effect of the Absences of 
Constitutional Process on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ 
compliance?   
*Creates potential for  
government  interventions 
*Weakens popular pressure for 
minority rights 
*Cause block holding model of 
corporate control 
 
Could you 
expand a little 
on this? 
Repetitive  
 
What could you say about the effect of the nature of legislation on 
the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance? 
* Precondition- Strong  
Mandatory Rules-civil law 
* MKT Creates a demand for 
legal rules-common law 
* Remedial Legislation- to  
establish minority rights 
 
Could you 
explain how the 
legal and political 
legislations 
interact? 
 
Political 
Economy 
 
 
 
What could you say about the effect of the size of private benefits 
of control on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance? 
*Shapes the choice of 
ownership structure 
* Weak Institutions= high 
Surplus extract 
*Surplus at IPO- Large  
*Law is lax= H Private B 
*Separation of cash flow rights 
and voting rights 
Researcher needs 
to explain what is 
meant by “Private 
Benefits within 
the context of 
political 
economy” to 
utilize the answer 
of this question. 
Use of emphasis 
is beneficial to 
explain the 
dimensional 
political effect 
  
 
What could you say about the effect of having a persuasive political 
voice in creating a Concentrated ownership structure and its overall 
effect on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance? 
*Excessive Control by States 
and Families: top MGT 
*Pyramidal Structures 
*Crony Capitalism 
*Difficulty for Potential 
Entrepreneurs seeking external 
Capital 
 
 
Could you Give 
an example of the 
political voice 
effect? 
 What could you say about the effect of the constant reinforcement 
by the Saudi Government and controlling families for each other on 
the nature of listed Saudi companies’ compliance? 
*Crony Capitalism: uniting 
both Gov and families 
*Law effect becomes  minimal 
Could you Give 
an example of the 
reinforcement 
practice? 
 
 
Proposition 
 
What kind of Institutional mechanism of curbing private benefits of 
control can have a positive effect on the nature of listed Saudi 
companies’ compliance? 
 
*Rate of Tax Compliance 
*legal protection of minority 
*level of diffusion of the press 
*Media exposing bad practices 
*Better accounting standards 
*Better accounting standards 
* Better law enforcement 
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 دليل المقابلة
  اسمي فيصل بن ضيف الله بن حماد الفريدي   :       السلام عليكم ورحمة اللهمقدمة المقابله  
 
على طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع خلال المفابلة: ارغب بمناقشة العوامل المختلفه من قانونيه و سياسيه و اقتصاديه ومدى تاثيرها على 
 قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما يختص بحقوق صغار المساهمين
  علق بكل عامل تحت ضوء القافه السعوديهمع الاخذ بعين الاعتبار هاذة العوامل المختلفه : اود سماع رايك بما يت
 الاسئله التوضيحيه أبراز و تشديد السوئال الرئيسي المصدر
 
 .A
 البيئه القانونيه
 
 
ماهو رايك عن تاثير البيئه القانونيه: من قوانين و تتطبيق و وجود محاكم 
متخصصه على طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين 
  الشركات بما يختص بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟حوكمة 
 *القوانين
 *تطبيق القانون
 *المحاكم النتخصصه
 
 
هل من الممكن التوسع في 
 هاذا الشق؟
ماهو رايك عن تاثير قوانين الشركات والموسسات: من ناحية مصدرها  
(المنشئ) وتحويرها من قبل الجماعات المصلحيه على طبيعة تجاوب 
المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما يختص بحقوق  الشركات السعوديه
 صغار المساهمين؟
*الجماعات المصلحيه: لاعوائل 
 المتحكمه
القانون -*مصدر القانون: مصر
 المدني الفرنسي
 
هل يوجد تضارب مصالح 
مابين العوائل المتحكمه و 
 صغار المساهمين؟
لاادارات العليه لادارة  ماهو رايك عن تاثير توزيع القوة قانونيا بحيث تسمح 
الشركات المساهمه او تسمح لكبار الملاك من المساهمين على طبيعة 
تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما يختص 
 بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
هل الاداراة العليا مشكله من  *الادارة العليا  & وكبار الملاك
افراد العوائل المتحكمه 
  لذين هم كبار الملاك؟ا
ماهو رايك عن تاثير اصحاب المصالح من ( الشركات الخاصه و الحكوميه  
المالكه لبعض الاسهم) باستخدام قواهم القانونيه لتاثير على ادارة الشركات 
لرفع قيمة اسهمهم على المدى القصير على طبيعة تجاوب الشركات 
ت بما يختص بحقوق صغار السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركا
 المساهمين؟
 *تمكين القانون
*اندفاع خلف الربحيه عل المدى 
 القصير
 
 
ماهو رايك عن تاثير طبيعة تشريع (سن القوانين) سوا كانت متمركزه على  
دعم السوق او متمركزه على سياسة (التشريع التطبيقي) على طبيعة تجاوب 
حوكمة الشركات بما يختص بحقوق الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين 
 صغار المساهمين؟
قوانين  -مسبق-*تمركز تشريعي
  القانون المدني-جبريه قويه
السوق -*تمركز على دعم السوق
  القانون العام-يخلق الطلب للتشريع
 *الاهتمام المفعل بالتشريع
 
 
 .B
قوة التشريعات 
القانونيه المختصه 
بحماية صغار 
 المساهمين
 
عن تاثير التشريعات القانونيه المختصه بحماية صغار ماهو رايك 
المساهمين الموجودة في المملكه العربيه السعوديه على طبيعة تجاوب 
الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما يختص بحقوق 
 صغار المساهمين؟
 
 *افصاح مستفيض
 *صوت لكل سهم
 *توزيع جبري لارباح الاسهم
  ر المساهمين واضحه*حقوق صغا
*موافقه مستفيضه من قبل 
المساهمين المتضررين (عمليات 
 الذاتيه) وغيرها
 
 
  
ماهو رايك عن تاثير جودة تطبيق القوانين المختصه بوسائل تعويض صغار 
المساهمين على طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين 
  المساهمين؟حوكمة الشركات بما يختص بحقوق صغار 
 *تسهيل رفع الدعواى للقضاء
 *حد ادنى من الادله
 *تخصصية المحاكم
 
هل من الممكن اعطاء مثال 
 عن هاذا؟
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 الاسئله التوضيحيه أبراز و تشديد السوئال الرئيسي المصدر
 
 
 
) على ماهو رايك عن تاثير ( الاقتراع التناسبي (تصويت الاغلبيه)) السعودي  
طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما 
  المساهمين؟يختص بحقوق صغار 
مع اصلاح انضمة  -*الحزب اليساري
الحوكمه & يخلق جماعات مصلحيه 
 مشكله من الطبقه المتوسطه
مع راس الماليه  -*الحزب اليميني
 العائليه و تكتل الملكيات
 *معدل تقلب  السياسات 
 
 
 
العوامل السياسيه 
المشكله لحوكمة 
 الشركات المساهمه
 
) على طبيعة تجاوب ماهو رايك عن تاثير ( الموسسات الحكوميه السعوديه) على 
الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما يختص 
 بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
 
 
*يسرع او يبطئ  عمل الجماعات 
 المصلحيه
*يوفر حمايه كبيره للمسثميرين 
 والمساهمين
ى *اصحاب الشركات مجبورين عل
اختيار هياكل ملكيات موزعه 
 للشركاتهم
 -هي مووسسات-*العوائل المتحكمه
 تنتج نموذج جديد من حوكمة الشركات
 
هل من الممكن التوسع في 
 هاذا الشق؟
 
  
ماهو رايك عن تاثير تكتل الجماعات المصلحيه لممارسة الضغط السياسي التشريعي 
مع قوانين حوكمة  ) على طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه
 الشركات بما يختص بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
 
 *اهتمام بالاستثمارات الاجنبيه
مع انتشار  -المبادرات الخاصه
 *الاسهم
*معوقات مستقبليه من العوائل المتحمه 
 كجماعات مصلحيه
 
هل من الممكن اعطاء مثال 
عن العراقيل التي قد تواجة 
السياسات  او التشريعات 
يه من قبل العوائل المستقبل
 المتحكمه؟
*سهولة الوصول لمعلومات تختبر 
 حصول (عمليات ذاتيه)
 
 .C
 تنمية سوق الاسهم
ماهو رايك عن تاثير قوانين حوكمة الشركات المجودة في المملكه العربيه 
تنضيم مشكلة ( التعامل الذاتي الذي تتنافر فيه المصلحه  السعوديه على
والواجب) على طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين 
 حوكمة الشركات بما يختص بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
 
 
*افصاح متجدد عن (العمليات 
 الذاتيه)
*تسهيل رفع الدعواى للقضاء من 
 قبل الساهمين المتضريرين
جن & وعقوبات ماليه على *مدة س
 (العمليات الذاتيه)
 
 
هل من الممكن اعطاء مثال 
 عن هاذا؟
 
 .E
خلال التقارب من 
 الاتلاف
ماهو رايك عن تاثير تسريع الخصخصه على معدل (مقدار) قوانين حماية 
صغار المساهمين و ملائمة مبادئ الافصاح في المملكه العربيه السعوديه؟ 
طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين وتاثيرهما الكلي على 
 حوكمة الشركات بما يختص بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
 *تسريع الخصخصه
 *قواناين حماية صغار المساهمين
 *ملائمة مبادئ الافصاح
 
 
هل من الممكن اعطاء مثال 
قاد ال  الاستيلاء او 
مصادرة حقوق صغار 
 المساهمين؟
 
 
 
احتمالية وجود جماعات مصلحيه غير العوائل المتحكمه هل تعتقد ان 
بالاقتصاد و (الشرركات الخاصه والحكوميه المالكه لبعض الاسهم) قد 
يودي الى تقارب قوانين حوكمة الشركات السعوديه مع قوانين الحوكمه 
الدوليه بما يختص بحقوق صغار المساهمين و قد يوثر كليا على طبيعة 
  وديه المساهمه في المستقبل؟تجاوب الشركات السع
 *الجماعات المصلحيه
 *DCEO مبادئ 
 *SRFIالقوانين المحاسبيه الدوليه 
من تتوقع ان يشكل افراد 
 هاذه الجماعه المصلحيه؟
وهل العولمه قد تقود او 
تاثر عل هاذا التشكل 
 المصلحي؟
القانوني هل تعتقد ان تناقل الخبرات و المعرفه القانونيه مابين النضام  
السعودي بما يختص بحقوق ضغار المساهمين مع الانضمه الا القانونيه 
الاكثر تقدما قد يثري و ينفع طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه في 
 المستقبل؟
 *القانون المدني
 *القانون العام
 
من هو النضام القانوني 
الذي يمتلك اوفر حض 
لاثراء ومنفعة النضام 
المملكه العربيه  القانوني في
 السعوديه؟ ولماذا؟
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) على طبيعة ماهو رايك عن تاثير (التدخل النسبي) للحكومه السعوديه في الاقتصاد  
تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما 
 يختص بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
يستخدم  -*اقتصاد مركزي (محصور)
 البنوك  ليسهل التحكم
يخلق قطاع  -مركزي*اقتصاد غير 
 خاص حر
 
 
  
) على طبيعة تجاوب الشركات ماهو رايك عن تاثير غياب (العمليه الدستوريه) 
السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما يختص بحقوق صغار 
 المساهمين؟
 
 *يخلق فرص للتدخل الحكومي
*يضعف الضغط الاجتماعي لحقوق 
 صغار المساهيمين
هياكل تكتليه من *يتسبب بخلق 
الملكيات كنماذج  للتحكم بالشركات 
 المساهمه
 
هل من الممكن التوسع في 
 هاذا الشق؟
  
) على طبيعة تجاوب ماهو رايك عن تاثير طبيعة التشريع (سن القوانين) 
الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما يختص 
 بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
 
قوانين  -مسبق-*تمركز تشريعي
  القانون المدني-جبريه قويه
السوق -*تمركز على دعم السوق
  القانون العام-يخلق الطلب للتشريع
*تشريعات اصلاحيه (تعويضيه) 
 لتاسيس حقوق صغار المساهيمين
 
هل من الممكن ان تشرح كيفية  
تفاعل التشريعات القانونيه 
والسياسيه مع بعضها البعض 
  الاخر؟واثر احداهما في 
 
 الاقتصاد السياسي
 
 
) على ماهو رايك عن تاثير حجم (المنفعه الخاصه من التحكم بالشركات المساهمه) 
طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما 
 يختص بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
 
*يحدد شكل الخيار في هيكل الملكيه 
 للشركات المساهمه
ضعيفه =  استخلاص *موسسات 
 فائض عالي
*الفائض عند (الاصدارات الاوليه 
  عالي جدن–العامه للاسهم) 
*القانون  متراخي = حجم المنفعه 
 الخاصه عالي
*الفصل مابين حقوق الدخل المالي و 
حقوق التصويت = دلاله على مصادرة 
 حقوق صغار المساهيمين 
 
  
 
ماهو رايك عن تاثير امتلاك صوت سياسي مقنع في خلق هياكل ملكيات متكتله داخل 
) على طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه وتاثير( هاذة الهياكل المتكتله 
الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما يختص 
 بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
وائل *تحكم مفرط من الحكومه او الع
 المتحكمه بالاقتصاد و اداراتها العائليه
 *الهياكل الهرميه للشركات
 *الراسماليه الحميمه = العائليه
*صعوبات مستقبليه لاصحاب 
المشاريع الراغبين  بتمويل مشاريعهم 
 عن طريق الاسهم (بشكل خارجي)
 
 
هل من الممكن اعطاء مثال 
 عن تاثير الصوت السياسي؟
ماهو رايك عن تاثير التعزيز (التحصين) مابين الحكومه السعوديه و العوائل  
على طبيعة تجاوب الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع  المتحكمه بالاقتصاد 
 قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما يختص بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
 
*الراسماليه الحميمه: توحد الحكومات 
 والعوائل المتحكمه
 * يصبح ادنىتاثير القانون 
هل من الممكن اعطاء مثال 
 عن مماراسات التعزيز؟
 
 
 اقتراح
 
اي نوع من الية العمل الموسساتيه الكابحه لجماح (المنفعه الخاصه من التحكم 
على طبيعة تجاوب  بالشركات المساهمه) تعتقد انها قادره على خلق اثر ايجابي 
الشركات السعوديه المساهمه مع قوانين حوكمة الشركات بما يختص 
 بحقوق صغار المساهمين؟
 
 
 *اجرة ضريبة التجاوب
 *القوانين الحاميه لصغار المساهيمين
 *حجم حرية الصحافه  وانتشاراها
*وسائل الاعلام  الفاضحه للماراسات 
السييئه للشركات المساهمه وملاكها 
  راتهاوادا
 *قوانين محاسبيه افضل
 *وتطبيق وتفعيل افضل للقانون
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10.8 APPENDIX B.8: Questionnaire's Coding& Hofstede's (2010) 
Assignments 
1. As an investor, to what extent you believe the following statements concerning your 
Rights are autonomously important to ensure the success of your investments? 
 
(Please indicate your opinion regarding each statement by ticking the appropriate box) 
  (SA = Strongly agree; A = Agree; N = Neutral; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly disagree) 
I. Rights of Shareholders Statements SA A N D SD 
 
A. 
 
Your basic shareholder rights should include the right to : 
 
22. Obtain relevant and material information on a timely and regular 
basics LTO=H 
5 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
3 2 1 
23. Participate and vote in general shareholder meetings PD=L,  
IND=H 
 
 
 
 
   
24. Call a shareholders’ meeting  PD=L,  IND=H 
  
 
   
25. Elect and remove members of the board PD=L,  IND=H 
     
26. Share in the profits of the corporation LTO=H 
     
 
B. 
 
You shall participate in and be sufficiently informed on decision 
concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: 
 
9. Amendments to the statutes or articles of incorporation PD=L, IND=H, 
UA=L 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
10. Authorization of additional shares PD=L, IND=H ,UA=L 
     
11. Assignment of Pre-Emptive Rights: given you the first opportunity to 
buy new issues of stock IND=H, UA=L , LTO=H 
     
12. Extraordinary transactions resulting in the sale of the company 
LTO=H 
     
 
C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You shall participate effectively and vote in general shareholder meetings. 
Hence, you shall:  
 
27. Be Informed of Issues to be decided at the meeting  PD=L, UA=L 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
28. Place items on the agenda of general meetings IND=H, PD=L 
 
 
    
29. Propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations IND=H 
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PD=L 
  
 
30. Challenge resolutions benefiting controlling shareholders IND=H 
PD=L 
     
 
D. 
 
You shall participate in key corporate governance decisions: Thus, you 
shall Approve: 
 
7. Remuneration policy for board members and key executives. IND=H, 
PD=L, UA=L 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
8. Compensation schemes for board members and employees IND=H, 
PD=L, UA=L 
     
9. Self-dealing transaction affecting disinterested shareholders such as 
yourself IND=H, PD=L, UA=L 
     
 
E. 
 
Your  votes should be given: 
4. Equal effect whether cast in person or in absentia or by Mail. IND=H, 
FEM=H 
  
 
   
 
 
2. Listed below are some Disclosure and Transparency factors that may contribute to 
your success as an investor in assessing your decisions of whether to hold onto 
you’re shares or sell them. How important do you believe these factors are? 
 
(Please select the appropriate answer by ticking the appropriate box) 
 (VI = Very important; I = Important; N = Neutral; NI = Not important; NVI = Not very important) 
 
II. Disclosure and Transparency Statements VI I N NI NVI 
A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: 
1.     The financial and operating results of a company. LTO=H, UA=L 
 
5 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
3 2 1 
2.     Major share ownership and voting rights. PD=L, UA=L 
 
     
 
3.    Related party transactions: all material facts about such transaction or the 
following : 
         (a) description of the assets; (b) nature and amount of consideration; and c) explanation 
for the price 
       PD=L, UA=L 
     
8. Foreseeable risk factors. LTO=H, UA=L 
     
9.   Capital structures enabling certain shareholders to obtain a degree of 
control disproportionate to their shares UA=L, FEM=H 
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B. The exercise of ownership rights by institutional investors, should be 
facilitated and disclosed: therefore, Institutional investors should 
Disclose: 
 
4. Their overall corporate governance and voting policies FEM=H, PD=L, 
UA=L 
     
 
 
5. Procedures they have in place for deciding on the use of their voting 
rights.UA=L, FEM=H   
     
 
6. Material conflicts of interest affecting the exercise of key ownership 
rights  
         UA=L , Fem=H 
 
     
C. 
Disclosure should: 
2. Provide an external and objective assurances to shareholders  
FEM=H, LTO=H, UA=L 
     
 
3. With reference to your investments, please evaluate the extent to which the following 
Equitable Treatmentproblems impact on your success as a shareholder?  
 
     (Please indicate your opinion regarding each statement by ticking the appropriate box) 
  (SA = Strongly agree; A = Agree; N = Neutral; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly disagree) 
 
III. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders’ Problems SD D N A SA  
 
A. 
 
All shareholders of the same series of a class should NOT be treated 
equally: 
 
6. Within any series of a class, all shares should not carry the same rights.  
FEM=H,  PD=L 
5 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
3 2 1 
7. Info about rights attached to shares shouldn’t be obtained before 
purchasing. IND=H, UA=L 
 
  
 
   
8. Changes in voting rights shouldn’t be subject to approval by classes of 
shares negatively affected IND=H, PD=L , FEM=H 
  
 
   
 
B. 
 
All minority shareholders should NOTbe protected from: 
 
13. Actions by controlling shareholders acting directly or indirectly for the 
benefits of their substantially invested capital FEM=H,  PD=L 
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14. General meetings’ (gm) procedures disallowing equitable treatment of 
all shareholders.  
       FEM=H, PD=L, UA=L 
     
15. Insider trading benefiting majority shareholders. FEM=H, PD=L 
  
 
   
 
16. Board members not disclosing material interest in transactions they 
have stake in FEM=H,  PD=L 
 
  
 
   
17. Company procedures (cp) disallowing effective means of redress by 
minorities  FEM=H,  UA=L 
 
     
18. Company procedures making  it difficult and expensive for (cp) 
minorities to cast votes FEM=H,  UA=L 
     
 
 
The Ideal Situation for the target values in accordance with the literature is: 
 
          H                        H                       L                                     L                                   S-
Short 
Individualism    Femininity     Power Distance    Uncertainty Avoidance   Short term 
Orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          H                        H                       L                                     L                                     H                          
Individualism     Femininity      Power Distance     Uncertainty Avoidance         Long term 
Orientation 
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10.9 APPENDIX B.9: Preliminary Questionnaire  
 
A Questionnaire of the impact of Saudi Arabia Culture on Corporate 
Governance on Minority Shareholder’s Rights 
 
Introduction  
Dear Minority Shareholder,  
Recognizing that the future of the Saudi Stock Market will be largely based on investments ofmass-minority 
shareholders’ segment, we are very eager to learn about your own experiences. In particular, we seek information 
on what you consider to be key factors of the success of your investments. Your contribution in this survey is 
therefore very important to identify these factors. By completing this questionnaire, the data you provide will 
lead to a series of recommendations to ensure the success of minority shareholders’ trading in the Saudi Stock 
Market.  
 
Purpose of Questionnaire: 
To Measure Saudi Minority Shareholder’s value dimensions in Relation to OECD principles of Corporate 
Governance pertaining to Minority Shareholders’ rights 
Instruction  
• Please complete this questionnaire accurately and objectively. In the absence of an option that accurately 
reflects your views, please choose the answer that seems relevant, and add any comment or explanation that you 
deem useful to illustrate your answer. Otherwise, SKIPto the next question 
• Most questions can be answered simply by ticking a box.  
• All of the answers you provide in this questionnaire WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. All information 
given will be used for the purpose of this research only. The study is being carried out in accordance with the UK 
Market Research Society’s guidelines.  
• The questionnaire should take ABOUT 15 MINUTES to complete.  
• The results of this research will be presented in the thesis to be submitted to the University of Gloucestershire, 
as required by the doctoral degree.  
• If you want a copy of the results of the study, please fill out your name, address or e-mail in the last page of the 
questionnaire.  
• Please return the completed questionnaire BEFORE 4th of  NOVEMBER 2014.  
. Rapid Feedback Scoreis provided at the end of the questionnaire; instruction of calculation‘s method is 
presented for each section to generate accumulative score on your success rate as an investor along with 
personalized , level-specific financial advice for you. 
Post : Faisal Alfordy   
The Park, Cheltenham 
GL50 2RH, UK 
Email : fdf3000@gmail.com 
 Fax : (0044) 01242 714 111  
Feel free to contact us if you would like any additional information. 
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SECTION 1: OECD Principles of Minority Shareholders’ Rights 
 
2. As an investor, to what extent you believe the following statements 
concerning your Rightsare autonomously important to ensure the success 
of your investments? 
(Please indicate your opinion regarding each statement by ticking the appropriate 
box) 
  (SA = Strongly agree; A = Agree; N = Neutral; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly disagree) 
I. Rights of Shareholders Statements SA A N D SD 
 
A. 
 
Your basic shareholder rights should include the right to 
 
31. Secure methods of ownership registration 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Convey or transfer shares 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
2. Obtain relevant and material information on a timely and regular basis 
   
 
 
 
 
 
3. Participate and vote in general shareholder meetings 
   
 
 
 
 
 
4. Elect and remove members of the board 
 
    
 
 
 
5. Share in the profits of the corporation 
     
 
B. 
 
You shall participate in and be sufficiently informed on decision 
concerning fundamental corporate changes such as 
 
13. Amendments to the statutes or articles of incorporation 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Authorization of additional shares 
 
    
 
 
 
15. Extraordinary transactions resulting in the sale of the company 
    
 
 
 
 
C. 
 
You shall participate effectively and vote in general shareholder meetings 
and be informed of 
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32. Rules, including voting procedures, that govern general shareholder 
meetings 
 
     
33. Date, location and agenda of general meetings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34.  Issues to be decided at the meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35. Ask questions to the board, relating to the annual external audit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36. Place items on the agenda of general meetings 
 
     
37. Propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations 
     
 
D. 
 
You shall participate in key corporate governance decisions: making your 
views known on 
 
10. Nomination and election of board members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Remuneration policy for board members and key executives.  
 
  
 
   
12. Approvalof compensation schemes for board members and employees  
     
 
E. 
 
Your  votes should be given: 
 
5. Equal effect whether cast in person or in absentia.  
 
  
 
 
   
 
F. 
 
You  should be provided with disclosure regarding 
 
2. Capital structures enabling certain shareholders to obtain a degree of 
control disproportionate to their shares  
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G. 
 
Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient 
and transparent manner: 
 
1. Rules governing acquisitions should be clearly articulated and 
disclosed to you 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Transactions should occur at transparent prices and under fair 
conditions  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Anti-take-over devices shouldn’t be used to shield management and 
board  
  
 
 
 
  
 
H. 
 
The exercise of ownership rights by institutional investors, should be 
facilitated and disclosed: therefore, Institutional investors should Disclose 
 
1. Their overall corporate governance and voting policies  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of their 
voting rights. 
     
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Material conflicts of interest affecting the exercise of key ownership 
rights  
 
I. 
 
You , including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to consult 
 
1. Each other on issues concerning basic shareholders’ rights 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
2. Listed below are some Disclosure and Transparencyfactors that may 
contribute to your success as an investor in assessing your decisions of 
whether to hold onto you’re  shares or sell them . How important do you 
believe these factors are? 
 
(Please select the appropriate answer by ticking the appropriate box) 
(VI = Very important; I = Important;N = Neutral; NI = Not important; NVI = Not very important) 
 
II. Disclosure and Transparency Statements VI I N NI NVI 
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A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: 
 
1.  The financial and operating results of a company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Major share ownership and voting rights. 
 
    
 
 
3.  Related party transactions. 
 
     
3. Foreseeable risk factors. 
     
4. Provide an external and objective assurances to the board and 
shareholders  
 
     
6. Represent fairly the financial position and performance in all material 
respects. 
     
C. External auditors should be accountable to all  shareholders 
 
1. Owing a duty to companies to exercise due professional care in their 
conduct 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
3. In your opinion, how would you rate the services of the Board Members 
regarding their Responsibilities towards you as an investor and other 
stakeholders? 
  (Please select the appropriate answer by ticking the appropriate box) 
   (Very high =VH ; High = H;Medium = M ; Low = L ; Very low = VL ) 
 
III Responsibilities of the Board: Services VH H M L VL 
 
A. 
 
Board members acting on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due 
diligence  
  
 
   
 
B. 
 
The board treating all shareholders fairly when decisions affect different 
groups  
 
     
 
C. 
 
The board applying  high ethical standards; with interests of stakeholders 
in mind 
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4. With reference to your investments, please evaluate the extent to which the 
following Equitable Treatmentproblems impact on your success as a 
shareholder? 
     (Please select the appropriate answer by ticking the appropriate box) 
(VC = Very challenging; C = Challenging; N =Neutral; I = Insignificant; VI = Very 
insignificant) 
 
V. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders’ Problems VC C N I VI  
 
A. 
 
All shareholders of the same series of a class should not be treated equally. 
 
5. Within any series of a class, all shares should not carry the same rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Info about rights attached to shares shouldn’t be obtained before 
purchasing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Changes in voting rights shouldn’t be subject to approval by classes of 
shares negatively affected. 
 
     
 
B. 
 
All minority shareholders should not be protected from: 
 
19. Actions by controlling shareholders acting directly or indirectly for the 
benefits of their substantially invested capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. General meetings’ procedures disallowing equitable treatment of all 
shareholders. 
 
     
21. Insider trading benefiting majority shareholders.  
   
 
  
 
22. Board members not disclosing material interest in transactions they have 
stake in 
 
     
23. Company procedures disallowing effective means of redress by minorities  
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24. Company procedures making  it difficult and expensive for minorities to 
cast votes  
 
   
 
  
 
25. Company procedures disallowing Votes casting by custodians on behalf of 
minorities. 
     
 
26. Company procedures’ impediments to cross border voting 
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SECTION 2: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
Here are some questions to seek socio-demographic information of Minority 
Shareholders. 
 
1. Your age: 
 
18-24        25-45   > 45 
 
2. Your gender: 
 
 Male       Female 
 
3. Your educational level? 
  None                         High School                 University diploma  
 
  Bachelor degree       Master degree              PhD degree 
 
  Other (Please specify): 
 
4. Have you had any previous work experience related to share trading?  
 
   Yes        No      if yes, Specify Occupation:  
 
5. For how long have you been trading in the Stock Market?  
 
< 1 years         1-3 years       4-10 years         11-20 years     
 
6. What is the longest period you have held onto a certain class of shares? 
 
<1 month      2-3 months        4-6 Months       6-12 months      1 year       2-3 years         >4 
years 
SUGGESTIONS & COMMENTS 
Please type any suggestions or comments you want to add regarding the topics that have been 
addressed in this questionnaire or any other subjects related to the success of small and medium 
enterprises. 
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10.10 APPENDIX B.10: Assignments of Hofstede's (2010) CVD Dimensions 
to OECD Items 
NOTE: all the below dimensions are obtained from Hofstede's website; hence, such 
definitions are up to date. 
 
A. Power distance can be defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally. ‘Institutions' are the basic elements of society like the family, 
school, and the community; 'organizations' are the places where people work. 
B. Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: 
everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. 
Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards 
are integrated into strong, cohesive in groups, which throughout people's lifetime 
continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 
C. Masculinity indicates the extent to which the dominant values of a society are 
"masculine" (e.g., assertive and competitive). Masculinity pertains to societies in 
which social gender roles are clearly distinct (i.e., men are supposed to be assertive, 
tough, and focused on material success whereas women are supposed to be more 
modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life). 
D. Femininity Pertains to societies in which social gender roles overlap i.e., both men and 
women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. 
E. Uncertainty avoidance can be defined as the extent to which the members of a culture 
feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations and try to avoid such situations. 
This feeling is, among other things, expressed through nervous stress and in a need for 
predictability: a need for written and unwritten rules. 
F. Long Term Orientation Long-Term Orientation (LTO) is defined as the fostering of 
virtues toward future rewards–in particular, perseverance and thrift. In contrast, short-
term orientation stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present–in 
particular, respect for tradition, preservation of face, and fulfilling social obligations.  
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SPECIFIC 
CONSTRUCT 
ASSIGNEMNT OF HOFESTEDE DIMENTIONS 
Information on a 
regular basis 
Triggers Long-Term Orientation as shareholders see the, pragmatic, need for regular basis of financial 
reporting to assess their holding for future profits. 
 
Vote in general 
meetings 
Triggers Power-Distance. Hence, minority shareholders don’t undermine themselves and view themselves as 
equals to major shareholders in decision concerning their corporations. In addition, voting in GM meetings 
triggers Individualism as shareholders look after themselves when voting. 
 
Elect and remove 
board 
Triggers Power-Distance as minority shareholders view themselves as equally important in electing and 
removing members of the board. In addition, it triggers Individualism as shareholders look after themselves 
in appointing eligible candidates and removing them when needed. 
 
Share in the profits 
Triggers Long-Term Orientation as shareholders highly view sharing in the future profits reported by 
financial statements. 
 
Call a 
shareholders’ 
meetings 
Triggers Power-Distance as minority shareholders view themselves as equally important in calling a 
shareholders’ meeting. In addition, it triggers Individualism as shareholders look after themselves in calling a 
shareholders’ meeting to address certain concerns of theirs. 
 
Amendments to 
the statutes 
Triggers Power-Distance in shareholders as they see themselves equal and valuable to participate and decide 
on matters concerning amendments to the statutes of incorporation .In addition, it triggers Individualism in 
shareholders as they take matter into their own hands to look after themselves. Moreover, by doing so 
Uncertainty-Avoidance is triggered and such task won’t be considered threatening as it’s lawfully prescribed. 
 
Authorization of 
additional shares 
Triggers Power-Distance in shareholders as they see themselves equal and valuable to participate and decide 
on matters concerning authorization of additional shares .In addition, it triggers Individualism in shareholders 
as they take matter into their own hands to look after themselves. Moreover, by doing so Uncertainty-
Avoidance is triggered and such task won’t be considered threatening as it’s lawfully prescribed.  
 
 
Pre-Emptive rights 
It triggers Individualism in shareholders as they look after their wealth and opportunity to increase it. 
Moreover, by doing so Uncertainty-Avoidance is triggered as shareholders demand the right to hold first 
opportunity to buy new issues of stock. Hence, they reduce the risk of un-wanted control by an existing 
major shareholder or a hostile outsider. In addition, it triggers Long-Term Orientation as shareholders look 
for better values to buy shares before bidding-inflation effect, a pragmatic approach towards their share 
investments, and allow them for better sale price in the future once the new shares are effectively accounted 
for as a companies’ capital in the Stock Market in the long run.  
 
Extraordinary 
transactions 
Triggers Long-Term Orientation as extraordinary transactions affect future reporting of profits and they are 
cautionary in nature in regard to future profits. In addition, extraordinary transactions trigger the LTO of 
shareholders in terms of their adaptabilities to changing circumstances in corporations they have invested in. 
 
Issues to be 
decided at the 
meeting   
Triggers Power-Distance as shareholders are all equally valued to decide on matters at the GM meeting. In 
addition, it triggers Uncertainty-Avoidance as any potential threat is lessened by participation and prior 
preparations as lawfully prescribed. 
 
Challenge 
resolution 
Triggers Individualism as shareholders challenge resolutions in order to look after their own investments. 
Hence, Power-Distance is also triggered as all shareholders are considered equally important to challenge a 
resolution if they have to. 
 
Approval for 
Remuneration 
policy for board 
members 
Triggers Power-Distance as all shareholders view themselves as equally important in making their views 
known on remuneration policy. In addition, it triggers Individualism as shareholders look after themselves in 
approving such policy. Hence, Uncertainty-Avoidance is also triggered as this whole task is lawfully 
prescribed to allow shareholders to protect their investments from any potential financial threat. 
 
Approval of 
compensation 
schemes 
Triggers Power-Distance as all shareholders view themselves as equally important in approving any 
compensation scheme. In addition, it triggers Individualism as shareholders look after themselves in 
approving such scheme. Hence, Uncertainty- Avoidance is also triggered as this whole task is lawfully 
prescribed to allow shareholders to protect their investments from any potential financial threat. 
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Approval by 
Disinterested 
shareholders 
regarding self-
dealing transaction 
Triggers Power-Distance as disinterested shareholders view themselves as equally important in approving 
any self-dealing transaction affecting their wealth. In addition, it triggers Individualism as shareholders look 
after themselves in approving such transaction. Hence, Uncertainty- Avoidance is also triggered as this whole 
task is lawfully prescribed to allow disinterested shareholders to protect their investments from any 
consequences they might suffer from self-dealing transactions. 
 
Equal effects given 
to all shareholders’ 
votes 
Triggers Individualism as shareholders vote to look after their own investments. Moreover, Femininity is also 
triggered as given equal effects to all votes’ calls for caring for all shareholders especially the weak once as 
prescribed lawfully. 
 
Financial and 
operating results 
Triggers Long-Term Orientation as shareholders are on the lookout for the future rewards of financial and 
operating results quarterly. In addition, such disclosure on a regular basis triggers Uncertainty-Avoidance as 
a lawful measure capable of lessening and informing shareholders of any potential threat. 
 
 
Major share 
ownership 
Triggers Power-Distance as all shareholders are considered equally important regardless of the size of their 
investments. Therefore, all shareholders are lawfully aware of major holders and voting rights as disclosed 
by law .Hence, it also triggers Uncertainty-Avoidance as the law makes minority shareholders aware of any 
potential threat from major shareholders as it singles them out in disclosure. 
 
 
Related party 
transactions 
Triggers Power-Distance as all shareholders are considered equally important and no such special treatment 
of related party transaction should be over-looked for the benefits of elite shareholders. Hence, it has to be 
disclosed. In addition, such disclosure also triggers Uncertainty-Avoidance as it makes all shareholders aware 
of any potential threat might be caused by elite shareholders’ related party transaction. 
 
 
Foreseeable risk 
factors 
Triggers Long-Term Orientation as such disclosure makes all shareholders aware of any potential financial 
loss regarding their future rewards in terms of dividends and exposes listed corporations’ abilities to 
distribute dividends while adapting to changing circumstances. It also triggers Uncertainty-Avoidance as the 
law is prescribed to enforce corporations to disclose any potential foreseeable risk so that all shareholders are 
becoming aware of any potential risk to their investments. Hence, they all shall have the time to assess and 
decide on their holdings to lessen any threat. 
 
Disclosure Criteria 
external and 
objective 
assurances 
Triggers Femininity as getting external and objective assurances on shareholders’ investments through 
disclosure is lawfully meant to care for all shareholders and is designed to ensure better quality of 
information for all stakeholders. It also triggers Long-Term Orientation as it is aimed at providing 
shareholders with objectively justified future rewards in the form of profits. Moreover, Uncertainty-
Avoidance is lawfully triggered trough disclosure as well and any potential threat is becoming described and 
presented in the financial statements for shareholders to assess. 
Capital structures 
arrangements 
empowering 
certain 
shareholders 
 
Triggers Uncertainty-Avoidance as the law is prescribed to enforce corporations to disclose any pre-
arrangements enabling certain class of shareholders with a degree of control disproportionate to their shares. 
Such pre-arrangement can be considered a threat for other shareholders if not disclosed. Hence, the law is 
caring in nature for the weak; therefore, it triggers Femininity as well. 
Institutional 
investors corporate 
governance and 
voting policies 
Triggers Femininity as the law is prescribed to protect weak shareholders from institutional investors’ use of 
their CG and voting polices. Moreover, it triggers Power-Distance as all investors are considered equally 
important. Moreover, the law requires institutional investors to disclose their CG and voting policies. Hence, 
Uncertainty-Avoidance is triggered as shareholders are becoming aware of any potential threat from 
institutional investors’ use of their CG and voting polices. 
 
Institutional 
investors 
Procedures on the 
use of their voting 
rights. 
Triggers Femininity as the law is prescribed to protect weak shareholders from institutional investors’ voting 
rights. Hence, Uncertainty-Avoidance is triggered as shareholders are becoming aware of any potential threat 
from institutional investors’ use of their voting rights. 
 Triggers Uncertainty-Avoidance as the law is prescribed to enforce institutional investors to disclose any 
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Institutional 
investors  
Material conflicts 
of interest 
material conflict of interests that might threaten the exercise of key ownership rights. Hence, the law is in 
nature on the side of the weak shareholders, triggers Femininity, and is designed to protect them from any 
potential threat from big institutional investors. In addition, it triggers Power-Distance as all investors 
viewed equal in the exercise of their ownership rights regardless of the size of their investments which does 
not constitute any special treatment. 
shares not carrying 
the same rights 
Triggers Femininity as it sympathizes with the weak in the distribution of power attached to shareholder’s 
rights, and triggers Power-Distance as every shareholder is equally valuable.  
 
 
Info about rights 
attached 
Triggers Individualism as it requires shareholders to look after themselves in collecting sufficient information 
on their potential investments before purchasing. It also triggers Uncertainty-Avoidance as a measure of 
reducing risk by shareholders getting to know what they are entitled to as to avoid any potential risk. 
 
Changes in voting 
rights 
Triggers Individualism as shareholders tend to look after themselves in approving any potential changes 
made to voting rights. It also triggers Power-Distance as such approval requires a mindset of equal 
importance of all classes of shareholders. Moreover, it triggers Femininity as such approval is a lawful 
measure for carrying for the weak and putting a defensive measure against any sort of expropriation. 
 
Actions by 
controlling 
shareholders 
Triggers Femininity as the law sympathizes with the weak to be protected from any action by controlling 
shareholders acting directly or indirectly for the benefits of their substantially invested capital. Also, it 
triggers Power-Distance in looking at all shareholders as equally important. 
 
(gm) procedures 
disallowing 
equitable treatment 
Triggers Femininity as the law is caring for the weak and is put in place to protect minority shareholders 
from (CP) disallowing equitable treatment of all shareholders. Also, it triggers Uncertainty-Avoidance as the 
law is meant to lessen any potential threat. In addition, it triggers Power Distance as the law previews all 
shareholders as equally significant; therefore, the all should be treated equally. 
 
 
Insider trading 
Triggers Femininity as the law is caring for the weak and is put in place to protect minority shareholders 
from majority holders. Also, it triggers Power-Distance as it views all shareholders equal and prohibits any 
preferential treatment such as insider trading. 
 
Board members 
not disclosing 
material interest 
Triggers Femininity as the law is caring for the weak and is put in place to protect minority shareholders 
from board members not disclosing material interest in transactions they have stake in. Also, it triggers 
Power-Distance as it views all stakeholders equal and prohibits the board from misusing their power. 
 
(CP) disallowing 
effective means of 
redress by 
minorities   
Triggers Femininity as the law is caring for the weak and is put in place to protect minority shareholders 
from (CP) disallowing effective means of redress by them. Also, it triggers Uncertainty-Avoidance as the law 
is meant to lessen any potential threat and readdress it appropriately for the benefit of minorities. 
(CP) making  it 
difficult and 
expensive for 
minorities to cast 
votes 
Triggers Femininity as the law is caring for the weak and is put in place to protect minority shareholders 
from (CP) making it difficult and expensive for minorities to cast votes. Also, it triggers Uncertainty-
Avoidance as the law is meant to lessen any potential voting threat might be caused by unjust company 
procedures. 
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10.11 APPENDIX B.11: A Checklist for a Case Study 
 
Note: Checklist questions are all adopted from the Good Research Guide for small-scale social 
research projects by Denscombe (2003). 
1. Is the research based on a naturally occurring situation? Yes 
This case study is a natural occurring phenomenon concerning the Saudi Culture. It is an Assessment 
of the Impact of Saudi Arabia Culture on Corporate Governance on Minority Shareholders’ rights. 
Hence, this natural occurring situation exists prior to the research project, and will continue to exist 
once the research has finished. Max Weber (1905) puts the emphasis on the persistence of traditional 
values despite economic and political changes. In addition, Max Weber’s view confirms with the 
notion that values are relatively independent of economic conditions (DiMaggio, 1994).   
2. Has the case been identified as a particular instance of a type of social phenomena/ (e.g. kind 
of event, type of organization, or people)? Yes 
As the case is an Assessment of the Impact of Saudi Arabia Culture on Corporate Governance on 
Minority Shareholders’ Rights, the focus is of a macro nature on one instance of a particular 
phenomena of CG with a view to providing an in-depth account of events, relationships, and processes 
occurring in that particular instance. 
3. Have the significant features of the case been described and have they been compared with 
those to be found elsewhere amongst the type of thing being studied?  Yes 
The study is based on the Saudi culture impact on Corporate Governance on Minority Shareholders’ 
Rights. In addition, the case uses Hofstede (2010) dimensions to assess such impact based on the five 
well-know Cultural Value dimensions (CVD) which can be used to assess other cultures either similar 
or different on attributes. In addition, it employees the OECD principles of CG which is an obligatory 
measure of governance imposed by the profession worldwide. Moreover, the study takes into account 
the legal and political factors’ effect on CG. These factors are well established in the quantitative 
literature and their implications can be found in any country. Hence, the applicability of these factors 
can be seen in developing and emerging economies such as the Saudi. Therefore, this case can be 
compared with others of its type as it was initially researched to develop a comprehensive framework 
which can be adopted by potential research cases taking place in developing and emerging economies 
resembling a similar culture to Saudi Arabia. Therefore,  
 The physical location of the geographical area is applicable to other potential cases 
taken place in one of the Middle East or African neighbouring countries as long as 
their economies can be categorized as developing or emerging. 
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 The historical location of developments and changes regarding the legal and political 
factors is also applicable to other potential cases to be taken in and around the same 
region as detailed above. 
 The social location of social class, religion, and culture is also applicable to other 
potential cases in the same or neighbouring regions as detailed above. 
 The institutional location of listed corporations, official CG policies and producers 
regarding minority rights is also applicable to other potential cases in the same or 
neighbouring regions as detailed above. 
 
4. Have the criteria for selection of the case been described or justified? Yes 
Selection on the basis of suitability:  
A- Typical Instance; the logic is that this particular case of the Impact of culture on CG on minority 
Shareholders’ rights is similar in crucial respects with others that might have been chosen. However, 
the difference between this case and other studies is that other studies have been done in a comparative 
international context. However, this case is going to be carried in the Saudi context to provide more in-
depth information. Hence, potential findings from this case study are more likely to be applicable 
countries of a similar culture. Consequentially, potential findings can be partially generalized to the 
whole class of things. 
 
B-Test Site for theory: the logic of selection of a particular case can be based on the relevance of the 
case for a previous theory as Yen (1994) stresses. Hence, this case study can be used for the purpose of 
testing the Institutional theory (New Institutional Sociology) as well as theory building. The rationale 
for choosing a specific case, then, can be that it contains crucial elements that are especially 
significant, and that the researcher should be able to predict certain outcomes if the theory holds true. 
5. Have the boundaries to the case been described and their implications considered? Yes 
The researcher has built a comprehensive model stemming from the relevant literature on culture and 
CG pertaining to minority shareholders rights. Hence, all implications have been considered from the 
major factors such as cultural, legal, political, and their interplay. Therefore, it is clear to the researcher 
what is (incorporated into the investigation and what is excluded from the focus of the study as 
variables were only selected from the relevant literature). 
6. Is the case a fairly self-contained entity? Yes 
As mentioned above, and due to the proposed model, this case study can be described as not only a 
fairly self contained entity but also has fairly distinct boundaries. Therefore, a clear vision of the 
boundaries to the case has been developed to provide an explicit account of what they are: cultural, 
legal, and political. 
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7. Has careful consideration been given to the issue of generalization stemming from research? 
Yes 
Although each case is in some respects unique, it is also a single example of a broader class of things. 
As the study is aimed at unveiling the effect of the Saudi culture on CG regarding minority rights, it 
can be treated as an instance of the impact of other cultures on CG regarding minority rights. 
In addition, the extent to which findings from a case study can be generalized to other examples in the 
class depends on how far the case study example is similar to other of its type: (see answer to Q3 for 
more detailed description.) 
8. Does the research make suitable use of multiple methods and multiple sources of data? Yes.  
As any case study is a matter of a research strategy not a research method, this intended research will 
use questionnaires and interviews as a strategy to provide a comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of 
Saudi Arabia Culture on Corporate Governance on Minority Shareholders’ Rights while investigating 
the legal and political factors contributing to the current status of compliance by listed Saudi 
Corporations. Hence, the research intends to use whatever method deemed appropriate to investigate 
the relationships and processes that are of interest to this assessment of the impact of the Saudi Culture 
on CG regarding minority rights. 
9. Does the research give due attention to relationships and process and provide a holistic 
perspective? Yes 
Attention is given to the processes which led to the outcomes to preserve the value of this case study. 
As a result, a comprehensive model of factors, pertaining to the intended assessment of this case study 
stemming from the relevant literature review, has been built. Therefore, the case offers the opportunity 
to explain why certain outcomes might happen. Hence, this case study is of a macro focus and holistic 
in nature. It is an in-depth assessment of the Impact of the Saudi Culture on Corporate Governance 
regarding Minority Shareholders’ rights. Moreover, it is aimed at assessing the process which led to 
certain outcomes by illuminating the general by looking at the particular. 
In sum, this is a single country, explanatory and exploratory, case study that fulfills the interpretive 
paradigm’s criteria as it has been motivated by the New Institutional Sociology theory which is 
interpretive in nature as detailed in the early parts of chapter four.  
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11. APPENDIX C: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 
11.1 APPENDIX C.1: Cronbach’s Alpha if Item Deleted: Reliability Test 
 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.861 .867 33 
 
Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Obtain relevant and material 
information on a timely and 
regular basis LTO=H 
128.24 205.281 .434 .821 .856 
Participate and vote in 
general shareholder 
meetings PD=L  IND=H 
128.32 212.672 .153 .851 .862 
Call a shareholders' 
meeting PD=L IND=H 
128.65 200.973 .566 .883 .853 
Elect and remove members 
of the board PD=L  IND=H 
128.60 209.050 .245 .852 .860 
Share in the profits of the 
corporation LTO=H 
128.14 207.995 .384 .836 .858 
Amendments to the statutes 
or articles of incorporation 
PD=L, IND=H, UA=L 
129.17 196.759 .603 .797 .851 
Authorization of additional 
shares PD=L IND=H UA=L 
128.57 209.765 .305 .674 .859 
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Assignment of Pre-Emptive 
rights: given you the first 
opportunity to buy new 
issues of stock IND=H 
UA=L LTO=H 
128.83 201.856 .376 .790 .858 
Extraordinary transactions 
resulting in the sale of the 
company LTO=H 
128.87 201.726 .346 .805 .859 
Be informed of Issues to be 
decided at the meeting  
PD=L  UA=L 
128.81 208.479 .310 .810 .859 
Challenge resolutions 
benefiting controlling 
shareholders IND=H PD=L 
128.84 203.458 .409 .793 .857 
Remuneration policy for 
board members and key 
executives. IND=H PD=L 
UA=L 
128.97 206.805 .266 .781 .860 
Compensation schemes for 
board members and 
employees IND=H PD=L 
UA=L 
128.87 208.403 .270 .632 .860 
Self dealing transactions 
affecting disinterested 
shareholders  IND=H PD=L 
UA=L 
128.71 202.885 .417 .829 .856 
Equal effect given to your 
vote whether cast in person 
or in absentia or by email. 
IND=H FEM=H 
128.83 197.792 .548 .707 .853 
The financial and operating 
results of a company. 
LTO=H UA=L 
128.16 210.620 .245 .770 .860 
Major share ownership and 
voting rights. PD=L UA=L 
128.46 208.188 .434 .789 .857 
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Related party transactions. 
PD=L UA=L 
128.73 196.878 .573 .864 .852 
Foreseeable risk factors. 
LTO=H UA=L 
128.25 209.967 .339 .561 .859 
Capital structures enabling 
certain shareholders to 
obtain a degree of control 
disproportionate to their 
shares UA=L FEM=H  
128.73 199.200 .629 .844 .852 
Their overall corporate 
governance and voting 
policies FEM=H PD=L 
UA=L 
128.44 212.057 .144 .764 .863 
Procedures that they have 
in place for deciding on the 
use of their voting rights. 
FEM=H  UA=L 
128.54 204.156 .487 .823 .855 
Material conflicts of interest 
affecting the exercise of key 
ownership rights UA=L  
PD=L FEM=H 
128.46 205.962 .513 .833 .856 
Provide an external and 
objective assurances to the 
board and shareholders  
FEM=H LTO=H UA=L 
128.08 213.107 .196 .850 .861 
Within any series of a class, 
all shares should not carry 
the same rights.  
 FEM=H PD=L 
128.86 208.221 .197 .761 .863 
Info about rights attached to 
shares shouldn’t be 
obtained before purchasing  
IND=H UA=L  
129.35 209.844 .124 .675 .866 
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Changes in voting rights 
shouldn’t be subject to 
approval by classes of 
shares negatively 
affected.IND=H PD=L 
FEM=H 
128.60 206.566 .329 .807 .859 
Actions by controlling 
shareholders acting directly 
or indirectly for the benefits 
of their substantially 
invested capital FEM=H 
PD=L  
128.43 204.668 .426 .620 .856 
General meetings’ (gm) 
procedures disallowing 
equitable treatment of all 
shareholders. FEM=H PD=L 
UA=L 
128.94 201.996 .391 .881 .857 
Insider trading benefiting 
majority shareholders. 
FEM=H  PD=L 
128.95 196.433 .513 .825 .853 
Board members not 
disclosing material interest 
in transactions they have 
stake in FEM=H  PD=L 
128.81 205.221 .281 .906 .860 
Company procedures (cp) 
disallowing effective means 
of redress by minorities 
FEM=H  UA=L  
129.10 193.442 .560 .894 .852 
Company procedures 
making  it difficult and 
expensive for (cp) minorities 
to cast votes FEM=H UA=L    
129.03 200.967 .415 .864 .856 
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11.2 APPENDIX C.2: Principle Component Analysis: Validity Test 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 7.112 21.552 21.552 7.112 21.552 21.552 3.681 11.153 11.153 
2 3.591 10.882 32.434 3.591 10.882 32.434 2.893 8.768 19.921 
3 2.452 7.430 39.864 2.452 7.430 39.864 2.598 7.873 27.794 
4 2.132 6.460 46.325 2.132 6.460 46.325 2.275 6.893 34.687 
5 2.033 6.162 52.487 2.033 6.162 52.487 2.270 6.880 41.567 
6 1.898 5.753 58.240 1.898 5.753 58.240 2.253 6.827 48.393 
7 1.731 5.247 63.487 1.731 5.247 63.487 2.183 6.616 55.009 
8 1.492 4.522 68.008 1.492 4.522 68.008 2.176 6.594 61.603 
9 1.450 4.395 72.403 1.450 4.395 72.403 2.166 6.564 68.167 
10 1.183 3.585 75.988 1.183 3.585 75.988 2.019 6.119 74.287 
11 1.017 3.081 79.069 1.017 3.081 79.069 1.578 4.783 79.069 
12 .872 2.643 81.712       
13 .774 2.344 84.057       
14 .700 2.122 86.178       
15 .626 1.897 88.075       
16 .567 1.717 89.793       
17 .508 1.541 91.333       
18 .414 1.256 92.589       
19 .357 1.082 93.672       
20 .336 1.018 94.690       
21 .284 .859 95.549       
22 .260 .787 96.336       
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23 .246 .744 97.080       
24 .179 .542 97.623       
25 .160 .485 98.108       
26 .138 .417 98.525       
27 .122 .368 98.893       
28 .094 .286 99.179       
29 .090 .274 99.453       
30 .062 .188 99.641       
31 .055 .168 99.808       
32 .036 .109 99.917       
33 .027 .083 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
Pattern Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
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Material conflicts 
of interest 
affecting the 
exercise of key 
ownership rights 
UA=L  PD=L 
FEM=H 
.895           
Procedures that 
they have in place 
for deciding on 
the use of their 
voting rights. 
FEM=H  UA=L 
.587         -.420  
Related party 
transactions. 
PD=L UA=L 
.470      .452     
Equal effect given 
to your vote 
whether cast in 
person or in 
absentia or by 
email. IND=H 
FEM=H 
.466       -.454    
Company 
procedures 
making  it difficult 
and expensive for 
(cp) minorities to 
cast votes 
FEM=H UA=L    
 .955          
Board members 
not disclosing 
material interest in 
transactions they 
have stake in 
FEM=H  PD=L 
 .658          
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Company 
procedures (cp) 
disallowing 
effective means of 
redress by 
minorities FEM=H  
UA=L  
 .624  -.454        
Insider trading 
benefiting majority 
shareholders. 
FEM=H  PD=L 
 .554          
General meetings’ 
(gm) procedures 
disallowing 
equitable 
treatment of all 
shareholders. 
FEM=H PD=L 
UA=L 
 .469      .403    
Participate and 
vote in general 
shareholder 
meetings PD=L  
IND=H 
  .899         
Call a 
shareholders' 
meeting PD=L 
IND=H 
  .606         
Obtain relevant 
and material 
information on a 
timely and regular 
basis LTO=H 
  .469   .403      
Elect and remove 
members of the 
board PD=L  
IND=H 
   .792        
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Changes in voting 
rights shouldn’t be 
subject to 
approval by 
classes of shares 
negatively 
affected.IND=H 
PD=L FEM=H 
   -.537        
Self dealing 
transactions 
affecting 
disinterested 
shareholders  
IND=H PD=L 
UA=L 
   -.472        
Their overall 
corporate 
governance and 
voting policies 
FEM=H PD=L 
UA=L 
    .898       
Provide an 
external and 
objective 
assurances to the 
board and 
shareholders  
FEM=H LTO=H 
UA=L 
    .895       
Foreseeable risk 
factors. LTO=H 
UA=L 
     .728      
Be informed of 
Issues to be 
decided at the 
meeting  PD=L  
UA=L 
     .624      
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Authorization of 
additional shares 
PD=L IND=H 
UA=L 
     .504 .454     
Extraordinary 
transactions 
resulting in the 
sale of the 
company LTO=H 
      .887     
Assignment of 
Pre-Emptive 
rights: given you 
the first 
opportunity to buy 
new issues of 
stock IND=H 
UA=L LTO=H 
      .768     
Remuneration 
policy for board 
members and key 
executives. 
IND=H PD=L 
UA=L 
       -.868    
Compensation 
schemes for 
board members 
and employees 
IND=H PD=L 
UA=L 
       -.522   .432 
Info about rights 
attached to 
shares shouldn’t 
be obtained 
before purchasing  
IND=H UA=L  
        .761   
APPENDIX C: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS   P a g e  | 325 
 
 
 
Major share 
ownership and 
voting rights. 
PD=L UA=L 
        -.606   
Within any series 
of a class, all 
shares should not 
carry the same 
rights.   FEM=H 
PD=L 
     .419   .483   
Actions by 
controlling 
shareholders 
acting directly or 
indirectly for the 
benefits of their 
substantially 
invested capital 
FEM=H PD=L  
         -.817  
Challenge 
resolutions 
benefiting 
controlling 
shareholders 
IND=H PD=L 
         -.630  
Capital structures 
enabling certain 
shareholders to 
obtain a degree of 
control 
disproportionate 
to their shares 
UA=L FEM=H  
         -.517  
The financial and 
operating results 
of a company. 
LTO=H UA=L 
          -.874 
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Amendments to 
the statutes or 
articles of 
incorporation 
PD=L, IND=H, 
UA=L 
          -.536 
Share in the 
profits of the 
corporation 
LTO=H 
         -.400 -.407 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization: Rotation converged in 28 iterations  
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .518 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1341.198 
Df 528 
Sig. .000 
 
The Pattern matrix confirmed all the research constructs with the emergence of interrelated themes under specific 
factors. 
 
The original themes were:  
Broad Theme Sub-themes Questions 
Rights of Shareholders Basic shareholder rights Q1:A1,A2,A3,A4,A5 
 Participation  on fundamental corporate changes Q1:B1,B2,B3,B4 
 Participation and voting in GM Q1;C1,C2 
 Participation in key corporate governance decisions Q1:D1,D2,D3 
 Voting power Q1:E1 
Disclosure and Transparency  Disclosure on material information Q2:A1,A2,A3,A4,A5 
 Exercise of ownership rights by institutional investors Q:2:B1,B2,B3 
 Criteria of Disclosure  Q2:C1 
Equitable Treatment  shareholders of the same series of a class  Q3:A1,A2,A3 
 shareholders protection Q3;B1,B2,B3,B4,B5,B6 
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The factorial analysis has via the Pattern Matrix produced a new order of the above constructs and merged the 
highly correlated items loading with each other on 11 factors with each other. The eleven factors suggested are: 
 
Factor Broad Theme Sub-themes Questions 
1 Rights of shareholders 
Disclosure and transparency 
Shareholders voting power 
Exercise of ownership by institutional investors 
Disclosure regarding material information 
Q1;E1 
Q2;B3, B2,A3 
 
2 Equitable treatment of shareholders shareholders protection Q3;B6, B4, B5, B3, B2 
3 Rights of shareholders Basic shareholder rights Q1:A2,A3,A1 
4 Rights of Shareholders 
 
Equitable Treatment 
Basic shareholder’s rights 
Participation in key CG decisions 
shareholders of the same series of a class 
Q1:A4, D3 
 
Q3:A3 
5 Disclosure and transparency Exercise of ownership by institutional investors 
Criteria of Disclosure 
Q2:B1, C1 
6 Disclosure and transparency 
Rights of shareholders 
Disclosure on material information 
Participation and voting in GM 
Q2:A4 
Q1:C1 
7 Rights of shareholders Participation  on fundamental corporate changes Q1: B2, B4, B3 
8 Rights of shareholders Participation in key corporate governance 
decisions 
Q1: D1, D2 
9 Equitable treatment 
Disclosure and transparency 
shareholders of the same series of a class 
Disclosure on material information 
Q3: A2, A1 
Q2: A2 
10 Equitable treatment 
Rights of shareholders 
Disclosure and transparency 
shareholders protection 
Participation and voting in GM 
Disclosure on material information 
Q3: B1 
Q1: C4 
Q2: A5 
11 Disclosure and transparency 
Rights of shareholders 
 
Disclosure on material information 
Participation  on fundamental corporate changes 
Basic shareholder rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q2: A1 
Q1: B1, A5 
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11.3 APPENDIX C.3: Descriptive Statistics: Demographics & shareholders 
Type  
1- An overall Demographic characteristics' analysis on the sample size 
Characteristics of respondents  Frequency  %  Cum %  
Gender  
Male  60 72.3 74.1 
Female  21 25.3 100 
Age  
25-45  61 73.5 75.3 
> 45  15 18.1 93.8 
18-24 5 6.0 100 
Education  
High school 5 6.0 6.3 
Diploma  19 22.9 30.0 
Doctorate  2 2.4 32.5 
Master degree  14 16.9 50.0 
Bachelor degree 40 48.2 100.0 
Shareholder’s Type 
Majority 16 19.3 19.3 
Sophosticated 17 20.5 39.8 
Minority 35 42.2 81.9 
Non-Shareholders 15 18.1 100 
Have you had any work experience related to share trading 
Yes 29 34.9 35.8 
No 52 62.7 100 
Have you been trading in the stock market? 
Yes 40 48.2 50 
No 40 48.2 100 
For how long have you been trading in the stock market? 
11-20 years 2 2.4 3.0 
4-10 years 14 16.9 24.2 
1-3 years 28 33.7 66.7 
< 1 year 22 26.5 100 
What is the longest period you have held onto a certain class of shares? 
 4 years 
6 7.2 9.0 
2-3 years 10 12.0 23.9 
1 year 10 12.0 38.8 
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6-12 months 5 6.0 46.3 
4- 6 months 12 14.5 64.2 
2-3 months 9 10.8 77.6 
 1 month 
15 18.1 100 
From this questionnaire, how much information have you been aware of regarding your rights 
as a shareholder? 
90 – 100 % 4 4.8 5.2 
70- 80 % 13 15.7 22.1 
40- 60 % 19 22.9 46.8 
20-30 % 15 18.1 66.2 
< 10 % 26 31.3 100 
Will you require the blessing of a religious scholar to enforce these rights? 
Yes 61 73.5 77.2 
No 18 21.7 100 
 
All observations are derived from the table above are out of 83 participants in total 
 Gender 
72.3 % of respondents are males, and the other 25.3 % are females. Female shareholders are 
under-represented at 25.3 % in the Saudi Stock Market, which reflects the social structure of 
the Saudi Society as females are less involved in commercial dealings compared to males. 
 Age 
73.5 % of respondents are between the ages of 25-45, 18.1 % are older than 45, and 6 % are 
between the ages of 18 - 24. These results reflect the age structure of the Saudi population that 
is characterized by the predominance of youth. 
 Educational Level 
48.2 % of respondents hold Bachelor degrees, whereas 22.9 % of respondents hold University 
Diplomas. In addition, 16.9 % of respondents hold master degrees and 2.4 % of respondents 
hold doctorate degrees: leaving only 6 % of respondents with high school degrees. Hence, 
more than half of respondents (67.5 %) have higher qualifications (Doctorate, Master, and 
Bachelor degrees) while a substantial number of 16.9 % of respondents have University 
Diplomas. Only, 6.3 % of respondents have high school degrees. Hence, the data collected, on 
average, represent a high level of education among the sample size. 
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 Shareholder’s Type 
42.2 % of respondents are minority shareholder whereas only 19.3 % are Majority 
shareholders. Hence, the percentage of minority shareholders is 2 times bigger than majority’s 
shareholders. On the other hand, sophisticated shareholders composed 20.5 % of respondents 
and the other 18.1 % are non-shareholders. 
 Previous Work Experience Related to Share Trading 
Only 34.9 % of respondents have relevant work experience to share trading whereas 62.7 % of 
respondents have no work experience related to share trading. Hence, such observation is 
indicative of Saudi shareholders’ investment behavior as the majority of shareholders don’t 
perceive practical experiences as necessary for share trading. 
 Currently Trading in the Stock Market 
50 % of respondents are active traders, and the other 50 % of respondents are passive traders. 
 The Length of Time Trading in the Stock Market 
33.7 % of respondents have been trading for 1-3 years and 26.5 % of respondents have been 
trading for less than a year. Only 16.9 % of respondents have been trading for 4-10 years and 
the other 2.4 % of respondents have been trading for more than 11 years. Hence, based on the 
sample size, these results provide an indication that Saudi shareholders are in it for the short 
run. 60 % of respondents last for less than 3 years in the stock market and only 20 % of 
respondents are in it for the long term. Perhaps, this is due to the lost confidence in the long 
term investments in listed corporations in the Saudi market. Thus, the qualitative analysis 
might provide an insight regarding this observation when assessing the legal and political 
framework and how such strong CG regime can provide shareholders with the needed 
confidence to hold onto their class of shares. 
 Length of Time Holding onto a Certain Class of Shares 
49.4 % of respondents have held onto a certain class of shares for less than a year whereas 
only 31 % of respondents held onto a certain class of shares for more than a year. In addition, 
18.1 % of respondents held onto a class of shares for less than a month. These descriptive 
findings confirm the previous observations made about Saudi shareholders’ level of 
confidence in listed Saudi corporations. It seems as if the level of confidence is relatively low 
as the majority of shareholders tend not to hold onto a cetin class of shares for more than a 
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year. Hence, as mentioned previously, further assessment of the legal and political framework 
in the qualitative phase might yield further explanations. 
 Awareness Regarding Shareholder’s Rights 
Regarding shareholders’ level of awareness in relation to their rights as prescribed in the 
OECD principles of CG, 31% of respondents are aware of less than 10 % of their rights. 
Moreover,22.9 % of respondents is aware of 40 to 60 % of their rights, and 18 % of 
respondents are aware of 20 to 30 % of their rights. Hence, on average, half of the 
respondents, 53.3 %, are aware of less than 30 % of their rights. On the other hand, 4.8 % of 
respondents are aware of 90 to 100 % of their rights whereas 15.7 % are aware of 70 to 80 % 
of their rights. Based on these results, the question that comes to mind is: who is responsible 
of this low level of awareness: is it the corporations or the Capital Market Authority or the 
shareholders? Such answer might be yield by the qualitative analysis when assessing the legal 
and political factors influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi Corporations’ with the 
OECD principles with respect to the protection of minority shareholder rights. 
11.3.1.1.1.1.1 Requiring a Blessing of a Religious Scholar 
Shockingly, 73.5 % of respondents required a religious permit from religious scholars to call 
for these rights whereas only 21 % of respondents don’t require such blessings. These results 
are of a great significance as they shed lights on the effect of religion on the level of 
compliance with CG principles pertaining to Minority Shareholder rights. 
Nevertheless, it will be premature to paint a picture out of these descriptive statistics on 
demographics. Hence, a further analysis of descriptive statistics is required on the type of 
shareholders to depict a clearer picture on all previous insights. 
3) A Shareholder Type Demographic Characteristics Analysis: (See APPENDIX C.3 for 
Tables): 
 Age: 
 Out of 16 Majority Shareholders, 14 were in between the ages of 25-45. Hence, 87 % 
are middle age and the other 12.5% are older than 45 
 Out of 17 Sophisticated Shareholders, 12 were in between the ages of 25-45, 70 % , 
the other 29.4 % are older than 45. 
 Out of 35 Minority Shareholders, 26 are in between the ages of 25-45, 74 %. The other 
4 and 5 % of minorities are older than 45 and between the ages of 18-24 respectively. 
APPENDIX C: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS   P a g e  | 332 
 
 
 
 Out of 13 Non-Shareholders, 9 are in between the ages of 25-45, 60%, and the other 
26.7 percent are older than 45. 
Hence, it can be said that the age structure of the sample size is characterized by the 
predominance of youth.  There is not a significant difference in the percentages of age 
regarding the shareholders’ type based on the descriptive statistics. 
 Gender: 
 Out of 16 Majority Shareholder, All 16 were males. 
 Out of 17 Sophisticated Shareholders, 82.4 % were males and the other 17.6 % are 
females. 
 Out of the 35 Minority Shareholders, 62.9 percent were males, and the other 37.1 
percent are females. 
The overall statistics show the dominance of males in the Saudi Stock market which is 
indicative, via the sample size of this research, of the masculine social structure of the Saudi 
Society. However, females are more represented under the category of Minority shareholders. 
This is perhaps due to the promise the stock market present in terms of wealth maximization 
to the Saudi society at large. 
 Educational level 
 Out of 16 Majority Shareholders, 50 % were bachelor degrees’ holders, 37.5 % master 
degrees’ holders, and 1.5 % are diploma holders. On average, the holders of high 
qualifications were 87.5 % of Majorities. 
 Out of 16 Sophisticated Shareholders, 47.1 % were bachelor degrees’ holders, 35.5 % 
were diploma holders and the other 11 % are evenly split between PhD and Master 
Degrees’ holders. On average, 69.1 % of sophisticated shareholders hold high 
qualifications. 
 Out of 35 Minority Shareholders, 51 % were bachelor degrees’ holders, 20 % were 
master degrees’ holders, and the other 20% were PhD holders. Only 8.6 % were 
diploma holders. On average, 91 %.of minorities hold high qualifications. 
In terms of high Qualifications, Minority shareholders lead the crowd; however, not by far 
from Majority shareholders. However, both Majority and Minority shareholders are, on 
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average, 18% higher in qualifications’ levels than sophisticated shareholders. Perhaps, a high 
level of education is not required by brokers companies for the recruitment of their personnel. 
 Previous Work Experience Related to Share Trading: 
 Majority, 75% had previous work experience, and the other 25 did not. 
 Sophisticated, 70.6 % had no previous work experience, and 29.4 did. 
 Minority, 65.7 % had no previous work experience, and 34.3 did 
Majority Shareholders seem to possess the necessary characteristics of practical knowledge 
and experience to succeed in the Stock market compared to the other segments of 
shareholders. 
 Currently Trading in the Stock Market 
 Majority, 68.8 % are currently active in the stock market, and 31.3 are passive. 
 Sophisticated, 58% are currently active in the market, and the other 41.2 are passive 
 Minority, 54.3 are active, and 45.7 are passive. 
Majority shareholders are more active than the other segments. Perhaps, this is due to their 
level of knowledge and various accesses to information provided to them by the legal and 
political environments. Hence, such observation will be further assessed under the qualitative 
analysis phase 
 The Length of Trading in the Stock Market 
 Majority, 50 % have been trading for 1 to 3 years, 12.5 % were trading for 4 to10 
years, 12.5 % were trading for 11 to 20 years. Only, 25 % of majority has been trading 
for less than a year. 
 Sophisticated, 50 % have been trading for 1 to 3 years, 25% were trading for 4 to 10 
years, and another 25% have been trading for less than a year. 
 Minority, 41.2 % have been trading for less than a year, 35.3 % were trading for 1 to 3 
years, and the other 23.5 % have been trading for 4 to 10 years. 
Overall, Majority shareholders lead the line in terms of the length of time trading in the Stock 
market. Perhaps this is due to commitments to their investments and their access to 
information. However, it is noticeable that trading over the period of 1 to 3 years is two times 
higher than any other period for both segments: Majority and Sophisticated. 
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However, after the 3 year period the number of Majority shareholders shrinks by 37.5% over 
the period of 4-10 years and then stays constant at 12.5 % over the period of 11- 20 years. For 
Sophisticated Shareholders, their number shrinks by 25% over the period of 4 -10 years. Then, 
they vanish from the Market. On the other hand, the majority of Minority Shareholders tend to 
trade for less than a year and their number shrinks by 6 % over the 1 -3 years period of trading 
and shrinks for a further 11.8 % over the period of 4-10 years. 
Overall, it is clear that there is a percentage of shareholders’ turn over in the Saudi Stock 
Market and this percentage can be clearly seen after the 3
rd
 year period. The highest 
percentage of turnover is scored by Majority Shareholders. Perhaps, this is due to their 
Knowledge, experience, and access to information and being able to avoid potential losses. 
Nevertheless, further assessment of the legal and political factors , via the qualitative analysis 
phase, influencing the level of compliance of listed Saudi Corporations’ with the OECD 
principles of CG might unveil whether or not Majority Shareholders possess privileged 
advantages. 
 Length of Time Holding onto a Certain Class of Shares 
 Majority shareholders on average, 62.6% of them held onto their shares for less than a 
year: 31% held onto their shares for less than a month. 31.3 % held onto their shares 
for a year and only, 6.3 % held onto their shares for 2-3 years. 
 Sophisticated shareholders, on average, 64.7%of them held onto their shares for less 
than a year: 23% held onto their shares for 2-3 months, and 17.6 % held onto their 
shares for 4-6 moths. In addition, 11.8 % held onto their shares for a year, 11.8 % held 
onto their shares for 2-3 years, and 11.8 % held onto their shares for more than 4 years. 
 Minority shareholders, on average, 58.8 5% of them held onto their shares for less than 
a year: 23.5 % hold for less than a month, 20.6 % held for 4-6 months. 8.8 % held onto 
their shares for a year, 20.6 % held onto their shares for 2-3 years, and 11.8 % held 
onto their shares for more than 4 years. 
Overall, based on this research’s sample size, for all segments of shareholders, 60 % on 
average, held onto their shares for less than year which is indicative of their low level of 
confidence in Saudi listed corporations. Moreover, Majority shareholders led the line in terms 
of holding onto their shares for a year:  31.35 % but this percentage hugely deteriorates to 6 % 
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over the 2-3 years’ period. On the other hand, sophisticated shareholders tend to hold onto 
their shares constantly at 11.8 % over periods exceeding one year. For Minority shareholders, 
they seem to hold the highest percentage of 20.6 of holding onto share for 2-3 years. 
These anomalies can be best explained by the quality of information provided to all segments, 
which is a variable already selected from the literature review phase to be further investigated 
under the qualitative phase of this study. Hence, such undertaking will account for the effect 
of insider trading; thus, it might explain such anomaly in terms of whether or not Majority 
shareholders possess a comparative edge when it comes to accessing information capable of 
cutting potential losses. 
 Awareness Regarding Shareholder’s Rights 
 Majority, 75 % of them are aware of 70-80 % of their rights and the other 25 % are 
aware of 90-100 % of their rights. 
 Sophisticated, 100 % of them are aware of 40-60 % of their rights. 
 Minority, 63% are aware of less than 10% of their rights, and the other 36.4 are aware 
of 20-30 % of their rights. 
Perhaps, based on the results of this sample size, the level of awareness is dependent on the 
close approximation between such segment and Saudi listed corporations’ boards. Hence, such 
further assessment of this factor is taken into account for the qualitative analysis phase as it 
was signified by the relevant literature review phase. 
 Requiring a Blessing of a Religious Scholar 
 Majority: 87.5 % of respondents require the blessings whereas 12.5 % do not require it 
 Sophisticated: 93.8 % of respondents require the blessings whereas 6.3 % do not 
require it 
 Minority: 74.3 % of respondents require the blessings whereas 25.7 % do not require it. 
These figures are indicative of the religious nature of Saudi shareholders and the Saudi 
Society as a whole. However, it seems as Minority Shareholders are more liberalized from 
religious restrictions than any other segment. Perhaps, this is due to the price they have paid 
and the losses they have incurred relying on such religiously driven advertisements. Further 
investigation of the religious factor will be conducted in the hypothesis phase of this section. 
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Nevertheless, such hypothesis testing shall be delayed until further descriptive analysis of the 
distributions of CV dimensions uncovers other basic features of the data. In addition, such 
undertaken will show whether or not assignments of Hofstede’s (2010) CVD to the 
corresponding OECD principles of CG pertaining to Saudi minority shareholders is capable of 
measuring the CVD of Saudi shareholders. Hence, a partial objective of the first research 
question, To what extent do available cultural models (for example, Hofstede (2010)) explain 
the quality of the exercise of minority shareholders’ rights as defined by the OECD in Saudi 
Arabia?,  will be met. 
2-Shareholder type specific- Demographic characteristics' analysis 
 
AGE 
SHARE HOLDER TYPE Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
MAJORITY Valid 25-45 14 87.5 87.5 87.5 
>45 2 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 16 100.0 100.0  
SOPOSTICATED Valid 25-45 12 70.6 70.6 70.6 
>45 5 29.4 29.4 100.0 
Total 17 100.0 100.0  
MINORITY Valid 25-45 26 74.3 74.3 74.3 
>45 4 11.4 11.4 85.7 
18-24 5 14.3 14.3 100.0 
Total 35 100.0 100.0  
NONSHAREHOLDERS Valid 25-45 9 60.0 69.2 69.2 
>45 4 26.7 30.8 100.0 
Total 13 86.7 100.0  
Missing -99 2 13.3   
Total 15 100.0   
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GENDER 
SHARE HOLDER TYPE Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
MAJORITY Valid Male 16 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SOPOSTICATED Valid Male 14 82.4 82.4 82.4 
Female 3 17.6 17.6 100.0 
Total 17 100.0 100.0  
MINORITY Valid Male 22 62.9 62.9 62.9 
Female 13 37.1 37.1 100.0 
Total 35 100.0 100.0  
NONSHAREHOLDERS Valid Male 8 53.3 61.5 61.5 
Female 5 33.3 38.5 100.0 
Total 13 86.7 100.0  
Missing -99 2 13.3   
Total 15 100.0   
 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
SHARE HOLDER TYPE Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
MAJORITY Valid university diploma 2 12.5 12.5 12.5 
master degree 6 37.5 37.5 50.0 
bachelor degree 8 50.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 16 100.0 100.0  
SOPOSTICATED Valid university diploma 6 35.3 37.5 37.5 
phd degree 1 5.9 6.3 43.8 
master degree 1 5.9 6.3 50.0 
bachelor degree 8 47.1 50.0 100.0 
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Total 16 94.1 100.0  
Missing -99 1 5.9   
Total 17 100.0   
MINORITY Valid high school 3 8.6 8.6 8.6 
university diploma 7 20.0 20.0 28.6 
master degree 7 20.0 20.0 48.6 
bachelor degree 18 51.4 51.4 100.0 
Total 35 100.0 100.0  
NONSHAREHOLDERS Valid high school 2 13.3 15.4 15.4 
university diploma 4 26.7 30.8 46.2 
phd degree 1 6.7 7.7 53.8 
bachelor degree 6 40.0 46.2 100.0 
Total 13 86.7 100.0  
Missing -99 2 13.3   
Total 15 100.0   
 
Have you had any previous work experience related to share trading?    
SHARE HOLDER TYPE Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
MAJORITY Valid Yes 12 75.0 75.0 75.0 
No 4 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 16 100.0 100.0  
SOPOSTICATED Valid Yes 5 29.4 29.4 29.4 
No 12 70.6 70.6 100.0 
Total 17 100.0 100.0  
MINORITY Valid Yes 12 34.3 34.3 34.3 
No 23 65.7 65.7 100.0 
Total 35 100.0 100.0  
APPENDIX C: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS   P a g e  | 339 
 
 
 
NONSHAREHOLDERS Valid No 13 86.7 100.0 100.0 
Missing -99 2 13.3   
Total 15 100.0   
 
Have you been trading in the stock market?  
SHARE HOLDER TYPE Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
MAJORITY Valid Yes 11 68.8 68.8 68.8 
No 5 31.3 31.3 100.0 
Total 16 100.0 100.0  
SOPOSTICATED Valid Yes 10 58.8 58.8 58.8 
No 7 41.2 41.2 100.0 
Total 17 100.0 100.0  
MINORITY Valid Yes 19 54.3 54.3 54.3 
No 16 45.7 45.7 100.0 
Total 35 100.0 100.0  
NONSHAREHOLDERS Valid No 12 80.0 100.0 100.0 
Missing -99 3 20.0   
Total 15 100.0   
. 
For how long have you been trading in the Stock Market?  
SHARE HOLDER TYPE Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
MAJORITY Valid 11-20 years 2 12.5 12.5 12.5 
4-10 years 2 12.5 12.5 25.0 
1-3 years 8 50.0 50.0 75.0 
< 1 year 4 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 16 100.0 100.0  
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SOPOSTICATED Valid 4-10 years 4 23.5 25.0 25.0 
1-3 years 8 47.1 50.0 75.0 
< 1 year 4 23.5 25.0 100.0 
Total 16 94.1 100.0  
Missing -99 1 5.9   
Total 17 100.0   
MINORITY Valid 4-10 years 8 22.9 23.5 23.5 
1-3 years 12 34.3 35.3 58.8 
< 1 year 14 40.0 41.2 100.0 
Total 34 97.1 100.0  
Missing -99 1 2.9   
Total 35 100.0   
NONSHAREHOLDERS Missing -99 15 100.0   
 
What is the longest period you have held onto a certain class of shares? 
SHARE HOLDER TYPE Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
MAJORITY Valid 2-3 years 1 6.3 6.3 6.3 
1 year 5 31.3 31.3 37.5 
6-12 months 1 6.3 6.3 43.8 
4-6 months 2 12.5 12.5 56.3 
2-3 months 2 12.5 12.5 68.8 
>1 month 5 31.3 31.3 100.0 
Total 16 100.0 100.0  
SOPOSTICATED Valid >4 years 2 11.8 11.8 11.8 
2-3 years 2 11.8 11.8 23.5 
1 year 2 11.8 11.8 35.3 
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6-12 months 2 11.8 11.8 47.1 
4-6 months 3 17.6 17.6 64.7 
2-3 months 4 23.5 23.5 88.2 
>1 month 2 11.8 11.8 100.0 
Total 17 100.0 100.0  
MINORITY Valid >4 years 4 11.4 11.8 11.8 
2-3 years 7 20.0 20.6 32.4 
1 year 3 8.6 8.8 41.2 
6-12 months 2 5.7 5.9 47.1 
4-6 months 7 20.0 20.6 67.6 
2-3 months 3 8.6 8.8 76.5 
>1 month 8 22.9 23.5 100.0 
Total 34 97.1 100.0  
Missing -99 1 2.9   
Total 35 100.0   
NONSHAREHOLDERS Missing -99 15 100.0   
 
 
 
 
From this Questionnaire, how much information have you been aware of regarding your rights as a 
shareholder? 
SHARE HOLDER TYPE Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
MAJORITY Valid 90-100% 4 25.0 25.0 25.0 
70-80% 12 75.0 75.0 100.0 
Total 16 100.0 100.0  
SOPOSTICATED Valid 40-60% 17 100.0 100.0 100.0 
MINORITY Valid 20-30% 12 34.3 36.4 36.4 
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<10% 21 60.0 63.6 100.0 
Total 33 94.3 100.0  
Missing -99 2 5.7   
Total 35 100.0   
NONSHAREHOLDERS Valid 70-80% 1 6.7 9.1 9.1 
40-60% 2 13.3 18.2 27.3 
20-30% 3 20.0 27.3 54.5 
<10% 5 33.3 45.5 100.0 
Total 11 73.3 100.0  
Missing -99 3 20.0   
System 1 6.7   
Total 4 26.7   
Total 15 100.0   
 
Will you require the blessing of a religous scholar to enforce these rights 
SHARE HOLDER TYPE Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
MAJORITY Valid Yes 14 87.5 87.5 87.5 
No 2 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 16 100.0 100.0  
SOPOSTICATED Valid Yes 15 88.2 93.8 93.8 
No 1 5.9 6.3 100.0 
Total 16 94.1 100.0  
Missing -99 1 5.9   
Total 17 100.0   
MINORITY Valid Yes 26 74.3 74.3 74.3 
No 9 25.7 25.7 100.0 
Total 35 100.0 100.0  
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NONSHAREHOLDERS Valid Yes 6 40.0 50.0 50.0 
No 6 40.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 12 80.0 100.0  
Missing -99 2 13.3   
System 1 6.7   
Total 3 20.0   
Total 15 100.0   
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11.4 APPENDIX C.4: Distributions of CVD Dimensions 
 
Statistics 
 
INDIVIDUALISE
MF 
POWERDIST
ANCEF 
UNCERTAINTYAV
OIDANCEF 
FEMININITY
F 
LONGTERMOR
IENTATIONF 
N Valid 73 70 69 73 73 
Missing 10 13 14 10 10 
Mean 51.2740 80.1143 79.8116 55.7945 30.1918 
Median 51.0000 80.0000 78.0000 54.0000 31.0000 
Mode 49.00 75.00
a
 74.00 48.00 32.00
a
 
Std. Deviation 6.34705 8.70206 8.88700 8.05357 3.66158 
Skewness -.017 .436 .383 .335 -.709 
Std. Error of Skewness .281 .287 .289 .281 .281 
Kurtosis -.278 -.467 -.109 -.746 .211 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .555 .566 .570 .555 .555 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
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By looking at the graph, we can see how the distribution of Individualism scored by Saudi shareholders is 
normally distributed. 
 
 
 
By looking at the graph, we can see how the distribution of Power Distance scored by Saudi shareholders is 
normally distributed. 
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By looking at the graph, we can see how the distribution of Uncertainty Avoidance scored by Saudi shareholders 
is normally distributed 
 
 
 
By looking at the graph, we can see how the distribution of Femininity scored by Saudi shareholders is not 
normally distributed but rather kurtosis. 
 
 
LONG TERM ORIENTATION 1 
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By looking at the graph, we can see how the distribution of Long Term orientation scored by Saudi shareholders 
is not normally distributed but rather negatively sewed. The Mode, 32, is higher than the Median and the Mean. 
Even though respondents have not scored high enough on this dimension but we could see there is a tendency in 
the culture to have a higher score. 
11.5 APPENDIX C.5: The Distribution on the CVD on Shareholders’ Type 
By talking a step further, and looking at how each shareholder’s type, namely:Majority, Sophisticated, and 
Minority score on the CVD, new findings emerge regarding the Saudi sub-cultures that exist using the Central of 
Tendency Distribution technique: 
Statistics 
SHARE HOLDER TYPE INDIVIDUALISEMF POWERDISTANCEF UNCERTAINTYAVOIDANCEF FEMININITYF LONGTERMORIENTATIONF 
MAJORITY N Valid 16 16 16 16 15 
Missing 0 0 0 0 1 
Mean 47.6250 74.2500 72.8125 50.6875 27.2667 
Median 49.0000 74.0000 74.5000 50.0000 27.0000 
Mode 49.00 75.00 74.00
a
 48.00 27.00 
Std. Deviation 5.48787 3.94124 6.76480 2.98259 2.65832 
Skewness .337 .773 -.173 1.018 1.617 
Std. Error of Skewness .564 .564 .564 .564 .580 
Kurtosis .269 .059 -.627 -.315 4.893 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 1.091 1.091 1.091 1.091 1.121 
SOPOSTICATED N Valid 14 13 12 13 16 
Missing 3 4 5 4 1 
Mean 51.5714 79.6923 79.0000 53.3846 30.4375 
Median 52.0000 82.0000 78.5000 53.0000 30.5000 
Mode 51.00
a
 69.00
a
 72.00 53.00 28.00
a
 
Std. Deviation 5.40248 7.80368 6.53661 5.48541 3.75888 
Skewness -.343 -.705 .574 -.640 -1.217 
Std. Error of Skewness .597 .616 .637 .616 .564 
Kurtosis -1.400 -.452 -.547 2.803 3.007 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 1.154 1.191 1.232 1.191 1.091 
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MINORITY N Valid 31 29 28 30 28 
Missing 4 6 7 5 7 
Mean 52.2903 82.0345 82.1071 58.2667 30.7500 
Median 53.0000 84.0000 82.0000 60.0000 32.0000 
Mode 52.00
a
 80.00
a
 82.00 53.00
a
 32.00 
Std. Deviation 6.01772 8.97808 8.19367 9.02844 3.67801 
Skewness -.624 -.195 .076 -.425 -1.565 
Std. Error of Skewness .421 .434 .441 .427 .441 
Kurtosis 1.082 -.772 -.675 -.887 2.231 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .821 .845 .858 .833 .858 
NONSHAREHOLDERS N Valid 12 12 13 14 14 
Missing 3 3 2 1 1 
Mean 53.1667 83.7500 84.2308 58.5714 31.9286 
Median 51.5000 79.5000 82.0000 56.5000 32.5000 
Mode 43.00
a
 75.00 82.00
a
 70.00 35.00 
Std. Deviation 7.94107 10.38465 10.03456 8.89005 2.89467 
Skewness .307 .707 .682 .200 -.650 
Std. Error of Skewness .637 .637 .616 .597 .597 
Kurtosis -1.392 -1.273 -1.017 -1.575 -.460 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 1.232 1.232 1.191 1.154 1.154 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
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11.6 APPENDIX C.6: Testing the Normality of Distributions of CVD Across 
Independent Samples of Shareholder’s Type 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Testhas been used to see the normality of the distributions of CVD across 
independent samples of shareholder’s type. As a result, distributions between all independent samples of 
shareholder’s type were found normal across Hofstede’s CVD except for Majority-Minority group comparison. 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test ( Majority- Minority) comparison 
 
INDIVIDUALI
SEMF 
POWERDISTA
NCEF 
UNCERTAINTYAVOID
ANCEF 
FEMININI
TYF 
LONGTERMORIENT
ATIONF 
Most 
Extreme 
Differen
ces 
Absol
ute 
.522 .530 .580 .567 .719 
Positi
ve 
.032 .103 .000 .133 .071 
Negat
ive 
-.522 -.530 -.580 -.567 -.719 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z 
1.696 1.702 1.852 1.830 2.247 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.006 .006 .002 .002 .000 
a. Grouping Variable: SHARE HOLDER TYPE 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test ( Sophisticated- Minority) comparison  
 
INDIVIDUALI
SEMF 
POWERDISTA
NCEF 
UNCERTAINTYAVOID
ANCEF 
FEMININI
TYF 
LONGTERMORIENT
ATIONF 
Most 
Extreme 
Differen
ces 
Absol
ute 
.157 .210 .238 .413 .214 
Positi
ve 
.092 .064 .107 .156 .116 
Negat
ive 
-.157 -.210 -.238 -.413 -.214 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z 
.487 .628 .690 1.243 .684 
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Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.972 .825 .728 .091 .738 
a. Grouping Variable: SHARE HOLDER TYPE 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test ( Minority- Non-shareholders ) comparison  
 
INDIVIDUALI
SEMF 
POWERDISTA
NCEF 
UNCERTAINTYAVOID
ANCEF 
FEMININI
TYF 
LONGTERMORIENT
ATIONF 
Most 
Extreme 
Differen
ces 
Absol
ute 
.210 .216 .231 .186 .214 
Positi
ve 
.204 .216 .231 .186 .214 
Negat
ive 
-.210 -.184 -.099 -.138 .000 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z 
.617 .628 .688 .574 .655 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.841 .825 .732 .897 .785 
a. Grouping Variable: SHARE HOLDER TYPE 
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11.7 APPENDIX C.7: Kruskal-Wallis for Testing the Hypotheses 
 
A. Kruskal-Wallis test: has been used as it compares all 4 independent samples at once on each of 
the CVD framework’s elements. The results indicated rejections of all null hypotheses that the 
distribution of CVD framework is the same across categories of shareholder’s type except for 
Individualism.  
 
 Null Hypothesis Test Sig Decision 
1 The distribution of Individualism is the 
Same across categories of Share Holder 
Type 
Independent Samples Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
.052 Retain the Null 
Hypothesis 
2 The distribution of Power Distance is 
the Same across categories of Share 
Holder Type 
Independent Samples Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
.010 Reject the Null 
Hypothesis 
3 The distribution of Uncertainty 
Avoidance is the Same across 
categories of Share Holder Type 
Independent Samples Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
.005 Reject the Null 
Hypothesis 
4 The distribution of Femininity is the 
Same across categories of Share Holder 
Type 
Independent Samples Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
.009 Reject the Null 
Hypothesis 
5 The distribution of Long Term 
Orientation is the Same across 
categories of Share Holder Type 
Independent Samples Kruskal-
Wallis Test 
.001 Reject the Null 
Hypothesis 
  
Following the mean rank of the Kruskal-Wallistest on CV Dimensions on across shareholder’s type confirmed 
with the early results of the Mode , and Median comparisons of the descriptive statistics except for Power 
Distance between minority and non shareholders. 
 
Ranks 
 SHARE HOLDER TYPE N Mean Rank 
INDIVIDUALISEMF MAJORITY 16 24.09 
SOPOSTICATED 14 38.96 
MINORITY 31 41.21 
NONSHAREHOLDERS 12 41.04 
Total 73  
POWERDISTANCEF MAJORITY 16 20.78 
SOPOSTICATED 13 36.42 
MINORITY 29 40.64 
NONSHAREHOLDERS 12 41.71 
Total 70  
UNCERTAINTYAVOIDANCEF MAJORITY 16 20.28 
SOPOSTICATED 12 32.92 
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MINORITY 28 40.73 
NONSHAREHOLDERS 13 42.69 
Total 69  
FEMININITYF MAJORITY 16 22.69 
SOPOSTICATED 13 33.35 
MINORITY 30 43.17 
NONSHAREHOLDERS 14 43.54 
Total 73  
LONGTERMORIENTATIONF MAJORITY 15 17.97 
SOPOSTICATED 16 38.75 
MINORITY 28 41.18 
NONSHAREHOLDERS 14 47.04 
Total 73  
 
 
Test Statistics
a,b
 
 
INDIVIDUALIS
EMF 
POWERDISTAN
CEF 
UNCERTAINTY
AVOIDANCEF FEMININITYF 
LONGTERMOR
IENTATIONF 
Chi-Square 7.721 11.388 12.978 11.614 16.569 
df 3 3 3 3 3 
Asymp. Sig. .052 .010 .005 .009 .001 
a. Kruskal-Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: SHARE HOLDER TYPE 
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11.8 APPENDIX C.8: Results of Mann-Whitney Test 
 
A. Mann-Whitney Test: has also been used to compare the level of CVD elements cross a paired 
category of shareholder’s type. Results indicated no significance between paired groups’ 
comparisons except between minority and Majority shareholder’s types. 
Ranks 
 SHARE HOLDER TYPE N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
INDIVIDUALISEMF MAJORITY 16 16.50 264.00 
MINORITY 31 27.87 864.00 
Total 47   
POWERDISTANCEF MAJORITY 16 15.03 240.50 
MINORITY 29 27.40 794.50 
Total 45   
UNCERTAINTYAVOIDANC
EF 
MAJORITY 16 13.94 223.00 
MINORITY 28 27.39 767.00 
Total 44   
FEMININITYF MAJORITY 16 15.84 253.50 
MINORITY 30 27.58 827.50 
Total 46   
LONGTERMORIENTATION
F 
MAJORITY 15 13.67 205.00 
MINORITY 28 26.46 741.00 
Total 43   
 
Test Statistics
a
 
 
INDIVIDUALISE
MF 
POWERDISTA
NCEF 
UNCERTAINTY
AVOIDANCEF FEMININITYF 
LONGTERMOR
IENTATIONF 
Mann-Whitney U 128.000 104.500 87.000 117.500 85.000 
Wilcoxon W 264.000 240.500 223.000 253.500 205.000 
Z -2.701 -3.028 -3.348 -2.834 -3.211 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .002 .001 .005 .001 
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Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .002 .001 .004 .001 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .003 .001 .000 .002 .000 
Point Probability .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
a. Grouping Variable: SHARE HOLDER TYPE 
 
 
Ranks 
 SHARE HOLDER TYPE N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
INDIVIDUALISEMF SOPOSTICATED 14 22.04 308.50 
MINORITY 31 23.44 726.50 
Total 45   
POWERDISTANCEF SOPOSTICATED 13 19.27 250.50 
MINORITY 29 22.50 652.50 
Total 42   
UNCERTAINTYAVOIDANC
EF 
SOPOSTICATED 12 17.46 209.50 
MINORITY 28 21.80 610.50 
Total 40   
FEMININITYF SOPOSTICATED 13 16.50 214.50 
MINORITY 30 24.38 731.50 
Total 43   
LONGTERMORIENTATION
F 
SOPOSTICATED 16 20.81 333.00 
MINORITY 28 23.46 657.00 
Total 44   
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Test Statistics
b
 
 
INDIVIDUALISE
MF 
POWERDISTA
NCEF 
UNCERTAINTY
AVOIDANCEF FEMININITYF 
LONGTERMOR
IENTATIONF 
Mann-Whitney U 203.500 159.500 131.500 123.500 197.000 
Wilcoxon W 308.500 250.500 209.500 214.500 333.000 
Z -.332 -.790 -1.079 -1.899 -.664 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .740 .429 .281 .058 .507 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]  .435a .286a .058a  
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .748 .438 .288 .058 .515 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .374 .219 .144 .029 .257 
Point Probability .005 .004 .003 .001 .004 
a. Not corrected for ties. 
b. Grouping Variable: SHARE HOLDER TYPE 
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11.9 APPENDIX C.9: Chi-Square & Fisher Exact Tests 
 
 
B. Chi-Square Test: found not suitable with my data as the expected frequency in most cases is less 
than 5 which validates a majored pre-test condition for the chi-square. 
C. Hence; Fisher’s exact test will be used to solve the problems I have with the chi-square 
assumptions of expected frequency of no less than 5. 
 
The significant relationships found between Categorical Variables using fisher exact are: 
 
1- CVD In relation to  Demographic: 
 
CVD Null Hypothesis Between Decision 
Individualism There is no significant relationship between:   Individualism    &   Information awareness Reject The Null Hypothesis 
Power Distance There is no significant relationship between Power Distance  &  Information Awareness,  Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between Power Distance  &   Age Reject The Null Hypothesis 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
There is no significant relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance & Information 
Awareness 
Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance  & length of 
shareholding 
Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between: Uncertainty Avoidance  &  Age Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between Uncertainty Avoidance  &  Gender Reject The Null Hypothesis 
Femininity There is no significant relationship between Femininity  &  Information Awareness, Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between Femininity  &   Gender Reject The Null Hypothesis 
long Term 
Orientation 
There is no significant relationship between Long Term Orientation  & Education Level Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 There is no significant relationship between Long Term Orientation  & Religion Reject The Null Hypothesis 
 
2- CVD In Relations to  ShareholdersType 
 
CVD Null Hypothesis Between Decision 
Femininity There is no significant relationship between:   Femininity & shareholders’ type Reject The Null Hypothesis 
Long Term 
Orientation 
There is no significant relationship between Long term orientation & shareholders’ type Reject The Null Hypothesis 
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11.10 APPENDIX C.10: Preliminary Factorial Analysis 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 13.040 27.744 27.744 13.040 27.744 27.744 11.705 24.903 24.903 
2 12.226 26.013 53.757 12.226 26.013 53.757 9.576 20.375 45.278 
3 8.157 17.354 71.111 8.157 17.354 71.111 8.684 18.476 63.754 
4 6.226 13.247 84.359 6.226 13.247 84.359 7.657 16.292 80.046 
5 3.622 7.706 92.065 3.622 7.706 92.065 3.284 6.986 87.032 
6 1.949 4.147 96.212 1.949 4.147 96.212 3.274 6.966 93.998 
7 1.780 3.788 100.000 1.780 3.788 100.000 2.821 6.002 100.000 
8 8.233E-
16 
1.752E-
15 
100.000 
      
9 4.733E-
16 
1.007E-
15 
100.000 
      
10 4.250E-
16 
9.044E-
16 
100.000 
      
11 3.878E-
16 
8.251E-
16 
100.000 
      
12 3.380E-
16 
7.190E-
16 
100.000 
      
13 3.079E-
16 
6.552E-
16 
100.000 
      
14 2.364E-
16 
5.029E-
16 
100.000 
      
15 2.016E-
16 
4.289E-
16 
100.000 
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16 1.840E-
16 
3.915E-
16 
100.000 
      
17 1.550E-
16 
3.298E-
16 
100.000 
      
18 1.375E-
16 
2.926E-
16 
100.000 
      
19 1.040E-
16 
2.212E-
16 
100.000 
      
20 7.475E-
17 
1.590E-
16 
100.000 
      
21 6.110E-
17 
1.300E-
16 
100.000 
      
22 2.744E-
17 
5.839E-
17 
100.000 
      
23 2.184E-
17 
4.646E-
17 
100.000 
      
24 1.903E-
20 
4.050E-
20 
100.000 
      
25 1.770E-
33 
3.765E-
33 
100.000 
      
26 -
1.171E-
32 
-2.491E-
32 
100.000 
      
27 -
1.460E-
32 
-3.106E-
32 
100.000 
      
28 -
1.653E-
18 
-3.518E-
18 
100.000 
      
29 -
5.231E-
18 
-1.113E-
17 
100.000 
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30 -
2.280E-
17 
-4.851E-
17 
100.000 
      
31 -
3.172E-
17 
-6.748E-
17 
100.000 
      
32 -
5.276E-
17 
-1.123E-
16 
100.000 
      
33 -
7.645E-
17 
-1.627E-
16 
100.000 
      
34 -
1.065E-
16 
-2.267E-
16 
100.000 
      
35 -
1.330E-
16 
-2.829E-
16 
100.000 
      
36 -
1.402E-
16 
-2.983E-
16 
100.000 
      
37 -
1.752E-
16 
-3.728E-
16 
100.000 
      
38 -
1.944E-
16 
-4.137E-
16 
100.000 
      
39 -
2.501E-
16 
-5.320E-
16 
100.000 
      
40 -
2.862E-
16 
-6.090E-
16 
100.000 
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41 -
3.065E-
16 
-6.522E-
16 
100.000 
      
42 -
3.566E-
16 
-7.588E-
16 
100.000 
      
43 -
4.099E-
16 
-8.722E-
16 
100.000 
      
44 -
4.737E-
16 
-1.008E-
15 
100.000 
      
45 -
6.317E-
16 
-1.344E-
15 
100.000 
      
46 -
6.870E-
16 
-1.462E-
15 
100.000 
      
47 -
7.114E-
16 
-1.514E-
15 
100.000 
      
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Secure methods of ownership registration  IND=H -
.245- 
.787 .291 .064 .377 .236 .184 
Convey or transfer shares IND=H .275 .179 .148 .283 -
.061- 
.880 .109 
Obtain relevant and material information on a timely and 
regular basis LTO=H 
-
.020- 
-
.163- 
.479 .037 -
.136- 
.267 .808 
Participate and vote in general shareholder meetings PD=L  
IND=H 
.254 .447 -
.251- 
.770 .106 .206 -
.160- 
Elect and remove members of the board PD=L  IND=H -
.106- 
-
.207- 
.890 .323 .077 .210 .024 
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Share in the profits of the corporation LTO=H -
.142- 
-
.027- 
.117 .938 -
.250- 
.025 .147 
Amendments to the statutes or articles of incorporation 
PD=L, IND=H, UA=L 
-
.404- 
-
.501- 
.581 -
.180- 
-
.092- 
-
.440- 
.121 
Authorization of additional shares PD=L IND=H UA=L .714 -
.134- 
.027 -
.071- 
.473 -
.287- 
-
.401- 
Extraordinary transactions resulting in the sale of the 
company LTO=H 
.881 .087 -
.092- 
.439 -
.081- 
-
.090- 
-
.017- 
Rules, including voting procedures, that govern general 
shareholder meetings IND=H  UA=L 
.446 -
.243- 
.482 .677 .110 .183 -
.077- 
Date, location and agenda of general meetings  UA=L -
.344- 
.393 .546 .558 .107 .325 -
.048- 
Issues to be decided at the meeting  PD=L  UA=L -
.453- 
.227 .354 .244 -
.248- 
.651 .271 
Place items on the agenda of general meetings  IND=H, 
PD=L 
.318 .258 .562 -
.054- 
.502 .400 -
.318- 
Propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations IND=H 
PD=L 
-
.011- 
.437 .427 -
.151- 
.255 .727 -
.098- 
Nomination and election of board members IND=H PD=L 
UA=L 
-
.324- 
-
.492- 
.766 -
.056- 
-
.142- 
-
.034- 
.203 
Remuneration policy for board members and key executives. 
IND=H PD=L UA=L 
.372 -
.753- 
.131 -
.453- 
-
.071- 
-
.242- 
.091 
Approval of compensation schemes for board members and 
employees IND=H PD=L UA=L 
.142 .027 -
.117- 
-
.938- 
.250 -
.025- 
-
.147- 
Equal effect whether cast in person or in absentia. IND=H 
FEM=H 
.323 -
.112- 
.625 .179 .285 .393 -
.475- 
Capital structures enabling certain shareholders to obtain a 
degree of control disproportionate to their shares UA=L 
FEM=H 
.004 .456 .439 .389 -
.523- 
.117 .402 
Rules governing acquisitions should be clearly articulated 
and disclosed to you UA=L PD=L 
.436 -
.105- 
-
.095- 
.885 -
.068- 
.043 -
.020- 
Transactions should occur at transparent prices and under 
fair conditions  UA=L FEM=H 
-
.344- 
.393 .546 .558 .107 .325 -
.048- 
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Anti-take-over devices shouldn’t be used to shield 
management and board  4. PD=L UA=L FEM=H 
.765 -
.012- 
.074 .103 .608 .172 .014 
Their overall corporate governance and voting policies 
FEM=H PD=L UA=L 
.959 .001 .035 .190 .202 -
.033- 
.040 
Procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of 
their voting rights. FEM=H  UA=L 
-
.088- 
.349 .844 .347 -
.043- 
.172 .083 
Material conflicts of interest affecting the exercise of key 
ownership rights UA=L  PD=L 
-
.080- 
.005 .036 .690 .259 -
.038- 
.669 
Each other on issues concerning basic shareholders’ rights 
UA=L IND=H 
.950 .006 .263 -
.033- 
.126 -
.006- 
-
.106- 
The financial and operating results of a company. LTO=H 
UA=L 
.051 .175 .160 .688 .009 -
.134- 
.670 
Major share ownership and voting rights. PD=L UA=L -
.143- 
-
.157- 
.676 .679 -
.068- 
.158 .088 
Related party transactions. PD=L UA=L .173 .090 .963 -
.102- 
-
.075- 
.018 .134 
Foreseeable risk factors. LTO=H UA=L .173 .090 .963 -
.102- 
-
.075- 
.018 .134 
Provide an external and objective assurances to the board 
and shareholders  FEM=H LTO=H UA=L 
.923 -
.126- 
.107 -
.269- 
-
.101- 
.173 .095 
Represent fairly the financial position and performance in all 
material respects FEM=H LTO=H UA=L 
.923 -
.126- 
.107 -
.269- 
-
.101- 
.173 .095 
Owing a duty to companies to exercise due professional care 
in their conduct FEM=H UA=L 
.923 -
.126- 
.107 -
.269- 
-
.101- 
.173 .095 
Board members acting on a fully informed basis, in good 
faith, with due diligence FEM= H  UA=L 
-
.130- 
.985 -
.049- 
-
.033- 
-
.003- 
.094 -
.028- 
The board treating all shareholders fairly when decisions 
affect different groups  FEM=H UA=L 
.103 .922 -
.214- 
-
.105- 
.172 .154 -
.170- 
The board applying  high ethical standards; with interests of 
stakeholders in mind FEM=H UA=L 
-
.130- 
.985 -
.049- 
-
.033- 
-
.003- 
.094 -
.028- 
Within any series of a class, all shares should not carry the 
same rights.  6. FEM=H PD=L 
.620 .268 -
.341- 
.546 .210 .165 -
.240- 
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Info about rights attached to shares shouldn’t be obtained 
before purchasing  IND=H UA=L 
-
.014- 
.031 .106 .442 -
.881- 
.099 -
.078- 
Changes in voting rights shouldn’t be subject to approval by 
classes of shares negatively affected.IND=H PD=L FEM=H 
.539 .278 -
.173- 
.359 .594 .305 -
.165- 
Actions by controlling shareholders acting directly or 
indirectly for the benefits of their substantially invested capital 
FEM=H PD=L 
.969 .100 -
.137- 
.132 .002 -
.103- 
-
.068- 
General meetings’ (gm) procedures disallowing equitable 
treatment of all shareholders. FEM=H PD=L UA=L 
.792 .568 -
.065- 
.161 -
.100- 
-
.098- 
.000 
Insider trading benefiting majority shareholders. FEM=H  
PD=L 
.145 .706 .614 .066 -
.244- 
-
.050- 
.192 
Board members not disclosing material interest in 
transactions they have stake in FEM=H  PD=L 
.948 -
.007- 
-
.231- 
.052 .134 -
.040- 
-
.160- 
Company procedures (cp) disallowing effective means of 
redress by minorities FEM=H  UA=L 
.565 .708 -
.284- 
-
.055- 
.201 .099 -
.213- 
Company procedures making  it difficult and expensive for 
(cp) minorities to cast votes FEM=H UA=L 
.374 .833 .350 .077 -
.164- 
-
.036- 
.097 
Company procedures disallowing Votes casting by 
custodians on behalf of  minorities. FEM=H UA=L 
.005 .726 .662 -
.142- 
.000 .113 .042 
Company procedures’ impediments to cross border voting 
FEM=H UA=L 
.011 .963 .091 .107 -
.202- 
-
.028- 
.110 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 14 iterations. 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 .606 .565 .360 -.021- .428 
2 -.688- .322 .415 .449 .222 
3 .316 -.653- .268 .595 .219 
4 .068 .263 -.777- .516 .236 
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5 .235 .286 .149 .420 -.815- 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequencies 
Statistics 
 
INDIVIDUALI
SEM 
LONGTERMOREINT
ATION 
FEMINIS
EM 
POWERDISTA
NCE 
UNCERTAINTYAVOID
ANCE 
N Valid 8 8 8 8 8 
Missi
ng 
2 2 2 2 2 
Mean 4.0156 4.4107 4.2784 4.1136 4.2773 
Std. Deviation .34192 .52036 .58334 .44735 .36191 
Skewness -.369- -.458- -.382- -.480- -.440- 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.752 .752 .752 .752 .752 
Range 1.00 1.43 1.59 1.27 1.03 
Percentil
es 
25 3.7500 3.9286 3.6818 3.7727 3.9766 
50 4.0313 4.5000 4.3864 4.2045 4.3438 
75 4.3594 4.9286 4.7841 4.5341 4.6016 
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12. APPENDIX D: QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
12.1 APPENDIX D.1: A sample of Conducted Interviews – English 
 
Source Main Question Answer 
 
A. 
Legal 
Environment 
 
 
What could you say about the effect of the 
legal environment; legal rules, their 
enforcements and specialized courts on the 
nature of listed Saudi Companies’ compliance 
with CG laws pertaining to minorities’ rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How about the specialized courts? Are they 
existent? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you mean in the execution of the law itself, 
the judge is speiclaiesd in Islamic principles of 
the law, but not in commericlal law? 
 
 
 
 
 
Are the minority shareholders rights existent 
in the market? Are the public well aware of? 
and how are they legislated? 
 
 
 
 
It suffers from lacking not in legislating new laws but in 
executing them.  
 
Unfortunately, we are in an environment where you have to 
knock the doors of different governmental organizations where 
as there should be a clear governmental organization for 
minority shareholders where they should voice there opinon. 
Hence, this governmental organization should be linking 
minority shareholder holders with other governmental 
organizations.  
 
This is what it should be like. Unfortunately, the rights of the 
small share holders not the bing once, are not beneficial,. 
Hence, their risk is bigger than the big shareholders due to the 
lack of significance given to them by the environment and the 
small amount of money invested by them.  
 
I personally view these courts are not specialized. even if you 
title them specialized courts: because the person holding the 
seat within is a person not specialized. At the end of the day, 
he tries to make cases simple on his part, and threat them as a 
car accident case. Hence tells both [ plaintiff, and defendant] 
their percentage of mistake, and ends up each one fixing his 
car on his own. 
 
the degrees of Allah is involved in all aspect of human beings 
even in his trade. However, that does not prohibit narrowing 
down the scope of Islamic legislation, [making them specific], 
and creating from them various majors upon which you can 
produce judges who can specialize in these various majors. 
However, the subject of always referring to Islamic scripts and 
Quranic Verses needs to be stopped. 
 
 
No, the public is not aware of them. They are measured on the 
scale of  “ maintance contracts”, maintance contracts are 
oppressive….he has not bought a defective product, he bought 
some thing managed by you. How come when you miss-
mange it , you  hold him responsible! 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D: QUALITATIVE RESULTS   P a g e  | 367 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So your saying banks are existen to suck up 
certin segments of the population? 
 
No, they are not hidden. These rights are existen, but their 
awareness programs are not tailor to our society 
 
 
With all due respect, believe it or not, it depends on the 
controlling family. I will  
 
this banking racesism is existent, and it don’t consider it some 
sort of competition. 
 
Yes certin segments of the population. To be utilized by them 
in the Saudi stock markets and others. 
 What could you say about the effect of 
corporate law and company law: in terms of 
their origin and modification by interested 
parties on the nature of  
listed Saudi companies’ compliance? 
 
 
We took our law from Egypt initially, the 
egyptial law is based on the French civil law 
Hence, the legislators are the politicians not 
the public 
Is that why the ls have not been renewed in 
Saudi because it is for the benfits of 
politicians? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is that the reason why the laws have t been 
renewed? 
 
 
 
 
Look the origin of the law has not been modified in an 
educated or planned manner this is first.  
Unfortunatelly, the laws of the ministies of trade, investment, 
and banks, Saudi Monetary Agency, and Saudi Capital Market 
Authority are just OLD. Renew it : they want to be open to 
globalization and forighn investors and impose Sauditization 
on us : renew your me 
Yes originally 
Very true 
True 
 
they fiqured out they needed to write up a political law that 
suits the needs of  a royal family only. It is not an issue the law 
coming from a republic, adeomcrates or socialisem. This is in 
English is considered a monarchy. 
 
 
 
With no doubts. The reason behind not renuing the laws is not 
due to comerical reason but rather political  reasons. And these 
reason are known and not hard not to find. Because you are 
dealing with a difficult society [ in Saudi] and 80 percent of 
out population are still nomads and you cant change the law 
based on the needs for a 20 percent of the population. He 
harbors the excuse that silences all of us. 
 
 What could you say about the effect of the 
distribution of power within the law-either 
allowing top management to run the show or 
major shareholder on the nature of listed Saudi 
companies’ compliance? 
This is a complicated issue…First you need to appoint unions 
and associations. Each union and watchdog represents a 
segment of society like it is in England: they have labor 
unions, union of politicians, mechants. Those you can select 
some of them to chose the laws that suits them and you give it 
to the government to impose them.  
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There is no specialty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So you are asking for a an externally 
independent union s or associations for the 
owners and the CEOs to presuurize , establish 
and legislate hand in hand with the 
government?- just like the associations of 
CEOS in England 
 
But the specialized financial people do see the 
majority holders do have the upper hand in 
corportation regardlessof their CEO? 
 
 
 
 
 
So the culture is responsible for the weakness 
of the existenting laws in Saudi? 
 
Is because the cared about the nature of 
legislations and Unions? 
 
 
 
 
This is how it is supposed to be. But what is happen here from 
the sauid parliament [ house of consultaion] is compsed of 
300- t0 400 individuals. “ be afraid of allah” 300 to 400 people 
will never agree on a certin thing. Who are joking ! 
 
This parliament [ house of consultation] can be a filter 
between the king and other unions but : not to be dealt with as 
a union. Specially, when you have a big segment of the 
population considered a labor union. with their qualifications 
you cant upgrade them  to administrative 
 
 
 
Yes , pressurize, and legislate wit hthe government. Because 
this way firstly, you wipe out 50 perecent of corruption that 
exists in the country, secondally, when you legislate your 
giving this union a commission to even wipe out another 40 
percent of corruption. 
 
Yes, why  because CEOs treat majority holders as royals 
ewhen they RE NOT.” 
 
Not only that, yes they have both, but the imposed the law on 
both small and big individuals. Even the son of Dubai was 
punished. When he fliterted with a girl, they shaved his head, 
scandal him in the media and forbig him form Dubai for a 
whole year 
 
 
Yes, why is because they hit the note that can only benefit 
them culturally. Especially with nomads- tocu hon his 
reputation. Will strighted out. But if ask him to be afraid of 
allah he will not straighten out. Unfortunately, they marched 
along this way, and it paid dividends. 
 
Dubais’ laws but with what I have seen it could be closer to 
the American common law or a mix that reserve the rights of 
shareholders in an amazing way 
 
It makes you so secure.  
 What could you say about the effect of 
institutional investors using their legal 
empowerment to influence management to 
increase their share values in the short run- on 
the nature of listed Saudi companies’ 
compliance?  
 
Look this effect between the 2 of us is is not healthy is not 
healthy economialy 
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Is it existent? To what degree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It looks like people haven’t learnt their lesson, 
I personally see  the corporation that the king 
amonth ago asked for a financial support for it 
was bankrupted. People bought shares in, and 
went bankrupted and the king supported it : so 
people have learnt the lesson nor asked for thri 
rights !so how all those oppressed recalled for 
their rights. Have they asked for their rights? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Just to clarify this matter against the bank was 
in regard to Shares? Shares of majority 
holders? Because I remember a big majority 
holder striped the wrest out of their shares? 
 
Selling shares of the bank or a corporation or 
corporations? 
 
What was the outcome of those investors? 
Were those holders in the same bank 
Were they majority holders? 
 
 
 
 
So you bring us to a point here the controlling 
families of banks are controlling the stock 
market? 
 
Just back to the same case: agsinst the bank; it 
seems the owners of that specifc bank they 
disrupted the investors? 
 
Yesit is exitent , to a degree , 10 years that degree was 90 
percent, but now people have learnt…. Learned it is not 
normal or possible the points in the market to increase from 
6000 to 21000over a week. There is a problem in legislating 
exuctis and unions available, and promotion of the capital 
market authority. Those who have certin advantages became 
clear ther advantages were personal gains not a commercial 
one. 
 
 
they have asked for their rights in places not specialed for their 
demands because there is not a special governmental 
institution can deal with this sort of matter unil now “ Augst 
2014”. Until now. For example, a lawyer I know of handled a 
financial matter against a bank and he approached the Saudi 
Monetay Agnecy. They have told him we are not the 
specialized organization for this matter. So they replied “ with 
no speciality”so he approached the capital market authority 
and replied  ‘with no speciality”. Then went to the court of 
Grievance Board and replied with n speciality. Then he wrote 
to the king: then, the king “ god saves his soul and enrich it “ 
commanded an appointment of a committee designating the 
specialty of the case.  This committee was great but it stopped 
in a place  
 
-What happened this majority holdr gave an order to sell 
shares but that command was not executed by the bank for a 
whole week which caused him to lose more. This is the caes in 
short. Various corporations but shares were managing by that 
specific bank !why the bank has not exuted the order: why has 
it delayed the order, the dession Bankrupted! 
 
No reqular investors, they investors gave an order to sell to the 
bank .the bank according to its regulation laws imposed by the 
Saudi monetary agency. Such transaction must happen on the 
same day. Why they delayed him for a week. If the investor 
good prevent 500,000 loss for a 5 million is better than to lose 
it all. 
Yes , they suid the bank. And the three designated 
governmental organizations in this matter claimed no specialty  
 
No. yes they control but shares are just a small portion 
 
 
Yes,  
 
Why not .it applies to all. Each bank has its owners and all 
banls are under the same legislation. Unfortunately, they do 
not treat all their clients the same. So who should hold them 
responsible?  When the king asked for that committee to 
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Can that be genralised to al bank? 
 
Special committee? 
 
 
 
decide the speciality. He commanded the comitee to be formed 
for this case only! But due to some attempts he kept the 
committee. Then, this committee did not study or fiquered 
how to filter cases so that they can be rightly approached to the 
specialized organization. Not this committee has legislated 
how similar cases shuld be trated and by which governmental 
organization. Then, “ like you have never conquered” 
 What could you say about the effect of the 
nature of legislation of either the market 
supporting focus or policy implementing focus 
on the nature of listed Saudi companies’ 
compliance? 
 
 
But there is evidence that, legislating laws in 
Saudi does not stem from a market support 
focus, that committee should have legislated a 
law [out of the case] because the market it 
need such legislation in that regard. But that 
did not happen did not? 
 
 
Ibelive these legislations are only executed 
against the weak? 
 
Look, here or there, you have to target both aspect. on one 
hand you secure the market and on the other hand you aid the 
market growth. You must. It has to be a mix. You can not 
achieve success in any project without creating a secure 
environment for an investor. If any investor doesn’t feel secure 
in such market, he will never invest. 
 
 
Yes, that did not happen.  
 
 
 
No, actually. They execute these legislations against the 
powerfull. Actullay, when the invidual is powerfull and 
well.integrated in the system. Then, these laws will be brought 
up and exucte them against him. If he was weak, they would 
not tire themselves bringing these laws up to execute. 
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12.2 APPENDIX D.2: A Sample of Synthesized Interviews' Summaries 
 
Source Main Question Answer 
 
A. 
Legal 
Environment 
 
 
What could you say about the effect ofthe 
legal environment; legal rules, their 
enforcements and specialized courts on the 
nature of listed Saudi Companies’ compliance 
with CG laws pertaining to minorities’ rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So what I infere from you, there is not such 
specialized courts/  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
we borrow laws that don’t suit the size of the work we have, 
nature of society or nature of businesses we have. 
Unfortunately,  
 
CG, it is existent as a theory. But again, the problem we 
have is in the execution. We are the best when it comes to 
legislating, but we don’t know how to execute 
unfortunately. Hence, the laws { CG} is existent but the 
dilemma is in the execution. Perhaps, the dilemma we have 
in execution might be due to not having an “the judgment 
authority”.  
 
Meaning,  the commercial courts we have as we speaking 
about CG regarding corporations : we are speaking of 
comapy laws , so the responsible for company laws are the 
commercial courts and their circles. Their circles are still 
under the court of grievance, hence it is still under the 
administrative court.  But they said during the coming 2 to 
three months these circles will be seprated. However, what 
will happen is that they will take the commercial circles as 
are with all its shortcomings in its infrustracture, 
qualifications of judges and their assistences.  As if they will 
seprate it in their own buildings no more no less. 
Unfortunately, this is what will happen. 
 
No, there are specialized courts, but the personnel in them 
are incompetent. We are taking about who is repsible for 
executing the laws of CG in the Capital Market authority are 
unspecialized personnel. In addition, the judges who deal 
with the commercial cases are incpmetent. The reason being 
is because the qualifications of the judges we have are not 
proerally suitable with the nate r of the specialized 
commercial law suites. Judges are Islamic Principles 
graduate and that is a must, and are legally competent to 
practice law. However, some one who studies historically 
traditional books; Amlogney, almatlob, almorbiah, how can 
he judge on cases he does not understand! This is what 
causing the delay and stretching of all commercial lawsuits 
in the commercial courts.  
 
It suffers from disability, and needs to be modernized 
 
The existing laws are draining people and oppressing them. 
there is no displine [ in enforcing the law] and you can not 
redeem your rights any where. 
 
I am not aware of such specialized courts as of yet.- there is 
not a worthy court capable of protecting any one. 
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How about the specialized courts? Are they 
existent? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you mean in the execution of the law 
itself, the judge is speiclaiesd in Islamic 
principles of the law, but not in commericlal 
law? 
 
 
 
 
 
Are the minority shareholders rights existent 
in the market? Are the public well aware of? 
and how are they legislated? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It suffers from lacking not in legislating new laws but in 
executing them.  
 
Unfortunately, we are in an environment where you have to 
knock the doors of different governmental organizations 
where as there should be a clear governmental organization 
for minority shareholders where they should voice there 
opinon. Hence, this governmental organization should be 
linking minority shareholder holders with other 
governmental organizations.  
 
This is what it should be like. Unfortunately, the rights of 
the small share holders not the bing once, are not beneficial,. 
Hence, their risk is bigger than the big shareholders due to 
the lack of significance given to them by the environment 
and the small amount of money invested by them.  
 
I personally view these courts are not specialized. even if 
you title them specialized courts: because the person holding 
the seat within is a person not specialized. At the end of the 
day, he tries to make cases simple on his part, and threat 
them as a car accident case. Hence tells both [ plaintiff, and 
defendant] their percentage of mistake, and ends up each 
one fixing his car on his own. 
 
the degrees of Allah is involved in all aspect of human 
beings even in his trade. However, that does not prohibit 
narrowing down the scope of Islamic legislation, [making 
them specific], and creating from them various majors upon 
which you can produce judges who can specialize in these 
various majors. However, the subject of always referring to 
Islamic scripts and Quranic Verses needs to be stopped. 
 
 
No, the public is not aware of them. They are measured on 
the scale of  “ maintance contracts”, maintance contracts are 
oppressive….he has not bought a defective product, he 
bought some thing managed by you. How come when you 
miss-mange it , you  hold him responsible! 
 
 
 
 
 
No, they are not hidden. These rights are existen, but their 
awareness programs are not tailor to our society 
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So your saying banks are existen to suck up 
certin segments of the population? 
With all due respect, believe it or not, it depends on the 
controlling family. I will  
 
this banking racesism is existent, and it don’t consider it 
some sort of competition. 
 
Yes certin segments of the population. To be utilized by 
them in the Saudi stock markets and others. 
 
 What could you say about the effect of 
corporate law and company law: in terms of 
their origin and modification by interested 
parties on the nature of  
listed Saudi companies’ complian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We took our law from Egypt initially, the 
egyptial law is based on the French civil law 
Hence, the legislators are the politicians not 
the public 
Is that why the ls have not been renewed in 
Saudi because it is for the benfits of 
politicians? 
The origin of the law here is Saudi Arabia was “ Copy 
Paste’ from Egypt in the 60’swe have gone through som 
many phases of “ copying and Pasting law” it has all started 
from in the 60’s.  
 
Actually, we imported experts from Egypt, what did they 
do? The brought  their laws as are , they have changed the 
title forom the united republic of Egypt, to the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. They have changed the currency from 
Egyptian Pound to Saudi ryal. This is the truth . 
 
So now, the weakness of the lawor because the law is so 
baagy, it opend a dimention for  playing as opposed to have 
a solid court law. 
 
NAATheir origin is Saudi Arabia, they are issued by a royal 
decree from the top- hence, these degrees were not carfully 
considered on many dimentsions.  
 
They interest groups are the powerful and the biggest and 
closest to the decision maker. Laws in Saudi Arabia are not 
legislated. 
 
powerfull people in the country. Those are the once who 
have an opinion. 
 
Look the origin of the law has not been modified in an 
educated or planned manner this is first.  
Unfortunatelly, the laws of the ministies of trade, 
investment, and banks, Saudi Monetary Agency, and Saudi 
Capital Market Authority are just OLD. Renew it : they 
want to be open to globalization and forighn investors and 
impose Sauditization on us : renew your me 
Yes originally 
Very true 
True 
 
they fiqured out they needed to write up a political law that 
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Is that the reason why the laws have t been 
renewed? 
 
suits the needs of  a royal family only. It is not an issue the 
law coming from a republic, adeomcrates or socialisem. 
This is in English is considered a monarchy. 
 
 
 
With no doubts. The reason behind not renuing the laws is 
not due to comerical reason but rather political  reasons. 
And these reason are known and not hard not to find. 
Because you are dealing with a difficult society [ in Saudi] 
and 80 percent of out population are still nomads and you 
cant change the law based on the needs for a 20 percent of 
the population. He harbors the excuse that silences all of us. 
 What could you say about the effect of the 
distribution of power within the law-either 
allowing top management to run the show or 
major shareholder on the nature of listed 
Saudi companies’ compliance? 
 
 
 
 
 
So what I understand from you is the CG law 
that are existent are worthless to the degree 
that any one  can influence the daily running 
of the company either a CEO or an owner?  
 
 
 
True, this iwhy I have titled my research , “ 
the effect of the Saudi Culture on natue of 
CG” even though must people just take it on 
the legal aspect even though I agree with you 
fully. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Look logic behind the CG is to seprate the administration 
from the ownership. So this way you have intervened with 
one of the main principles of CG. This is a window for 
corruption, I have seen this with my own eyes. There is 
some one who owns 17 % in this listed company, this guy 
has an influence on the running of the every day aspect of 
the company. Hence, I see this is wrong and the law should 
be a sword on all heads. And you as shareholder don’t have 
a role ecept in the General meeting  no more no less. 
 
Referring again to the nature of our society, the nature of 
our society, let be logical, the manager know this person 
who ownes 20% if he does not oby to his desires , he will 
not elect him for renewal. Hence, this person with 205 he 
can bring anoer owner of 20% r more, and kick this person [ 
manager ] out. So w are getting back to, please don’t seprate 
the nature of society in your research. When you deal with 
any lawfull issue or policitcla or social,  
 
Fanatastic, yes, yes yes,  another thing, be caustions , the 
theory always differs from practices especially here. For 
example, if you go to any coporation where you know some 
people, you will find  ashareholder regardless of hier size, 
he will have an employee of his appointed in this 
corporation.  And other spyies within that update him on 
every thing. It is a betrayl to thei loyality but this is what is 
happeneing. Not to mention, he he can lift up a phone on 
GM or CEO and blow it in his phase: you have done this 
and that .this is my money and father’s money. This is 
happening all the time. Back again , you cant seprate the 
culture from the daily life! 
 
NAA The major shareholders. I think they are the most 
powerfull. 
 
. Hece, [ ceo’s] are executing whatever comes from the top. 
 
This is a complicated issue…First you need to appoint 
unions and associations. Each union and watchdog 
represents a segment of society like it is in England: they 
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There is no specialty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So you are asking for a an externally 
independent union s or associations for the 
owners and the CEOs to presuurize , establish 
and legislate hand in hand with the 
government?- just like the associations of 
CEOS in England 
 
But the specialized financial people do see the 
majority holders do have the upper hand in 
corportation regardlessof their CEO? 
 
 
 
 
 
So the culture is responsible for the weakness 
of the existenting laws in Saudi? 
 
Is because the cared about the nature of 
legislations and Unions? 
 
have labor unions, union of politicians, mechants. Those you 
can select some of them to chose the laws that suits them 
and you give it to the government to impose them.  
 
This is how it is supposed to be. But what is happen here 
from the sauid parliament [ house of consultaion] is 
compsed of 300- t0 400 individuals. “ be afraid of allah” 
300 to 400 people will never agree on a certin thing. Who 
are joking ! 
 
This parliament [ house of consultation] can be a filter 
between the king and other unions but : not to be dealt with 
as a union. Specially, when you have a big segment of the 
population considered a labor union. with their 
qualifications you cant upgrade them  to administrative 
 
 
 
Yes , pressurize, and legislate wit hthe government. Because 
this way firstly, you wipe out 50 perecent of corruption that 
exists in the country, secondally, when you legislate your 
giving this union a commission to even wipe out another 40 
percent of corruption. 
 
Yes, why  because CEOs treat majority holders as royals 
ewhen they RE NOT.” 
 
Not only that, yes they have both, but the imposed the law 
on both small and big individuals. Even the son of Dubai 
was punished. When he fliterted with a girl, they shaved his 
head, scandal him in the media and forbig him form Dubai 
for a whole year 
 
 
Yes, why is because they hit the note that can only benefit 
them culturally. Especially with nomads- tocu hon his 
reputation. Will strighted out. But if ask him to be afraid of 
allah he will not straighten out. Unfortunately, they marched 
along this way, and it paid dividends. 
 
Dubais’ laws but with what I have seen it could be closer to 
the American common law or a mix that reserve the rights 
of shareholders in an amazing way 
 
It makes you so secure. 
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12.3 APPENDIX D.3: A Sample of Exchanged Emails between Hofstede & 
Researcher 
 
 
 
Van: Alfordy, Faisal [mailto:FaisalAlfordy@connect.glos.ac.uk]  
Verzonden: donderdag 12 maart 2015 13:59 
Aan:hofstede@bart.nl 
CC: Bob Ryan 
Onderwerp: Inquiry about using your Paradigm in Corporate Governance 
Dear Professor. Hofstede 
My name is Faisal Alfordy, a current PhD student conducting "An Assessment of the 
Impact of Saudi Arabia Culture on Corporate Governance on Minority Shareholders’ 
Rights" 
I have been inspired by the evolution of your work incorporating your Paradigm of Cultural 
Value  Dimensions (CVD) in assessing the level of Corporate Governance (CG) compliance 
in developing countries such as my own -Saudi Arabia.  
The questionnaire, i have used in my study, was constructed using variables composing the 
minority shareholder’s protection index found in the OECD principles of CG and 
corresponding to other indices aimed at measuring the strength of minority shareholder’s 
protection such as la Porta et al’s Anti-director rights Index (1997, 1998, 2006) and the 
Index of Self Dealing by Djankov et al. (2008). The elements of the constructed index are: 
Transparency, Disclosure, Directors’ compensation, basic shareholders rights, equitable 
treatment of shareholders rights, and basic shareholders rights corresponding to future 
rewards in terms of profts. Moreover, each variable of the questionnaire was assigned to 
the applicable CV dimension in accordance with your criteria (Hofstede, 2001).  
I have reached similar results to yours as indicated on your website pertaining to Saudi 
Arabia's CVDs except for Individualism:  
  Individualism Power Distance 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Masculinity/Femininity 
Long Term 
Orientation 
Your Results 25 95 80 60 32 
My Results 51.2 80.1 79.8 55.7 30 
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Hence, I would appreciate your opinion on some theoretically provoked questions if I may: 
1.      Does the level of Individualism increase in a person when his/ her money is involved 
in such a transaction as opposed to when there is no personal- tangible property is 
involved? 
2.      Do you speculate the use of "Transactional Approach to Culture (Patel and Rayner, 
2012)" might enrich your paradigm in explaining the effect of sub-cultures on CG 
compliance? Statistically, the only significant CVD driven correlations were found between 
Majority shareholders (Active culture) and minorities' (Passive culture) as my analysis 
indicated.  
 
3.      Do you regard Berle and Means (1932) prediction that all large public corporations 
will be maturing to a capital structure that is highly characterized by the separation of 
ownership and control to, STILL, be held valid assuming different cultural dynamics found 
worldwide? 
  
4.       Do you envision the effect of "Modernization" as Karl Marx proposed leading to the 
convergence of values with economic developments, to be responsible for potential 
change in the numeric measurements of your CVD (assuming effects of Media and 
Globalization are inevitable in the process)?   
Kind Regards  
Faisal Alfordy 
From: Hofstede <hofstede@bart.nl> 
Sent: 12 March 2015 16:44 
To: Alfordy, Faisal 
Subject: RE: Inquiry about using your Paradigm in Corporate Governance   
Dear Mr Alfordy, here are my answers to your questions: 
1.       My concept of “individualism” applies only to national cultures, not to 
individuals. See my warnings against confusing levels of analysis. At the 
national level, individualism increases with per capita national wealth. 
2.       Unfortunately I am not familiar with this subject, and presently my 
priorities lie elsewhere. 
3.       No, I think they underestimated the tenacity of cultural variety across 
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the world. 
4.       No, I have followed value differences for almost half a century, and I 
did not see convergence. 
See also www.geerthofstede.eu . 
Yours, Geert Hofstede 
 
 
 
Van: Alfordy, Faisal [mailto:FaisalAlfordy@connect.glos.ac.uk]  
Verzonden: maandag 16 maart 2015 15:09 
Aan: Hofstede 
Onderwerp: Re: Inquiry about using your Paradigm in Corporate Governance 
Dear Professor. Hofstede 
Thank you very much indeed for your prompt reply and valuable intakes. I have taken the 
time to reflect on your answers to understand their implications in the area of Corporate 
Governance. 
Based on your scholarly knowledge and distinguished expertise that cultural traits are 
persistent as also  noted in the work of Max Weber with the exception that your view is more 
economically inviting to cultural shifts. 
I would highly appreciate your comments on the following questions: 
Firstly: For Corporate governance (CG) researchers such as myself seeking to enhance the 
level of compliance while considering the cultural effects: 
1.      Shall we implement "more culturally oriented CG policies and monitoring mechanisms 
on the local level" so that we could lessen the exercises of negative cultural traits on 
compliance?  What else do you recommend for us? 
Secondly: considering your warnings against confusing levels of analysis, when I attempted to 
major the Saudi Cultural Value Dimensions, I split my data for further statistical analysis on 
groups to strengthen my findings. The descriptive statistics showed an anomaly only 
between the groups of Majority and Minority shareholders. Hence, I performed further tests 
and found the distribution of each CV dimension, except for individualism, was not the same 
when comparing the groups of Majority with Minority shareholders. Hence, significant 
correlations emerged. The non-parametric test of Kruskal-Wallis and Man U Whitney showed 
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that Minority shareholders scored 50 % higher on average on Power Distance, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, and Femininity dimensions compared to Majority shareholders. 
  
Hence, is this what you referred to as the "exceptions to the rule of cultural shift"   as it is 
due to the levels of wealth and education increasing very rapidly? 
2.      What do you speculate causing the difference of CVD profiles between majority and 
minority shareholders? 
Lastly, I want to thank you once again for taking the time to go over these major concerns of 
mine and I will be enthusiastically looking forward to receiving your valuable answers.   
Kind Regards 
Faisal Alfordy 
From: Hofstede <hofstede@bart.nl> 
Date: March 18, 2015 at 10:07:08 AM GMT 
To: "'Alfordy, Faisal'" <FaisalAlfordy@connect.glos.ac.uk> 
Subject:RE: Inquiry about using your Paradigm in Corporate Governance 
Dear Mr Alfordy, these national dimensions do not apply to groups like minority and majority 
shareholders. The data you refer to cannot be interpreted by these dimensions. The 
dimensions approach belongs to organizational anthropology, whereas your study belongs to 
organizational sociology. Doesn’t the literature you studied offer alternative sources of 
inspiration? Yours, Geert Hofstede 
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 السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته
  
التأثير و حالين اقوم بأعداد رسالة الدكتوراة في "   انا فيصل بن ضيف الله بن حماد الفريدي : عضو هيئة تدريس في جامعة حائل
 الثقافي على حوكمة الشركات وحقوق صغار المساهمين في المملكة العربية السعودية " في بريطانيا
  
الغرض من مخاطبة هيئة سوق المال السعودية هي أتاحة الفرصه لي للإجراء بعض المقابلات مع ذوي التخصص فيما يتعلق بوضع و 
بلأضافة الى ذالك يهدف البحث .متابعة قوانيين حوكمة الشركات في المملكة العربيه السعودية بما يخص حقوق صغار المساهيميين 
على طبيعة حوكمة الشركات بما يتعلق بحقوق صغار المساهيميين عن طريق نموذج أستبيان يستهدف صغار ال قياس التأثير الثقافي 
 .المساهيميين للإجابة عليه 
  
هجري بما  6431 / 2 / 8هجري ال  1431 /11/ 6  لذالك ارجو من هيئة سوق المال اعطائي الموافقة للقيام بجمع المعلومات من تاريخ
  لرفعها للملحقية الثقافية السعودية ببريطانيا  ةيتوافق مع خطتي البحثي
  
 ولكم جزيل الشكر والأمتنان
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  و   بن حماد الفريدي : عضو هيئة تدريس في جامعة حائلانا فيصل بن ضيف الله
 حالين اقوم بأعداد رسالة الدكتوراة في " التأثير الثقافي على حوكمة
 الشركات وحقوق صغار المساهمين في المملكة العربية السعودية " في بريطانيا
 
  بعضالغرض من مخاطبة هيئة سوق المال السعودية هي أتاحة الفرصه لي للإجراء 
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 المقابلات مع ذوي التخصص فيما يتعلق بوضع و متابعة قوانيين حوكمة الشركات
 . في المملكة العربيه السعودية بما يخص حقوق صغار المساهيميين
 
 بلأضافة الى ذالك قد سبق وان قابلة مدير أدارة حوكمة الشركات الخاصة 
  بمكتبة بهيئة 3613شوال  73الأستاذ الوليد السناني يوم الأربعاء الموافق 
  ضهر الى 53سوق المال وقد دار بيننا نقاش حول بحثي العلمي من الساعة 
 الساعه الواحدة ضهر .وكان النقاش مع الأستاذ الوليد السناني جدن بناء
 
 لذالك ارجو من هيئة سوق المال اعطائي الموافقة الرسمية للقيام بأجراء بعض
 2 /  2هجري ال  5613/ 33/3  ص من تاريخالمقابلات مع منسوبيها من ذوي التخص
  لرفعها للملحقية الثقافية  هجري بما يتوافق مع خطتي البحثية 6341 /
 السعودية ببريطانيا
 
 ولكم جزيل الشكر والأمتنان
 
   xobnI   
   
 damaH niB lasiaF
 >moc.liamg@0003fdf<
  MP 81:5 ta 4102 ,22 guA ,irF
  as.vog.fom@secivresE :oT
 >moc.liamg@0003fdf< damaH niB lasiaF :cC
 lanigiro wohS | eteleD | tnirP | drawroF | lla ot ylpeR | ylpeR
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  و  انا فيصل بن ضيف الله بن حماد الفريدي : عضو هيئة تدريس في جامعة حائل
 حالين اقوم بأعداد رسالة الدكتوراة في " التأثير الثقافي على حوكمة
 الشركات وحقوق صغار المساهمين في المملكة العربية السعودية " في بريطانيا
 
  وزارة المالية السعودية هي أتاحة الفرصه لي للإجراء بعضالغرض من مخاطبة 
 المقابلات مع ذوي التخصص فيما يتعلق بوضع و متابعة قوانيين حوكمة الشركات
 في المملكة العربيه السعودية بما يخص حقوق صغار المساهيميين
 
 لمقابلة 6341 شوال  23وقد سبق وان زرت فرع الوزارة بالرياض يوم الخميس 
  المسؤولين من ذوي التخصص ولاكن لم يسمح الأخوان بالأستقبال بذالك وبعض 
 طلبو مني التواصل عن طريق الهاتف أو البريد الألكتروني
 
 لذالك ارجو من وزارة المالية السعودية اعطائي الموافقة للقيام بأجراء بعض
  5/  2هجري ال  5613/ 33/3  المقابلات مع منسوبيها من ذوي التخصص من تاريخ
  لرفعها للملحقية الثقافية  هجري بما يتوافق مع خطتي البحثية 6341 /
 السعودية ببريطانيا
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  و  بن حماد الفريدي : عضو هيئة تدريس في جامعة حائل انا فيصل بن ضيف الله
 حالين اقوم بأعداد رسالة الدكتوراة في " التأثير الثقافي على حوكمة
 الشركات وحقوق صغار المساهمين في المملكة العربية السعودية " في بريطانيا
 
  ليالغرض من مخاطبة الهيئة السعودية للمحاسبين القانونيي هي أتاحة الفرصه 
 للإجراء بعض المقابلات مع ذوي التخصص فيما يتعلق بوضع و متابعة قوانيين
 حوكمة الشركات في المملكة العربيه السعودية بما يخص حقوق صغار
 المساهيميين
 
 لذالك ارجو من الهيئة السعودية للمحاسبين القانونيي اعطائي الموافقة
 / 33/3  ي التخصص من تاريخللقيام بأجراء بعض المقابلات مع منسوبيها من ذو
  لرفعها  هجري بما يتوافق مع خطتي البحثية 3613/  5/  2هجري ال  5341
 للملحقية الثقافية السعودية ببريطانيا
 
 ولكم جزيل الشكر والأمتنان
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13. APPENDIX E: Application of Social Network Theory (SNT) on 
Listed Saudi Corporations 
 
Methodology:  
A scale free network 
The scale free topology is a natural consequence of the ever expanding nature of real networks. Starting from two 
connected nods. Empty nodes represent new arrival shown as an empty circle is added to the network. When 
deciding where to link, new nodes prefer to attach to the more connected nodes. Due to the growth and 
preferential attachment, a few highly connected hubs emerge 
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Hubs:  
1- General organization for Social Insurance = 32 connections with 32 nodes 
2- Public Pension funds = 19 connections with 19 nodes 
3- Public Investment funds = 18 connections with 18 nodes. 
These three hubs’ connections account for 42 % of integration with listed corporations in the Saudi Stock 
Exchange. 
Implications: the governmental contractual intervention is highly significant in the Market. However, the level of 
intervention is found to be concentrated in: the bank, petrochemicals, cement, Insurance sectors. Consequently, 
the intervention level scatters and fades out over the other sectors. 
Industrial nodes 
Banks: 
The most significant node found is Alrujhi bank which connects to 14 nodes. Then, the number decreases hugely 
to 4 nodes for Alainma, and Saudi Investment banks. 3 connections found for another two banks, Riyadh, and 
Arab national bank. Interestingly, the rest of the banks hold two connections with nodes. 
Petrochemical: 
SABIC is held as the most highly connected node with seven connections. Four other petrochemical listed 
corporations found to have only two connections with 2 nodes. The rest, nine listed corporations do equal zero 
connection. 
Cement: 
Four companies, namely: Qassim, yammamah, Yanbou, and EPCC hold tree connections with nodes. Three other 
listed corporations hold two connections. Two other listed account for only 1 connection.  And four listed hold 
only zero connections 
Insurance: 
Only two listed count for 2 connections.  Seven other listed account for only one connection. Significantly, 24 
listed corporations equalling zero connection 
Building and Real Estate: 
Only one listed found to account for 3 connections with nodes. Five listed account for only 1 connection. 
Significantly, 17 listed equalling zero connection. 
Industrial Investment and Multi-investment: 
Only one listed holds 3 connections with nodes. Two other listed hold only 1 connection.  18 listed account for 
zero connection. 
Agriculture and Food: 
Only one listed has 2 connections with nodes. Four other listed account for only 1 connection. Significantly, the 
majority 12 listed account for zero nodes. 
Energy:  
Only one company holds 2 connections with nodes. Other 3 hold zero connection 
Retail: 
Two listed account for only 1 connection. And other ten have zero connection. 
Telecommunication: 
Only one listed holds 3 connections with nodes whereas the other 2 account for only 1 connection. Two other 
listed account for zero 
Transportation: 
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Only two listed account for 1 connection. The other two have zero connection 
Media: 
Only one listed account for 2 connections and other two listed have zero connection 
Hotel and Tourism: 
One listed account for 2 connections. Other two hold zero connection. 
Share Market Indicators for last 13 years 
 
End of 
Period 
 
Number of 
Companies 
 
Number of 
Shares 
Traded 
 
Value of 
Shares 
Traded 
 
Market 
Value 
of Shares 
 
Number of 
Transactions 
 
General 
Index 
 
2001 64 692 83,602 275 605,035 2,430.11 
2002 68 1,736 133,787 281 1,033,669 2,518.08 
2003 70 5,566 596,510 590 3,763,403 4,437.58 
2004 73 10,298 1,773,858 1,149 13,319,523 8,206.23 
2005 77 12,281 4,138,695 2,438 46,607,951 16,712.64 
2006 86 68,515 5,261,851 1,226 96,095,920 7,933.29 
2007 111 57,829 2,557,712 1,946 65,665,500 11,038.66 
2008 117 58,727 1,962,945 925 52,135,929 4,802.99 
2009 144 56,685 1,264,012 1,196 36,458,326 6,121.76 
2010 145 33.01 billion 759.18 
billion 
 19.54 million  
2011 150 48.26 billion 1,098.84  25.55 mil  
2012 161 82.54 billion 1,929.32  42.11 mil  
Over the last few years, Saudi listed companies increased dramatically from 81 companies in 2005 to 144 in 2010 
(Saudi Stock Exchange Law, 2009). Nowadays, there are 161 more listed companies distributed among different 
industries in the Saudi market with various percentages of ownership.  
 
Implication: ease of incorporation, lax of governance, Significance of liquidation at the expense of private 
benefits through IPO’s under the assumption that weak regulation in the market. Therefore, the Result is the 
existence of under developed market. 
Moreover, the 2006 and 2008 market crisis in Saudi Arabia revealed serious weaknesses in financial reporting, 
namely a lack of transparency, disclosure, and accountability. 
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14. APPENDIX F: Personal Reflection  
Personal Reflection  
Doing a PhD on the “Impact of Saudi Culture on Minority shareholders’ rights” has led me to realise 
the significance of the voyage of discovery I was embarking on to find answers to my research 
questions.  
As a matter of fact, before undertaking this journey, I was not able to properly appreciate the issue of 
Saudi Minority shareholders as, I came to realise, I was not properly equipped as a researcher to utilise 
the different research methods necessary to undergo such a challenge.  
Nevertheless, this journey has taught me how to utilise the secondary data available such as research 
articles, journals, textbooks, periodicals etc. related to my research questions. In addition, I have 
learned how to prioritise the secondary data available in accordance with a set of important criteria 
such as available scholars, in relevant disciplines, credentials, dates of publications, credentials of 
publishers etc. The development of this skill had considerable benefits in terms of time-saving and 
increasing the level of validity and reliability of secondary data used. 
Moreover, this journey has equipped me with the necessary skills to gather valuable primary data and 
analyse it in a proper manner. In fact, opting for a mixed research strategy has enabled me to appreciate 
the depth and breadth of the issues I was exploring. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with primary data collection methods were explored in depth before opting for a selection of 
a certain choice, such as type of questionnaire or interview, focus groups, observations etc. Most 
importantly, I was able to appreciate and understand the importance of a proper sampling segment in 
general and the choice of the most suitable sampling method in particular during the process.  
In addition, this research process required extensive thinking, planning, communication with assigned 
supervisors and preparation for each stage. Hence, each stage of this research study was accordingly 
conducted in an organised manner from a time-management perspective. Moreover, the level of self-
confidence gained from undertaking this research study will be a major asset for me in the future as an 
academic researcher and as a businessman involved in a highly competitive marketplace.   
In summary, without a doubt, doing a PhD is definitely a first class voyage of discovery, as it has been 
for me. It has enlightened me, via both secondary and primary data, of the significant cultural, legal, 
and political factors influencing the quality of the exercise of Saudi Minority shareholders’ rights and 
the level of compliance of listed Saudi corporations. Therefore, it was profoundly rewarding to 
undertake this journey, and quite tempting to embark on another research journey as soon as I get back 
to my academic life. 
